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ABSTRACT
The thesis is concerned with the Ethiopian 
revolution between 1974, when an urban popular uprising 
broke out, and 1984, when the new regime established the 
Workers Party of Ethiopia.
Chapter 1 discusses the background to the revolution 
and introduces the factors that became important in the 
causes and outcomes of the revolution.
Part one (Chapters 2 and 3) is concerned with the 
collapse of the old-s£ate in 1974. Chapter 2 deals with 
the urban popular uprising of early 1974 which followed 
in the wake of the structural crisis. Chapter 3 deals 
with the capture of power by a group of junior officers 
and privates (the Derg) claiming to represent the 
security forces.
1974 to 1977 discusses under part two (chapters 4 
6) can be taken as the formative years of the post­
revolutionary order. Chapter 4 discusses the new regime's 
1975 social and economic reforms; chapter 5 the emergence 
of the political organizations and the regime's 1976 
conversion from "African socialism" to "scientific 
Socialism"; and, Chapter 6 the autocratization under 
Mengistu Haile-Mariam of what had until 1977 been a 
collective exercise of power by a group of junior 
officers, in the name of the Derg.
Part three (Chapters 7 and 8) is concerned with the 
consolidation of power by the new autocracy. Chapter 7 
describes its victories over urban dissension led by one 
of the leftist civilian organizations (EPRP) and over 
international and domestic counter-revolutionary forces 
as well as Ethiopia's shift of alliances from the west to 
the east. Chapter 8 deals with the elimination of all 
existing political organizations and with the 
establishment of the Workers Party of Ethiopia.
Chapter 9 gives a summary of the whole work and 
attempts to examine the episode under consideration from 
the perspective of contemporary social science research.
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INTRODUCTION
In the first half of 1974 the Ethiopian urban 
centres were engulfed by a spontaneous uprising. In, 
September, this led to the overthrow of the absolutist 
monarchy and the seizure of power by a collective body of 
junior officers, NCO's and privates called the Derg. In 
1975 and 1976, the new regime adopted a series of socio­
economic and political reforms and implemented them 
vigorously. However, the question of who was to have 
power proved difficult to resolve; rather, it became a 
source of conflict within and outside the Derg. 
Consequently, the Derg underwent an internal 
transformation which led to the emergence of an autocracy 
in February 1977. In 1984, the new regime had emerged as 
a party state after having mobilized, organized and armed 
the urban and rural populations, liquidated all other 
political organizations which aspired to monopolize or 
have a share in power and established a Leninist vanguard 
party. These were the main component parts of the 
transformation which took place between 1974 and 1984 and 
it is with them that the present research is primarily 
concerned.
Three trends are reflected in the literature 
published by the Ethiopian political organizations on the 
components of the transformations. The first of these is 
that part written by partisans of some of the political 
organizations who, because of their ideological 
persuasions, were opposed to the "socialist" orientation 
of the transformations. Examples are the papers of the 
rightwing pan-Ethiopian and regional political 
organizations. This literature is aimed not at an 
explanation of the transformations that have taken place 
but at mobilizing public opinion against the new regime. 
Further, it mainly dwells, for obvious reasons, on one of 
the component parts of the transformations, namely, the 
new regime and its "atrocities" and condemns it as 
"Fascist". Despite that, a brief discussion of EDU's
- 8 -
programme and papers has been included in Chapter 5 
because, it is believed, doing so will throw light on the 
course of the struggle between the various organized 
groups.1
A second body of literature which concurs with the 
first was produced by partisans of EPRP and the radical 
regionalist organizations. The central thesis of the 
rhetoric of these allegedly Marxist-Leninist 
organizations is that the new regime is not socialist 
because it has not pursued Marxist-Leninist policies; 
rather, it is "fascist" or "neo-colonialist". This 
literature is also motivated by the determination to 
discredit the new regime rather than give an objective 
account or evaluation of the transformations.
A third body of literature is that which is also 
supposedly Marxist-Leninist but which takes the opposite 
position from the above two. This consists of the public 
pronouncements, newspapers, articles and papers of the 
new regime and the political organizations like AESM 
which were working in collaboration with it until they 
split with each other between 1977-1979. This part of the 
literature is extremely sweeping in its condemnation of 
the old order and full of praise for the new order. It 
aims at rallying public support behind the "revolutionary 
transformations". As reflected in the debate between EPRP 
and AESM, the central issue between the two bodies of 
Marxist-Leninist literature was whether the 
transformations were socialist or not.
It can be said that the literature produced by 
individuals falls within one or other of these three 
trends. Again, the bulk of this is interested in 
influencing the direction of the change rather than 
explaining it. Examples of works that come under the 
anti-socialist body of literature are the so-called 
"instant histories". There were a number of thin books 
such as that by B. Thomson3 which were published within 
the first several years of the outbreak of the revolt. 
Those focussed on the excesses of the new regime and
- 9 -
condemned everything that had anything to do with the 
change as an aberration. An example of the exposition of 
the second type of literature is that of Michael Warr who 
argues that the Ethiopian revolution is "betrayed" by the 
military regime which is "bonapartist" bent on 
consummating not a socialist but a state capitalist 
revolution.4 A glaring example of a book that comes 
under the third type of literature is that written by a 
Central Committee member of the Cuban Communist Party 
(Valdes Vivo) who was most unsparing in his condemnations 
of the old-state and in his eulogy for the 
transformations and for Mengistu in person. For him, the 
changes that had taken place in Ethiopia amounted to a 
true "socialist" revolution.5
There are a different class of authors whose books 
on the Ethiopian revolution are worthy of the reader's 
attention since they are objective and informative. 
However, these works suffer from one shortcoming: they 
lack firm grounding in general theoretical works. Two
• • • firepresentative authors m  this area are Rene, Lefort and 
Marina and David Ottaway.7
By contrast, there are authors who have produced 
books which rank as proper exercises within the 
discipline of the sociology of revolution. They are 
interested more in the project of explaining the causes 
and outcomes of the Ethiopian revolution rather than in 
reflecting their prejudices or in influencing the course 
of the transformations. Moreover, they cite works on 
general theories of revolutions in order to validate 
their findings. In this regard, three authors, who 
represent three trends within the general debate on the 
Ethiopian revolution, stand out as being most relevant.
The first is Christopher Clapham who acknowledges 
that transformations have taken place in Ethiopia to 
warrant the conclusion that a revolution has occurred 
but, sharing the scepticism of deTocqueville, argues that 
there is very little that revolutions can change from the 
past.8 The second is John Markakis whose views are,
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perhaps, coloured by his sympathy for one of the leftist 
groups of Ethiopia. Nevertheless, following Marxist 
methodology, he argues coherently that, despite the 
transformations, what is achieved in Ethiopia is neither 
a middle class revolution since there was no indigenous 
middle-class to talk of nor a socialist revolution since 
the army has usurped the power from the true 
revolutionaries and imposed its rule without any form of 
legitimacy. He describes the new political order as 
"garrison socialism", not different from some of the 
other military dictatorships in Africa.9 The third are 
Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux who, following 
especially Trimberger's concept of "revolution from 
above", accept that a radical social revolution has been 
achieved in Ethiopia but that the possibility of a 
reversal will continue to persist until a real 
distribution of social and political power takes place.10 
In Chapter 9, an attempt is made to react to these and to 
some of the more general theoretical works on 
revolutions; suffice it here to indicate some of the 
similarities and differences in approach between them and 
the present study.
One of the attractions of socialism to the Ethiopian 
left starting from the 1960's was their conviction that 
once it was adopted as the official ideology, it would 
put an end to local nationalism and give birth to a new 
and united Ethiopia. It was argued that some regions 
sought to break away from the country because their 
inhabitants were opposed to the exploitative nature of 
the regime and that, once a socialist order was in place, 
the need for the struggle to secede would cease to exist. 
In the course of the revolution, however, instead of 
being a solution to the problems of local nationalism, 
the understanding of the correct path to socialism itself 
became a source of conflict and bloodshed among the 
contending leftist political organizations.
Further, the great bulk of the literature produced 
at home and abroad was dominated by the question of
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whether the revolution was socialist or not. The issue 
is an article of faith to those who have already taken a 
position on it and, in any case, the question is 
unsettled among veterans of the Communist movement such 
as those of the Soviet Union. Consequently, an attempt 
is made here to document the arguments on both sides and 
to comment on the applicability or otherwise of the 
Marxist methodology on certain questions in the hope that 
this will throw light on the ideology of the new 
regime.11 Beyond that, however, the present study, 
unlike that of Markakis, refuses to become embroiled in 
the debate, or to attempt to resolve the issue, because 
it is believed that it does not have much explanatory 
value.
Instead, an effort is made to give an objective 
account of the revolutionary transformations that have 
taken place in Ethiopia between 1974 and 1984. However, 
objectivity is not absolute. There are grey areas which 
are genuinely difficult to classify as coming within the 
orbit of the subjective or of the objective. Moreover, 
there is the question of the diversity of experiences and 
interests which can always colour one's judgement. One 
problem area in this regard is the role of individuals or 
rulers like Haile Sellassie or Mengistu in revolutionary 
transformations. These are often deliberately distorted 
or unwittingly exaggerated or undermined. The world of 
pure objectivity must remain an ideal which we all aspire 
to attain; in the meantime, one can only hope to do the 
best one can.
Moreover, the present study seeks to render a 
comprehensive account of the component parts of the 
revolutionary transformations. Chapter 1 introduces the 
complex and relevant factors that became important in the 
causes and outcomes of the revolution. Thus introduced 
are: the international dynamic, the emergence of Ethiopia 
as a sovereign state, the old-state and the 
contradictions within it, and the social structures that 
were relevant to the course of the revolution. The
- 12 -
following parts and chapters take up individual themes 
and attempt to give an "objective” account of how they 
developed. Part one describes the collapse of the old- 
state? part two critically examines the early socio­
economic and political transformations that determined 
the direction of the revolution; and, part three 
discusses the process of consolidation of power by the 
new regime. Chapter 9 summarizes the whole work and also 
examines the transformations from the perspectives of the 
existing literature on the Ethiopian revolution and the 
general theory on revolutions.
The present study also tries to give a narrative of 
the component parts of the transformations in a 
chronological order as far as possible. It is hoped that 
this will explain, better than existing works have done, 
the sequence of events and the important conjunctures in 
the course of the revolution. Though this has been the 
dominant approach (an approach which may be called "the 
historical method"), it has not been employed to the 
detriment of the comparative or thematic approaches as 
these have also been used where relevant. For example, 
the 1974 revolution has been compared with and contrasted 
to the abortive coup of 1960 and to other revolutions and 
the mobilization of the Ethiopian peasantry compared with 
and contrasted to that of other countries.12 Also, 
themes like agrarian, political and organizational 
reforms have been developed in different chapters.
Further, the thesis relies heavily on primary 
sources written mostly in the national official language 
(Amharic). This includes official pronouncements, laws 
and newspapers of the new regimes as well as 
constitutions, programmes and publications of the various 
political organizations. It is hoped that this will 
enable the present study to capture the mood of the 
revolution more than previous works have done.
In addition, an attempt is made to view the 
transformations from the perspective of general theories 
on revolutions. Not one but several theories have been
- 13 -
used because it was felt that one theory was more suited 
to explaining a given component of the revolutionary 
transformation than another. Thus, Skocpol's notion of 
the convergence of a complex set of structures appears to 
offer better insight into the causes of revolutions than 
other works.13 On the other hand, Charles Tilly's idea 
of multiple sovereignty has been found appropriate to 
explain the emergence and outcome of the conflict between 
the various political organizations including the new 
regime.14 Finally, Barrington Moore's acceptance, not of 
class exploitation, but of culture as an explanation for 
the actions of a social group has been found appropriate 
in explaining why the army led by junior officers, as 
opposed to the military-civilian upper class or the 
intermediate elite, felt they could take power in 
Ethiopia and run the state and acted to do so.15
An attempt is also made to examine, in light of 
general theory, the sum of the component parts of the 
transformation as a whole. The method employed to do 
this is to go beyond explaining or documenting the 
transformations achieved and to evaluate them. In other 
words, it will be argued that change for the sake of 
change is not adequate to justify pegging the name 
"revolution" to an episode especially when the 
transformation achieved is found, by some acceptable 
standard, to be static or retrogressive. From the 
perspective of general theory, the question of whether 
evaluation is an appropriate scientific inquiry may be a 
contentious issue. Nevertheless, it is believed that 
general theories on revolutions are hardly ever 
cumulative but rather "islands of theories" co-existing 
with each other. Consequently, a humble work such as 
this cannot aim at reconciling the various theories and 
evolve an appropriate overarching theory to explain or 
evaluate the Ethiopian revolution. Under the 
circumstances, the best that can be done is find the most 
illuminating theory and applying it to the Ethiopian 
episode.
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On the whole, the tendency of the existing 
literature is to accept that a revolution has been 
achieved so long as a degree of transformation has taken 
place. Clapham in fact goes further and warns against 
adopting a criterion other than transformation in 
deciding whether a revolution has taken place or not.16 
As already noted, Markakis, on the other hand, makes the 
attainment of "true socialism" a requisite for 
revolutions.17 Halliday and Molyneux appear to suggest 
that an effective and permanent distribution of social 
and political power is a requisite for an irreversible 
socialist revolutionary transformation.18 To Skocpol, 
transformations in social and political structures are 
sufficient to warrant the dubbing of an episode a 
"revolution".19
To Marx, on the other hand, revolutions are 
necessarily progressive; they bring about qualitative 
changes in the mode of production. For reasons that will 
be explained in Chapter 9,20 the present research finds 
this Marxist conception of the revolution illuminating. 
Thus, each of the chapters below will be critical in 
examining the reforms from the point of view of the 
benefits they have or are likely to achieve for the 
people. Criteria like organizations to the people have 
been woven into the relevant chapters as standards for 
the evaluation fo whether the new order is any better 
than the past. However, like the works of Marx, the 
present study places much more emphasis on the economic 
criterion (on the question of whether the new order is 
more dynamic in terms of productivity) since the other 
criteria normally break down during revolutionary 
upheavals. The economic reforms are discussed especially 
in chapters 4 and 9.21 Arguably, despite the reality of 
radical transformations, the adoption of such criteria 
used to evaluate them casts doubt on whether it is
a p p r o p r i a t e  "^ 0 c f y  CA>y tx \^ <U/o l\x4r\o»
C\ reVolvA-Vi acX-m a((.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE EMERGENCE OF THE STRUCTURAL CRISIS
(A) THE EMERGENCE OF ETHIOPIA AS A SOVEREIGN STATE
The region now called Ethiopia has been the home of 
diverse linguistic groups since time immemorial. These 
were the Semitic languages of the northern and central 
highlands, notably Amharic and Tigrean, the Cushitic 
languages of the lowlands and of the south-western, 
central and south-eastern highlands, notably Oromo, Afar 
and Somali? the Sidama languages of the central and 
southern highlands? and, the Nilotic languages of the 
periphery areas along the Sudanese frontier. It has been 
the orthodoxy among "Ethiopianists" to assert that, 
whereas the other groups have lived in the region since 
time immemorial, the Semitic languages and people were a 
result of intermarriages and cultural exchanges between 
the Cushitic peoples of northern Ethiopia, and settlers 
from the Arabian Peninsula which took place only in the 
first millenium B.C. . However, the idea is not without 
challenge? Grover Hudson for one has argued that all the 
Afro-Asiatic languages have in fact originated from the 
Ethiopian region1. If correct, this would render 
Ethiopia the source of the Semitic, Cushitic and Sidama 
languages and their counterparts in the present 
neighbouring countries of Africa and the Middle East as 
well as many other languages in north, central and West 
Africa, like the Berber and Chadic languages, clearly the 
origin of the Ethiopian linguistic groups is still a 
matter of conjecture.
The Ethiopian region was also an early home for the 
great monotheistic religions of the Middle East. Though 
Judaism was perhaps the first to be introduced into the 
region (probably before Christ), it was Christianity
- 18 -
(fourth century AD) and Islam (seventh century AD) which 
were superimposed on the linguistically diverse, Judaic 
and animist populations of the region and became the 
major contending ideologies from that time to the 
present.
In addition, the Ethiopian region has been the home 
of diverse political institutions for at least the last 
2000 years. During that period, the major protagonist 
has been the Christian kingdom which had to change its 
seat several times in the northern and central highlands. 
The first of these was the classical Kingdom of Axum 
(first millenium AD) which had as its heart-land the 
present regions of the Tigrean and Eritrean plateau and 
the adjoining coastal area of the Red Sea. The kingdom 
was notable for its architecture, having a written 
culture and maintaining a flourishing trade not only with 
the interior but also the Middle East and Far East. At 
the height of its glory as of the middle of the 
millenium, it was in control of a large area extending 
into the Arabian Peninsula across the Red Sea, the 
present day Sudan, and also dominated most of the trading
posts on the southern coast of the Red Sea as far as
present day Somalia. Axum's rise to a land and sea power 
earned it the designation "empire". However, the rise 
and expansion of Islam in the 7th century AD, and the
waves of migrations of the Beja's from the north, cut the
empire's relations with the other centres of the 
classical civilizations and, by the end of the millenium, 
put an end to Axum altogether2.
In the 12th and 13th centuries, the medieval 
kingdoms of Ethiopia emerged in the Agaw (Cushitic) and 
Amhara regions of the central highlands with the 
religious ideology and script of Axum3. In addition to 
making an impressive array of conquests in all directions 
including the present Eritrean region in the North, they 
built monasteries and produced literature, music and art. 
The political career of the more important of the 
kingdoms which was ruled by the so called Solomanic
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dynasty and which had emerged among the Amhara in the 
13th century, was marked by having to change its seat 
constantly in order to tame independent - minded regional 
governors and to ward off increasingly important Islamic 
encroachments from the strings of emirates that had come 
to exist in the eastern highland and lowland areas during 
the 12th century4.
The decline of this kingdom came in the 16th century 
as a result of invasions by one of these emirates (Harar) 
and by waves of Oromo migrations from the south. Harar, 
led by Gragn who was probably a Somali, overran the 
length and breadth of the central and northern highlands 
from 1529 to 1543. If, in this enterprise, Harar was 
backed by the Ottoman Empire, which was by then beginning 
to make its influence in the region felt, the Christian 
kingdom was rescued from total annihilation by Portuguese 
musketeers made available courtesy of their government. 
Despite the failure of the conquest, it appears to have 
resulted in the further penetration of Islam among the 
highland populations. Harar's defeat was followed by 50 
years of waves of migrations by the animist Oromo into 
the eastern, western, central and northern highlands. 
Subsequently, the Oromo settled in the territories which 
they conquered and adopted either Christianity or Islam 
depending on the religion of the people among whom they 
settled5.
The greatly weakened Christian kingdom established 
its capital in the north-western part of the highlands 
(Gondar) in the second half of the 16th century? 
nevertheless, quite apart from the fact that it had not 
recovered from the previous invasions, it was further 
debilitated by religious disputes provoked by the 
intervention of Jesuit missionaries, by the centrifugal 
tendencies among the regional nobles, and by the 
restiveness of the royal garrisons. With the religious 
disputes out of the way, with an understanding struck 
between the nobility and the monarchy, and with the 
influence of the Ottoman empire having declined in the
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region because of revolts against it in the Arabian 
Peninsula, the Christian kingdom was able to flourish 
once again at Gondar between the 1640's and the 1770's. 
From then to the 1850's, however, it disintegrated into 
feudal anarchy often referred to as "the era of the 
princes”.6
These political actors can be described as an empire 
(Axum), a city-state (Harar), a kingdom (Janjero among 
the Sidama's), and as a clan (the Somali's). In other 
words, none of them were sovereign states with a claim to 
independence, equality, and territorial integrity, nor 
were they committed to non-interference in each others 
internal affairs, and the settlement of disputes 
peacefully. Rather, they felt free to trample on and 
pillage each others rights and properties, subdue one 
another and exact tribute. Similarly, the whole of the 
region that we now call "Ethiopia", composed as it was of 
all these political actors, did not enjoy the attributes 
of a sovereign state in its dealings with powers like the 
Greek or Ottoman empires. Its relations with such powers 
were governed by the same rules that prevailed among the 
actors within the Ethiopian region.
The process of Ethiopia's emergence as a sovereign 
state can be said to have been initiated and completed by 
its well known kings: Tewodros of Gondar (1855-1868),
Yohannis of Tigre (1869-1889) and Menelik of the central 
province of Shoa (1889-1913). Calling himself king of 
"Ethiopia" like his predecessors and imbued with 
Ethiopian nationalism, Tewodros conducted a series of 
campaigns and managed to bring most of the northern 
highlands under his control, thus putting an end to the 
era of princes. Yohannis not only consolidated 
Tewodros's fragile reunification of the north but also 
extended his rule to the Red Sea coast by bringing under 
his control the naibs of the port towns of Massawa and 
Arkiko who, since the 16th century, had been switching 
their allegiances between the Ethiopian kings and the 
rulers of the Ottoman and Egyptian empires7. Thus ,
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Egypt, which in the 19th century had replaced the Ottoman 
Empire as the regional power, was expelled from the area 
as recognized by the tripartite agreement of 1884 
concluded between Yohannis, Egypt and Britain. While 
acknowledging the suzerainty of Yohannis, Menelik was in 
the meantime expanding to the south-west, south and 
south-east and in so doing bringing under his control 
territories like the Ogaden which had never been under 
the jurisdiction of the kingdoms of the north. When 
Yohannis died fighting the Dervishes on the present 
Ethio-Sudanese frontier in 1889, Menelik inherited his 
throne and became the uncontested ruler of the whole of 
present-day Ethiopia.
As the internal consolidation was underway, the 
regional Islamic expansionists were replaced by the 
European imperial powers. In fact, Menelik's southward 
thrust was in part instigated by his competing in the 
carving up of the Horn of Africa with European powers; he 
is reputed to have stated that he was not going to be an 
independent spectator to the division of the region among 
the Europeans. However, it soon transpired that European 
designs were not limited to competing with him over 
territories which were outside his jurisdiction but 
extended to the annexation of the whole of Ethiopia as 
built by Tewodros, Yohannis and himself. Thus, Italy 
which had a coaling post at Asab and which had been 
fighting with the forces of Yohannis in order to expand 
into the interior, took advantage of the confusion that 
ensued upon Yohannis' death and in 1890 carved out the 
whole of the coastal area and the tip of the northern 
highlands, christened it "Eritrea", and brought it under 
its control. Then, in 1896, Italy declared an all-out 
war on Ethiopia but was heavily defeated at the hands of 
Menelik at Adwa (Tigre), not far from what became the 
Ethio-Eritrean boundary. Why Menelik did not then pursue 
the Italians, drive them out of Eritrea and claim what 
was his by right (by the fact that he was a successor of
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Yohannis) has since been a matter of intense speculation 
among Ethiopians.
Menelik's diplomatic genius (his ability to play one 
state against another) is often cited as a major reason 
for his strong stature in the eyes of the European 
powers. More important in this regard, was, perhaps, his 
Adwa victory; that event seems to have enhanced the 
standing of Menelik and his country in the international 
arena, frustrated the ambition of the European powers to 
colonize Ethiopia, and forced them to conclude boundary 
treaties with him. Thus, Ethiopia and France concluded a 
treaty concerning the Ethio-Djibouti boundary in 1897? 
Ethiopia and Britain concerning the Ethio-Sudanese 
boundary in 1902, the Ethio-Kenyan boundary in 1907, and 
Ethio-British Somaliland in 1908; and Ethiopia and Italy 
concerning the Ethio-Eritrean boundary in 1908. Though a 
similar treaty was concluded between Ethiopia and Italy 
concerning the Ethio-Italian Somaliland boundary in 1908, 
the instruments by which they were executed (oral 
agreements and exchanges of correspondence) have since 
proved illusory.
The recognition of her boundaries by the European 
states coupled with the fact that she had a government 
and a people effectively made Ethiopia a sovereign state. 
This was further enhanced by the recognition of her 
sovereignty over all her territories except Eritrea by a 
tripartite treaty of 1906 concluded between Britain, 
France and Italy and by her membership of the League of 
Nations in 1922. The emergence of Ethiopia as a 
sovereign state at the turn of the century was remarkably 
early? at the time, only the Latin American states, Japan 
and China had joined the European state system? a few 
other countries like Saudi Arabia and Yemen which were 
allowed to keep their independence, were, not unlike 
Ethiopia, targets of colonial ambitions of European 
powers.
Like the present third world countries and, perhaps, 
like non-nuclear states, the sovereignty of Ethiopia was
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true only in the juridical sense of the term. In other 
words, Ethiopia lacked the resources with which she could 
assert such formal attributes of a state as equality, 
independence and territorial integrity against the 
European powers which continued to pose a threat against 
her until 1944. Thus, though there were earlier attempts 
at dividing her into British, French and Italian spheres 
of influence, the real threat to her independence came in 
193 6. Resentful of her humiliation at Adwa, fascist 
Italy launched its offensive against Ethiopia from its 
African possessions of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland; 
this time, Italy had the advantage of modern weapons like 
planes and poison gas with the help of which she tore 
into the Ethiopian forces and occupied the country. 
Land-locked and starved of European weapons by a French 
blockade of Djibouti, Ethiopia's patriots resorted to 
guerrilla resistance while Haile Selassie went to Europe 
in self-imposed exile and, from that vantage point, 
launched a diplomatic offensive against Italy.
With the outbreak of World War II in the European 
theatre and with Mussolini's joining the Axis , Italy was 
confronted by the Allied powers both at home and in her 
colonial possessions. In 1941 Britain, at the head of 
the Allied Forces, liberated Ethiopia and reinstated 
Haile Selassie. Britain followed this by imposing a 
number of restrictions on the Ethiopian government which 
amounted to reducing the country to the status of a 
British de facto protectorate. This gave rise to the 
fear in Addis Ababa that Britain intended to treat 
Ethiopia as an enemy-occupied territory, which would not 
have been altogether inconsistent with her recognition of 
Italy's occupation of Ethiopia by an Anglo-Italian treaty 
of 1938. As it happened, Britain did not pursue the 
restrictions she imposed on Ethiopia with much vigour? 
after some diplomatic wrangling and a degree of US 
pressure, the restrictions began to be relaxed as of 
19428
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On the other hand, Britain was insistent that the 
Somali inhabited regions of the Ogaden and Haud which she 
had brought under her control should be treated as enemy 
occupied territories, a fact Ethiopia was made to 
recognize by treaty in 1942. After a lot of protests on 
the part of Ethiopia, another Anglo-Ethiopian treaty was 
concluded in 1944. That treaty recognized Ethiopia's 
sovereignty over the Ogaden and Haud subject to their 
continued British administration, since Britain insisted 
that they were necessary for the prosecution of World War
II. Despite this understanding, in 1945 Britain 
submitted the Ogaden and Haud for disposal by the Council 
of Foreign Ministers of the Great Powers. As the 
proposal was not greeted with favour, the British 
government went public and declared that the idea had 
been submitted to the council only because of its 
sympathy for the Somali People and that the proposal 
would be dropped as of then. However, the Ogaden was not 
returned to Ethiopia until 1948 and the Haud area until 
1955, three years and ten years after the end of the war 
respectively9.
In 1941, Eritrea too came under British 
administration as enemy occupied territory. Britain 
sought (or it was accused of having sought) to expand its 
adjoining colony of the Sudan by hanging on to Eritrea.
On its part, Italy, which had made its peace with the 
Allied Powers in 1943, sought the return of its ex-colony 
of Eritrea. Ethiopia sought "reunification" because of 
its need for access to the sea, its claim that the 
territory used to belong to it and because the peoples of 
Ethiopia shared the same historical, linguistic and 
religious heritage with the peoples of the territory.
Some Eritreans supported the British, some the Italians 
and some the Ethiopian position, while others were in 
favour of outright independence. The question of the 
disposal of Eritrea was then entertained by the Council 
of Foreign Ministers of the Great Powers between 1945 and 
1948. However, they could not agree on the question, not
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least because of the onset of the Cold War which was 
beginning both to frustrate their attempts at a post-war 
settlement of European issues, and to spill over to 
extra-European questions like that of Eritrea. Finally, 
they agreed to submit the question to the General 
Assembly of the UN, which, after several years of 
deliberation, decided to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia 
as of 195210•
(B) THE MODERNIZING AUTOCRACY
Medieval Ethiopia was very much an agrarian society 
composed of a mass of cultivating peasants and a surplus 
- appropriating upper class. The northern socio-economic 
order was introduced into the southern highlands during 
Menelik's conquests of the region in the last quarter of 
the 19th century and superimposed on the pre-existing 
agrarian system about which very little is known. Though 
important as animal rearing communities, the nomadic 
people's who inhabited the vast expanses of the arid and 
semi-arid lowlands along the Red Sea Coast and Somali 
frontier have not been absorbed into the northern 
socio-economic order.
Though there were important pockets of tenancy in 
the north, the bulk of the peasants had a title to their 
holdings called "wrist" which entitled the holders to use 
their land and pass them on to their heirs. Contrary to 
popular misconception, there is growing evidence to show 
that the "wrist" holders also had the right to sell their 
land though in reality they rarely exercised that right 
because they depended on their holdings for their 
livelihood and because if they sold their plots, they 
would lose the right to claim a share of the family 
"wrist" land. Since the land was owned by the 
cultivator, therefore, the major form of surplus 
appropriation in the north was tribute, known as 
"gult"(fief). By contrast, the major form of surplus 
appropriation in the south was rent collected by 
landlords from the peasants. This arose from the fact
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that the conquerors of the south and their descendants, 
who were probably given tribute rights initially, managed 
to register the land and claim it in the form of 
ownership and reduce the cultivators to tenancy in the 
course of the 20th century. In addition to tribute and 
rent, the peasants of both northern and southern Ethiopia 
were subjected to corvee and to presenting gifts on 
special occasions11.
Further, the "wrist" holders paid a tenth of their
produce by way of tax. In 1944 this was replaced by the
payment of rates based on the size and quality of the 
land and in 1967 by a progressive income tax. Though the 
same obligations existed for the landlords of the south, 
there was apparently a wide practice of shifting their 
tax duties onto the tenants. Finally, the peasants of 
the north and south and, when possible, the nomads of the 
lowlands paid tax on livestock, salt and trade.
The upper class which lived off the surplus
appropriations was composed of what could be called the 
gentry and the nobility. More often than not, the gentry 
were state functionaries who were responsible for local 
administration, justice and tax collection. In return 
for their services, the gentry was entitled to a share of 
the tax they collected and sometimes to a tribute? often, 
they would have their own land in which case they could 
also be beneficiaries of corvee and rent12.
Superimposed on the gentry were the nobility who 
were primarily a class of warriors. The monarch gave 
rights of tribute over certain lands to members of the 
nobility in exchange for a commitment to make available, 
in time of war, their "private" armies as well as 
soldiers spontaneously raised from among the gentry and 
peasants. In addition to the land tenure and tax 
systems, these "feudal institutions " of the north were 
introduced to the south by Menelik's conquest of the 
region towards the end of the 19th century, giving rise 
to a new class of gentry and nobility often referred to 
as the "neftegna".
- 27 -
A constant feature of the weakness of the medieval 
Ethiopian state was the fact that these regional nobles 
who were in charge of military and administrative 
functions tended to assert independence against the 
monarch. The monarch counterbalanced the influence of 
the nobility with whatever political skills and 
manoeuverings he could master and with the many royal 
garrisons (chewa) which were commanded by his loyal ras's 
and asmache's-LJ. Except for the period between the 
1770's to the 1850's when the centrifugal forces 
prevailed, central rule continued to be the order ever 
since. Despite this inherent weakness in the state, 
strong monarchy of medieval Ethiopia were able to use 
these institutions to conquer vast territories and it was 
the same institutions that the monarch from Tewodros in 
the middle of the 19th century to Haile Selassie in the 
20th century used to create present day Ethiopia,to 
defeat Italy at Adwa in 1896,and to fight and resist it 
during its occupation of the country from 1936 to 1941.
In the 20th century, the nobility was to find its 
position undermined on account of the demands of 
modernization set in motion by European expansionism.
The major reason for this was the state's creation of a 
modern civilian and military bureaucracy and the 
increasing dependence on it rather than the traditional 
elite. No doubt, modern education plays a pivotal role 
in the building up of such a bureaucracy. The first 
modern school was established by Menelik in Addis Ababa 
(Menelik II School), a school that Haile Selassie himself 
attended as a boy. Graduates of the Menelik and Mission 
schools, as well as individuals hand-picked by the 
government were sent abroad for further education and 
returned in the early part of the century to constitute a 
class of radical advocates of reform in the social, 
economic and political fields14. Called "Japanizers" or 
"the young of Ethiopia", these precursors of the radical 
civilian elite of the 1960's and 1970's held government 
positions that required modern education, and backed
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Haile Selassie in his drive to adopt progressive policies
which were opposed by the. traditional nobility. It
vv/o''''o>v\*\3
appears very few of the survived the Italian occupation 
of the country and those that did seem to have fallen out 
with the monarch on matters of policy as well as the 
question of his sojourn to Britain during the occupation. 
After the war, however, the monarch devoted a great deal 
of attention to the building of schools and institutions 
of higher education; for a time, he appointed himself 
minister of education, visited every school at least once 
a year, gave one of his palaces to the university etc.
The kind of education pursued was very elitist; partly as 
a result of this and partly because of the belated 
introduction and slow growth of educational institutions, 
by no means all children of school age were provided with 
access to schools. In 1970, the number of enroled 
secondary school students was 70,000 while the equivalent 
figure for university students in 1974 was 6,000 with a 
further 2,000 attending universities in other countries. 
The civil service, which was the most important employer 
of the school and university graduates, was gradually 
yielding to modernization under their influence. By 
1974, therefore, 20,000 school and 6,000 university 
graduates were working in the civil service. The bulk of 
the remaining civil servants, totalling about 100,000 in 
19741^ had primary school education and or church, 
education, the latter of which only enabled them to read 
and write the official language (Amharic).
More important to the decline of the state's 
dependence on the nobility was the creation of a modern 
army which had been begun in the 1920's when Haile 
Selassie was the most powerful man in the government as 
regent and heir to the throne (1916 to 1930) and pursued 
vigorously when he became king (1930 to 1974). The first 
to be established was the Royal Bodyguard in the 1920's, 
with the help of a Belgium military mission engaged for 
the purpose and with the training of officers in France. 
This was followed in 1934 by the establishment of the
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Genet Military Academy of Holeta. After the Italian 
occupation, the British helped in organizing and 
financing the army (1941 to 1951) followed by the 
American and others thereafter. The royal Bodyguard was 
reconstituted with pre-occupation graduates of the Holeta 
Academy, the Police Abadina was established in the 
1940's, the Harar Academy in 1957, and the Air Force and 
Navy were greatly expanded thereafter. The assistance of 
different countries was employed in the running of these 
establishments: Indians for the Harar Academy and the
Bodyguard, Swedes for the Air Force, Norwegians for the 
Navy and the Israelis for the police commandoes and for 
other security units16.
The Holeta Academy recruited its intake from among 
non-commissioned officers who could read and write the 
national official language (Amharic) and who could do 
their basic arithmetic; however, in its two years of 
training it offered no academic subjects whatsoever. 
Whereas the Abadina Police College was no different from 
the Holeta Academy in this regard, the others including 
the Harar Academy, the Air Force and the Navy, recruited 
some of the best school graduates of the country and 
provided them with an academic background equivalent to 
three years of university education in addition to the 
usual military training in strategy, Law, and the like.
By 1974, the army consisted of 45,000 men including four 
divisions of infantry ... ., one tank
battalion, one airborne infantry battalion, four armoured 
car squadrons, four artillery battalions, two engineer 
battalions, fifty medium tanks, twenty light tanks, forty 
armed personnel carriers, eighty-six armed cars, six 
helicopters, a 6,800 mobile emergency force, 1,200 
frontier guards, a 3,200 commando force as well and 9,200 
paramilitary territorials in active force17.
The civilian and military bureaucracy was extremely 
expensive to maintain in several respects. In the first 
place, quite apart from the costs involved in running 
modern institutions like colleges, academic institutions,
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hospitals and the like, the amount paid to members of the 
new elite by way of salary was much more than the income 
of the direct producers of wealth (the peasants and 
workers). For example, whereas the pay of a university 
graduate was a minimum of 500 dollars per month and that 
of a school graduate half of that, the per capita income 
of the country was a mere 150 dollars a year. Secondly, 
there was the expectation of the members of the modern 
elite not only to be paid above the level of inflation 
but also to receive an ever increasing income in order to 
promote their prestige and standard of living. Thirdly, 
the need to import weapons created dependence of the 
state on other powers and on exportable goods? whatever,
could not be paid for by the export of coffee, hides, oil
seeds and other less important commodities, had to be 
made good by the generosity of external powers. In 
addition, economic development became, in its own right, 
the tenet and ideology of the new elite. In other words, 
the economy had to be made to generate more wealth to 
meet these demands and others which, politically, were 
arguably less important in the short run but in terms of 
the plight of the people in the long term were even more 
pressing.
The state was in a dilemma with regard to its
agrarian strategy, if it can be said to have had one.
There was very little it could do concerning the 
extensive lowlands which the nomads used for watering and 
grazing their herds, short of developing certain parts of 
it through the granting of concession agreements to 
foreign investors since they required 
capital-intensive projects beyond the means of the 
government. Foreign investors would probably not have 
been easily attracted for this purpose. The rist lands 
of the north which were arguably equivalent to a system 
of freehold, were fairly divided up by the peasants but 
extremely subdivided and fragmented. The only possible 
land reform in these areas was either nationalization 
and/or collectivization; while the wisdom of such a
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policy is questionable, the ancien regime was in any case 
not predisposed to these policies. The state, therefore, 
was reduced to providing fertilizers and insecticides 
made available by courtesy of the UN organizations during 
the 1960's. By contrast, the state could have acted on 
the land which was being cultivated through tenancy 
agreements between the farmers and landlords but, 
instead, it prevaricated on the question.
There were at least three trends discernible the 
late 1960's, which were not necessarily consistent. In 
the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration there was 
a proposal to place a ceiling on the amount of land an 
individual could own without paying excessive tax on it; 
this was obviously intended to result in a certain amount 
of redistribution of land in areas where there were 
concentrations of land holdings in individual hands. 
Conversely, in practice the opposite applied; the 
vigorous commercialisation of agriculture pursued in 
several areas of the country in the late 1960's made 
possible by international public capital, led to the 
eviction of thousands of tenants and poor farmers. 
However, there is no question that this policy actually 
led to unprecedented levels of productivity. Yet again, 
there was another draft legislation which was finally 
submitted to parliament intended to regulate 
tenant-landlord relations; if adopted, this might have 
put an end to eviction of tenants; however, it would also 
have acted against the laissez faire commercialisation 
policy of the state. Coffee which mostly grew in the 
south-west and which constituted by far the most 
important foreign exchange earner did not show a marked 
rise in productivity in the 1960's and 1970's. It was 
not a good match to the Middle East's oil. In effect, 
agriculture was, on the whole, neither in a position to 
provide the raw materials required by industry nor 
generate sufficient taxable surplus to meet the
• . • • • 1 oincreasing requirements of the modernizing statex .
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Arguably, the achievements in the industrial sector 
over the same period were more impressive than the 
agricultural sector. Though the government launched 
three successive five years plans starting in 1957, the 
policy pursued in relation to the growth of industry was 
also basically laissez faire and the plans were mere 
indicators of targets that it was hoped would be met by 
the private as well as public sectors. In fact, most of 
the big industries which were actually developed by 
multinationals (for instance the St. George beer Brewery, 
the Ethiopian Airlines, the Wenji Sugar Factory and the 
Melloti Beer Brewery) predate the five year plans. More 
important than these, at least in terms of creating 
employment, were the intermediate industries that were 
established mostly by resident Italians, Greeks and 
Armenians in the 1960's. The explanation for the sudden 
increase in the number of these industries which included 
garages, food processing plants, restaurants, pulp 
industries, as well as import-export businesses was most 
probably the adoption in 1964 of a liberal investment 
guarantee proclamation with generous provisions on the 
expatriation of capital. By and large, nationals were 
limited to the retail business. In the 1960's, 
manufacturing production expanded at an average annual 
rate of 11.1 percent with higher rates registered in the 
later part of the decade; the labour force grew from 
28,340 in 1961 to 51,312 in 1971.19 However, all this 
was an extremely modest step towards a capitalist 
transformation of the national economy; 51,312 
manufacturers in a population of about 32 million is not 
only insignificant but had also come very late. The 
inadequacy of the rate of growth is perhaps best 
reflected by the fact that there was still a great deal 
of unemployment. By the end of the 1960's, school 
graduates were also beginning to be unemployed and the 
fear of unemployment for university graduates was on the 
horizon from the early 1960's.
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Thus, the national economy did not live up to the 
expectations of the modern elite: it did not improve its
standard of living, or provide adequate employment for 
its new members. Nor was the state able to afford modern 
weapons comparable to Middle eastern countries with which 
Ethiopia was in military competition. In fact, in the 
1960's, it became unfashionable for this elite to 
complain about its immediate circumstances? instead, its 
rhetoric became preoccupied with the plight of the lower 
classes in addition to becoming engulfed by a great sense 
of economic nationalism. How was it that Ethiopia, which 
had the potential to feed the whole of Africa or the 
Middle East, and which had been independent for 3000 
years was now, in the second half of the 20th century 
just as backward as other third world countries if not 
more so? This rhetorical question was echoed in all 
speeches and debates of the elite. It can be argued that 
this was the situation in most less developed countries. 
In the case of Ethiopia, however, it was easy for the new 
elite to find a scapegoat in the anachronistic 
aristocratic autocracy which was still intact but which 
was in the meantime being rendered obsolete by the forces 
of modernization which it had itself unleashed.
Though the nobility and gentry had lost their 
traditional military functions, they had survived the 
changes of modernization as an administrative and 
surplus appropriating class. In 1908, Menelik introduced 
the first ministerial form of government. A bi-product 
of this was the division of the country in the same year 
into 34 administrative regions based on ethnic 
distribution and geographical position. During the 
occupation, Italy revised this and divided the country, 
including Italian Somaliland, into only 5 regions on 
similar grounds as before. In 1942, Haile Selassie's 
government again restructured the administrative units 
into 12 provinces with three subordinate administrative 
layers20. With some changes, most notably the 
acquisition of the Eritrean province and the division of
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Hararghe into two provinces, this last structure lasted 
until 1987.^v32?1 top administrative positions were 
retained by the nobility and gentry until 1974. Yet 
another preserve of the nobility continued to be the 
monarch's court and up to about 1960 the bulk of the 
ministerial positions.
The survival of the upper class up to the beginning 
of the last quarter of the 20th century was in the 
context of a modernizing autocracy. Prior to the Italian 
occupation, the nobility had still been very influential 
and, hence, even in a position to obstruct some of the 
progressive policies of Haile Selassie which he pursued 
as regent and king up to the time of Italian occupation. 
After the occupation, however, the traditional regional 
nobility were greatly weakened with the result that the 
nobility drawn from the central province of Shoa replaced 
the regional ones who had local power base and 
legitimacy. Thus, like the south, the north came under 
the tutelage of the Shoan aristocracy. The latter were 
none other than Menelik's courtiers, his warrior lords of 
the south (the apex of the neftegna) and their 
descendants. More specifically, this meant that the 
provincial governorships were given to members of the 
royal family (including in-laws and distant relations) 
and hand-picked Shoans chosen for their loyalty to the 
crown.
A result of the Shoanization of the state was one of 
the reasons both for the further weakening of the 
nobility as well as the weakening of the bond between the 
government and the people. As Clapham pointed out the 
concept "Amhara" is not an ethnic but a linguistic and 
psychological one? the Shoan aristocracy including the 
monarch like Haile Selassie were descendants various 
ethnic groups like the Oromo and Amhara21* The Amhara's 
of the north who do not accept Shoans as belonging to the 
same ethnic group as themselves, and who in fact believe 
that the Shoans usurped the throne which rightly belonged 
to them, found it insulting that the Shoan aristocracy
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were preferred to their own nobility to rule them as 
provincial governors. The Tigrians, who shared the same 
sentiments as the Amhara of the north, had the additional 
burden of having to speak Amharic in order to be able to 
go to school and to be employed by the state. To the 
southerners, the ruling class had always been not only a 
speaker of a different language but also a usurper of 
their land. Finally, while the Muslims of the lowlands 
did not suffer any deprivation of land on account of the 
ruling class, there were the questions of language and 
religion which acted as a barrier between them and the 
rulers. This is not to raise the controversial question 
of whether the peoples of Ethiopia are sufficiently 
integrated to live in one state or not - a question that 
anthropologists enjoy delving into - but merely to point 
out that such differences as the above between the rulers 
and the ruled were, as will be noted in the next section, 
important in creating friction between them.
The decline of the influence of the nobility was 
marked by a corresponding ascent of the monarch to the 
heights of power. Article 4 of the Revised Constitution 
issued at the height of Haile Selassie's power (1955) 
stated: "By virtue of His Imperial Blood, as well as by 
the anointing which He has received, the person of the 
Emperor is sacred, His dignity is inviolable and His 
power indisputable. He is, consequently, entitled to all 
the honours due to him in accordance with tradition and 
the present Constitution." Both tradition and the 
Constitution were generous in according the monarch 
indisputable power. As noted earlier, the regional 
nobles had been at times in a position to challenge his 
authority in the past; more often than not, however, he 
was the fountain of all power and justice; at any rate, 
with the decline of the nobility in the 20th century, the 
monarch's powers became more "indisputable" than ever 
before. Moreover, the Constitution of 1955 granted him 
not only the power of veto over laws made by parliament 
but also the personal authority to promulgate the kind of
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law that parliament was authorised to make22. In 
addition to his legislative prerogatives, the monarch 
enjoyed extensive powers in the judicial, executive and 
treaty - making areas. Thus, he could review court 
judgements, make any executive decisions and conclude 
treaties with foreign powers subject in a limited number 
of cases to ratification by parliament23.
The monarch had his court with the help of which he 
carried out these tasks. He had his royal seal with which 
he promulgated laws made by parliament as well as by 
himself. He had, in addition, a department called 
"chilot" with the help of which he revised any judicial 
matters that were submitted to him, including most 
notably, decisions made by the regular courts. Further, 
he had the Ministry of Pen with the help of which he made 
his decisions known to the subordinate government 
agencies including the council of ministers. Finally, 
there was the institution of the "Akabi Sihat" over which 
the monarch presided and gave audience to the high 
dignitaries of state who offered their views on matters 
for which they had been granted an appointment or on any 
other matters where the monarch sought their opinions? 
they bestowed their respects through ritualistic 
prostrations as they approached the throne by way of 
showing their continued subservience to the monarch.
These age-old institutions which were housed in the 
palace were filled predominantly by the aristocracy. The 
monarch was the centre around whom state power revolved. 
He used his position to play one individual or faction 
against another. Though this was most operative among 
the king's courtiers, the provincial governors were also 
subject to it; this was enhanced by the fact that the 
provincial governors were encouraged to bring matters 
directly to the king rather than through the Ministry of 
Interior to which they were subordinate. The upper 
echelons of the bureaucracy were not saved from this 
medieval machination either. Relevant in this regard was 
the emergence of a highly educated class of technocrats
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who began assuming the highest government positions, 
including the ministerial posts as of the early 1960's. 
The monarch also exploited the split or competition that 
existed within this group, a split between the 
descendants of the aristocracy who emerged victorious 
during the 1974 uprising and those of humbler origin led 
by Aklilou Habte-Wolde (prime minister between 1961 and 
1974) .
According to Clapham, this system of government 
could cope with small court factions but not with a wider 
set of political constituencies as were developing in 
Ethiopia at the time24. Further, it can be said that 
this excessive concentration of power in one man and the 
absolute accountability to him of the officials could but 
breed not only complete subservience of the officials to 
the monarch but also to the concomitant irrelevance of 
officials building a power base within the society they 
ruled: if power flows from the king alone, it can be
derived only from him and not from the people. A further 
implication of this state of affairs was the tendency of 
such officials not to take responsible decision but pass 
the same to the king for his action. Moreover, all this 
can work well, or work after a fashion, when the monarch 
is young, strong and intelligent, attributes which Haile 
Selassie had amply demonstrated in his long years of 
effective control of the state. An outstanding example 
of this was his incisive cross-examination of his 
generals and civilian officials which he conducted 
through radio interviews from Asmara on his way back to 
reinstate his rule after three days of unrest in the 
country as a result of an abortive coup against him in 
December 1960. By 1974, however, he was too old to make a 
single coherent sentence. Further, another inherent 
weakness of the Ethiopian monarchy was the fact that 
despite its centuries of history it had not evolved 
effective rules of succession to the throne with the 
result that a number of contenders emerged at these 
junctures giving rise to a leadership crisis.
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Speculation about who was going to succeed Haile Selassie 
was actually raging for a number of years prior to 1974.
Thus, by 1960, the process of modernization had far 
advanced and tilted the balance in favour of the new 
elite as against the old; for all intents and purposes, 
the age-old aristocracy which had, for centuries, been 
the backbone of the monarchy had lost its military and 
administrative functions to the new elite. Though the 
monarchy survived with all its anachronisms and inherent 
weaknesses and continued to preside over these social 
forces, it was, as of 1960, finding it increasingly 
difficult to make itself relevant to the new elite. 
Moreover, the changing international environment greatly 
contributed to the decline of the ancien regime. The 
next section will deal with these internal and external 
factors that led to the collapse of Haile Selassie's 
regime in 1974.
(C) THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL FACTORS IN THE DECLINE OF
THE STATE
A state derives its strengths and weaknesses from 
internal and external sources. In this regard, two 
post-world war II developments on the international scene 
(the emergence of the bi-polar security system and the 
emergence of the Middle East into independent sovereign 
states) appear relevant sources of strength and weakness 
for the Ethiopian state. Internally, three centres of 
opposition to the ancien regime look worthy of note: the
rebellion in the Ogaden and Bale, the rebellion in 
Eritrea and the emergence of opposition at the centre. 
Arguably, all three had their genesis in the events of 
1960.
Starting from the early 1940's Ethiopia had been 
cultivating friendly relations with the US not least 
because it sought to oust British influence in the area; 
however, it was not until 1950 that concrete bargains 
were struck between the two countries. As early as 1948, 
Pentagon officials had expressed interest in maintaining
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the old Italian communications installation near Asmara 
(Eritrea). Secondly, US officials were about the same 
time developing the strategy of organizing the countries 
at the southern flank of the Soviet Union, like Turkey, 
and Iran, into a military alliance under NATO to form a 
line of defence (the northern tier) against possible USSR 
southward expansion. Also, entertained by the Pentagon 
was an extension of this strategy, namely, the southern 
tier (a secondary line of defence to be composed of 
amenable Middle Eastern countries). Thirdly, the US had 
taken advantage of the temporary absence of the USSR from 
the UN and successfully moved the General Assembly of 
that organization to pass the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution which authorised member states to contribute 
military units for deployment in Korea against the 
"threat" of North Korean "expansion" to the south. The 
US was, therefore, eager for member states of the UN to 
commit certain of their military units to that end. In 
1950, Ethiopian diplomats at the UN expressed Ethiopia's 
willingness to allow the US to keep the communications 
facilities should Eritrea be returned to Ethiopia, 
persuasively advocated the establishment of and 
Ethiopia's participation in the southern tier alliance, 
and promised to commit a unit of her Bodyguard to the war 
in Korea. Having come to an understanding on all points, 
the US and Ethiopia concluded two agreements: the first,
in 1951 entitling Ethiopia to the Point Four economic aid 
programme, and the second, in 1952, entitling her to 
military aid under the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 
1949.
The United States preoccupation in all this was its 
fear of possible Soviet expansion. As the Marshall plan 
of 1947 had marked the onset of the cold war between the 
east and west, the Point Four Programmes and the Mutual 
Defence Assistance acts of 1949 marked its extension to 
the third world. Dubbed Kagnew after the name of the 
Ethiopian Bodyguard battalion sent to Korea, the 
communications installation was used by the US for
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tracking space satellites, monitoring radio broadcasts 
from eastern Europe and the Middle East, relaying 
military and diplomatic communications, and for linking 
American telecommunication in Europe and the Far East25. 
By contrast, Ethiopia's primary interests were 
territorial consolidation, access to the sea, economic 
development, and countering the threat that was building 
up against her in the Middle East. As it happened, she 
benefited a great deal in these respects: Eritrea was
federated to Ethiopia in 1952 by a decision of the UN 
General Assembly and, between 1952 and 1974, she received 
270 million dollars worth of military aid and 350 million 
dollars worth of economic aid26. The amount of military 
aid provided is more than half the total of US military 
assistance given to all the African countries over the 
same period? based on such comparisons, observers of 
Ethiopian politics often express surprise at the extent 
of US support for Ethiopia. However, this overlooks one 
important fact: Ethiopia during that period was not so
much in military competition with the African countries 
as with those of the Middle East.
In the wake of its emergence into independence, the 
Middle East was plunged into an ideological crisis 
perhaps unprecedented in its history. It was torn 
between the forces of Pan-Islamism and those of 
Pan-Arabism, between these forces and those of local 
nationalism, between the forces of progress and those of 
reaction, and between the forces of capitalism and those 
of socialism. In their manifestations, all these trends 
in the Middle East had negative implications for 
Ethiopia.
In its most fundamentalist form, pan-Islamism 
recognized only two kinds of territories: that which is
inhabited by the community of believers (dar'al Islam) 
and that which is inhabited by the community of infidels 
(dar'al harb). According to the principle of jihad, 
since dar'al Islam recognized no boundaries imposed by 
dar'al harb, the normal condition between the two
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communities is one of war, at least until such time as 
the whole world is transformed into an Islamic state27.
In this sense, pan-Islamism makes it a duty upon dar'al 
Islam (the community of the Islamic world) not only to 
liberate Ethiopian Muslims from rule by the infidel but 
also to absorb the Ethiopian Christians into the Islamic 
world. In its more tamed post-war version, pan-Islamism 
makes it incumbent upon Muslims to collaborate with their 
co-religionists. The most consistent adherents of 
pan-Islamism have been Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.
As far as its implications for Ethiopia are 
concerned, Pan-Arabism is a variation of the same theme. 
Article 7 of the 1947 Ba'th Party Programme provided:
"The Arab fatherland is that part of the globe inhabited 
by the Arab nation which stretches from the Taurus 
Mountain, Poucht-I-Kouh Mountains, the Gulf of Basra, the 
Arab Ocean, the Ethiopian mountains, the Sahara, the 
Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean." Thus,, the 
Ba'thist governments of Syria and Iraq would be 
proponents of carving out the Ethiopian lowlands and 
annexing them into the greater Arabian fatherland.
Yet again, the Middle East was divided along 
east-west lines. The starting point of this was the 
defeat of the Arabs in the Palestinian war of 1948 which 
in its wake gave rise to an anti-west and an 
anti-government fervour resulting in coups, revolutions 
and assassinations during the early 1950's. Obviously, 
this tended to suck the extra-regional powers into the 
politics of the Middle East. In 1957, for instance, 
Eisenhower's Doctrine declared the exposure of the Middle 
East to communist expansion and offered economic and 
military assistance to friendly states in the region (a 
term which apparently included Ethiopia) and direct 
military intervention should the friendly countries come 
under attack from communist forces of the region or of 
the Soviet Union28. This led to the subsequent 
radicalization of Egypt, Algeria, Libya, South Yemen and 
the Palestinian movement, all of which became hostile to
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Ethiopia because of her close associations with the US.
In fact, radio Cairo had, since the early 1950's, been 
running an anti-Ethiopian campaign in the languages of 
the Horn of Africa and Egypt's radicalization only 
reinforced an already existing trend. The Eisenhower 
Doctrine in fact suggested the formation of an alliance 
between a group of Middle Eastern countries including 
Ethiopia in order to counter the influence of the radical 
states? however, Ethiopia could not even be a party to 
any association of conservative Arab states for reasons 
explained earlier. Her only choice was to throw in her 
lot with Israel, a move which aggravated the Arab states 
even further.
Implicit in all this is the fact that the Middle 
East emerged in the post-war years not as one but as many 
independent sovereign states. This is best reflected in 
the Charter of the League of Arab States (1945) which, in 
its preamble and Article 5 in particular, recognized as 
valid all the attributes of European states. Again, as 
states, some of the Arab and Afro-Arab countries have 
interests that go against those of Ethiopia . In this 
regard, mention could be made of the Yemen's interest in 
the control of the Red Sea and Ethiopia's islands there, 
Egypt's and Sudan's interests in the Nile, and the 
latter's interest in controlling common frontier regions 
and guerilla movements and activities. Since the most 
important conflict of interest with Ethiopia has been 
that of Somalia, further discussion of this particular 
country is warranted.
In 1960, a republic of Somalia emerged as an 
independent sovereign state composed of the ex-British 
and ex-Italian Somalilands. The designation "Afro-Arab" 
appears appropriate to the new republic since on the one 
hand, it is situated on the continent of Africa and it 
became a member of the OAU, and on the other hand, it 
became a member of the League of Arab States in 1973, the 
charter of which in article 1 requires its members to be 
independent Arab states. Ethnically and linguistically,
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the Somalis are not Arabs? the attraction of League 
membership appears to have been such provisions as 
article 6 of its Charter which declared that if one of 
the members were a victim of aggression, the League would 
"... determine the measures necessary to repulse the 
aggression”, a provision approaching something like a 
mutual defence pact.
The source of conflict between the Republic of 
Somalia and its neighbouring countries (Ethiopia, Kenya 
and Djibouti) is her stated policy of bringing all the 
Somali peoples in those countries under her rule 
(pan-Somalism). Stated from a different perspective, the 
particular issue between Somalia and Ethiopia could be 
said to have emanated from the annexation of the Ogaden 
by the Ethiopian monarch (Menelik) in the late 19th 
century, though, despite her official pronouncements to 
the contrary, the republic's claims extend to vast 
territories beyond the Somali inhabited region of the 
Ogaden. Be that as it may, pan-Somalism led the republic 
to condemn the existing boundaries between herself and 
neighbouring countries as impositions of imperial powers 
and launched a diplomatic and military offensive to have 
them revised. The acceptance by African countries of the 
sanctity of colonial boundaries, as reflected in article 
2 and 3 (3) of the OAU Charter of 1963, afforded Ethiopia 
a substantial amount of diplomatic support in her drive 
to stave off Somalia's claims. Though the provisions of 
the Charter of the League of Arab States on the question 
of territorial integrity of independent states is the 
same as that of the OAU Charter, the members of the 
League and other Moslem states provided Somalia with 
diplomatic and material support in her drive to bring 
about the unity of the Somali Peoples.
At the founding congress of the OAU in 1963, 
President Osman of Somalia condemned Ethiopia as 
expansionist, claimed that the Somali question was unique 
and demanded self-determination for all Somali People.
The Ethiopian prime minister, Aklilou Habte-Wolde,
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retorted in kind: it was Somalia which was obsessed with
territorial aggrandizement; all African states must 
respect existing territorial boundaries whatever their 
merit. Somalia failed to make headway on the diplomatic 
front; on the contrary, at the Cairo meeting of the OAU 
in 1964, the organization reaffirmed its commitment to 
the principle of territorial integrity only in clearer 
and stronger terms.
From February to March 1964, open warfare broke out 
between Ethiopia and Somalia along their common frontier. 
After many OAU committee meetings and good offices, the 
parties were able to reach an agreement on cease-fire, a 
demilitarized zone six to ten miles deep on each side of 
the border, and a cessation of hostile propaganda by 
press and radio. After a short lull, hostilities broke 
out again in 1965. Somalia raised the question of the 
Ogaden once more and Ethiopia reacted by cutting 
diplomatic relations and by closing the border because of 
alleged arms smuggling into Ethiopia across the frontier. 
In the following year, the focus of conflict between the 
two states became Djibouti, a conflict provoked by De 
Gaulle's visit to the territory in August of that year 
and by the resulting expectation that the territory was 
about to become independent. As it happened, De Gaulle 
submitted the question to a referendum and the people of 
Djibouti decided to stay under French administration. 
Djibouti being an important port and inhabited by Afars 
and Somalis, two ethnic groups who also live in Ethiopia 
and Somalia, was yet another bone of contention between
0 Qthe two states .
Detente between them came in the wake of Somali 
elections of July 1967 when Shermarke became president 
and Igal prime minister. In September, a Somali 
delegation led by Igal met with Ethiopia's cabinet and 
agreed to end the state of emergency along the 
Ethio-Somali frontier which had been in force since 1964, 
to conclude further agreements regarding cultural and 
commercial exchanges, and to establish a permanent
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advisory commission on a ministerial level to consider 
mutual problems. These agreements were concluded and in 
the following year endorsed by the Somali parliament.
The pan-Africanist and architect of rapprochement, Igal, 
abandoned Somalia's territorial claims on Ethiopia but at
the same time insisted on the granting of the right of
• • • • • n •self-determination to the Ethiopian SomalisJ . President
Bare, who took power through a coup of October 1969,
declared that Somalia would honour its legitimate
international treaties and obligations? thus, Igal's
rapprochement seemed to hold but only until 1972 when
Somali hostilities resumed with a vengeance. By then
Bare's adoption of socialism had made his country the
beneficiary of substantial military aid from the Soviet
Union.
It is submitted that it was in these global and 
regional contexts that the oppositions against the ancien 
regime of the 1960's (the alienation and resistance in 
the south-east , in the north and in the centre) can best 
be understood. In fact, it is difficult to disentangle 
the resistance in the south-east (among the Somali of the 
Ogaden and the Oromo of Bale) from the military 
activities and sabotage of the adjoining Republic of 
Somalia. The Western Somali Liberation Front, (WSLF) 
which had the aim of liberating the Muslim Somalis of the 
Ogaden, was formed in Mogadishu (the capital city of the 
Republic of Somalia) in 1960, the year when the Republic 
became independent, which had the aim of
liberating the Muslim Oromos of Bale, was established at 
about the same time. From 1966 to 1970, the two 
liberation movements operated in close collaboration with 
each other also drawing much of their assistance from the 
Republic of Somalia. The alliance between the two 
movements came to an end in 1970 because Bare, on account, 
of his continued rapprochement with Ethiopia, put the 
WSLF leadership behind bars, and because the i&kfev' ©■(- 
w <Wtyv\Gi/itgave himself up to the Ethiopian authorities.
WSLF was reactivated in the early 1970's, as was a
- 46 -
splinter group of <iV\d A (the Ethiopian National
Liberation Front); this time the latter had as its focus 
the liberation of the "oppressed" peoples of Ethiopia, 
especially the Oromo31.
The Republic of Somalia's support for WSLF can be 
explained by its commitment to pan-Somali and pan-Islamic 
ideologies but its support for the rv\®vfe^ tcan be
explained only by the latter of the two ideologies since 
the Oromo of Bale though Muslim are ethnically different 
from the Somali. In fact, the Oromo are the biggest 
linguistic group in Ethiopia and the Oromo of Bale are a 
small part of that ethnic group. This argument is 
further supported by the jurisdictional claim of the 
Somali Youth League of 1959 and later of the Republic of 
Somalia itself over the bulk of the Muslims in the region 
including the Afars of Ethiopia32. No less important are 
also the economic and strategic advantages involved in 
expanding to include the Ogaden and Bale.
The second centre of opposition to the ancien regime 
was Eritrea in the north and north-east of the country 
occupying all of Ethiopia's coast from the Sudan to 
Djibouti. Egypt and Pakistan, which had an associate 
status at the Council of Foreign Ministers, were the most 
adamant supporters of Eritrean independence when the 
question was being considered by that body from 1945 to 
1948. When in 1948 the question came before the General 
Assembly of the UN, these countries spearheaded the 
Islamic hostility to the proposal of Eritrean unity with 
Ethiopia. During the 1940's Eritrean Moslems mostly 
supported the independence solution and the highland 
Christians the unionist solution. Taking the whole 
population of Eritrea, the unionist solution was the 
proposal which had the most substantial following33.
The idea of an independent Eritrea was kept alive by 
Cairo's radio broadcasts starting from at least the 
middle of the 1950's. These called for the secession of 
the region from Ethiopia. The price Egypt sought to exact 
from Ethiopia for the latter's association with the US34.
- 47 -
Egypt followed this in 1958 by training the first 
Eritrean fighters in a camp near Alexandria as part of 
its campaign against "reactionary" governments of the 
region and by sending the best officers among them to the 
Soviet Union for further training35. By the end of the 
1960/s many disaffected Eritreans, especially Muslims, 
had left the region and gone to Egypt either because they 
did not approve of the federal solution of the General 
Assembly of 1952, or because Haile Selassie's government 
was unduly intrusive in matters that came under local 
jurisdiction, or because the Muslims and Christians in 
the Eritrean assembly could not see eye to eye on a 
number of issues which in turn led to the alienation of 
the former. In 1960, those who were trained abroad 
formed the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and launched 
their armed struggle in the following year.
In 1962, the Eritrean Assembly decided to dissolve 
the federal structure and unite Eritrea with Ethiopia, a 
move which Haile Selassie's government is widely believed 
to have instigated. The dissolution of the federation is 
often taken as the cause of secession; however, given the 
trends prior to 1962, it is doubtful if Eritrea would 
have taken a different course than it did anyhow.
The ELF was primarily based on the Muslim half of 
the Eritrean population; the Eritrean People's Liberation 
Front (EPLF), which was to take the secessionists 
struggle to the Christian highlanders and finally develop 
into the dominant group, emerged as one of the factions 
that broke away from the ELF towards the end of the 
1960's. The ELF was conservative whereas the EPLF became 
radically left of centre. The radicalization of the 
latter was part of the general trend among the Ethiopian 
students, in the Middle East (particularly the 
Palestinians) as well as in the west. There is 
circumstantial evidence to suggest that as the ELF was 
supported by the conservative forces in the Middle East 
so was the EPLF by the radical forces of the region such 
as leftist sections of the PLO, Syria, and South Yemen.
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The Egyptian military training programme of 1958 was 
continued until 1967 followed by Algeria, the PLO, Libya, 
Syria and South Yemen; other strong supporters included 
Somalia, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In addition to 
providing arms, funds and wide press coverage, the Arab 
countries served as intermediaries between the socialist 
countries and the Eritrean insurgents. For example, in 
December 1964, large shipments of Soviet light weapons 
were transmitted to Eritrea through Syria and the Sudan. 
Further, Soviet, Czech, and Chinese automatic weapons 
including Soviet AD47's, rockets, mortars and Sam7
•4-
hitseek missiles and Chinese plastic mines were ferried 
across the Red Sea from South Yemen to Eritrea.
Arab organizations have had the Eritrean question on 
their agenda and have at times even allowed the 
secessionist organization to attend their proceedings.
For example, the League of Arab States has entertained 
the question since at least 1962 and, in 1969, the leader 
of the ELF was allowed to attend its meeting as an 
observer. The periodic Islamic conferences (the Council 
of Arab Parliamentary Union and the Federation of Arab 
Lawyers) have expressed their support for Eritrean 
independence time and again.36.
Sudan's position on the Eritrean question is 
uniquely important. Under pressure from the Arab world 
and domestic fundamentalist and leftist movements, it has 
kept its frontiers open for Eritrean insurgents except 
for two relatively short interludes. In the early 
1960's, President Aboud of Sudan agreed to close the 
frontier to Eritrean in exchange for
Ethiopia doing the same to southern Sudanese insurgents. 
However, the agreement came to an end with the overthrow 
of Aboud in 1964. A similar agreement was again 
concluded between President Numeri and Haile Selassie 
which was effective only for two years (1972 to 1974).37
Despite the preponderance of Christians in Eritrea 
in terms of numbers as well as political organization, 
some Arab states regarded Eritrea as a Muslim community
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and their support for its independence as a form of jihad 
against the Christian regime of Haile Selassie. For 
example, King Faisel of Saudi Arabia is reported to have 
said that his government's policy was to create an 
Islamic state of Eritrea. Others have seen Eritrea as 
part of the Arab fatherland; in 1969, for instance, Arab 
supporters are reported to have described Eritrean 
seccessvenas: "... a streak of red Arab revolution into 
the black continent". In 1975, the Kuwaiti Minister of 
Cabinet Affairs "regretted the blood shed, destruction 
and catastrophe which had taken place in that dear part 
of the Arab nation"38.
The third focus of dissension was the centre; the 
opposition there also had its genesis in 1960. In 
December of that year, the commander of the Royal 
Bodyguard, General Mengistu Neway, and his American- 
educated and radical brother, Germame Neway, used the 
Bodyguard to launch a coup against Haile Selassie and 
proclaimed his replacement as king by his son, the crown 
prince Merid Azmach Asfaw Wosen. However, the loyalist 
generals used the other sections of the army to put the 
rebellion down within three days; apparently, the US 
Military Advisory Mission also helped in providing aerial 
photography to the loyalists. When it transpired that 
they were losing the battle, the brothers had the high 
government officials, whom they had under detention, 
massacred. Several days later, Germame shot his brother 
and himself; however, Mengistu survived, only to be tried 
and hanged afterwards.
It is not clear whether the coup was another 
instance of the many intrigues and plots that preceded it 
or whether its leaders had revolutionary economic and 
political programmes39. Interestingly enough, neither the 
leaders of the coup nor those who took part in the 
rallies and demonstrations so much as mentioned the king 
let alone criticised him; Haile Selassie was still "elect 
of God" and beyond reproach. However, everyone knew that 
the coup was all about him; they also knew that all the
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speeches about the backwardness of the country were 
directed against him. In effect, the political discourse 
(initially conducted in private ) that the coup unleashed 
had the immediate effect of stripping the monarch of his 
divine status and of subjecting his ministers to a 
greater degree of criticism and charges of corruption 
than ever before.
Yet another impact of the abortive coup appears to 
have been the government's speeding up of the processes 
of modernization. The number of civil servants increased 
from 35,000 in 1960 to 100,000 by 1974. The army was
45,000 strong in 197440. The teachers and students' 
population showed a similar growth in the same period: 
the number of enroled secondary school students in 1970 
was 70,000 and the number of enroled university students 
in 1974 was 6,000 with a further 2,000 studying abroad41. 
The number of private enterprises also increased 
substantially with the result that the labour force grew 
from 28,000 in 1961 to over 51,000 in 197142. Moreover, 
these social sectors were allowed to organize themselves 
into unions and associations . For example, though the 
revised Constitution of 1955 had allowed the formation of 
trade unions, the enabling legislation was not issued 
until 1962 when the Confederation of Ethiopian Labour 
Unions was launched for the first time. By 1974, the 
size of the Confederation had grown to about 80,000. 
Subsequently, the teachers, students and other 
professional associations emerged with government 
sanctions.
It was these social elements and corporate groups 
(institutions adapted from European models) which were 
most influenced by the enlightenment that ensued from the 
abortive coup of 1960. Initially, their grievances had 
been corporatist; as the decade wore on, however, they 
became more and more political; no doubt, some groups 
became more politically conscious than others. Thus, in 
the course of the decade, the rank and file of the 
loyalist army went directly to the palace several times
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and successfully petitioned the king for pay increases.
By 1974, there were also apparently mess committees 
within the various units issuing lists of grievances43. 
The demands of the other groups were not met with such 
success; by and large, their petitions were kept at the 
level of the relevant ministries and their demands for 
pay increases, the right to form associations and for 
improved conditions of work remained unsatisfied. No 
doubt, the preferential treatment of the army further 
alienated both the trade unions which came under the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, and the civil 
servants who came under various other ministries.
The politicisation of the grievances was spearheaded 
by the university and school students. During the coup, 
the former did demonstrate against the government but 
only under pressure from General Mengistu himself. By 
the middle of the 1960's, however, their associations had 
constituted what came to be known as the Ethiopian 
Student's Movement (ESM)- with branch associations in 
Addis Ababa, Western Europe and north America- advocating 
radical reforms concerning land redistribution and 
democratic rights? by the end of the decade, all the 
branch associations had adopted Marxism-Leninism as the 
appropriate ideology to pursue and had committed 
themselves to the overthrow of the existing "Feudo- 
capitalist" order? and, by 1974, the associations had 
become the basis for the organization of Leninist-Maoist 
parties.44
The abortive coup of 1960 was important in 
discrediting the ancien regime in the eyes of, amongst 
other, the students. Once the ESM came into existence, 
however, it was swept off the ground not by trends in the 
Middle East as in the case of the regional rebellions, 
but rather by European ideologies and organizational 
models? it was a by-product of neocolonialism in the 
sense that ESM was a part of the western 
anti-authoritarian anti-imperialist movement of the 
1960's, and particularly militant variant of it at that.
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While the movement's heroes were Mao, Ho Chi Minh,Castro, 
and Che Guevara about whom songs and poems were written 
by its partisans and while the literature most widely 
read were the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao 
as well as the Peking review and an assortment of 
pamphlets written in the name of the Chinese communes, 
the bulk of these books and articles came, interestingly 
enough, not from the east but from the west. The 
channels of ideological transmissions were the 
classrooms, conversations with the western instructors 
who fancied themselves radical, the libraries , and the 
journeys by Ethiopians mostly to the west. For example, 
out of the 4,500 university graduates by 1974, about
1,000 were educated abroad? further, the branch 
associations of the ESM in western Europe worked closely 
with groups radically to the left of centre. Even the 
army was not spared exposure to the west; in addition to 
fighting in Korea and the Congo (1950 and 1961 
respectively) , a lot of commissioned and 
non-commissioned officers were sent to the US for short 
-term training.
On the whole, it appears that the students' 
appraisal of the internal Ethiopian situation left 
something to be desired. Certainly, student papers made 
an attempt at analysing such questions as feudalism and 
national self-determination; more often than not, 
however, they were mechanical applications of Marxist 
concepts in the Ethiopian context. The earlier 
generation of young Ethiopian intellectuals (Japanizers) 
produced a more objective and original literature on 
their period than did the leftist radicals of the 1960's 
of theirs. It appears that the ESM was gripped more by 
an external ideology than by the immediate circumstances 
of the Ethiopian workers and peasants, circumstances 
which it was hard put to try and recast in the Marxian 
mould.
Centrally important was the fact that the opposition 
forces (the rebellions in the peripheries and the
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dissensions at the centre) had the impact of radicalizing 
and reinforcing each others' outlooks, grievances and 
alienations from the regime. For example, by the end of 
the 1960's, the bulk of the army was pinned down by the 
rebels in the peripheries and, hence, forced to live in 
the arid and semi-arid regions of the lowlands often 
exposed to thirst, hunger and squalid conditions of life 
as well as to eminent danger of death in a war the end of 
which it could not see. More important was the 
vanguardship of the students' movement in radicalizing 
the civil servants and workers. The graduates of the 
academically advanced military establishments (the Harar 
Academy, the Air Force, the Navy and the Abadina Police) 
were often allowed to go to the university in Ethiopia or 
abroad for degree courses; there, they would obviously 
engage in a mutual exchange of outlook with members of 
ESM. Moreover, the 4,500 university and 20,000 school 
graduates who had joined the public and private sectors 
can only be assumed to have gone to those places with 
their ideas? the fact that some of the leaders of the 
teachers' associations and of the Confederation of the 
Ethiopian labour Unions were identifying themselves with 
the students' movement in 1974 can be attributed to this 
trend. Yet another important development towards the end 
of 1960's, was the popularization, by the Addis Ababa 
University students, of the thorny question of the right 
of national self determination as an appropriate solution 
in the Ethiopian context. This gave secession a cloak of 
respectability that had not been there previously. One 
of the spin-offs of this was the departure of the 
Eritrean students and graduates from Addis Ababa and 
Asmara en masse to the ELF culminating finally in the 
emergence of the EPLF led by leftist elites.
Moreover, the internal forces of opposition had an 
impact not only on each other but also transnationally, 
disorientating the ancien regime more than ever before.
In 1972 and 1973, the only comfort for the regime came 
from the diplomatic support of the African countries on
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the Eritrean and Ogaden questions and from the 
rapprochement with the Sudanese government which 
restricted the movement of Eritrean rebels across the 
frontiers of the two countries. By contrast, Ethiopia's 
relations with the Arabs, Israel and the US reached truly 
crisis proportions.
In 1972, North Yemen and South Yemen, supported by 
Arab campaigns, laid claim to Ethiopia's group of islands 
in the Red Sea, because, they maintained, Ethiopia had 
allowed Israel to build a military base there. No amount 
of denial by Ethiopia of the existence of such a base 
would temper the Arab demand for the islands45. Towards 
the end of the same year, Somalia, which by then had 
become a strong military power on account of Soviet aid, 
sent a probing force into the Ogaden near to where oil 
and natural gas deposits were found. Ethiopia drove the 
invading force out by simply cutting its only supply of 
water and deploying a substantial military force in the 
area. Between March and April 1973, there was yet 
another military confrontation between the two countries 
near the town of Dolo (close to the Kenyan border) again 
near an area where a natural gas deposits had been struck 
during the previous December. Since 1972, therefore, the 
two countries had engaged in a war of words, with 
Somalia, claiming that it was in imminent danger of 
aggression by Ethiopian forces and the latter that it had 
been invaded by Somali infiltrators47.
More important for Haile Selassie's beleaguered 
government was the pressure that the Arab countries 
brought to bear on Ethiopia during and around the time of 
the tenth anniversary of the OAU in May 1973. Before the 
summit, Syria and Libya condemned Ethiopia for standing 
in the way of the aspirations of the Eritrean and Somali 
peoples and further insisted that the headquarters of the 
OAU should be transferred to Cairo or the summit should 
be boycotted unless Ethiopia cut diplomatic relations 
with Israel. The summit was saved and held in Addis 
Ababa because Haile Selassie managed to persuade Sadat,
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Bare and the others to attend? however, the Arab 
diplomatic offensive continued during its proceedings: 
they insisted that Ethiopia cut her relations with 
Israel. On her part, Somalia urged the heads of states 
to have the courage to resolve the "territorial” dispute 
over the Ogaden and demanded that Ethiopia be stopped 
from amassing her forces in the region.
During the summit, President Boumeidian of Algeria 
apparently promised the Ethiopian authorities that if 
Ethiopia severed her diplomatic relations with Israel, he 
would use his influence to discourage Arab support for 
the ELF. This was welcomed by the Ethiopian prime 
minister, Aklilou Habte-Wolde, who canvassed cabinet 
support for the proposal in June and July; finally, after 
a great deal of soul-searching, the cabinet decided to 
end diplomatic relations with Israel. However, the king 
vetoed the decision. Then came the Arab-Israeli war of 
October 1973 followed immediately by the African states 
cutting diplomatic relations with Israel one after the 
other. Haile Selassie was then persuaded to follow suit? 
on October 23 Ethio-Israeli diplomatic relations were
A Qalso severed* .
In October 1973, the ancien regime lost not only its 
good friend and ally (Israel) without securing any hard 
commitment of Arab neutrality on the Ogaden and Eritrean 
questions but was also relegated to the outer perimeters 
of US security policy priorities. In 1972 the US pursued 
a hands-off policy on the Arab claim of the Ethiopian Red 
Sea islands; by contrast, Israel offered military 
assistance at the time though Ethiopia declined the offer 
for fear of invoking an Arab backlash. Also, at the time 
of the Arab diplomatic offensive in May 1973, Haile 
Selassie went to the US and asked President Nixon to 
provide him with modern fighter planes, M60 tanks and 
air-to-ground missiles in order to offset Somali modern 
weapons provided by the Soviet Union. He returned 
disappointed, having received a promise of defensive 
weapons only. Finally, during the month when Ethiopia
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cut her relations with Israel (October 1973) the US told 
the regime of its intention to close the Kagnew 
communications facilities which was one of the major 
factors that had brought the two governments together in 
the first place.
All this was in stark contrast to previous US 
policies towards Ethiopia, to, for instance, the 
Eisenhower Doctrine which proposed a direct US 
intervention should its allies in the Middle East, 
including Ethiopia, be threatened by regional or Soviet 
communist expansionism. The reasons for the decline of 
US interest in Ethiopia in the early 1970's are of 
interest. According to an American who for a long time 
was adviser to the Ethiopian Foreign Office 
(John H. Spencer), the explanations for the US handsoff 
policy in the 1972 Ethio-Arab confrontation over the Red 
Sea islands, and for President Nixon's refusal to provide 
weapons to Ethiopia were detente between the superpowers, 
a perceived need to accommodate the Arabs, and the US's 
wish not to be identified with the monarch against whom 
the Ethiopian middle class was becoming increasingly 
hostile. The Americans also realized that, because of 
his age, the Emperor was finding it difficult to reach 
decisions with the result that government activities were
A Qcoming to a halt. * Most observers agree that the 
reasons for US loss of interest in the communications 
facilities was the advance in technology which rendered 
them obsolete and the US acquisition of new facilities in 
Diago Garcia which could be used instead of Kagnew.
The suggestion made in relation to detente does not 
make much sense, as it had not led to a super-power 
disengagement in the Middle East as reflected by the US 
continued support for Israel and the conservative Arab 
states? and by Soviet support for the radical Arab 
states. A relevant example of this might have been 
Soviet challenge to the US in the Horn of Africa: the
former was building up the Somali Military forces and in 
1973 was, according to western reports, in the process of
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completing the construction of a military base in Berbera 
(Somalia). On the other hand, the explanation of the 
United States policy of Arab accommodation makes a lot of 
sense. By 1971, the formation of OPEC had reached an 
advanced state thus enabling the Arabs to control oil 
prices in the subsequent years and in 1973 to use the 
ensuing power as a diplomatic weapon. This Arab 
ascendancy of power and prestige was celebrated by Africa 
as a victory against western domination. The west, 
(including most notably the US which had great fear of 
being victimized because of its alliance with Israel), 
was forced to acknowledge the fact and accommodate itself 
to the changed circumstances. No doubt, accommodating 
the Arabs in this sense implied at least neutrality over 
Arab policies towards countries that mattered less to the 
US (like Ethiopia). Accommodation also seems to have 
meant supporting, or rather not opposing vigorously,
Arab policies towards the Red Sea islands, Eritrea and 
the Ogaden. Similarly, Ethiopia's severance of 
diplomatic relations with Israel and its willingness to 
demote relations with the US was influenced by its fear 
of Middle Eastern ascendancy. Also, the reference made 
to domestic "middle class" opposition against the ancien 
regime can only make sense in the context of the 
opposition that was building up among the students, civil 
servants and workers as explained above, since this was 
the only form of opposition that was in existence at the 
time. What is more, the opposition had been taking an 
increasingly leftist stance, condemning, above all, "US 
imperialism" and Haile Selassie as its puppet. It is 
probable that the US may well have been further alienated 
by the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the opposition in 
Ethiopia.
To sum up, the aristocracy which had lost its 
military and administrative functions to the new elite 
was no longer the pillar of the monarchy; rather, the 
latter had become dependent on the new military and 
civilian elite. However, in the course of the 1960's and
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1970's, the new elite, armed with western ideology, 
became the main antithesis of the ancien regime.
Moreover, alienated from the centre and backed by 
Ethiopia's traditional opponents (the countries of the 
Middle East), certain of the peoples on the peripheries 
(the Somali's, the Oromo of Bale and the Eritreans) had 
raised arms against the ancien regime and had, by 1974, 
managed to pin down the national army in those regions. 
Finally, in the early 1970's, the ancien regime lost its 
western allies (the US and Israel) at a time when the 
Middle East was in the ascendant because of the power and 
prestige it derived from its ability to control oil 
prices. These developments coupled with the anachronisms 
and inherent weaknesses of Haile Selassie's autocracy, 
had so weakened the state that it had almost ceased to 
function when the urban uprising broke out in 1974.
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FART ONE
THE COLLAPSE OF THE OLD-STATE 
(JANUARY - NOVEMBER 1974)
CHAPTER TWO
The Urban Uprising of January to June, 1974
The main actors of the popular uprising that erupted 
from January to June, 1974, against Haile-Selassie's 
government were the armed forces, the teachers, the 
students, the trade unions and the civil servants. The 
armed forces, without whose collaboration the other 
groups would have found it difficult to put up resistance 
against the government, were composed of five division 
consisting of tens of brigades and battalions dotted all 
over the country. Bodyguard, was situated in the 
capital, Addis Ababa, as was the Fourth Division, which 
had brigades and battalions in the provinces. The Second 
Division, also known as the Northern Forces, and the 
Third Division were based in Eritrea and Hararghe 
Provinces respectively. The Fifth Division was an 
amalgam of various specialized units mainly located in 
and around Addis Ababa.
On January 12, 1974, the privates and NCO's of the 
24th brigade (Fourth Division) situated in the town of 
Negele (Sidamo province) mutinied and placed their 
officers under arrest. They then demanded to see senior 
government officials who would meet their demands, which 
included pay and pension increases, better food 
allowances, injury benefits, improved living quarters, 
removal of disciplinary injustices, price control and 
access to water wells1. When General Derese Dubale, 
Commander of the Ground Forces, was sent to Negele, the 
mutineers placed him under arrest, apparently because
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they wanted to see a higher official than him. They 
released him after a week only because they were 
flattered to receive a letter from the King sent through 
General Assefa Abera, Commander of the Air Force, 
promising them that their demands would be met. On his 
release, General Dersese Dubale was sent to Dolo (a town 
on the Ethio-Kenyan border) where a battalion of the
24th brigade was in mutiny. There he was made to sit
under the scorching sun for half a day and, when thirsty
and hungry, treated to dirty water and bread full of
grit. The general was told that that was what the 
soldiers normally ate and drank2.
The Negele-Dolo incidents passed unreported and, as 
a result, the civilian population was quite unaware of 
them. However, they sent waves of unrest within the 
army, where the control over the use of communication 
facilities seems to have suddenly become rather lax. For 
example, a similar thing to the Negele-Dolo mutiny took 
place in the Debre-Zeit Air Force (some fifty kilometers 
outside the capital) from February 10 -13. Also, the 
radical elements in the Air Force and in the First,
Second and Fourth Divisions established co-ordinating 
committees in the course of the same month and started 
mobilizing the army to come up with more and more extreme 
demands3.
In the third week of February, 1974, certain 
sections of the civilian population started their 
uprising, it seems, quite independently from that of the 
army. On February 18, (the official day for the 
beginning of the uprising) the taxi drivers, the teachers 
and students went on strikes and demonstrations.
In the wake of the Arab-Israeli war and the dramatic 
petrol price increases, Ethiopia had to buy the commodity 
on the international market in 1974 for three times the 
previous year's price. As a result, in January 1974, 
Ethiopia increased the price of petrol to the consumer by 
50%4. The Addis Ababa taxi drivers, numbering over a 
thousand, who felt that a part of their income had been
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unduly whittled down, withdrew their services and went on 
demonstration starting from February 18, demanding the 
reduction of petrol prices.
By 1974, the eighteen thousand strong Ethiopian 
Teachers' Association had been engaged, without any 
success, in a protracted negotiation with the Ministry of 
education concerning pay increases and salary scales, for 
at least six years5. In January and February, 1974, the 
teachers were further aggravated by an educational reform 
programme (The Sector Review) adopted by the government 
in December, 19736, to which they took exception 
particularly because it advocated universal education up 
to fourth grade followed by vocational training 
thereafter. The teachers felt that this was tantamount 
to condemning the children of the poor to perpetual 
subservience to those of the rich who could always afford 
private education beyond the fourth grade leading them to 
more successful careers. Upon learning that the taxi 
drivers were going to go on strike as of February 18, the 
Teachers' Association decided to join them and bring the 
country's educational system to a standstill on the same 
day. Having been highly politicized since the late 
sixties, the Association's petitions on February 18, did 
not limit itself to matters concerned with teachers 
(salary scales and the Sector Review) but extended to 
demands like the following: the liberalization of the
laws concerning the right to demonstrate, minimum wages 
for all wage earners, pay increases for factory workers, 
price control, pensions for industrial workers, 
improvement of the laws concerning dismissal of workers, 
regular employment for temporary workers, the cessation 
of judges and other high officials from becoming members 
of company board of governors, granting of employment 
priorities to Ethiopians as opposed to aliens, expansion 
of employment opportunities, and the right to organize
. . . .  7trade unions for employees of certain organisations.
The students, who, since the late sixties, had 
deliberately abandoned pursuing corporatist interests in
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favour of advocating a fundamental political change 
through class boycotts, demonstrations and the 
distribution of anti-government leaflets, found in the 
taxi drivers and teachers long sought-after allies and, 
on February 18, poured out onto the streets of Addis 
Ababa chanting revolutionary slogans and agitating 
resistance against the government. The events of that 
day also aroused the rebellious mood of the capital's 
lumpen proletariat into action8.
Addis Ababa and the neighbouring towns, to which the 
resistance spread very quickly, became engulfed in 
disturbances for about a week starting from February 18. 
There were riotous demonstrations9, the stoning of buses 
and luxury cars10 in an attempt to bring public transport 
to a halt and the robbing and destroying of property.11 
On February 24, it was reported that the taxi drivers, 
students and the lumpen proletariat had caused in and 
around Addis Ababa the deaths of three and the wounding 
of twenty-two individuals, and had damaged seventy-five 
buses, sixty-nine cars, two trains, a motor-bike and 
thirty-eight houses.12
The government's response to these challenges was 
one of sticks and carrots. On February 22, the Ministry 
of Interior indicated that the police had been authorized 
to take stern measures in order to uphold law and order, 
warned parents to stop their children engaging in 
disturbances and urged teachers and taxi drivers to go 
back to work13. Two days later, it was reported that a 
total of five hundred and fifty-eight taxi drivers and 
other individuals had been placed under arrest for 
distributing anti-government leaflets, breaking cars, 
causing physical damage to persons and for robbery14. In 
a radio and television address of February 21, on the 
other hand, the King announced that the Sector Review had 
been suspended, reassured the teachers that their other 
demands would be met within a month and urged them to 
resume teaching. In the same address, he explained that, 
despite the implications to the National Economic Plan,
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he had ordered the reduction of petrol prices15. As it 
happened, the price was reduced by ten cents, and not by 
twenty-five cents, which is the amount by which it had 
increased several weeks earlier16. Further, on February 
23, it was reported that the Ministries of Defence and 
Interior, in accordance with the King's orders, had 
increased the salary of soldiers and policemen by 
eighteen birr (about nine U.S. dollars) each and 
announced that the salary scale for officers and payment 
for special skills would be studied and implemented in 
the future17
In spite of these responses, the government's
troubles took a dramatic turn for the worse. By the end
of February, 1974, what is usually referred to as "the 
first round of military and police uprising" was in full 
swing. In addition to the co-ordinating committees at 
the unit level, there was now a co-ordinating committee 
of thirty men from the armed forces established in the 
headquarters of the Fourth Division (Addis Ababa), 
claiming to represent all the military units except the 
navy18. On February 26, the Second Division seized the 
radio station in Asmara (Eritrea) and broadcast its
objection to the pay increases of several days earlier as
being inadequate, and its many other demands, not all of 
which were limited to matters concerning the armed 
forces. On the next day, representatives of the various 
military units in and around Addis Ababa went to the 
King19 and submitted their demands including, it appears, 
freedom of political parties, the democratic election of 
administrators, land reform, the improvement of 
employee-employer regulations, freeing of all political 
prisoners, free education for every-one, enforcement of 
necessary price controls, the appearance in court of the 
government officials who directly and indirectly 
embezzled public funds and belongings, salary rises for 
members of the army and other workers in accordance with 
prevailing market prices and the formation of a committee
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including members of the army and the civilian public to 
follow up the enforcement of the above points20.
Faced with such formidable mutiny, the King had no 
choice but to give in to the demands of the armed forces. 
In his February 27 address to the representatives of the 
armed forces, the King appealed to their nationalism and 
pleaded with them not to ask for more than the country 
could afford, and to protect the country21. On the next 
day, he also gave an audience to representatives of the 
Second Division and promised to meet their demands22. On 
March 1, it was announced that the privates had been 
given a pay rise of thirty birr (about fifteen U.S. 
dollars) instead of the eighteen birr previously 
promised, a pension rise of twenty birr (about ten U.S. 
dollars) and promised to pay twenty birr for special 
skills to privates and officers alike23. It seems they 
were also promised the establishment of a committee to go 
into their other grievances.
A more interesting effect of "the first round of 
military and police uprising" was the sudden resignation 
of the Prime Minister, Tshafi Tizaz Akililou Habte-Wolde, 
and his cabinet on February 2724. On February 24, as a 
result of the demand of the coordinating committee of the 
armed forces. On the following day it was reported that 
the King had accepted Akililou's resignation25, and, 
apparently, appointed General Abiy Ababe as Prime 
Minister; however, upon being told that the army 
preferred Lij Endalkachew Mekonnen as Prime Minster, 
changed his mind and appointed the general as Minister of 
Defence and Endaldachew as Prime Minister26. It is clear 
that there were personal rivalries between members of the 
old cabinet and also group rivalries between the class of 
an aristocratic elite, to which dignitaries like Lij 
Endaldachew and General Abiy belonged, on one hand, and 
the government technocrats of a humbler origin to which 
officials like Tshafi Tizaz Aklilou and most of his 
cabinet members belonged, on the other. What is not 
clear is whether such considerations motivated
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Endalkachew to have the King informed that the armed 
forces did not want the old cabinet and whether the King, 
as a result, pressurised Aklilou and his cabinet to 
resign.
An even more intriguing query is whether there was 
some kind of collusion between the activities of 
Endalkachew and his group, on the one hand, and those of 
the army, on the other. On February 28, the armed forces 
acted to arrest most members of Akilou's cabinet27 though 
not Endalkachew, who was also a member of that cabinet as 
Minister of Posts and Communications. According to one 
source, at least, it was not the co-ordinating committee 
of thirty men from the NCO's that effected the arrests 
but another group of intermediate officers who brought 
the first committee under its influence towards the end 
of February, and which was led by Colonel Alem Zewd 
Tesema, Commander of the Airborn Brigade, Colonel Yigezu 
Yemane, Commander of the Army Aviation, Major Atnafu 
Abate of the Fourth Division, Junior Aircraftsman Girma 
Fissiha, Lieutenant Colonel Yilma Teshome of the Fourth 
Division, Lieutenant Colonel Afework of the Air Force, 
Colonel Fikru of the Fourth Division and Captain Demissie 
of the Addis Ababa police force28. Judging by the role 
that Colonel Alem Zewd's committee played in trying to 
quell the civilian uprising against the government in the 
subsequent months, it is pretty likely that Endalkachew 
had a hand in the formation and activities of the 
officers group.
In his first Prime Ministerial address to the nation 
through the mass media on February 28, 1974, Endaldachew 
outlined two matters as requiring his urgent attention: 
the safeguarding of the nation's peace and security and 
the continuation of governmental functions. Under the 
first strategy, he placed Addis Ababa under a 9.00 p.m. 
to 6.00 a.m. curfew, brought the armed forces and the 
police under a single command within the Ministry of 
Defence and instructed them to apportion the city into 
zones and uphold law and order in their areas of
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jurisdiction29. On a later occasion, Endalkachew 
explained that the need to involve the army in the 
maintenance of law and order arose from the conviction 
that a situation beyond the control of the police had
, i n  ,
ansenJ . It appears that the command established under 
the presumably Ministry of Defence was none other than 
the intermediate officers group of late February, led by 
Alem Zewd Tesema.
Under the second strategy (continuation of 
governmental functions) Endalkachew took the interim 
measure of appointing himself as the Minister of 
Interior, in addition to his premiership, and of 
authorizing the highest officials in each Ministry to act 
as Ministers until such time as the members of the new 
cabinet were appointed31. The names of the new cabinet 
members were not announced until March 2232, because they
, . *50
were resident abroad at the time of their appointment”* .
The March, 1974, resistance to Endalkachew's 
government was no less extreme than the resistance of the 
previous months. Satisfied, it seemed, with what they 
had achieved, the NCO-led mutineers went to the King, 
thanked him for the pay increases, expressed their 
loyalty to the crown, handed over the members of the old 
cabinet whom they had detained and retired to their 
barracks34. This marked the end of the so-called "first 
round of military uprising"? but the civilian resistance 
continued from where the soldiers had left off.
The radical elements within the civilian population 
accused the army of being interested only in pay 
increases for its members and of having betrayed the 
"people's movement" by going back to their barracks.
They also argued that what was needed was not a reshuffle 
of the cabinet, but a more fundamental change. They 
distributed clandestine leaflets vilifying members of the 
new cabinet especially Endalkachew, by way of showing 
that the new cabinet was, if anything, worse than the 
old. Also, even if the strike of the Addis Ababa taxis 
drivers did not survive Aklilou's government, that of the
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teachers continued until March 20, when they decided to 
resume teaching: even then, they added more demands to
the ones issued by them a month earlier and made 
reservations to the decisions of the premier on March 14, 
regarding their previous petition35. The decision to 
resume teaching remained a theoretical one because the 
university and school students refused to attend classes, 
or did so intermittently, till the end of the academic 
year (June, 1974) because they felt their own demands 
were not met36. While, thus the educational system was in 
abeyance, several other groups went on strike and 
demonstration in March, 1974. In the hope of taking 
advantage of the chaotic conditions of the time, the 
inmates of the Addis Ababa prison (Kershele) went on the 
rampage for four days starting from March 2, resulting in 
shoot-outs and deaths among the prisoners and guards.
The disturbance came to an end only because the 
government established a committee which would go into 
the grievances of the inmates37. The Confederation of 
Ethiopian Labour Unions (Celu) brought the country to its 
knees by calling for a general strike of its 85,000 
members to come into effect as of March 8. A deepening 
of the crisis was averted within four days with CELU
concluding a seventeen point agreement with the central
. . .government in which the rights demanded were granted"* .
On March 11, the 800 employees of the Civil Aviation 
Agency petitioned the government to grant them the right 
to form a trade union, free medical services, the right 
to have their insurance paid for by the government, free 
education which would enable them to improve their 
professional skills, etc., and went on strike the same 
day39. As a result, flights were disrupted completely 
for three days and partially thereafter40. On March 13, 
the 350 employees of the Ethiopian Tobacco Monopoly 
submitted an eleven-point demand to the government and 
went on strike for a day and a half in spite of having 
agreed to suspend the strike by a month within which 
period their demands were to be met. Apart from demands
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for the right to form a trade union, pay increases, 
over-time pay, bonuses, better health care and the like, 
they also requested the removal of the Chairman of the 
Monopoly's Board of Governors (Ato Tadesse Yacob)41.
From then on, the request to have government officials 
dismissed became very common among strikers and 
demonstrators.
In addition to these strikes, there were a number of 
other organisations which submitted petitions to the 
government in March and threatened to go on strike if 
their demands were not met within a prescribed period of 
time. These included the teachers of the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church Schools4 ,^ other employees of the 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church43 and the employees of the 
Addis Ababa Municipality44.
Obviously, the question of whether the army was 
going to come on the side of the government and uphold 
law and order, or whether it was going to support the 
resistance to the government had, by now, become crucial 
for the outcome of the events of the time. But the army 
did not speak with one voice; as suggested earlier, it 
was divided between the officer-dominated group which was 
essentially pro status-quo and which felt that the 
changes of late February, 1974, were adequate, and the 
NCO-dominated group, which was after a more radical 
change, albeit inarticulate.
On March 14, for example, it was reported that 
representatives of the Fourth Division and the police of 
Eritrea went to the King and told him that he had done 
right in increasing the pay of members of the armed 
forces and of the police because, the representative 
argued, that section of the population was the least paid 
and added that the civilians, particularly the teachers, 
had no "right" to take advantage of the situation and ask 
for more pay because they had been educated at the 
expense of the country. Reportedly, the representatives 
also assured the King that they would crush those on 
strike should the King wish it45. Further, on March 16,
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it was reported that a communique had been issued by the 
Ministry of Interior warning Addis Ababans against 
distributing defamatory leaflets, because the security 
forces had been authorized to take stern measures against
• • • . Lthose who engaged m  such activities* . Thus, the 
government, with the assistance of the conservative 
elements within the security forces, did not take strong 
measures against the civilian opposition, perhaps because 
that resistance took the less disruptive form of strikes 
rather than unruly demonstrations.
A more convincing argument for the lack of strong 
action on the part of the government appears to be fear 
of a backlash from the radical NCO's and privates.
Towards the beginning of March, leaflets were being 
distributed in the name of the army arguing that they had 
gone back to their barracks only because a government 
committee was established to go into their demands and 
that their demands to the King concerned the rights of 
the army as well as those of the civilian population47.
In the subsequent weeks, a plot to overthrow the 
government including the King was being hatched by, it 
appears, the most radical elements among the NCO's and 
privates claiming to represent the First Division, the 
Fourth Division, the Air Force and the Paratroop 
Brigades. On the eve of the execution of the plot (March 
24), the representatives met and agreed that the 
beginning of the coup d'etat on the next morning would be 
marked by fighter planes flying over the capital while 
those on the ground would start taking over the national 
radio station and all other strategic places in the city. 
However, the representatives of the Paratroop Brigade 
could not agree to the plan to kill Col. Alem Zewd, who 
was commander of the same brigade, Chairman of the Joint 
Military and Police Command recently established under 
the Ministry of Defence and confidente of Endalkachew. 
When the others refused to accept the open protest of the 
Paratroop Brigade representative, he walked out on them
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and exposed the whole plot to the Ministry of Defence 
directly48.
By the next morning, the Ministry of Defence had 
moved to have the rebels rounded up and the runway of the 
Air Force base in Debre Zeit blocked with the help of the 
paratroopers. On March 27, it was reported that the 
radio station and the airport in Asmara (Eritrea) were 
being guarded by pro-government members of the security 
forces because, it was explained, some units within the 
army and the police of the province were in rebellion and
that the people were being advised, through the radio, to
go about their business normally because the situation 
was under control49. However, it was not until April 2, 
that the government officially admitted that there had 
ever been an attempted coup d'etat, and even then under 
pressure from the armed forces50.
The rebels had gone against the cardinal military 
doctrine of "absolute loyalty to the Crown"? it was, 
therefore, easy for the government and the conservative 
group of the armed forces to expose them in the eyes of 
the army. The various units of the security forces 
condemned the rebels and expressed their loyalty to the 
King and the new cabinet. These included: the Fourth
Division and the Police of Eritrea on March 2651,
unspecified brigades on March 2752, the Third Division 
and the Police of Harargue Province on March 3 053 and the 
Police of Kefa and Bale Provinces on April 2 54.
In spite of the crackdown on the rebels, April,
1974, witnessed the most violent and disruptive 
disturbances, strikes and demonstrations of the whole 
uprising of that year. Each of the communities and 
organisations that came out in protest submitted 
petitions containing a lot of points - in some cases as 
many as thirty - but most of them were adamant on two of 
the demands (the dismissal of a number of their officials 
and the right to form trade unions). It appears that 
they were quite willing to give up their other demands if 
the two were met.
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The demand for the dismissal of government officials 
was spearheaded by residents of provincial and 
sub-provincial capitals. Between March 29 and April 6, 
it was reported that there had been strikes and 
demonstrations in all of the provincial capitals with 
police actions against the demonstrators being at their 
severest in four of them: Jimma (Kefa)55, Metu
(£llibabur), Asela (Arusi) and Arbaminch (Gamo Gofa)56.
In these four provincial capitals almost all of the adult 
male population - 300,000 people in Metu alone - seem to 
have come out onto the streets demanding the dismissal of 
their governor generals (heads of the provincial 
administration) and other officials allegedly because 
they were administratively incompetent, had evicted 
tenants and given the land away to friends in Addis Ababa 
and had misappropriated millions of dollars raised from 
the public for particular projects5758 As a result of 
police brutalities against the demonstrators, two people 
were killed and eight wounded in Jimma, and a lot of
. R Q  ,people were beaten up in Metu and Arbaminch*' , and m  
Asela 1514 people were arrested.
The Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of 
parliament) was incensed by the police actions in these 
and other provinces. For four days it held an extremely 
heated debate on the subject, and, on April 4, it decided 
that the government should investigate the police 
brutalities and punish those responsible and have the 
Auditor General audit the allegations concerning the 
misappropriation of funds by the officials60. The 
central government was in a dilemma? it could neither 
meet the demands overnight, as seems to have been the 
expectation of the people, nor use the police to quell 
the disturbances without provoking further opposition. 
Under pressure from the parliament and the growing 
momentum of the opposition, the government retreated; on 
April 8, it dismissed the governor generals of Sidamo and 
Arsi61, and on April 16, those of Shoa and Kefa62. On 
those two days no less than fourteen high officials were
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. • Cl ,appointed with many more to come soon after0 , suggesting 
that the dismissals were much more extensive than was 
actually reported.
The disturbances, strikes and demonstrations of 
April, 1974, were not limited to the provincial people, 
but extended to residents of Addis Ababa, particularly 
those working for governmental and semi-governmental 
organisations. Almost all of them gave prominence to the 
demands of the dismissal of certain of their officials 
and of the right to form trade unions. For example, some 
600 employees of the Ministry of Finance submitted 
twenty-two demands and, after several days of strike, 
went back to work on April 17, only because three of the 
Ministry's officials were dismissed in accordance with 
their request and because they were promised that their 
other demands would be met in due course64. Their demand 
for the right to form a trade union was denied them on 
the grounds that they were civil servants and as such 
could not properly establish a union under the law65. 
Similarly, the employees of the Ministries of Justice66, 
Agriculture67 and Health68 all made the dismissal of 
certain of their officials a requisite for resuming work.
More protracted and disruptive were the strikes and 
demonstrations of the service rendering governmental and 
semi-governmental agencies of Addis Ababa. Strikes by 
the employees of the Civil Aviation Agency, which started 
on March ll69, did not come to an end until April l70.
As a result, flights were held up until at least five of
• • • • 71the agency's officials were dismissed . The employees 
of the Addis Ababa Municipality went on strike for 
sixteen days until April 12, and managed to have the 
Mayor dismissed by the central government73. The danger 
to the city was such that on account of the accumulating 
tons of garbage, there was fear of cholera breaking out 
any time73. The capital city's only rail link with the 
outside world was cut off from April 6, to May 9, by the 
strike of the employees of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway 
Company74. Reportedly, the implications of the delivery
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of food aid from the port of Djibouti to the interior and 
of armaments to the army in the eastern region of 
Harargue were very serious? nonetheless, the employees 
would not budge until at least thirteen of the company's 
officials were removed75. The public transport system of 
Addis Ababa was also disrupted intermittently between 
March 1376, and the beginning of May77, by the strike of 
the employees of the Lion Bus Company. On April 24, the 
city's taxis were stoned and the windows of many smashed. 
The bus drivers who sought to bring the entire transport 
system to a halt, and who actually managed to do so for a 
few days, were suspected of stoning the taxis. The 
employees of the company also demanded the dismissal of 
ten officials before they would consider going back to 
work at all78.
Further, the employees of the Telecommunications
Board who had petitioned the government on March ll79,
* ft nwent on strike on April 3 0° , and resumed work only on
June 581. In spite of the fact that they had submitted a
twenty-five point petition, they expressed their
willingness to resume work if two of their demands were
met - namely the dismissal of some of their officials and
the right to form a trade union. On the question of the
right to form a trade union, the employees of the
Telecommunications Board were joined, on April 30, by the
employees of seven other agencies. These included the
employees of the Ethiopian Light and Power Authority, the
Ethiopian Coffee Board, the Ethiopian Commercial Bank,
the Highway Authority, the Addis Ababa Municipality, the
Civil Aviation Agency and the Water and Sewerage
Authority of Addis Ababa. The first four of these went
on strike on the same day82. All of these agencies had
been arguing for years that, as industrial or profit-
making government agencies, the relevant law83 could and
should be interpreted to allow them to form trade unions.
The trade union registering government department (the
then Ministry of Community Development) rejected the
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application of the employees of the telecommunications 
Board which had argued along these lines84.
It was by no means only employees of governmental, 
semi-governmental and private organisations that took 
part in the protest movement in April, but also religious 
and various other communities that poured out onto the 
streets of Addis Ababa and submitted petitions to the 
government. An outstanding example of this was the 
demonstration of the Muslim community and their Christian 
supporters on April 20, which brought out onto the 
streets over 100,000 people. In the biggest 
demonstrations of the protest movement, they demanded, 
through placards and chants, equal status for their 
religion85. Generally, the protest movement in April was 
so ubiquitous that in moments of flippancy the story was 
told that such peripheral communities, like the beggars 
and prostitutes, also demanded the doubling of alms to be 
received and payment for services rendered, and went on
• • • Q £strike until such time as their demands were met00.
Part of the reason why Addis Ababans went on strikes 
and demonstrations quite unchallenged was because the 
army and the police were themselves involved in the 
protest movement of April. By the beginning of that 
month, they were starting to feel that the King's 
promises a month earlier to have the corrupt officials of 
Aklilou's cabinet tried by a court of law was going to 
remain unfulfilled. Further, when, on April 18, 
Endalkachew addressed some two hundred representatives of 
the armed forces in the Fourth Division, to ask them for 
their collaboration in the implementation of his 
cabinet's programmes, the one question that was asked 
again and again was why the members of Aklilou's 
government had not been placed under arrest and why they 
had not been punished?87 Incidentally, the lower house 
of parliament also added its voice, on April 22, to the 
chorus of demands that members of the old cabinet be 
placed under arrest for their own safety, the country's
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security and for facilitating the work of the new 
Cabinet88.
The security forces did not limit themselves to 
complaints; rather they took the law into their hands and 
started arresting the officials. On April 7, the armed 
forces and the police of Harague placed the local radio 
station and certain other government offices under their 
control and demanded the dismissal of Lt. Gen Haile 
Baykedgn, Second Commander of the Ground Forces, and Lt. 
Gen. Yilama Shibeshi, Commander of the Police Force. Lt. 
Gen Haile Baykedagn resigned the next day89.
These were isolated incidents, but the co-ordinating 
committee which surfaced by the last week of April in the 
Fourth Division, claiming to represent the Ground Forces, 
the Bodyguard, the Air Force, the Navy, the Police and 
various other units of the armed forces, started taking 
concentrated action against the officials. In what is 
usually referred to as "the second round of military 
uprising", the group placed under arrest Aklilou, members 
of his cabinet and their collaborators, in the last week 
of April90. What were referred to as "collaborators" 
were none other than the provincial governor generals, 
senior military and police officers and other high 
government officials of whom about two hundred were 
detained at the time91. On April 27, representatives of 
the group went to the King and expressed their allegiance 
to the Crown and to the new cabinet92. On the 29th, they 
declared that they had accomplished the task for which 
they had been established and retired to their 
barracks93.
Also, there may have been another committee calling 
itself the Co-ordinating Committee of the Armed Forces 
and the Police, let by Col. Alem-Zewd Tessema? this too 
seems to have emerged in the last week of April94. Even 
if the circumstances suggest that this was a separate 
committee from the previous one, it could, on the other 
hand, simply have been the conservative wing of the same 
committee. As Hagai Erlich suggests, it appears that
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Endalkachew, with the help of Alem-Zewd's committee, used 
the upsurge of the military movement against the old 
officials who may have been conspiring against his 
cabinet while at the same time appeasing the protestors 
by collaborating in the arrest of the allegedly corrupt 
officials95.
In May and June, the protest movement started losing 
its momentum, mainly on account of the strong measures 
that the government was able to take with the assistance 
of the conservative officers. From the time of his 
appointment as Prime Minister, Endalkachew, in his public 
addresses, had been pleading for time to deal with the 
innumerable petitions, and time for the implementation of 
his cabinet's programmes. In April, his strategy was to 
evade the petitions which were submitted to his office by 
referring them to the relevant organisations where the 
disputes could be settled between the employees and the 
management, while, in the mean time buying time for 
himself to deal with the more pressing demands of the 
army.
In the last week of April, the government started 
threatening to rigorously enforce the law on strikes and 
demonstrations and to use the security forces against 
those who went on strikes and demonstrations without 
adhering to the procedures of the law. On April 23, for 
instance, the government resolved to take appropriate 
measures against industrial workers who went on strike 
outside the prescriptions of the law, civil servants who 
went on strike at all, and against those who went on 
demonstration except J,
in accordance with the law and announced that the 
security forces had been authorized to enforce these 
decisions96. On April 30, the government issued a 
communique citing its decisions of April 23, and in 
pursuance of it, warned civil servant who were on strike 
that they would be replaced by new employees if they did 
not resume work immediately, and directed managers to 
keep a record of strict working hours97. On April 30,
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the Ministry of Justice published, in the official 
newspaper, all the relevant Penal Code provisions against 
strikes and warned that they would be rigorously enforced 
as of then98. On May 3, the Ministry of Interior did the 
same with the laws on demonstrations and added new
, , QQ
restrictions on thenr .
From early on there was a half-hearted attempt to 
use the labour court in the then Ministry of Community 
Development to enforce these laws. It will be remembered 
that CELU, which represented a lot of the workers in the 
private sector, had called for a general strike by its 
members and that it was called off after four days of an 
effective strike (March 7 -11) because CELU had reached a 
seventeen point agreement with the central government.
On March 18, the Employers Federation of Ethiopia applied 
to the Employer-Employee Board asking it to declare the 
general strike illegal and to find that the agreement 
reached between CELU and the central government did not 
mind the Employers' Federation. On April 20, the court 
decided in favour of the Employers' Federation on both 
counts and, in spite of the fact that the agreement 
between CLU and the government had provided that no 
reprisals would be taken against the workers who took 
part in the general strikes, it ruled that the workers 
would not be paid for the days they were on strike. CELU 
then declared the decision illegal and convened a meeting 
to consider what measures to take against it100.
The court's decisions did nothing to quell the 
rebellious mood of CELU. It continued to challenge the 
authority of the government so much that on April 30, the 
Ministry of Defence accused CELU of promoting lawlessness 
and strikes especially by civil servants and warned it to 
stop these illegal activities or face closure101. In its 
letter to the Prime Minister, CELU expressed its deep 
shock at the communique of the Ministry of defense, 
denied that it was promoting lawlessness, declared the 
warning illegal and asserted that threatening workers 
into submission would only damage the economy. Further,
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it claimed that, since the armed forces shared the 
demands of the workers concerning living conditions and 
since they had time and again, sympathetically assisted 
the workers in promoting the same demands, they knew that 
CELU stood for the poor and that it was concerned about 
the country's progress102. The Prime Ministers' office 
took exception to the fact that CELU's letter was 
despatched to the local and international press before it 
was received by itself and pronounced that everyone 
including CELU was under the law103. Also, the labour 
court had occasion to entertain petitions from individual 
unions and employers104, but its decisions were not 
effective since the parties continued to challenge them.
More effective than the law courts in quelling the 
strikes was what was called the High National Security 
Commission, which was probably created by the Minister of 
Defence (Gen. Abiye) behind the back of Endalkachew. 
According to Endalkachew, the commission was a revival of 
the Military and Police Joint Command which was 
established by him two months earlier so as to uphold law 
and order and which was dissolved later as the security 
situation improved. Further, he explained that the 
differences between the two were that the jurisdiction of 
the Joint Command was limited to the capital city whereas 
that of the Commission extended to the rest of the 
country as well and that the composition of the Joint 
Command was limited to the members of the army and the 
police whereas that of the Commission included civilians 
as well. Despite this acknowledgement of the commission 
by Endalkachew, Gilkes points out that the latter took it 
as a ploy of Abiye to overthrow him105.
Of the cases dealt with by the Commission, that of 
the Telecommunications Board was most striking. On May 
16, the employees of that agency submitted a twenty-five 
point petition to the commission and asked it to deal 
with some of the points and leave the rest to be dealt 
with by the management of the Board. The Commission then 
held a number of meetings with the representatives of the
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employees in which the one question of the dismissal of 
certain of the agency's officials became extremely 
controversial. The Commission took the position that 
individual rights cannot be deprived without due process 
of law? the representatives of employees on the other had 
argued that since the demand was that of the majority, 
the Commission should enforce it without asking for 
evidence to prove the guilt of officials concerned. On 
May 25, the representatives of the Employees held a 
meeting of all the workers of the Board and communicated 
the decisions of the Commission to it. Representatives 
of the Commission who were also attending the meeting 
felt that the decisions were misrepresented and tried to 
stop the meeting unsuccessfully. At the end of the 
meeting, the Commission had twenty-four of the employees 
arrested and the rest dispersed by force106. After the 
government brought further pressure to bear on the 
employees107, they all resumed work on June 6 with the 
sole demand now that their colleagues under arrest be 
released.
A further example of the Commission's activities is 
its intervention in the dispute between the employees and 
officials of the General Post Office. On May 2, the 
employees of that agency locked out seven of their 
officials. Since the employees had done this once before 
and since on that occasion soldiers sent by the 
Commission opened the offices of the officials and let 
them in, the employees responsible for this second 
lock-out were placed under arrest, but released on the 
next day because the arrest led to a general strike of 
protest by all the employees of the General Post 
Office108109. Further, the Commission conducted a series 
of consultations with the Ministry of Education, 
teachers, students and parents and, on May 11, it 
published in the official newspaper the decisions it 
arrived at. It hoped that the decisions would lead to 
the re-opening of the schools which were shut as a result 
of student class boycotts110, but all in vain.
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If the role of the Commission in these cases looked 
ineffective, its authority was nevertheless, being 
recognized by other agencies. On June 17, the Diabaco 
Cotton Spinning Factory was closed and both employees and 
employers petitioned the Commission accusing each other 
of being responsible for the closure111. On June 23, the 
employers were able to dismiss on hundred and fourteen 
workers and to keep forty full-time employees of the 
factory out of work until their cases were resolved112, 
measures that would have been undreamt of but two months 
earlier. By June, the urban uprising had begun to thaw.
CONCLUSION
What is clear from the preceding pages is that the 
rural populations of Ethiopia were not involved in the 
uprising which prevailed over the first six months of 
1974. Despite that, leftist observers of the events have 
maintained that the peasant had always been involved in 
insurrectionary protests against the exploiting class and 
continued to do so during the uprising under 
consideration. In support of their claim, they often 
cite the armed struggle of the Oromo in Bale from 
1960-1970, the 1967 resistance of the farmers of the 
north-western province of Gojam against tax reforms, and 
the thousands of farmers (mostly tenants) who were 
dislodged from their holdings as a result of the 
development of commercial farms in several areas as of 
the late 1960's.
However, the Bale resistance involved all classes of 
the area and was based more on ethnic and religious 
considerations than anything else; further, it was led by 
an organized elite helped and abetted by the Republic of 
Somalia. Also, in the Gojam resistance, all the upper 
and lower classes took a common position against the 
government attempts to measure their holdings for the 
purpose of tax evaluations because, they feared, the 
measurement was a government ploy to introduce land 
reform in the region. Further, the peasants displaced
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from the commercial farms left their holdings sheepishly 
and the bulk of them became wage labours in the
neighbouring farms and towns, or joined the pool of the
unemployed there. The fact remains that there is no 
evidence to show that the peasants of the north or those 
of the south ever acted either independently or except 
for those in Bale as part of an organised political 
movement. Moreover, there is no evidence to show that 
they behaved any differently in the uprising of 1974. 
Their mobilization and absorption into the political life 
of the country did not take place until later.
In fact, the revolutionary credentials of the
Ethiopian peasantry compared poorly to that of the nomads
whom the literature on Ethiopia have on the whole 
ignored. As argued earlier, the nomads of the Sahel 
plains in Eritrea and those of the Ogaden had, since 
about 1960, been involved in armed resistance against the 
ancien regime. Like the Oromos of Bale, the resistance 
of these nomads was primarily based on religious and 
ethnic considerations and was led by an organized elite 
with substantial international support. Though the 
general literature on the revolutionary potential of 
nomads leaves a lot to be desired, the Ethiopian 
experience seems to suggest that the nomads can be as 
revolutionary as the peasants if not more. Be that as it 
may, despite the fact that the nomads had struggled for a 
long time and may well have contributed to the decline of 
the ancien regime, they did not play any role in the 
uprising of 1974 which was quite outside their reach.
As the topic of this chapter suggests, the uprising 
of 1974 was based on the "urban" residents who numbered 
about 3 million out of a total population of almost 32 
million. Of these, it was only the civil servants, 
industrial workers, the army and the students who took an 
active part in the protest movement. The total number of 
civil servants was 100,000 about a third of whom were 
employed in the state owned or dominated enterprises; the 
employees of some of the state owned or dominated
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enterpises like the Ethiopian Air Lines were allowed to 
form trade unions but most were not. The Confederation 
of Ethiopian Trade Unions, which included the employees 
of the state owned enterprises which could form unions, 
had a total membership of about 80 thousand. The 
Ethiopian Teachers' Association whose members were civil 
servants was 18 thousand strong. In addition to the 
civil servants, there was the army of 55 thousand 
including the ten thousand territorial army in active 
force and a police force of about 30 thousand. The 
number of enrolled school students was about 70 thousand 
and that of the university six thousand. Thus, out of 
the total urban population of 3 million, the politically 
active group made up of civil servants, workers, the 
soldiers and students was less than 300,000? the rest of 
the urban residents were either self-employed, part of 
the informal economy, or unemployed and hence, dependent 
on those who earned their living from the formal and 
informal sectors.
In early March, the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade 
Unions called for a general strike by its members? the 
government gave in to all the demands of the 
Confederation and the strike was called off within a few 
days. Following that, the headquarters of the 
Confederation became the focal point at which a lot of 
the demonstrations by all interest groups (including 
those that were not members of the Confederation) started 
and or ended. This was mainly due to the activists 
within the interest groups who, because of their 
ideological leanings, sought to give the workers a 
leading role in the uprising and encouraged the 
demonstrators to go to the headquarters of the 
Confederation. The headquarters had become the focus of 
the demonstrations so much that in April the government 
was forced to accuse the Confederation of instigating all 
the demonstrations and strikes and warned it to stop such 
activities or face closure.
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Despite this, there are considerations that make the 
active participation of the working class in the popular 
uprising of 1974 questionable. First, the members of the 
Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions were university 
or school graduates and, hence, part of the petit 
bourgeois intellectual substratum? in other words, they 
were not a product of the industrial work force who got 
to their position by dirtying their hands with labour or 
the production belt. Second, the industrial workers of 
the individual enterprises, as opposed to their national 
Confederation which held only one general strike in the 
six months of social upheaval, were involved in strikes 
and lockouts of employers only in a handful of cases and 
even then for only a few days in each case. By contrast, 
the strikes and demonstrations of quite a number of the 
government agencies like the Civil Aviation Agency, the 
Telecommunications, and the Municipality of Addis Ababa 
were much more protracted, lasting for months on end.
It is believed that the civilian left and the army 
competed for the vanguardship of the urban uprising of 
1974 much more than the industrial workers. The civilian 
left had at its disposal the University Students Union of 
Addis Ababa with the help of which it organised the 
university and school students to boycott classes , hold 
rallies and go out on demonstrations for the duration of 
the uprising. The influence of the civilian left was not 
limited to the students but also extended to the 
employees of the government and semi-government agencies 
which were embroiled in the uprising. The school and 
university graduates who were working for these 
government and semi-government agencies managed to 
dominate the steering committees that sprang up in those 
agencies in the course of the uprising. The functions of 
the steering committees were presiding over the general 
meetings of the employees of their respective agencies, 
writing petitions to the government, preparing papers and 
placards for the public, and organising strikes and 
demonstrations. The civilian left played an active role
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in all this not as affiliates of any political 
organisation but as individuals. At the time there was 
an underground organisation called Abiyot (Revolution) 
which was based among the civilian left; however, as 
opposed to its couterparts abroad, it was completely 
inept and played a minimal role in the uprising if at 
all.
Equally important, if not more so, was the role 
played by the security forces in the uprising of 1974. 
Their units also had steering committees which led the 
discussions concerning the mood of the protest movement 
among the civilan population, wrote petitions to the 
government, prepared papers for distribution to the 
public, and generally considered what measures to take.
As it happened, the measures they took in exacting 
concessions from the government and in arresting the 
officials of the ancien regime were much more effective 
for the "success" of the uprising than any of the 
measures taken by the civilian population. In a sense, 
the uprising could be seen as a competition between the 
state and the civilian population to win over the 
security forces to one side or the other; as it happened, 
the security forces erred on the side of supporting the 
protest movement. It is doubtful if the uprising would 
have persisted had it not been for this fact.
Despite their numerical insignificance compared to 
the rest of the population, the politically active elite 
managed to hold the ancien regime to ransom. The 
explanation for this must be sought in the crisis of the 
ancien regime itself, in Haile Selassie's government and 
in the cabinets of Aklilou and Endalkachew. As argued in 
the previous chapter, Haile Selassie's autocracy had not 
only been buffetted and discredited by internal and 
external opposition but also its head, the monarch, had 
become too old and senile to employ even his old skills 
effectively. Since the early 20th century, Haile 
Selassie had been riding waves of mutinies and public 
protests by blaming his officials for things that had
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gone wrong in the government and by compromising the 
positions of his officials by way of concessions to the 
protestors. In 1974, he followed a similar strategy: 
not only did he sacrifice Aklilou's cabinet in the hope 
of appeasing the security forces but also told his 
officials not to resist arrests by the army and to trust 
him to be able ride the wave of the protest movement once 
again. However, the mutinies and protests of 1974 had an 
unpresidentedly wide social base? they were too deep 
rooted to be managed by anyone let alone the monarch 
whose senility had given rise to a power vacuum in that 
year.
That Haile Selassie had left a power vacuum was 
obvious more to his officials than to anyone else. The 
monarch's monopoly of power had left them without any 
power base in the society including the army and had, 
further, rendered them too weak and divided to replace 
him. Those of the ministers who attempted to fill in the 
vacuum only managed to trip over each other and fall 
together. The February "resignation” of Aklilou's 
cabinet was no doubt a result of the demand of an NCO 
committee of the time; however, there is evidence to show 
that Endalkachew who had an eye to the prime ministerial 
position had a hand in instigating the demand, in 
influencing the monarch's appointment of a prime minister 
in his favour, and in bringing about the arrest in April 
of hundreds of the officials including members of 
Aklilou's cabinet . Members of Endalkachew's cabinet 
were more from an aristrocratic stock than their 
predecessors; as some of the pamphlets of the time 
indicated, this was incongruent with the populist spirit 
of the popular uprising. Be that as it may,
Endalkachew's cabinet could not hold together. 
Endalkachew's bid to become prime minister was contested 
by Lt. Gen. Abiye Abebe who was merely appointed Minister 
of Defence. However, the competition between the two 
continued, leading in March to the establishment of Alem 
Zewd's committee by Endalkachew for the purpose of
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coordinating the security forces, and in May to the 
establishment of the National Security Commission by 
Abiye for the same purpose. Though these were admirable 
attempts at building a power base within the army, they 
were at the same time directed against one aristocratic 
group by another with spill overs to the security forces 
which almost resulted in an armed confrontation among 
them. The uprising of January to June, 1974, was limited 
to the urban areas. However, this was sufficient to 
completely disorientate the ancien regime which, because 
of its already weakened position in the society, was 
unable to deal with it.
In effect, what the events of January to June, 1974, 
show is the total collapse of the ancien regime and the 
absence of any obvious successor to it.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Turning of an Urban Movement into a 
Junta Dictatorship
(A) The Emergence of the Derg
In the organisations in which the members had unions 
or associations, the task of co-ordinating the demands, 
strikes and demonstrations of February - June, 1974, fell 
on the democratically elected leaders and committees. 
Examples of these were the Confederation of Ethiopian 
Labour Unions (CELU), the Ethiopian Teachers Association 
and the University Student's Union of Addis Ababa. In the 
other organisations, spontaneous committees sprung up in 
the course of the movement and took on the task of 
co-ordinating the protest activities in their respective 
organisations. Also, in some of the provincial capitals, 
notably in Jimma (Kefa), committees made up of similar 
corporate groups went as far as temporarily occupying the 
local administrations and setting themselves up as 
popular governments, albeit for a short time. Needless to 
say, the most active in all these committees were the 
radical left.
According to Lefort, the emergence of Co-ordinating 
Committees within the army goes as far back as late 1973 
when, what he calls 'Army Mess Committees' started 
compiling lists of strictly corporatist grievances, at 
the instigation of senior officers who sought to create 
discontentment among the army against the Prime Minister 
(Aklilou Habte-Wolde).1 By the end of February, 1974, 
highly politicised unit co-ordinating committees were 
established at least in the Air-Force and in the First, 
Second and Fourth Divisions2 and spread to the remaining 
units thereafter. The military-police co-ordinating 
committees (like the ones that emerged in February and 
April) were different from what we have called 'the unit
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co-ordinating committees' in that they purported to 
represent all or most of the units instead of individual 
ones. Finally, the Military-Police Joint Command of late 
February (created by Endal^ lCachew) and the High National 
Security Commission of late April (created by Abiye) were 
different from the others in that they were not 
established by the armed forces and the police but by the 
government in order to arrest the tide of the movement.
The Military-Police Joint Command and the High 
National Security Commission were essentially pro-status 
quo; with the help of the moderates in the other 
committees, they tried to stabilise Endalkachew's 
cabinet. On the other hand, the radicals in the unit 
co-ordinating committees and the military police co­
ordinating committees sought to destabilise the 
government, as they managed to do during the first and 
second military uprisings of late February and April when 
the civilian protest movement seemed to have the upper 
hand. Even if it was clear that power had fallen into the 
hands of the armed forces in the course of the movement, 
they were unable to take any decisive measures because of 
the continuously changing balance of power between the 
moderates and the radicals among these groups.
In May and June, 1974, the High National Security 
Commission, chaired by the Minister of Defence (Lt. 
General Abiye Abebe), weakened the movement by 
interceding in disputes between the employees and 
management and, when necessary, by the use and threat of 
force. Needless to say, its decisions were enforced by 
the lower ranking officers, NCO's and privates. In this, 
the radical members of the military-police co-ordinating 
committees found they were acting against the very 
civilian and military activists with whom they had 
identified themselves time and again. More important, 
perhaps, was the fact that in the aftermath of the 1960 
abortive coup d'etat, the rebels in the First Division 
(the Bodyguard) were executed, imprisoned or dismissed 
from the army for treason and related offences. The
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radicals of the 1974 movement feared that a similar fate 
might befall them for having been involved in mutinies 
and incarceration of the government officials, should the 
High National Security Commission succeed in reinstating 
the ancien regime. Spurred by considerations like this, 
the activists, at least, in Addis Ababa, continued to 
hold informal meetings wherever they could: private 
houses, the wooded outskirts of the capital, churchyards 
and the like. The purpose of these meetings was to try 
and promote discontent among members of the armed forces 
by pointing out to them that the detainees, instead of 
being treated like criminals, had their families visit 
them freely and provide them with sumptuous meals and 
glorious birthday parties while millions were starving as 
a result of the drought. In this way, the military 
radicals and the civilian militants who were able to take 
part in these activities managed to keep the spirit of 
the movement alive within the armed forces.3
Apparently, the Government, with the assistance of 
the moderates in the army, had arrested or sent to remote 
areas some of the radical members of the military-police 
co-ordinating committee, after the first and second 
rounds of the military uprisings. Some of the others, 
particularly those who came from Addis Ababa, and 
Debre-Zeit, survived the arrest and banishments4 and 
continued to struggle. Endalkachew unwittingly helped the 
armed forces organise themselves? seeing his downfall in 
the success of the National Security Commission's 
quelling of the uprising, he went to the various units 
and told them to put their house in order. According to 
Hagai Erlich, some twelve to sixteen of these radicals 
decided to form their own Co-ordinating Committee in 
early June 1974.5 The committee was laid by a Major 
Atnafu Abate from the Fourth Division and by Major Tefera 
Tekle-ab of army engineers; other members of the 
committee included aircraftsman Girma Fisiha, Major 
Tibebu, Major Genetu, Major Sisay Habte, and Major Fisiha 
Desta.6 This marks the beginning of the third round of
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the military uprising which proved more decisive that the 
first two.
The third round of the uprising drew its strength 
not from another upsurge of civilian unrest but from an 
ability to co-ordinate the armed forces in and around 
Addis Ababa through the exploitation of the grievances of 
the veterans of U.N. military operations in Korea and the 
Congo, in 1951 and 1960 respectively. These veterans were 
led to believe that the government had paid them only 
part of what the U.N. had assigned for them and 
misappropriated the rest. Earlier on they had petitioned 
the government for a remedy in vain. In June 1974, they, 
at the instigation of EndalJCachew, appealed to the king 
against the Ministry of Defence (Abiye) only to be told 
to go and see Endalkachew. In their frustration and 
apparently with the encouragement of Endalkachew the 
leaders of the veterans turned to the radicals and, with 
Major Atnafu's co-ordinating committee, started promoting 
discontent among the armed forces of Addis Ababa and the 
surrounding areas.7 Once again, the balance had tipped in 
favour of the radicals.
The only task that remained to be accomplished by 
Major Atnafu's Co-ordinating Committee was the bringing 
of the provincial military units within the orbit of the 
movement. Accordingly, the committee promoted among them 
the idea that the purpose of the then movement was to 
arrest and bring to justice the officials of the ancien 
regime who were still at large. By then, the popular 
presumption within the army was that the officials were 
guilty of corruption and were responsible for the 
backwardness of the country and that the Investigation 
Commission was too inept to accomplish its task. By 
mid-June, 1974, the bulk of the provincial units were 
apparently aware of the existence of the Co-ordinating 
Committee.8
By all accounts, the last straw seems to have been 
when, on June 26, two groups of M.P.'s (one led by an Ato 
Kagnew Kitachew and the other by a Major Admasse Zelleke)
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went to the Fourth Division and addressed the soldiers 
there about the detained officials. The first group 
advocated the continued detention of the officials while 
the second pleaded for their release on bail.9 The 
emotive appeal of Ato Kagnew greatly aroused members of 
the Co-ordinating Committee which took advantage of the 
occasion and called upon the soldiers there to take up 
arms and be on the ready to come out of their barracks 
and arrest the old officials.10 Major Admasses's group 
was roundly condemned as having been instigated by the 
officials of the ancien regime.11 Lt. General Abiye who 
still believed to have been in control of the armed 
forces and who was planning to make a move against the 
Co-ordinating Committee is thought to have been behind 
Major Admasse's intercession.12
According to some sources it was at this juncture 
(June 26, 1974) that Major Altnafu's Co-ordinating 
Committee sent telegrams to the provincial military and 
police units asking them to delegate three 
representatives each in order to participate in the 
leadership of the movement or that Major Tefera captured 
the radio station on behalf of the Co-ordinating 
Committee and broadcasted the same message to the 
provincial units.13 However, considering the speed at 
which the Committee was able to hold a general meeting 
and to start acting, it is more logical to assume that 
the involvement of the provincial unit was invoked 
earlier on;according to Hagai Erlich for instance, some 
thirty-five to forty of the military units were invited 
to send such representatives by the middle of June.14 On 
June 28, the bulk of the delegates were assembled in the 
headquarters of the Fourth Division (Addis Ababa). Some, 
like the ground forces, the Air-Force, the Navy and the 
Police of the Second Division (Eritrea) did not send 
their delegates until July 5 15 and still others until 
later. The publicised number of the final membership of 
the Co-ordinating Committee was a hundred and twenty - a 
figure which apparently included the clerical staff of
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the Committee - but the actual number of representatives 
was a hundred and six.
The decision to ask the units to send three 
delegates each was in order to have an equal 
representation of the junior officers up to and including 
majors, NCO's and privates, which suggests that the body 
so created was composed roughly in that proportion. The 
senior officers were excluded because they were 
identified with the ancien regime. Thus, on June 28,
1974, was created what was then called the Co-ordinating 
Committee of the Armed Forces, the Police and the 
Territorial Army16 and later variously as the Armed 
Forces Committee, the Provisional Military Administrative 
Council, the Provisional Military Government, or simply 
as the Derg (the committee).
(B) 'The Creeping Coup' (June 28 - September 12 1974).
Major Atnafu was, perhaps, elected Chairman of the 
Co-ordinating Committee soon after the Provincial 
Military Units expressed in the middle of June, their 
willingness to collaborate with the third round of 
military uprisings.17 On the very first day of the Derg's 
plenum (June 28) which was chaired by Major Atnafu Abate 
of the Fourth Division, the leadership question was 
raised again. A group within the Derg called upon the 
assembly not to waste its time by discussing the fate of 
the officials under arrest and those still at large, but 
to focus on the questions of adopting 'wise' leadership 
and of rising to the challenge of the time and living up 
to the expectations of the movement. On the next day, the 
leadership question came to the forefront and, after some 
tense discussions, Major Mengistu Haile-Mariam of the
Division, was elected chairman, Major Atnafu Abate 
Vice-Chairman and Major Gebreges Welde-Hana 
Secretary-General of the Derg.18 It appears that the 
stirring-up of the leadership question among these 
delegates, most of whom did not know one another, and
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also the outcome of the elections, was a result of 
personal ambitions and diplomacy in the corridors of the 
Fourth Division.
The appointment of the non-Derg member, Lt. General 
Aman Andom, as the chairman of the Derg was announced 
officially on September 13, 1974 as though it was made on 
the previous day, 19 whereas in actual fact it seems to 
have been made on June 30, 1974.20 His credentials could 
only have strongly recommended him to the Derg: he was 
involved in the activities of the radical wing of the 
Military-Police Co-ordinating Committee starting from its 
inception21? he was popular with the army in general? he 
had, behind him, long years of experience in governmental 
affairs: as an Eritrean he could be expected to diffuse 
the Eritrean secessionist demand? and, he was an 
acknowledged hero in the fight against the Republic of 
Somalia, which had territorial ambitions over Ethiopia. 
From early July on, Lt. General Aman started acting as 
Head of State, receiving Ambassadors and other foreign 
dignitaries on behalf of the state.22 Be that as it may, 
the effect of Lt. General Aman's appointment on the 
ordering of the leadership was to make Major Mengistu 
First Vice-Chairman and Major AtnafuAbate second 
Vice-Chairman of the Derg.
At the same time as it was considering the question 
of leadership, the Derg was trying to define the purpose 
for which it was established. As noted earlier the 
purpose for its establishment was to detain the officials 
of the ancien regime, allegedly because they were 
obstructing the work of the new cabinet of Endalkachew, 
and bring them to justice alongside their colleagues 
already in prison. The need to co-ordinate the armed 
forces and avoid bloodshed among them appears to have 
been the other purpose of its formation. At any rate, 
once the Derg was assembled, the more radical elements 
within it considered these considerations too mundane a 
target for such a representative body to dwell on, and 
started whipping up the emotion of its members with a
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view to rallying support for a more radical stance. 
Reminiscing about the first three days of the Derg's 
general meetings some thirteen years later, Major 
Mengistu Haile-Mariam 23 said that it seemed as though 
'fire' was coming out of the mouths of the speakers when 
they were making speeches about the backwardness of 
Ethiopia, its history, the suffering of its people and 
the progress made in other countries. The small, round 
room in the Fourth Division where they met, he said, was 
gradually becoming charged with emotion until finally it 
reached a climax and exploded with scenes of war songs 
and declarations of readiness to die 'Not the death of a 
dog but that of a lion' in the course of liberating the 
Ethiopian people from oppression. On the third day (June 
30) they took an oath never to see the suffering and 
humiliation of the Ethiopian people again and to remain 
united to the point of death.24 According to a Derg 
report, of September 1975, they actually swore an oath 
"In the name of the living God" not to betray the secrets 
of the Derg.
One of the spin-offs of all this was the adoption of 
a policy statement called 'Ethiopia First', which was 
announced on July 4 25, the contents of which were
• 0 fi *published on July 10. Variously referred to by the 
Derg as its motto, slogan, philosophy, principle, 
ideology etc., 'Ethiopia First' had thirteen sections, 
most of which related to the issues of the time. Examples 
of this are: allegiance to the King and Crown, Cabinet 
reform, the trial of the corrupt and inept officials, 
speedy implementation of the draft constitution, close 
collaboration with the cabinet, the continuation of 
humanitarian aid to the drought affected people, foreign 
aid from friendly countries in general and expansion of 
tourism. The other points reflect the Derg's long-term 
strategy: protection of rights for the entire people, 
quick development of the people, modern legislation on 
employer-employee relations, modernisation of the 
traditional beliefs that obstruct the development and
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unity of the country, increased participation by the 
people in the development process, betterment and modern 
civilization on the basis of nationalism and equality 
rather than on the basis of the age old discrimination 
along national and religious lines, and the conviction 
that the movement of the armed forces and police would 
result in change without blood-shed which would be 
possible because of the uniqueness of the country's 
history and culture.27
Actually, the Derg did consider overthrowing Haile 
Selassie's government some time in early July but 
rejected it because its members could not see eye-to-eye 
on the subject.28 However, this did not stand in the way 
of its actions, which it started taking at the same time 
as it was expressing its allegiance to the crown and to 
Endalkachew's cabinet.29/30 On June 28, the Derg had 
placed the mass media under its control. In July and 
August, it used radio, television, newspapers, letters to 
government departments, the backing of the army and the 
police, and the guidance of 'Ethiopia First' to exercise 
increasing significant executive and legislative 
functions to the detriment of the powers of the cabinet, 
the King and Parliament - a move which has aptly been 
described as the 'Creeping Coup'.
The Derg did not abandon the primary purpose for 
which it was established (the arrest of the officials of 
the ancien regime who were still at large). In a series 
of publications in the main newspaper of the government 
(Addis Zemen), it issued long lists of names of these 
officials and called upon them to give themselves up or 
to face confiscation of their assets. In July and 
August, it was reported that about one hundred of such 
officials had been detained. Most of them gave 
themselves up voluntarily? but those who did not were 
arrested by force and also had their assets confiscated, 
through Derg letters to such agencies as the banks, the 
municipality and the Ministry of Land Reform31.
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At the same time as it was placing the officials 
under arrest, the Derg set about undermining 
Endalkachew's cabinet and gradually reducing it to a 
status of subservience. On June 29, some Derg 
representatives went to the cabinet and proposed the 
establishment of a joint committee between the Derg and 
the cabinet, ostensibly to study '...the situation in the 
country...'32. Within about a week of this, no less than 
ten meetings of the joint committee, made up of four 
cabinet ministers and some Derg representatives were held 
mainly to try and thrash out the relations between the 
two bodies"* .
One of the early questions raised by the cabinet was 
whether it was appropriate for it to deal with a body, 
whose legal status was undefined, to say the least. This 
prompted the Derg to send a delegation on July 3 to the 
King to ask his permission, among other things, to work 
closely with the cabinet in the interest of the country's 
security, unity, development and the improvement of the 
army and the police. The King, who had the power to take 
any measures34 he deemed to be in the interest of the 
country,35 granted the request.
With the legal hurdle out of the way, the Derg 
representatives explained to the joint committee that the 
aims of the Derg were "Ethiopia First", the arrest of
o  /r
corrupt officials and the removal of obstacles from 
both within and outside the cabinet which might stand in 
the way of its smooth operations. On their part, the 
cabinet representatives explained that the cabinet had 
adopted its programme of action on April 9, 1974, but was 
unable to "solve" the problems of the country because of 
the demonstrations, the absence of security, and because 
responsibility was entrusted to the cabinet while power 
was vested elsewhere. The problems of the country were 
indicated to be the drought , the decline of the tourist 
trade, lack of confidence by foreign investors in the 
country and decline of agricultural output due to 
aggravating relations between the tenants and landlords.
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The most important and protracted issue discussed in 
the joint committee proved to be the question of who 
should tackle these problems next. The cabinet 
representative suggested that another cabinet - Derg 
joint committee should be established combining both 
responsibility and power and that the Derg, or some of 
its members, be despatched to the provinces to created 
branch offices which would come under the committee.
After consultations with the Derg, its representatives 
rejected the cabinet's proposals and, instead, told the 
cabinet to continue working under the constitution and to 
tackle the problems itself. They said that the Derg 
preferred to continue working outside the cabinet. The 
cabinet could do nothing beyond expressing doubt on the 
wisdom of the Derg's response.37
Clearly, this was a show-down between the two 
contending parties (the Derg and the Cabinet). As 
already noted, however, the Derg had the armed forces, 
the police and the mass media behind it. Further, it 
had, by now, the blessing of the King and had, as a 
result, acquired some semblance of legality. Under the 
circumstances, the Derg was in a position to assert its 
will against the helpless cabinet38 whose members were, 
by now, probably divided between those who were willing 
to work under the Derg and those who were not. The Derg 
acted to isolate those members who were not amenable to 
its whims? On July 16, it arrested Lt. General Abiye 
Abebe (Minister of Defence)39 and on July 22 it replaced 
Lij Endalkachew Mekonnen by Lij Michael Imru as Prime 
Minister40. In addition to his other responsibilities, 
Lt. General Aman Andom was appointed Minister of Defence 
in a subsequent Cabinet reshuffle41. The Derg's control 
of the cabinet was now complete.
The next to fall prey to the Derg's designs was the 
King, who by then was helpless and isolated, most of his 
close proteges having been arrested, and the rest having 
betrayed him. As of July 17, the tone of the mass media 
turned harsher than before. Almost every other day, it
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started issuing lengthy and populist articles vilifying 
Haile Selassie's government as having been highly corrupt 
and exploitative42. By the second half of August it 
appears that the Derg felt the King had been sufficiently 
discredited in the eyes of the public for it to start 
dissolving the institutions around the Crown (with the 
help of which the monarch had exercised his prerogative 
powers) as well as confiscating the enterprises in which 
the King and the other members of the Royal Family had a 
vested interest. Hence, on August 15, it was reported 
that the Minister of Pen (the King's Secretariat) had 
been brought under the Derg until such time as it was 
transferred to the cabinet43. Two days later, it was 
announced that the crown council, the special brigade and 
the Chilot (a court of final instance, presided over by 
the King) had all been dissolved44. Also, the Lion Bus 
Company (August 28)45, the St. George Brewery and the 
Haile Selassie PriZa Trust (September 6)46, were brought 
under the administration of the Ministry of Finance 
because, it was explained, most of their assets and 
shares belonged to the King and the other members of the 
Royal Family47.
Thus, in July and August, 1974, the Derg
incarcerated the bulk of the top officials of the ancien
regime, reduced the cabinet to a status of subservience
and isolated the King from the exercise of power without
any opposition from the public. If there was any
feedback it was from the militant left which condemned
the measures as being haphazard and off the socialist
path and demanded for more and more radical actions to be
taken by the Derg, or preferably, by a "People's
Government" to be made up of the representatives of the
social groups, including the army, which had been active
in the popular uprising48. Under these circumstances,
Derg radicals were able to rally support within the Derg 
• 49for carrying out a coup d'etat^ .
As noted earlier, the questions of overthrowing 
Haile Selassie's government and the nature of the
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government that should replace it were considered by the 
Derg, in early July, but postponed until such time as a 
compromise on the issues raised could be reached. Again, 
the same questions came to the forefront in early 
September and were debated between the sixth and the 
tenth of that month50. Apparently, seven alternative 
proposals were discussed in those meetings: to maintain
the Crown and remove the obstacles from within and 
outside the cabinet, to maintain the Crown and replace 
the cabinet with a new one, to maintain the Crown and 
establish a civilian - military joint cabinet, to replace 
the Crown with a provisional military head of state and 
improve the cabinet, to replace the Crown and the cabinet 
with a military government, or to replace the Crown and 
the cabinet with a people's government51. The final 
verdict was not proclaimed until September 12, 1974, 
which has since been annually celebrated as Revolution 
Day.
Since, in the summer of 1974, the Derg was already 
in a position to declare curfews, effect arrests, 
confiscate assets and appoint ministers including the 
premier, it can arguably be maintained that it had become 
the government as of June 28, 1974, when it was 
established. However, the formalization of that fact did 
not take place until September 12, 1974, when it issued 
proclamations 1 and 2 which suspended the existing 
constitution, deposed King Haile Selassie I, and 
dissolved the parliament. The proclamations replaced 
these institutions with the Derg which was declared to 
have assumed "...full governmental powers..." until such 
time as a people's assembly was established52.
In part, the assumption of "...full governmental 
powers..." meant that the Derg appointed itself as a 
collective head of state53. The Derg was to express this 
status through its chairman who was authorised to grant 
audience to foreign guests and ambassadors and to execute 
international agreements on behalf of, and in accordance 
with the decisions of the Derg54. Also, it was envisaged
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that the functions of the head of state would be 
transferred to the Crown Prince, Merid Azmach 
Asfaw-Wosen, who was to be crowned as a constitutional 
monarch upon his return to the country55 from Switzerland 
where he was staying for medical treatment56.
More important was the fact that the Derg was 
entrusted with sweeping law-making powers. Thus, it was 
authorised to enact "all types of laws"57, declare war 
and take all necessary measures to safeguard the 
integrity and defence of the country58, and determine 
which treaties and international agreements would be 
subject to ratification before becoming binding on the 
state, and ratify the sameJ . An example of the Derg's 
law-making power noted earlier is the issuance by it of 
proclamations which, under the suspended constitution 
could only have been promulgated by parliament and the 
King.
Even if articulated less clearly than its law-making 
power, the executive powers of the Derg were no less 
extensive than the former. Obviously, such 
authorisations of the Derg as the power to take any 
action necessary to safeguard the defence and integrity
of the state60, had implications for both legislative and
executive powers. More specific was the mandate of the 
Derg not only to make laws, but also to provide for their 
implementation61. If these provisions sound vague or 
very narrow in their scope, the Derg's broad mandate, to 
assume "full governmental powers" could always be 
invoked to justify the exercise of any executive powers.
(C) The Derg's Assertion of Power over the Vanguards of
the Popular Uprising
The Derg was "a provisional military government" and
as such could leave little or no room for popular
participation in the supreme decision-making processes. 
Ostensibly, the only concession it made towards public 
participation in supreme governmental affairs was the 
establishment by it of a Provisional National Advisory
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Commission to advise it on how a non-provisional 
government should be established and, more specifically, 
to draft a new constitution for the country63. The 
membership of the commission was limited to a maximum of 
sixty being made up of two representatives from two 
Co-operatives, three from The Confederation of Ethiopian 
Labour Unions, six from three Teachers' Associations, 
four from the Christian and Muslim communities, two from 
the business community, fourteen from the provinces and
. fid . .twenty-one from government agencies0 . The Commission 
would have given the civilian population a say in the 
future of the country, but its importance was watered 
down by the fact that it was reduced to the status of an 
advisory body whose recommendations could be vetoed by 
the Derg at will65.
Further, quite unlike the early part of 1974, the 
public was now denied the right to manifest its demands 
through strikes and demonstrations. Immediately after 
its establishment, the Derg condemned all forms of 
strikes and demonstrations as being contrary to its aim 
of change without bloodshed and as being inimical to the 
economy of the country, and threatened to take stern 
measures against those who participated in them66. Also, 
the law which announced the Derg's formal seizure of 
power on September 12, 1974, prohibited engaging in any 
strikes, holding unauthorised demonstrations and 
assemblies and contravening the Derg's principle of 
"Ethiopia First"67. People who went against these 
provisions were to be tried before a military court
• fiffwithout any right of appeal .
The fact that the Derg was a military government 
which excluded civilian participation in the supreme 
decision-making processes of the government and the fact 
that it had restrictive policies concerning democratic 
rights brought it into conflict with what may be called 
the vanguards of the popular uprising of early 1974. As 
noted earlier, the then uprising was kept aflame by the 
formally elected leaders of the corporate groups like the
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CELU, the Teachers' Association, and the Student Unions. 
Also active behind the scenes were the co-ordinating 
committees that mushroomed at the time among the civil 
servants, military units and the police all of which, by 
law, had been prevented from creating association of any 
sort. These committees co-ordinated strikes, 
demonstrations and the issuance of petitions to the 
government and anti-government leaflets to be distributed 
to the public. Further, in some provincial capitals 
there emerged, at the time of the popular uprising, what 
looked like spontaneous popular governments made up of 
teachers, students, workers and delegates to municipal 
councils which attempted to run the local administration, 
albeit temporarily69.
Some of these groups continued to be politically 
active even after the Derg's emergence and seizure of 
power in June and September 1974. One major exception to 
this were the civil servants, who stopped having strikes 
and demonstrations as of early June, 1974, thus lending 
their name to the rhetoric of the Derg, which continued 
to issue in the official newspaper (Addis Zemen) long 
lists of Government Agencies which were supposed to have
written messages supporting the establishment of the Derg
, . . 7 nand its policies' .
Other sections of the population were however, 
restive. On October 26, 1974, for instance, the 
unemployed of Addis Ababa met in front of CELU's head 
office to demand employment from the Government. They 
were dispersed by the police with gunfire which resulted 
in two deaths and one wounded71. Also, the agricultural 
tenants who, as far as the evidence goes did not take 
part in the early 1974 uprising, were, around the time of 
the deposition of the King, beginning to refuse to pay 
rent and also to assert a claim to the land they worked, 
partly because they misunderstood a statement of the Derg 
that no additional rent was to be charged, to mean that 
tenancy was abolished72 and partly because some civilian 
activists were encouraging them to believe the government
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had introduced land reform. This took place in several 
awrajas (sub-provinces) of Hararghe Arsi, and Sidamo 
provinces where the assertive tenants were harassed and 
subdued by the military units within the areas
7 * i  , , ,
concerned7 . Obviously the uprising of the unemployed 
and the tenants had very little to do with opposing the 
establishment of a military government or it policies.
More to the point was the opposition of CELU. In 
its annual congress of September 15-17, 1974, it passed a 
resolution demanding the dismantling of the Derg and the 
establishment in its place of a provisional people's 
government and the reinstatement of fundamental civil 
rights which had been suspended by the Derg74. The Derg 
ordered CELU to withdraw its resolution, and, when that 
was not forthcoming, it moved to arrest its president, 
vice-president and secretary75. CELU reacted by calling 
for a general strike of its members to take effect as of 
September 25, but it failed to materialise because of the 
Derg's stern warning and threats against so doing and 
because of the intervention of the unit co-ordinating76 
at the factory level77.
Another of the vanguards of the early 1974 popular 
uprising which put up resistance to Derg rule was the 
student movement. On September 17 and 18, 1974, students 
of the Arat Kilo and Sidist Kilo colleges of the Addis 
Ababa University held meetings in which they adopted the 
resolution of CELU, demanded the replacement of the Derg 
by a "peoples government" and rejected the Derg's 
decision to send them on a campaign in order to educate 
the people about basic health care and developmental 
problems and afterwards, went on a demonstration in
. 7 ftsupport of their claims70. On October 11, students of 
Addis Ababa and of the Alemaya Agricultural College 
(Hararghe Province) also went on a demonstration 
demanding the reinstatement of democratic rights prior to 
the implementation of the campaign programme. The Derg's
security forces dispersed these demonstrations with
• 7 Qgunfire and arrests .
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Much more pressing was the resistance to Derg rule 
by the various military units, including the Engineers 
Unit, the Army Aviation, the Medical Corps, the Military 
Band, the Veterans of the Congo Campaign, the 
Borena-Negele Fourth Brigade, the Seventeenth Battalion, 
the Air Force, the First Division (Body guard)80, the 
Third Division and the Second Division81. In other words 
certain of the units in all of the five military 
divisions, particularly those located in the capital, 
were part of the resistance.
The most ardent military opposition to the Derg's 
seizure of power seems to have come from the Engineers, 
the Army Aviation and the Bodyguard, all of which were 
located in Addis Ababa. In early August, 1974, it was 
reported that a rift was emerging between the Derg and 
the Army Aviation because the latter had demanded the 
reinstatement of democratic rights (including freedom of 
speech, writing, demonstration, assembly and organising 
political groups), the distribution of land to the 
"tiller”, the launching of a planned economy and the
• . ft ?establishment of a democratic people's government0*. 
Within weeks of the Derg's formal seizure of power on 
September 12, the opposition to Derg rule had spread to 
the other military units in and around Addis Ababa, 
leading to the arrest of many officers and other ranks, 
including Colonel Yegezu of the Army Aviation, Major 
Teferra Tekle-Ab of the Engineers Unit, a Tekeste of the 
Air Force and Major Damtew Teferra of the Military 
Police83. The final show-down came on October 7, 1974, 
when the Derg, with the help of the more amenable 
military units, especially from the Third Division, 
crushed the resistance of the Engineers with force after 
having killed five, wounding an unknown number and 
imprisoning some three hundred of their members. At the 
same time, it surrounded the Army Aviation and managed to 
subdue them without much resistance. The First Division 
(the Bodyguard) saved itself from the wrath of the Derg 
by handing over the activists among its ranks, including
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Captain Demise Taferra, chairman of the Bodyguards' 
Co-ordinating Committee84. On November 21, 1974, 
"Democracia" reported that the Third Division had 
imprisoned its commander and recalled its representatives 
to the Derg, including Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, and 
that the Unit Committees of the Second Division were 
claiming equal status with the Derg because their members 
were also elected by the Army units that they 
represented8^.
The most important opposition, especially in the 
long run, came from two budding underground political 
organizations, established several years before 1974 
among veterans of the student movement abroad. The first 
of these was what is usually referred to as the 
Democracia group and what emerged as the Ethiopian 
People's Revolutionary Party(EPRP) and the second was 
what is usually referred to as the Voice of the Masses 
Group and what emerged in April 1976, as the All 
Ethiopian Socialist Movement (AESM). The leadership of 
EPRP returned to Ethiopia in July, 1974, and launched its 
weekly paper (Democracia) in the same month. Though the 
leadership of AESM did not return to Ethiopia until the 
beginning of 1975, it appears it had enough followers in 
the country to launch its weekly paper (Voice of the 
Masses) in August, 197486. From then on, the EPRP and 
AESM were beginning to see themselves as championing the 
cause of the vanguards of the early 1974 popular 
uprising; however, being anti-Derg themselves, they may 
have overstated the case of the opposition. The 
circumstances of the time dictate the conclusion, 
nonetheless, that the bulk of the groups claimed by the 
two organs to have been actively opposed to Derg rule 
were indeed engaged in anti-Derg demonstrations and 
boycotts of classes.
On their part, "Democracia1 and "Voice of the 
Masses" advocated and influenced Derg's imprisonment of 
members of the aristocracy, nationalisation of their 
assets, suspension of the existing constitution and the
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deposition of the King while at the same time condemning 
the same actions as superficial. They argued again and 
again that what was required to effect a fundamental 
change was the dismantling of the censorship machinery 
and the spying network of the ancien regime, the 
nationalization of industrial and financial institutions 
and the granting of land to the "tiller", thereby 
abolishing capitalist and imperialist exploitation in one
07 ,
fell swoop0 . The two most important demands of 
"Democracia" and "Voice of the Masses" which they were to 
advocate for a long time to come, were: the
reinstatement of democratic rights88 to the broad masses, 
especially the right to form associations and the 
immediate handing over of power by the Derg to "a
• . ft Qprovisional People's Government"0* made up of the 
representative of the workers, farmers, students, 
teachers, small business men, low-ranking civil servants, 
artisans and handi-crafts men, progressive intellectuals,
o rj ,
the unemployed and the army* . Essentially, the Derg was 
being criticised for lack of class consciousness, for not 
vigorously pursuing a Marxist-Leninist line and for 
manifesting "Fascist"91 tendencies in its handling of the 
opposition.
The Derg's response to the challenges of the 
civilian and military activists was not limited to the 
use of fire arms and tear gas against and the
imprisonment of those who went on strikes and
demonstrations, but also extended to resorting to 
counter-propaganda, summary executions of those already 
in prison and the disbanding of rebellious military 
units. On the propaganda level, the Derg re-iterated, 
time and again, that it was itself a provisional 
military government which intended to act as a vehicle
for the transfer of power from the ancien regime to a
q n  f ,
people's government** after a new constitution had been 
adopted93. At the time, the general public may have 
believed this? the political activists among them, on the 
other hand, refused to take the Derg's commitment at face
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value. This was so, partly because of the Derg's 
reluctance to commit itself to any timetable in which it 
would transfer power to the people and partly because 
some of its programmes had a long-term perspective. On 
September 2 and 26, the Derg's Chairman Lt. General Aman 
Andom explained that a civilian government would be 
established after the people had been made, through 
education, conscious enough to administer themselves94. 
Also, like some sections of "Ethiopia First" which have 
been noted earlier, a section of the thirteen-point 
programme issued by the Derg on September 13, 1974, could 
only be accomplished over a long period of time. These 
included the commitment of the Derg to ensure the rights, 
equality and development of the people; to abolish 
discrimination on the basis of nationality, religion and 
income; to remove superstitions inimical to the 
modernisation of the country; to provide free education 
to all Ethiopians; and, to expand industrial
• Q Sproduction^.
Moreover, the Derg had the official daily newspaper 
(Addis Zemen) publish frequent messages of support from 
a wide spectrum of the population by way of showing the 
existence of popular support for the military government 
and its policies. Further, it condemned all those that 
opposed it as puppets or remnants of the ancien regime 
and asked members of the public to hand over those who 
were misleading the people about the Derg's true 
intentions96.
As of the middle of November, the Derg started 
taking more and more desperate actions on account of the 
problems with the opposition which were beginning to 
reverberate within the Derg. On November 16, therefore, 
it issued no less than four draconian legislations; the 
first establishing a military court with a mandate to try 
any offences; the second describing new offences in 
addition to those provided for in the existing Penal Code 
of Ethiopia; the third providing for special procedures 
for the military court; and the fourth declaring an
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emergency law authorising the Minister of Interior to
• • Q7conduct search and seizure without warrant^ . One could 
have presumed that these laws were targeted towards the 
officials of the ancien regime who were under arrest and 
who were being screened by the investigation commission 
established for the purpose about eight months earlier.
It is justifiable to presume this because the Derg was 
reiterating the same at the time. However, the contents 
of those legislations reflect that they were actually 
directed towards arresting the hostile activities of 
those opposed to Derg rule.
On November 23, the Derg showed how bloody it could 
be by a summary execution of well over sixty detainees, 
not because they had been tried by any court of law, but 
because the Derg, according to itself, had made "a
, , , , no
political decision"^ . Included among those executed 
were two Derg members, five non-Derg member junior 
officers and other ranking members of the armed forces 
and others whose number and identity it was promised 
would be revealed later. According to the Derg, these 
had attempted to overthrow the government by instigating 
feud and bloodshed among the various units of the armed 
forces" and, according to "Democracia", they were the 
activists within the First Division, the Engineers Unit, 
the Army Aviation and the Air Force who had been placed 
under arrest in the preceding months of September and 
October for their role in opposing the military 
government100.
Lt. General Aman Andom, Chairman of the Derg, was 
one of the sixty killed on the same day. The why's and 
wherefore's of his killing have been a matter of much 
verbal and written conjecture and there is, perhaps, no 
need to add to it here. One thing is clear? for some 
time before November 23, he could not see eye to eye with 
most Derg members on a number of issues including most 
probably, the handling of the Eritrean question and the 
unruly proceedings of Derg meetings. As a result, he had 
resigned his post of chairmanship around November 15101,
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which could only have thrown the Derg into confusion and 
more desperation. It appears that some Derg members who 
sought to victimize him, then started accusing him of 
dictatorial tendencies, of having had dealings with 
foreigners and the army behind the back of the Derg, and 
of reluctance to delegate some of his powers to others as 
the Derg had wished102. The fundamental point of 
friction seems to have been that in appointing the 
General as its chairman, some of the Derg members had 
intended to make of him a figure-head whose reputation it 
could use to advantage. However, the General was the 
wrong choice for this purpose; he was a strong character, 
well able to stand-up to the King, let alone the Derg, 
which was composed of members of the armed forces and the 
police very much his junior103. Be that as it may, on 
November 23, General Aman Andom died in an exchange of 
fire with agents of the Dfi-rgs' security men who had come 
to his residence to arrest him according to some, on 
orders of the Derg, and, according to others, on orders 
of the Dergs' First Vice Chairman (Mengistu Haile- 
Mariam)104.
The remaining fifty-two victims of the Derg's 
political decision were twenty-nine of some of the 
highest civilian dignitaries and twenty-three senior 
military and police officers of the ancien regime whom 
the co-ordination committee of the Armed Forces and the 
Police and later the Derg had been incarcerating, 
starting from early 1974. Included in this group were 
the two previous Prime Ministers ( JSxrHAfi Tizzy AkltloU 
HaPT£ ~ix/A*-Q and Lij Endalkachew Mekonnen) . Again, the 
reasons for the summary execution of all these officials 
is mysterious, especially in view of the fact that an 
investigation Commission had been established to 
investigate their cases and in view of the fact that the 
Derg had time and again bound itself to commit them to 
trial105. One explanation appears to be that the 
officials were sacrificed on the altar of the Derg's 
desire to win to its side the civilian left, which was
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the only vocal group in the country. In the proceeding 
months, there were underground leaflets which urged 
'political actions' against the officials of the ancien 
regime without actually explaining what they meant by the 
term. Also, Democracia and Voice of the Masses had, 
since almost their inception, been asserting again and 
again that the Derg was reactionary because it was taking 
measures against the 'progressives' (the civilian and 
military activists who were opposed to Derg rule) while 
it was pampering the officials of the ancien regime in 
prison106. That the Derg wanted to identify itself with 
the militant left is obvious from its statements about
• 1 07 •itAV" . Yet another explanation has been that the First 
Voice Chairman moved the Derg to take the action in order 
to submerge Aman's death into the obscurity of the 
elimination of the "corrupt" officials108.
It is one of the ironies of the time - or the double 
faced disposition of the Derg - that a week before the 
executions the first vice - chairman of the Derg, Major 
Mengistu Haile Marimba, had expounded that during the 
Glorious Revolution in England, hundreds and thousands of 
people had been killed and many houses had been burnt to 
the ground? that during the French revolution, many 
aristocrats had been decapitated? and that during the 
Russian revolution, members of the opposition had been 
wiped out like locusts. He contrasted these with the 
then on-going revolution of Ethiopia which, he said, 
ousted the three thousand year-old aristocracy without a 
drop of blood, disproving the theory of the world 
intellectuals that a revolution is not possible without 
blood-shed109. In spite of this and in spite of the 
Derg's earlier commitments to bring about the change 
without blood-shed as in "Ethiopia First", various 
proclamations and releases to the press, the "revolution" 
was officially stained with blood as of at least November 
23, 1974, and rule of law had given way to expediency.
By and large, the Derg was tolerant of the civilian 
militants but not of the military activist. In order to
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quell military resistance to its rule it disbanded the 
rebellious units either by imprisoning their members, as 
in the case of the Engineers unit, or by assigning them 
to remote parts of the country, as in the case of the 
First Division. Similarly, towards the end of November, 
the Derg called to Addis Ababa some two hundred and 
seventy-six members of the armed forces and the police, 
gave them a short seminar on its policies and, starting 
from December 4, assigned them to various government 
departments to act as its watch-dogs. These the Derg 
called 'apostles of change'110. The bulk of the 276 
seminar participants were drawn from among the unit 
co-ordination committees which had later been recognised 
and maintained by the Derg to act as bridges between it 
and the various military units and the police. However, 
since a lot of them seem to have been active in the 
anti-Derg opposition and since, in some cases, the unit 
co-ordination committees refused to be elected by 
military units and the police,111 the Derg removed them 
from the midst of the army and the police, under the 
guise of assigning their members to relatively high 
government positions.
The elected representatives of the armed forces and 
the police came together and formed the Derg on June 28, 
1974. The emergence of the Derg marked the beginning of 
the end of the ancien regime as the Derg started 
whittling down its powers. Also, the emergence of the 
Derg marks the beginning of the end of the people's 
exercise of democratic rights since it prohibited 
strikes, demonstrations and boycott of classes within a 
week of its establishment.
The armed forces and the police created the Derg 
mainly for the purpose of bringing to justice the 
officials of the ancien regime who were supposed to be 
responsible for the backwardness of the country on 
account of being corrupt and inept and also answerable 
for the deaths of about one hundred thousand people 
because of the 1973-4 drought, the realities of which
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they were supposed to have covered up. In spite of this 
mandate, the Derg concentrated on the question of power. 
It considered alternative forms of governments to the 
ancien regime and, on September 12, 1974, converted 
itself into a provisional military government. On that 
day, not only did it formalise its powers but also 
institutionalised the abolition of democratic rights in 
proclamations 1 and 2, 1974. The fact that it was a 
military government and the fact that it had strict 
policies on democratic rights brought it into conflict 
with the civilian and military activists who were opposed 
to the establishment of a military government. These 
groups felt that those who had been active in the early 
1974 uprising should have been included in the government 
and should be able to enjoy the democratic rights that 
they had gained under the previous regime and 
particularly in the course of the uprising. By December, 
1974 the Derg was able to assert its will against anyone 
who cared to oppose it including its own members who 
sought to be independent minded, other members of the 
security forces and the civilian population.
However the manner in which it managed to assert its 
will led the Derg to become dictatorial. The 
establishment of a military government itself and the 
subsequent abolition of democratic rights effectively 
excluded the civilian population from participating in 
government affairs and from the right to express its 
wishes. Further, the summary execution of Derg members 
who did not toe the line meant that all other members 
were accountable to the Derg and not to the units which 
had elected them; and the disbanding of the rebellious 
military units and the Unit Co-ordination Committees, 
meant that the Derg's accountability to the armed forces 
and the police, which had created it in the first place, 
was put to an end. Finally the arbitrariness with which 
it disposed of the then helpless officials of the ancien 
regime and the military activists that it had already 
placed under arrest showed that the Derg was not under
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the law even when that law was made by itself. Hence by 
the end of 1974, the Derg had become a law unto itself; a 
dictatorship that was to rule Ethiopia for years to come 
by decree, or, rather by considerations of expediency.
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PART TWO
THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY ORDER 
(DECEMBER 1974 - FEBRUARY 1977)
CHAPTER FOUR
The Socio-Economic Reforms of 1975
The main preoccupations of this chapter are the 
socio-economic reforms adopted by the Derg in the course 
of 1975. According to most writers these reforms 
(nationalization of land and financial, industrial and 
commercial undertakings) transformed the military coup 
d'etat, examined in the previous chapter, into a 
revolution. Whereas the reforms are considered in 
sections A to D, the first section is devoted to an 
examination of the organs of state directly involved in 
the drafting and adoption of these policies. An attempt 
is also made in the relevant sections to indicate which 
government departments were involved in the drafting of 
the measure of nationalization concerned although this 
has not always been easy due to lack of sources.
Haile Selassie's government had realized that the 
early 1974 popular uprising was not limited to 
corporatist demands like pay increases, dismissal of 
departmental officials and recognition of union rights 
but, more importantly, extended to reforming the 
government itself. It had, accordingly, established a 
constitution-drafting committee which completed its work 
in the summer of the same year by drawing up a liberal 
constitution. At the height of the uprising, 
Endalkachew's cabinet was, apparently, divided among 
those who sought to leave all questions of reform to the 
government which was to be constituted in accordance with 
the new constitution, and those who sought to start 
adopting reforms right away.1 No doubt prevarications of
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the cabinet along these lines undermined its credibility 
and contributed to its downfall.
By the summer of 1974, the popular uprising had died 
down, and, with it, the pressure it had brought to bear 
on the government. What survived the emergence and 
subsequent assertion of authority by the Derg was the 
pressure of the radical left to have the government 
adopt Marxist-Leninist programmes and to have Derg 
replace itself with a "Provisional People's Government". 
Unlike Endalkachew's cabinet, the Derg did not 
prevaricate on the question of reforms? in the course of 
1975, it pursued a series on nationalization measures 
which, as will be argued later, were in line with those 
demanded by the radical left and were adopted in order to 
appease them. The most important demand of the left (the 
immediate establishment of a provisional people's 
government) was, however, postponed indefinitely, as were 
all other questions to do with the establishment of 
parties and a non-provisional government.
The nationalization measures to be taken needed to 
be based on some political and economic programme? 
"Ethiopia First", which was adopted by the Derg in July 
of the same year as its programme of action, did not have 
a policy on the national economy to speak of, and even 
less, on the more particular question of nationalization. 
At the time, in fact, the Derg went out of its way to 
reassure domestic and international businessmen that it 
did not have any intentions of nationalizing their 
assets.2 Despite that, it found it appropriate to 
confiscate the assets of the royal family including those 
of the king and the aristocracy. However, these measures 
were taken, not as a result of any economic policies, but 
partly as a result of the Derg's decision to confiscate 
the assets of the ancien regime's officials who did not 
hand themselves over when asked to do so and partly as a 
result of the simplistic creed reiterated by the Derg 
that even if the masses of the people had for centuries 
fought against foreign invaders to keep Ethiopia
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independent and, hence, entitled to an equal share of the 
wealth of the country, the aristocracy had become rich by 
usurping the share of the poor.3
The left charged that "Ethiopia First" contained no 
guiding principles and condemned it as an embodiment of 
ethical and propagandist pronouncements devoid of any 
class content.4 The Derg responded by saying that the 
opposition consisted of the partisans of the student 
movement, and were therefore, in the minority when 
contrasted to the number of people who supported the 
government? and that the Derg's actions would continue to 
be based on Ethiopia's cultural values.5 The official 
media, in fact, went as far as declaring that Marx,
Engels and Lenin were not appropriate solutions to 
Ethiopia's problems.6
It was on December 20, 1974, that the Derg's first 
fundamental political and economic programme, "Ethiopian 
Socialism", was issued. The Derg's policy statement 
explained that it was derived from an interpretation of 
"Ethiopia First" and from Ethiopian culture and 
religions. It further explained that even though it was 
a twelve-page document, it was capable of being subsumed 
under five basic principles: sovereignty, the 
absoluteness of Ethiopia's unity, self-reliance, the 
dignity of labour and the precedence of the public good. 
Elaborating the policies of the programme in the economic 
sphere, it said that those assets which were beneficial 
to the public would be nationalized and those which, if 
left in private hands would not go contrary to "Ethiopia 
First", would be left in the private sector. It was also 
stated that land would be owned by the people and the 
cottage industries would be promoted.7
In an article called "Ethiopian Socialism or 
Scientific Socialism", Voice of the Masses criticized the 
programme for falling foul of the Marxist-Leninist 
approach to revolution. it denied the existence of more 
than one kind of socialism and asserted that references 
to "British socialism" or "national socialism", as in the
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case of Hitler's Germany, were wrong because those were 
not cases of socialism at all. It expounded, further, 
that there could not be Ethiopian electricity, Somali 
Electricity, etc since the fundamental law of electricity 
everywhere was the same. By the same token, it argued, 
socialism could only be the same everywhere? if there 
were differences between nations, they could only be 
secondary.8
Democracia also devoted an article entitled "What 
Kind of Socialism?" to reviewing the programme. It 
declared that it was not impressed by the inclusion of 
the word "socialism" in the programme because it was a 
word used in different senses by many governments 
including Kenya's, Tunisia's and Hitler's. It also took 
exception to the programme's rendering of the history of 
exploitation by statements like: exploitation had been 
introduced into Ethiopia in the preceding forty years 
prior to which the people has exercised self-reliance; at 
the time the leaders had been close to the people? they 
had ruled in accordance with the wishes of the people? 
realising this, the people had looked upon the leaders as 
their own fathers? and the religious leaders had curbed 
•oppression by the political leaders. The article stated 
that blaming Haile Selassie for everything was to deny 
the existence of class contradictions and its 
preponderance over the centuries. It also pointed out 
that even if the programme condemned imperialism, its 
assertion that Ethiopia had never been under its 
domination was tantamount to denying that imperialism was 
one of the enemies of the people.
The Democracia Article then took the main principles 
of "Ethiopian Socialism" to task. It saw the programme's 
reference to "the precedence of the public good" as 
posing a contradiction, not between classes, but between 
the individual and society, which the article scorned as 
a moral precept. The reference to the "absoluteness of 
Ethiopia's unity" is condemned as giving precedence to 
the unity of the country over the independence, rights
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and benefits of the broad masses and as being fascist in 
outlook. The programme's perception of "labour" as hard 
work rather than as a class of people who live by selling 
their labour is taken as an indication of a lack of 
desire to abolish exploitation. Finally, the article 
pointed out that the programme's reference to "equality" 
is vague. It explained that, to the bourgeoisie, it 
means equality before the Law which, in any case, cannot 
be realized and which cannot do away with exploitation.
To the working class, it continues, equality has 
political and economic aspects which can only be realised 
by recognizing the political rights of the progressives, 
resolving national rights democratically, and by 
nationalizing all the means of production like banks, 
insurance companies, industries, big commercial 
companies, and land.9
"Ethiopian Socialism" appears to have been envisaged 
by the Derg as a compromise between the demands of the 
radical left for a Marxist-Leninist programme, on the one 
hand, and of the interest groups and voices of 
moderation, on the other. However, the capitalist class, 
not to mention the landed gentry, did not have a vanguard 
organization to articulate its interests and its 
influence on the Derg remained minimal. When, in the 
course of 1975, the Derg translated "Ethiopian socialism" 
into practice by adopting a series of nationalization 
measures, it was obvious it was implementing the 
programmes of the radical left. In this regard it is 
interesting to note the similarities between the 
suggestions in Democracia concerning nationalization 
(cited in the last sentence of the previous paragraph) 
with the 1975 nationalization measures.
"Ethiopian socialism" was, most probably, adopted by 
an officers' Junta of the Derg and rubber-stamped by the 
General Assembly of the same body. The tenor of the 
language is consistent with earlier pronouncements of the 
Derg and, according to Lefort, the government ministers 
learned of the programme only from radio broadcasts.10
- 138 -
(A) THE NATIONALIZATION OF BUSINESS ORGANISATIONS
It appears that like the adoption of Ethiopian 
Socialism, the decision to nationalize the private banks 
and insurance companies that came soon after it (January 
1, 1975) was the decision of the Derg and the Derg alone. 
Other government agencies do not appear to have been 
involved in the process of its drafting nor its adoption. 
The issue before the Derg was very simple: if such an 
institution was not in the service of the masses, it had 
to be nationalized.11 The official explanation confirmed 
this view. On January 2, the major official newspaper, 
Addis Zemen. explained that the nationalization of the 
financial institutions was in order to make them render 
equal service to the ordinary traders, farmers and 
workers (presumably meaning equal service with the other 
classes). This, it was explained, was consistent with 
Ethiopian Socialism.12
The banks that were nationalized consisted of the 
Commercial Bank of the Addis Ababa Share Company, the 
Banco di Roma Share Company and the Banco di Napoli 
Share Company, these three, which were the only private 
banks in the country, were brought under the 
administration of the Ethiopian Central Bank like three 
others which already existed as government banks. A 
later legislation which merged the nationalized banks 
under the administration of one bank (the Addis Ababa 
Bank), stated that their rights and obligations were 
transferred in full to the new bank so merged13 and that 
the capital of the new bank was twenty million Birr 
(about ten million dollars).14 From this it appears that 
the nationalized banks were relatively small and that the 
assets gained by the state were minimal.
Of the three nationalized banks, the Commercial Bank 
of Addis Ababa was the most indigenous. The process of 
its establishment had begun in 1962 when it started off 
with ten thousand shares valued at about a hundred and 
twenty-five thousand US dollars and owned by two thousand 
Ethiopian nationals mostly drawn from the business
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community. When two years later a law requiring a 
minimum paid-up capital of two million Birr (about one 
million US dollars) was issued, the Commercial Bank of 
Addis Ababa was able to raise the required amount and 
register with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
within the same year. The Bank achieved this by 
attracting foreign shareholders: the National Grindley 
Bank of London bought 40% of the total shares in 1964 and 
by the time of the nationalization of banks, 40% of the 
total shares of the Commercial Bank of Addis Ababa were 
in foreign hands.15 The Banco di Roma and the Banco di 
Napoli were branches of their parent companies in Italy, 
and, probably, Ethiopian nationals had very little or no 
shares in them. Further, at the same time, fourteen 
insurance companies were also nationalised on the same 
grounds as the nationalization of banks and brought under 
the administration of the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry until such time as a new law redefining their 
status was enacted.16 When enacted, the law that was so 
envisaged provided for the bringing of all insurance 
companies under the administration of one government 
agency, namely the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation. The 
law further provided that the assets, rights and 
obligations of the pre-existing insurance companies were 
to be transferred to the Ethiopian Insurance
• 17 • •Corporation and that the paid-up capital of the 
Corporation was eleven million Birr (almost 5.5 million 
US dollars).18 Again, not taking into consideration the 
credits and debts of the insurance companies, the assets 
that were nationalized were even less important than 
those of the banks. Figures showing the proportion of 
foreign investment in insurance companies are not 
available; however, the Insurance Proclamation of 1970 
limited the percentage of total foreign investment in an 
insurance company to a maximum of forty-nine.
The next to be nationalized were quite a number of 
commercial and industrial companies. It is not possible 
to ascertain the exact date but it appears that towards
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the end of 1974, the Derg established a high-powered 
economic policy formulation committee led by Captain 
Moges Welde-Michael and Aircraftsman Gesese Welde-Kidan 
(first and vice chairman of the Derg Economic 
Sub-committee respectively) and had the following as its 
members: Mebrate Mengistu (Minister of Natural Resources 
Development), Mohammed Abdurahmin (Minister of Commerce, 
Industry and Tourism), Tadese Moges (Minister of state in 
the Ministry of commerce, Industry and Tourism), Dr. 
Debebe Worku (expert in the Ministry of Commerce, Trade 
and Tourism), Tekalign Gedamu (Minister of Transport and 
Communications), Col. Belachew Jemaneh (Minister of 
Interior), Tefera Degefe (Governor of the National Bank 
of Ethiopia), Birihanu Wakoya (Commissioner of the 
Ethiopian Planning Board), Ashagre Yigletu and Wole 
Chekol (representatives of the Provisional National 
Advisory Commission).
The committee held its deliberations in the Ministry 
of Natural Resources Development and drew up three 
documents: a general policy concerned with the industrial 
sector, which is contained in a little pamphlet called 
"the Red Book", a list of the industrial and commercial 
organizations to be nationalized, and a preamble to go 
with the announcement of the nationalization of those 
organizations. The documents were then submitted to the 
Ad-hoc Supreme Organizing committee of the Derg which 
approved it with a few amendments of the wording of the 
texts - amendments concerned with the style rather than 
the contents of the documents. On the same day, the 
documents were read to the General Assembly of the Derg 
and approved by a clapping of hands without any 
discussions, comments or questions. However, the Ad-hoc 
Supreme Organising Committee did not allow the reading of 
the list of the nationalized business organizations to 
the General Assembly on the grounds that the 
confidentiality of the list would be betrayed by its 
members.19 In spite of this, the organizations were 
deemed nationalized by the Derg as of February 7, 1975.
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Also, the broad outlines of the principles in accordance 
with which mining, industrial and commercial 
organizations were to be nationalized was enacted on the 
same day as "The Government Ownership of the Means of 
Production Proclamation 26, 1975”.
That law delineates between three kinds of mining, 
industrial and commercial activities. The first were to 
be owned and operated by the government exclusively20, 
the second to be owned and operated by government and 
private investors jointly21, and the third to be owned 
and operated by private investors exclusively22. The 
preamble to the legislation explained that the activities 
under the first category are brought under state control 
because it was necessary to give precedence to public 
interest? those under the second category were opened to 
joint venture because they were not amenable to complete 
government ownership; and those in the third category 
were left to the private sector because doing so would 
not be harmful to society. It was further explained that 
the basis for the delineation between the three 
categories was Ethiopian Socialism.23
If any of the economic activities under the first 
category were in private hands, they were to be 
nationalized.24 It was in accordance with this principle 
that the Economic Policy Committee mentioned above short 
listed a total of seventy-two business organisations for 
nationalization by the Derg. The undertakings so 
nationalized were: thirteen food-processing industries,
nine leather-processing and shoe-making industries, four 
printing establishments, eight chemical-processing 
facilities, five metal factories, and eleven others not 
classified.25 Obviously, no mining activities were 
nationalized because they were almost non-existent and 
the very few that existed were, in any case, owned and 
run by the state.
Further, it was provided that the government was to 
hold a minimum of fifty-one per cent of the shares in 
each of the joint ventures. If the extent of the value
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of its shares in existing joint ventures was less than 
that, it had to be readjusted accordingly.26 Such 
readjustment was taken on twenty-nine joint ventures 
including eleven food-processing industries, two textile 
factories, six wood works, one pulp industry, three 
chemical industries, two metal factories and four petrol 
stations.27
There was no provision for the denationalization of 
industrial and commercial organizations which, in terms 
of the law, should have come under the third category.
In other words, it was only those undertakings which were 
considered appropriate for the private sector and which, 
at the same time, were already in that sector, which were 
allowed remain in private hands.
The private sector was further delimited by another 
piece of legislation which was enacted in December, 1975. 
According to it, retailers were allowed to a maximum 
capital of about a hundred thousand US Dollars28, 
wholesalers about a hundred and fifty thousand US 
Dollars29, and industrialists about two hundred and fifty
on , ,
thousand US Dollars J . Five exceptions were made to 
these capital restrictions: business organizations which
were already in private hands; construction works, 
surface transport, inland water transport and the 
publication of newspapers and magazines to be undertaken 
in the future31; wholesalers to be engaged in the sale of
• , , T O  ,agricultural products, skins and h i d e s a n d  retailers 
to be engaged in import-export businesses; and those who 
secure a waiver from the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry33.
Thus the private sector was allowed to survive the 
reforms of 1975 and operate within the confines of these 
rules. There are some within it which are relatively 
big. An example of this is the Quat Share Company which 
actually received a waiver from the council of ministers 
and which exports quat (leaves chewed as drug) to 
Djibouti valued at about fifteen million US Dollars per 
annum. Another is the chain of Bekele Mola hotels mostly
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in the resort areas of southern Ethiopia which predates 
the nationalization measures of 1975 and which deals 
probably with millions of Dollars. The bulk of the 
others, however, are very small businesses like trucks, 
buses, taxis, small hotels, bars, barbers, tailors, 
shops, etc. Usually, one businessman owns only one of 
these undertakings.
CONCLUSION
Of the subsectors enumerated in the table below, the 
only ones affected by the nationalization measures under 
consideration were: manufacturing; small industries; and 
banking and insurance, which in 1971 together accounted 
for less than 9.4 per cent of G.D.P. Among those 
affected only the major ones were actually nationalized. 
Even making allowances for the then government's tendency 
to exaggerate the importance of the modern sector by way 
of showing its effectiveness, the size of the subsectors 
affected by the nationalizations was minimal when 
compared to the share of other sectors of the national 
economy.
Gross Domestic Product of 1970/1971 at constant
factor cost 1960/1961
Sectors % %
Agriculture 52.7
Industries 15.3
Mining 0.2
Manufacturing 4.0
Handicraft and small industry 4.1
Building and construction 5.9
Electricity 1.1
Wholesale and retail trade 8.8
Transport and communication 5.9
Other services 17.3
Banking, insurance and real estate 1.3
Public administration and defence 5.3
Educational services 1.9
Health services 0.7
Others 8.2
Total 100.0
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Source: Central Statistical Office, Statistical
Abstract.34
According to the figures of the Ethiopian C oiaa^ > 
Corvimission total foreign investments were as follows: 
Italian - 55%, Dutch 20.18%, American - 7%, British - 5%, 
Swiss - 3.4%, Austrian - 2.8%, Greek -2.5%, West German - 
1% and Indian - 1%. The following had less than 1% each: 
Egypt, Japan, North Yemen, Canada, France, Norway,
Sweden, Denmark and Armenia.35
However, although the Compensation Commission has 
not made available any figures showing the extent of 
foreign investment, one vague indication of this is the 
amount paid by the Ethiopian government in settlement of 
a compensation claim made on behalf of Italian nationals. 
The Italian and Ethiopian governments were able to 
resolve through negotiation a subrogation claim of 
Italy's by reaching an agreement that Ethiopia pay 
compensation of about 7.5 million US dollars. This 
implies that if 55% of the total foreign investment 
(owned by Italians) was 7.5 million US dollars, the total 
amount of foreign investment was the meagre sum of just 
over 13.5 million US dollars. If we were to multiply 
this figure by a factor of two in order to make 
allowances for the fact that the amount paid in 
compensation was a result of a negotiated settlement and 
perhaps does not, therefore, reflect the actual value of 
assets nationalised, the sum involved would still be 
insignificant. This is not surprising, however, when we 
consider that much of the foreign capital inflow was the 
result of bi-lateral arrangements which were not affected 
by the nationalization measures. Obviously these 
estimates are extremely vague? nevertheless, they are the 
only indications available to show the extent of 'world 
capitalist penetration' about which so much emphasis is 
made by writers of leftist persuasion. In fact, a lot of 
the so-called foreign investors were residents in the 
country.
Another figure which is often cited by writers on 
Ethiopia and which goes some way in indicating the amount
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of total value of the nationalised assets is found in the 
statement of Ishetu Chole to the effect that in 1967 75% 
of the private paid-up capital was foreign owned.36 
Assuming that this was more or less the proportion of 
foreign and domestic private paid-up capital that was 
likely to have been nationalised in 1975 and assuming 
further that the total value of foreign assets 
nationalised was, as indicated earlier, just over 27 
million US dollars, this would give us the total sum of 
over 36 million US dollars for the value of total private 
paid-up capital affected by the nationalization of 
business organisations. Their estimate is, perhaps, not 
altogether unrealistic if we were to remember the facts 
noted earlier, namely, that the total capital of all the 
private banks (which were not nationalised) was about 10 
million US dollars, that the comparable figure for the 14 
insurance companies was 5.5 million US dollars and that 
the bulk of the remaining 79 or so businesses that were 
nationalised were extremely small. Obviously, if we were 
to use the per capita benefit to the population (which at 
that time stood at about 32 million) as the index for the 
need to nationalise the business organisations, the 
measure taken can only be rejected as having been 
misconceived.
The benefits of the nationalization measures to the 
national economy are not obvious either. In the first 
place, the Derg promised fair compensation to those who 
lost any assets as a result of the nationalization of the 
financial institutions37 and the business undertakings38. 
Quite apart from the cost involved in running a 
full-fledged Compensation Commission which was 
established to negotiate with claimants, whatever assets 
the government gained through nationalization it would, 
in principle, lose by way of paying compensation. In 
reality, the bulk of foreign investors were able to claim 
compensation even if the payments were not necessarily 
prompt, adequate and effective; Ethiopian nationals, on
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the other hand, able to receive any compensation at all 
did so in dribs and drabs.
Also, one of the effects of nationalization of 
business organisations has been to bring them under the 
management of the state? as it transpired, the form of 
management chosen was central planning of the sort common 
to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. From the 
perspective of the performance of the economy, this 
assumes that the state administrative machinery involved 
in the formulation and implementation of plan tasks (the 
organs of the central government, the middle links and 
enterprises) is more efficient and productive than the 
system of company management, a theory hardly ever borne 
out in practice. Further, it is questionable whether 
governments would syphon off the surplus from 
nationalized enterprises and invest it in more productive 
sectors than would the private owner. Given the civil 
strife in Ethiopia and the hostile relations of the 
country with its neighbours, it was more likely than not 
that it would channel the surplus into sectors chosen for 
considerations other than economic.
The implication to the workers of the 
nationalization of the business organisations was 
minimal? after the nationalization they became employees 
of the state rather than of the private sector. In 
principle, the existing law would have entitled the 
government to disband their unions. In practice, 
however, the government brought the business 
organisations that were operating in a sub-sector of the 
economy under the administration of a sectoral 
corporation, allowed the latter a degree of autonomy from 
the ministry to which they were subordinate and 
authorised the workers in the enterprises to maintain 
their unions. In December, 1975, a new law was issued 
politicising and centralising all the existing unions 
under the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.
The measures are, perhaps, understood better from 
the ideological and political rather than the social and
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economic point of view. The derg or its leaders saw 
themselves as carrying out the reforms demanded by the 
popular uprising of early 1974. With the uprising having 
died down by the summer of the same year, the only 
demands that continued to require its attention came from 
the civilian left. As noted earlier, the civilian left 
had been urging nationalization of the means of 
production owned by domestic and international 
capitalists and hence the abolition of "imperialism" and 
"national capitalism" in one fell swoop. It appears that 
this was the most important driving force behind the' 
Derg's nationalization measures - the desire to be seen 
to be progressive in the eyes of the leftists and win 
them over to its side.
B. DESAIFICATION OF RURAL LANDS
The reform of the land-tenure system was by far the 
most important undertaking of the government, in that it 
affected the lives of 88.7% of the then thirty-two 
million population39, over 60% of the GDP and 90% of 
exports40, and in that it took the revolution from its 
urban base to the countryside. The move was in fact more 
than a reform; it was a radical transformation which was 
to change the social, economic and political scene of the 
country substantially.
The pre-1975 land-tenure system was extremely 
complex and varied from region to region, so that only 
mention of its main features will be made here. The 
Highlands, which are amenable to agricultural activities, 
were over-populated and, hence, subject to extensive 
fragmentation and subdivision of holdings. About half of 
the farmers were tenants working under a share-cropping 
arrangement and the bulk of the remaining were small 
owner-cultivators.41 A small percentage of the rural 
population was landless, they lived among these petty 
cultivators and worked mainly as farm labourers. Even 
less important was the commercial farm sub-sector, which 
emerged as of the late 1960's supported by bilateral and
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multilateral aid, and which, by 1975, was using 2,900 
tractors and 3,000 irrigation pumps on 480,000 hectares 
of farmland.42 The rest of the country, which consisted 
of arid and semi-arid expanses of the lowland was 
inhabited by nomads, who were very much part of the 
rural, if not the crop-producing, part of the population.
Of these, the share-cropping arrangement between the 
tenants and landlords was the most controversial and 
politically significant. It was generally believed that 
the tenants were made to forfeit an unfair amount of 
their produce to the landlord and the government, which 
allowed the contract of rent to provide for the payment 
of up to 75% of the produce, was not doing enough about 
it. Further, it is often said that the tenants were 
subjected to feudal dues like working on the landlord's 
farm and giving him presents on special occasions not 
least because they sought to ward off eviction. In 
addition to the fact that the system was seen as unjust, 
it was considered as going against the promotion of 
productivity, since, it was believed, it did not give the 
tenants incentive to produce more because, it was 
alleged, they lost a lot of the increased produce to the 
.landlord. The most radical criticism of the land-tenure 
system came from the student movement, which, from the 
middle of the 1960's, made the slogan "Land to the 
Tiller" its main rallying call and the attainment of land 
reform its main target. When, as of 1969, the issue 
surfaced concerning whether the southern part of the 
country was not a case of settler colonialism by people 
for the north, and whether, therefore, the southern 
tenants were reduced to this status on land which had 
once been their own, land reform acquired a much greater 
political poignancy than ever before. Also, academics, 
governments and aid agencies were very critical of the 
existing land-tenure system and urged for some kind of 
reform to be adopted.
One of Haile-Selassie's government's responses to 
these criticisms was the establishment of a Ministry of
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Land Reform and Administration to deal with the matter. 
One notion promoted by that ministry, well before 1974, 
was the redistribution of individually owned land in 
excess of twenty hectares. A draft proposal to that 
effect was shelved for lack of support in government 
circles. The fact that the government officials and 
M.P.'s had their economic and hence political power based
on land is often blamed for the obstruction of the
adoption of the draft proposal.
As noted earlier, the popular uprising of 1974 
brought the question of land reform once again onto the 
government's agenda. Then parliament asked Endalkachew's 
cabinet to submit to it a draft legislation on land
reform, so that, by the time the Derg took power, the
question was already being studied in the Ministry of 
Land Reform. In doing this, parliament was merely 
reflecting the popular demand for land reform which had 
been the rallying call of the Ethiopian student Movement 
for about a decade and which, in 1974, was being echoed 
by demonstrators and their placards and by underground 
papers circulating at the time. No doubt, Endalkachew's 
response to these demands was to refer the matter to the 
Ministry of Land Reform and Administration by asking it 
to come up with a draft proposal. It appears that the 
tendency within the Ministry was to revive the old 
proposal of placing a ceiling of 20 hectares on 
individually owned land and redistributing anything in 
excess of that to the land-hungry peasants as well as 
drawing up a tax system which would discourage leaving 
land idle. It is not clear whether Endalkachew also 
referred the matter to the Constitution Drafting 
commission. Nevertheless, articles 136 and 137 of the 
Draft Constitution which the commission prepared provided 
for the nationalization of all rural land.
It appears that towards the end of the summer, 
individuals closely associated with the Chilalo 
Agricultural Development Unit (an agricultural 
development package programme launched in a sub-province
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of Arsi with Swedish Financial aid) were to be 
redistributed to peasants in the form of private 
ownership, each peasant to receive a maximum of 10 
hectares. It is said that the radical elements 
associated with the draft distributed the proposed 
legislation to the peasants as though it was a government 
approved law and instigated them to consider the land 
which they were tilling as their own and to refuse the 
payments of rent. The Derg, which, from its inception, 
had been preoccupied with the demands of the civilian 
left, saw in the draft legislation a means of appeasing 
them, and, beginning from its seizure of power in its 
policy declaration of September 13, for instance, it 
stated that very soon a new land law which would satisfy 
the requirements of the ordinary farmer and promote crop 
production would be studied and implemented.43 This was 
further elaborated by "Ethiopian socialism” of December 
20 which stated that land would be owned by the people.44 
By this time, it was obvious that the more influential 
officers in the Derg were favouring the nationalization 
of rural land as opposed to its redistribution in the 
form of private ownership. One of the reasons for this 
appears to have been that the Derg had referred the draft 
legislation prepared by individuals associated with the 
Chilalo project to a Committee made up of several 
university lecturers and a famous novelist who, by a 
majority decision, endorsed the draft legislation with 
one proviso, namely, that rural land should be 
nationalised, this solution was also upheld by the 
radical elements within the Ministry of Land Reform and 
Administration who had adopted the draft as their won and 
who were advocating its adoption by the Derg. However, 
the old idea of redistributing land in excess of 20 
hectares in the form of private ownership was supported 
by the more pragmatic elements within the Ministry and 
may well have been the official proposal of the 
Government Department.
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The Minister of Land Reform and Administration 
submitted the two alternative proposals to the Officers 
Junta but argued strongly against the adoption of the 
more radical draft on the grounds that it would require a 
substantial amount of expenditure and administrative 
substructure to implement, and that, contrary to the 
Derg's policy of a bloodless revolution, it would entail 
a lot of bloodshed. This was a voice in the wilderness. 
The nationalising legislation was supported by the 
radical elements of the Derg, who had to work hard to 
persuade the others to their point of view and, at times, 
even had to invite the drafters from the Ministry of Land 
Reform and Administration to come and do some of the 
explaining. In the final analysis the issue before the 
Officers' Junta was whether its members were on the side 
of the poor peasants, in which case they should vote in 
favour of the nationalising legislation, or on the side 
of the rich, in which case they could reject it in favour 
of the alternative legislation. The voice of moderation 
lost the day; the Officers' Junta adopted the radical 
legislation and had it rubber-stamped by the Derg, and, 
on march 4, 1975, that draft legislation was adopted as 
Proclamation 31 of 1975.
According to that legislation, all rural land was 
declared the collective property of the Ethiopian 
people.45 With the exception of large-scale private 
farms which, in terms of the law, the government could 
run either as state farms46 or convert into 
co-operatives47, all privately-owned rural land was to be 
distributed to people who were willing to cultivate their 
holdings personally.48 The intention of the legislation, 
as far as regards holdings in rist areas, was to 
transform them directly into co-operatives49, although in 
reality, they were also redistributed like privately 
owned land. Under the new legislation, the rights of 
the individual over his plot of land consisted of 
cultivating it personally50 and of enjoying the fruits 
thereof51, which together amount to what the legislation
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calls "use right". In other words, he does not own his 
plot52 which, in any case, belongs to the Ethiopian 
people and cannot, therefore, transfer it to another 
person in any way whatsoever53.
An equally important facet of the legislation was 
its drive to organize the farmers into associations. 
According to it farmers living within a maximum area of 
800 hectares had to establish what the law called "a 
peasant association"54. All tenants, landless persons, 
hired agricultural workers and land-owners with less than 
ten hectares each were to become members of the 
association55, but land-owners with more than ten 
hectares each had to wait until land had been 
redistributed before they could become members56. 
Obviously, this excluded from membership residents who 
were engaged in occupations other than farming, like 
artisans, potters, teachers, nurses and the like. The 
leaders of an association were to be elected by the 
members57. At this juncture, the peasant associations 
were to be constituted at three levels: all the peasant 
associations within a wereda were to delegate 
representatives who would come together and establish a 
Higher Association at the wereda level,58 and all the 
Higher Associations within an Awraja would delegate 
representatives who would come together and form the 
Awrala Peasant Association59. The legislation did not 
envisage the establishment of a peasant association at 
the provincial and national levels at this stage.60
There is no doubt that the land reform was the most
popular measure adopted by the government and that it was
met with an almost universal acclaim. Various sections
of the urban population went on massive demonstrations to
• 61express their support for it° . "Voice of the Masses" 
called the reform historic and expressed its 
determination to collaborate with the forces that would 
struggle to implement it and fight against the 
reactionaries. Nonetheless, it had a proviso to its 
acclaim of the reform: it argued that progressives and
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the broad masses could emerge victorious only if they 
were better organized and armed than the reactionaries 
and that, in order to discuss views and achieve this, 
they needed democratic rights like freedom of speech, 
writing, assembly, organisation, and arming. The Derg, 
it said, had denied these rights but granted land reform 
which was tantamount to giving meat and denying the knife 
with which to cut it up62.
The only kind word Democracia ever had for any of 
the Derg members was in relating to land reform. It said 
that the fact that the privates, the NCO's and some 
progressive officers of the Derg who were children of the 
workers and farmers was concrete evidence of their 
loyalty to their class allies (the broad masses) and they 
hoped that these pro-people elements would continue their 
struggle to the last for the fulfilment of the two basic 
demands, democratic rights and anti-imperialism. 
Democracia also criticized the reform for not allowing 
the people to take power from the bureaucratic 
capitalists and establish their own government under the 
leadership of the workers? for giving the land to 
bureaucratic capitalists rather than the broad masses 
and, hence, protecting the interests of the petit-
bourgeoisie; and for envisaging bureaucratic rather than
, , ,
democratic associations0 .
Be that as it may, the implementation of the law 
(the establishment of peasant associations and the 
redistribution of land) was even more important than its 
proclamation. Starting from the 1950's, for instance, 
the ancien regime had been adopting a modern legal system 
intended to supplant the traditional legal order. In 
practice, however, both continued to operate side by side 
with the modern law being followed mainly in the urban 
centres and the traditional in the rural areas. This 
"legal dualism" led some academics to be justifiably 
sceptical about the vigour with which the new government 
would and could enforce the land reform law under 
consideration64. Despite such fears, the law was not to
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remain as a kind of ideal to be achieved at some 
indefinite date in the future and fall into disuse in the 
process; it was in fact, fully implemented.
The main function of the peasant associations was, 
at least in the initial stages, to distribute land to 
their members as equally as possible65. As such, the 
establishment of peasant associations should have 
preceded the distribution of land? as it happened, 
however, both took place simultaneously. The tasks of 
establishing peasant associations and redistributing land 
fell primarily upon the Ministry of Land Reform and 
Administration, the Ministry of the Interior, the 
National Development Campaign and roving members of the 
Derg who supervised operations. Starting well before the 
promulgation of the land law, the two ministries 
conducted short seminars on different types of land 
reform policies for their existing and newly-recruited 
employees whom they then deployed in their provincial and 
sub-provincial branch offices66.
Participants of a National Development Campaign, 
consisting of teachers and students, were deployed in the 
countryside starting from January 14, 1975, in order to 
"enlighten" the rural masses about development. Perhaps, 
what gave the most important boost to the establishment 
of peasant associations and the redistribution of land 
was the coming together of the land-hungry peasants and 
the civilian left (from among the students and teachers) 
occasioned by the campaign programme. It was noted 
earlier that, as of September, 1974, the Derg had been 
finding it difficult to restrain the peasants from taking 
the law into their own hands and refusing to pay rent to 
landlords because they believed that law providing for 
the re-distribution and land had been enacted or was on 
the verge of being enacted. Also, the focus of the 
student movement for about a decade had been land reform 
as exemplified by its most popular slogan "Land to the 
Tiller". When, as of January, 1975, some 56,000 teachers 
and students were deployed to the countryside on the
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campaign programme, they set about instigating the 
already convinced peasants to organise themselves, oust 
the landlords and take the land for themselves67. When, 
in March, the law was finally issued, the campaign 
participants who were under the influence of the EPRP 
and, to a lesser extent, under the influence of the AESN, 
thought of it as an achievement of the "revolution” or 
that of the student movement, but not that of the 
government. At any rate, the result of the alliance of 
the peasants and the campaign participants in particular, 
but also that of the government agencies concerned in 
general against the landlords, was to organise four 
million peasants into sixteen thousand peasant
fTQ
associations by July, 1975 , and the bulk of the land
considered to be in excess of what an individual farmer 
was legally entitled to had been redistributed by the end 
of that year.
The land reform meant different things to the 
different communities of the rural population.
Obviously, big landowners and even those who had holdings 
of above a few hectares stood to lose from the reform 
more than other groups, whether they were cultivating 
their holdings personally or had rented them out to 
tenants. Although the law had provided that only 
individually owned land in excess of ten hectares was to 
be redistributed, in actual fact land owned in excess of 
a hectare or even less was redistributed in order to 
accommodate the small cultivators and the landless. In 
fact, a landowner was entitled to an equal share of land 
with others only if he was willing to cultivate his 
holding personally; otherwise, he stood to lose 
everything. Given the hostility of the poor peasants and 
the campaign participants towards big landowners, and 
given the fact that these social elements were in charge 
of land redistribution, it is doubtful even if this 
limited right of the ex-landowner was honoured at all in 
some areas, particularly in the South. More often than 
not, the landowners were ridiculed as exploiting
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parasites and dispossessed of their holdings. In the 
south, where the landowners were often from a different 
ethnic origin from the tenants, peasants and the campaign 
participants even resorted to violence in an attempt not 
only to oust them from their land, but also to drive the 
landowners out of those regions altogether.
The overzealousness with which the law was enforced, 
and the desire of the big landowners to defend their 
lives rather than to retain their land, drove them to 
take up arms and go to the woods from where they started 
threatening beating up and killing these involved in the 
implementation of the land reform. At any rate, since at 
that time the government was attributing all forms of 
resistance in the countryside to the reactionary 
landlords it is difficult to decide how much of it was 
perpetrated by landlords because of the land reform and 
how much of it by them and other sections of the 
population for reasons unrelated to land reform. 
Historically, it had been common for law and order to 
break down during the transition from one king to the 
next and for warlords to rally local support and assert 
autonomy against other communities of try and conquer 
them. In spite of Haile-Selassie's policy of 
centralization, this tendency was not completely 
eradicated, especially in the northern part of the 
country, where, perhaps, the widespread armed resistance 
in certain sub-provinces of Gondar and Gojjam, was 
brought about by local notables trying to take advantage 
of the breakdown of law and order. In some cases, such 
notables could have been putting up an armed resistance 
more in support of the deposed monarch than in a desire 
to effect local autonomy. Also, when law and order broke 
down, it was common for certain communities to loot one 
another or nearby towns. In addition, the Derg's 
imprisonment and summary execution of the officials of 
the ancien regime drove many to escape to the refuge of 
their relations in the countryside from where they were 
able to rally local support and put up armed resistance
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against the government. In 1975 and 1976, the EPRP and 
the Ethiopian Democratic Union69 also had men under arms 
operating in the northern provinces of the country and 
promoting rural dissension against the government more 
for political reasons than for reasons concerned with 
expropriating land. At any rate, pitted against the mass 
of the peasantry, the civilian left and the military 
might of the government, the landowners had to lose their 
struggle; by all accounts Ethiopia was cleansed of 
landlordism, and with it of power and prestige based on 
land ownership, by 1976.
As noted earlier, the reform affected not only the 
big landowners (who were, in any case, numerically 
insignificant) but also the small owner-cultivators who 
in a lot of cases had about a hectare each. Since 
normally there was no extra land for redistribution they 
had to share their holdings with the ex-tenants or the 
landless on an equal footing. Further, the impact of the 
land reform on small owner-cultivators 70 was to weaken 
the control they had over their plots. It has already 
been noted that the right of the individual owner to 
transfer his holding to another person was abolished by 
the reform. This, in effect, meant that, whereas before 
the reform, the owner-cultivator could sell, pass on by 
way of inheritance or pledge his plot, he could do none 
of those things after the reform71. Upon his death, for 
instance, the plot did not go to a person he designated, 
but to persons specified by law or to the peasant 
association for redistribution by it to other members72. 
Further, whereas prior to the reform, he could pledge his 
plot and borrow from either private or public sources, 
the land had no such value to him after the reform. The 
diminution of control over his plot, coupled with the 
constant fear of losing it in the process of 
collectivizations or the periodic redistribution of land 
by peasant associations that ensued could only have a 
negative impact on his desire to make permanent 
improvements on his land, like irrigation channels,
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storage facilities, decent living quarters, barns and the 
like.
In this sense, the impact of the reform on 
rist-holders was similar to that on owner - cultivators 
who together accounted for almost all the cultivation of 
the arable land in the country. The rist land tenure 
system prevalent in the northern provinces of Tigre, 
Gondar (Begemedir), Gojam and Wollo is often treated by 
writers on the subject as a form of family ownership 
because it was argued that any descendant of the presumed 
first settler family in an area now inhabited by an 
extended family could at any time claim a share of 
plot(s) from the group, and because it was presumed that 
land in rist areas was considered extra commercium and 
hence alienable. The rights of the rist-holder, it is 
often stated, are limited to using his plot and passing 
it on to his heirs on his death. In other words, he 
could not sell his plot and was under an obligation to 
transfer some of it to a new member of the family who 
invoked his right to a share of it.
Contrary to these assumptions, however, there is 
growing evidence to show that farmers in rist areas have, 
as far back as records go, been selling their holdings, 
albeit sparingly, because land was the only means of 
livelihood at their disposal. Moreover, the obligation 
to give up a part of their rist holding to a new claimant 
was more the exception than the rule since the pattern of 
migration was more towards the urban centres than the 
other way round. The reform Law under consideration 
failed to recognise the highly individualistic ethos of 
the rist system and sought to transform "the community of 
the family" directly into co-operatives rather than 
redistributing it to individuals . In reality, however, 
the effect was the same in the cases of both rist and the 
privately-owned land: land was further sub-divided and 
redistributed to individual farmers and the control the 
farmers had over their privately owned land or rist 
holdings diminished. One possible difference between the
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two relates to payments made to upper classes. In 
medieval Ethiopia the main means of surplus appropriation 
by the upper class was tribute estimated to be between a 
fifth and a third of the rist-holder's produce; however, 
with the decline of the upper class in the twentieth 
century, with the introduction of wages for the rural 
administrative elite and with the tax reforms of 1944 and 
1967, it is not clear how much of the tribute and other 
feudal dues had survived. The reform would have 
abolished any residual feudal rights that might have 
persisted. The table below will indicate the extent of
privately owned land of the south and rist-holdings of
13
the north.
1'roV\*'\CJL'
*  _  . D I S T R I B U T I O N  O F
po p
TENAN£§* o w ^ ,
Arussi 690,600 307,764 50,724 358,488
Begemeder 1,087,200 97,848 62, 232 160,080
Gomu-Goffa 583,300 249,412 21,633 271,045
Gojjam 1,344,500 172,785 95,024 267,809
Hararge 1,435,570 703,429 71,778 775,207
Illubabor 515,375 376,224 10,307 386,531
Kaffa 969,100 571,769 29,073 600,842
Shoa 3,585,000 1,828,350 573,600 2 ,401,950
Sidamo 1,987,590 735,408 39,751 775,159
Tigre 1,410,800 98,848 257,218 356,066
Wollega 1,064,100 574,738 49,715 624,453
Wollo 2.061.800 360.552 474 .214 834.766
TOTALS:16.734.935 6.076.927 1.735.269 7.812.396
(3^%) C.4-6Y.7
It is often said - and the government'^ rhetoric is
most emphatic about it - that the land reform under
consideration was, of the greatest benefit to the tenant
farmers of Ethiopia who according to the above table
constituted 3 5% of the crop-production community. The
Ethiopian Civil Code of 1960, allowed the contract of
rent to provide for the payment of up to 75% of the
tenant's produce to the landlord.74 The reality was,
however, different. The bulk of the tenants paid 25%
33% of their produce to the landlord by way of rent, and
only in exceptional cases did that go as high as 50%
hardly ever beyond that75. Some surveys have shown that
in certain areas, the landlord also transferred to his
tenants the obligation of paying land tax76. The tenant
was also subservient to the whims of the landlord and had
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to buy his favour by working on his land by presenting 
gifts on special occasions and by paying deference to him 
partly in order to fend off eviction.
The land reform swept away all rents and feudal dues 
in one fell swoop77, and raised the status of the tenants 
to that of an owner of all his produce. However, the 
final verdict on whether his burdens were made any 
lighter has to be postponed until the pre-reform rents 
and feudal dues are weighted against the post reform 
taxes, price controls, quota system under which he was 
made to sell to the government a part of his produce at a 
price much lower than the market value, obligatory 
subscriptions to various mass organizations, subservience 
not to a landlord but to a multitude of government 
officials, peasant association leaders, and cadres, 
forced resettlements, collectivizations, villagization, 
cyclical labour and financial contributions that the new 
officials exacted from him. These impositions came later 
and it would be premature to consider them in any detail 
here.
Apparently, the landless who lived interspersed 
among the owner-cultivators and tenants were clear 
•beneficiaries of the reform because they were given their 
own plots in the course of the land redistribution and 
because it can be presumed that to have a plot of land 
however small would create a livelihood for them. There 
are no figures for the landless at the national level, 
but a 1981 survey, carried out in four weredas in the 
north-west, the west and the south of the country showed 
that they ranged between four and seven per cent of the 
population in those weredas and that they received the 
smallest plots compared to the ex-owner-cultivators and
7ftex-tenants'°.
By contrast, the land reform has been irrelevant to 
the lives of the nomadic peoples like the Afars, Issas 
and the Sidamo Oromos who together constitute some 6% of 
the total population79. The land law under consideration 
stated that it was the responsibility of the government,
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besides other things, to settle the nomads for 
agricultural purposes80. The wisdom of such a policy is 
questionable, for various reasons: the nomads inhabit the 
extremely arid zones of the lowlands which are not 
amenable to cultivation? the semi-arid zones which they 
also inhabit can only be developed through 
capital-intensive projects? settling nomads around ponds, 
lakes and rivers could expose them to diseases like 
malaria? alternative development strategies exist? and 
settlement can only be secured and maintained through the 
use of force as it is contrary to the way of life of the 
nomads. The nomads have, therefore, been allowed to 
continue to roam the vast expanses of the lowlands in 
search of water and grazing land and fighting off 
intruders upon land they consider their own as they have
• • , Q 1done since time immemorial0 .
Finally, mention must be made of the land tenure 
system which has survived sixty years of Italian colonial 
rule and the radical reforms of 1975 and still prevails 
among the peasants of the Ethiopian highlands. This is 
what is called "desai" (village ownership) and lends its 
name to the topic of the section under consideration.
The desai socio-economic order is one of the most 
egalitarian and democratic institutions that has ever 
been devised. According to the system, access to land 
depends on membership of the community of the village 
which in turn depends on two considerations: whether an
individual is a descendant of the family that had settled 
first in the area and whether the individual is a 
resident in the village or, at least, lives close enough 
to maintain his ties with it. Every seven years, all the 
family heads hold a general meeting which is presided 
over by the state-appointed local judge-administrator 
known as "chica”. After ritualistic sermons by the 
elders and the priests about past disputes and the need 
to make peace and start anew, the "chita” nominates three 
recognised members of the community who in turn nominate 
twelve others: three to collect tax, three to help
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administrate the churches in the village, three to 
redistribute land and three to ensure that the 
redistribution is in accordance with established customs 
and practices. Members of the Assembly can and do 
criticise the nominees and by acclamation reject any one 
of them. Those in charge of redistribution then divide 
the land at the disposal of the village into four parts 
on the basis of the fertility of the land and on the 
kinds of crops that can be grown. This accomplished, 
plots of land are allocated to each member in each of the 
four parts by the drawing of lots. The rights to the 
individual over his plots is limited to use-right which 
lasts for seven years. With minor differences from area 
to area, this is the outline of the "desai” system of the 
Ethiopian highlands.
In fact the reform law under consideration failed to 
make a distinction between the "rist" and the "desai" 
tenure systems and sought to transform the community of 
the family (in the case of the "rist" system) and the 
community of the village (in the case of the "desai" 
system) into co-operatives. Save in some sample cases, 
co-operatives have not materialised in either system. In 
fact, in the case of the "desai" area, the reform made 
hardly any difference at all. Since the office of the 
"chica" was abolished, the peasant association filled the 
gap and presided over the seven yearly assemblies that 
redistributed land democratically. Both the reform law 
and the traditional "desai" system gave to the landholder 
the use-right over his plots. It appears that the reform 
law has merely replaced the community of the village with 
the community of the peasant association.
As a matter of fact, the reform law refers to the 
measure taken under it as "the public ownership of rural 
land" but since there cannot be any meaningful control of 
land by the public through its agent (the state) before 
collectivisation and since collectivisation has proved 
illusory in the case of Ethiopia, the law has not 
nationalised but abolished all the pre-existing land
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tenure systems and replaced them with a form of "desai" 
system. Thus, though the reform perpetuated the "desai" 
system in its homestead (the Eritrean highlands) it was 
less democratically introduced in the rest of the country 
because there each peasant association redistributed 
land more frequently than every seven years and, more to 
the point, without consulting its members.
Finally, an impact of the reform on productivity 
needs to be mentioned. By the time of the reform, the 
arable land of the country had been subjected to 
extensive sub-division of holdings as a result of 
population pressure, with about 60% of the farmers having 
plots of less than one hectare each82. In spite of the 
fact that the land reform legislation provided for the 
granting of up to ten hectares to individual farmers83, 
it can be presumed that the size of plots actually 
distributed was, in most cases, either the same as or 
smaller than the holdings prevalent prior to the reform 
because the landless had now to be accommodated and the 
excesss land that was nationalized was not enough for any 
bigger redistribution of land84. This assumption is, at 
any rate, confirmed in the case of four widely 
distributed weredas by a survey carried out in 198185. 
This meant, in effect, that, assuming the farmers were in 
a position to introduce modern technology, the size of 
their plots would not be able to accommodate such 
innovations. In this regard, the reform can be accused 
of intending to tie down the farmers to their traditional 
agricultural implements, like the hoe, the plough and the 
farm ox, and hence freeze productivity to the pre-reform 
level.
It was, perhaps, intended to create a larger scale 
of farming by bringing neighbouring farms together to 
work their plots collectively. The reform law under 
consideration in fact talked of co-operative farms which 
it defined as "...any farm the possession and 
administration of which belongs to the farmers using the 
land"88. If this gave rise to the interpretation that
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the fanners who belonged to a co-operative could 
collaborate in some areas while retaining their property 
rights over their plots, that possibility was dashed by 
another legislation which was adopted in December, 1975. 
According to it, the farmers were to bring their 
labour-force, their plots and their other instruments of 
production under the control or ownership of the co­
operative and work collectively with their interest being 
limited to a share of the produce on the basis of 
labour-time contributed by them to the co-operative87. 
While collectivization could be presumed to solve the 
problem of sub-division of farm plots, at the same time, 
it raises a number of other problems of its own and has, 
in any case, proved illusory in the Ethiopian context88.
The scope of the land reform was limited in that it 
was not meant to address itself to all variables 
concerned with agrarian development strategy, notable 
examples being taxes and prices. The reform was 
primarily concerned with land tenure - with the kind of 
relationship that should exist between the farmer and his 
plot and, consequently, also between him and all others. 
The kind of tenure chosen as appropriate for the 
post-reform order was the granting to individual farmers 
of what is called "use-right” over his plot (the right to 
decide to what kind of use his plot will be put subject 
to government directives, and the right to enjoy the 
fruits thereof). Like prices and taxes, however, the 
type of land tenure system chosen can have implications 
for productivity, some of which have already been 
indicated in passing. For example, it has been noted 
that use-right does not give the farmer as much incentive 
to make permanent improvements on his holding, nor the 
facility to pledge it and borrow from private and public 
sources as does individual ownership of land. Also, it 
has been indicated that the reform has led to a further 
sub-division of holdings with negative implications to 
the farmers7 ability to make technological innovations.
In view of this, it is perhaps in order to ask why
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use-right over sub-divided holdings has been chosen in 
preference to individual ownership over small or even 
large farms.
Nationalization of land is in line with the 
Marxist-Leninist principle of bringing the means of 
production under state ownership. Once the state is made 
the owner , land cannot be distributed to farmers in the 
form of ownership because two owners over one thing is 
not logically tenable and because the notion of mine and 
thine does not appear to be a desirable pursuit by 
Marxist-Leninist. However, use-right, which is chosen as 
more appropriate than individual ownership, is more akin 
to traditional categories of property relations and hence 
belongs neither to socialist nor capitalist relations of 
production. Its validity in the immediate aftermath of 
an aspiring socialist revolution rests on its presumed 
potential to be transformed into some kind of property 
relation controllable by socio-economic organizations 
like institutions, co-operatives, communes, or state 
farms.
It is perhaps unlikely that the full economic 
implications of such a reform and the complexity of the 
property relations involved was analysed sufficiently by 
its drafters in the Ministry of Land Reform and 
Administration and appreciated in any meaningful way by 
members of the Derg, with the possible exception of a 
few. For the drafters it was enough that the reform was 
in line with what had been done in some other socialist 
countries, notably the USSR and China, and for the Derg 
it was enough that it was seen to be doing what the 
civilian left clamoured for and that the reform was just 
in the sense that it gave pieces of land to the poor 
peasants on an equal basis. The reform is, therefore, 
better understood not from the economic point of view 
(where it is seen as an agrarian development strategy 
intended to unleash the dynamics of agricultural 
productivity), but rather from the ethical, ideological 
and political points of view.
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(C) THE NATIONALIZATION OF URBAN LAND AND EXTRA HOUSES
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF URBAN DWELLERS'
ASSOCIATIONS
i. The Nationalization of Urban Land and Extra 
Houses
After the nationalization of the business 
organizations and rural land discussed in the previous 
sections, the next to be transferred to government 
ownership were urban land and extra houses. The task of 
drafting the Law on the subject was entrusted to the 
Ministry of Public Works and Housing (later known as the 
Ministry of Urban Development and Housing) in which 
members of the Voice of the Masses group were dominant. 
Relevant agencies like the Addis Ababa Municipality and 
the National Statistical Office provided the data 
required by the drafting committee and probably 
participated in its proceedings through 
representatives89. The draft legislation was then 
submitted to the Council of Ministers who forwarded it to 
the Derg without so much as discussing it. The Ad-hoc 
Supreme Organizing Committee wanted to act on it with the 
greatest possible speed because it sought to pre-empt any 
underhand dealings by proprietors who had already learnt 
that the government was about to nationalize land and 
houses. The Law was finally enacted on July 26, 1975, 
presumably by the Ad-hoc Supreme Organising Committee 
since, at the time, a lot of the other Derg members were 
absent, most were away in the provinces engaged , mainly 
in the establishment of peasant associations, 
redistribution of land, and resolving local differences, 
and some were receiving political training abroad.
The most important provision of the legislation 
declared that, as of its effective date (August, 7,
1975), all urban land and extra houses would become the 
property of the government90. It provided, further, that
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the government would pay compensation for the 
nationalized extra houses 91 but not for land92.
"Extra houses" means those which are in excess of 
what the legislation allowed a person to own. It allowed 
a person or a family to own one dwelling house93, a house 
or houses needed to run a business94, and/or a dwelling 
house or houses for employees of an organization95. The 
Ministry of Urban Development and Housing was authorised 
to determine the actual size of land to be allotted for 
the construction of a dwelling house96, but is was at no 
time to exceed five hundred square metres97. No similar 
ceiling was placed on the size of land on which business 
premises or a dwelling house or houses for employees of 
an organization were to be built; the same Ministry was 
authorised to determine the appropriate size in each 
case98.
In part this meant that the owner of a house could 
transfer it to another by way of sale, barter, succession 
and the like99, but he could not do the same to the land 
that went with the house because that belonged to the 
government100. Nonetheless, when the owner transfers his 
house to another, his right over the land (referred to by 
law as "use-right") also gets transferred to the new 
owner of the house. In the case of a dwelling house, for 
instance, the parking space, the garden and the play 
ground, if any, along with the land on which the house is 
actually built, gets transferred to the new owner of the 
house. It is as though the land is an intrinsic part of 
the house and must therefore, suffer the same 
incumbents.
On the face of it, the implications of the 
nationalization of rural and urban land appears to be the 
same. In both cases, land is owned by the state; the 
rights of the individual over the land allotted to him is 
referred to as "use-right" (the right to decide to what 
use the land should be allocated and the right to enjoy 
the fruits of such decision). Nonetheless, in the case 
of rural land, the power to redistribute land is given to
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the peasant associations; whereas in the case of urban 
land, such power is vested in the Ministry of Urban 
Development and Housing. In fact the relevant 
legislations talk of "public ownership of rural land" and 
"government ownership of urban land"? but it is not clear 
whether the differences in terminology are intended to 
refer to such distinctions. Also, the urban dweller who 
is allotted a piece of land seems to have more limited 
rights than does the farmer over his. On the whole, the 
former can use his land only for the purpose of building
a house; once that is done, his land becomes a mere
appendage of the house which he loses as soon as he 
transfers the house to a third party for any reason. By
contrast, the farmer has a wider choice of purposes to 
which he can put his land and whatever he decides to do 
with the product, the land, which enjoys an independent 
existence from the products, is his to stay. 
Interestingly, the tenant of a government house which 
has, for example, a garden enjoys the same benefits on 
the land he possesses as does the owner of a house with 
the added advantage of not having to pay property tax.
Rural land is "a means of production" and as such 
its nationalization may be explained in terms of Marxist 
categories of property relations. Urban land may not be 
"a means of production"; nonetheless, the preamble of the 
legislation justifies its nationalization on three 
counts: to abolish the shortage of land and the soaring
of prices caused by the concentration of land into the 
hands of a few feudal lords, aristocrats, high government 
officials and capitalists; to abolish the exploitation of 
the many by the few; and, to abolish tax evasion.
Perhaps, shortage of land, inflation and tax evasion 
could respond to different kinds of treatments; but the 
most direct treatment for "exploitation" (by which is 
perhaps meant the renting of land) is nationalization.
The rhetoric of the left was by now beginning to be 
adopted by the Derg policy statements. If this was the 
choice of language of the radicals who were drafting the
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legislation, the Derg was, obviously, quite happy to pass 
it as its own.
The nationalized extra houses were rented out to 
urban dwellers at rates fixed by the Ministry of Urban 
Development and Housing101. Mostly, rents of up to Birr 
100 (about 50 US dollars) were to be collected by urban 
dwellers' associations (UDA) and rents above that were to 
be collected by the Ministry. All rents were to be used 
for providing services to urban dwellers in accordance 
with government comprehensive urban development plans and 
directives. In other words, UDAS were meant to use the 
rent they collected for developmental and other matters 
coming under their jurisdiction: maintenance of rented
houses, payment of salaries of UDA employees, common 
services for their members like latrines, water supplies, 
roads, kindergartens and basic health facilities. The 
rent collected by the Ministry was to be used for 
projects at the level of the cities102. According to the 
preamble of the legislation, one of the purposes for the 
nationalization of extra houses was control of soaring 
rents which had caused "...misery to the lives of the 
urban masses". It achieved this control by following 
policies of static rents and lax rent collections, 
particularly of UDA houses. The service envisaged from 
rent proceeds were pursued with a fair amount of vigour 
in the immediate aftermath of the reform; since then, 
however, the pursuit has been abandoned103.
A most central purpose of such an urban development 
policy is the provision of adequate housing for urban 
dwellers, particularly for those that come within the 
low-income bracket. Housing can not be said to have been 
adequate at the time of the reform? but, as the 
population grew, even more houses needed to be built.
The reform recognized this need. It directed the 
Ministry of Urban Development and Housing , in 
collaboration with the concerned agencies like the 
Ministry of Finance and the National Bank, to assist 
urban dwellers to secure loans for the purchase and
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construction of houses104. In the immediate aftermath of
the reform, this led to a flurry of construction of
private houses by those who could borrow against the
collateral of salaries and other securities; later,
however, shortage of land and building materials, and
liquidity crisis on the part of the mortgage bank put an
end to it. Also, apart from the preambular commitments
(like ”... provide opportunities of work and shelter for
the toiling people...” and "...help them regain their
economic, social and political rights...") , the
legislation said nothing of substance regarding the
problem of how the poor were to acquire houses. All
told, the two important impacts of the reform were
dispossessing landlords and causing an immediate crisis
in the supply of both rented and owned accommodation,
effects which were felt with increasing intensity as time 
105wore on.
ii Urban Dwellers' Associations
The peasant associations and the urban dwellers 
associations (UDA) are a contribution of the new 
government to the social and political scene of Ethiopia. 
These and other mass organizations were the most 
important forums on which the struggle for power by 
various factional contenders, including the Derg, were 
fought out in subsequent years. It is perhaps in order 
to say a few words on UDAs by way of explaining its
essential features as well as those of the peasant
associations since they are both fundamentally the same.
It was the same legislation which nationalized urban 
land and extra houses that organized urban residents into
associations which it called "co-operative societies" and
later changed to "urban dwellers associations". They 
were organized at three levels: at the local or kebele,
the higher and central levels106. The central urban 
dwellers association in the same municipal council 
established in each city and the other two exist at the
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zonal and district levels of cities and are subordinate 
to it.
All urban inhabitants were made members of UDA's 
except ex-landlords who were prohibited from voting in 
the election of UDA leaders or from being elected
1 07themselves for a year^'. The organs of UDA's at each 
level included an executive committee, a public welfare 
committee and a judicial tribunal. The first of these is 
established through direct election by all members and 
the other two are then established by the executive
, i nocommittee ■LWO.
The primary task of delineating the boundaries of 
and organizing the UDAs was entrusted to the Ministry of
1 0 9  • •Urban Development and Housing . Hence, the Ministry 
divided the capital city, which then had a population of 
just over a million, into three hundred kebeles 
(districts). The city's elections were held on August 
24, 1975, leading to the establishment of three hundred 
executive committees with five members each, three 
hundred public welfare committees with three members 
each, three hundred judicial tribunals with three members 
each and three hundred control committees with two 
members each. The size of each of the committees and the 
establishment of control committees were decided by an 
organizing committee of the Ministry110. The 
establishment of UDAs in the provincial towns and 
villages did not start until the second half of 
October111. All these elections were concerned with the 
establishment of kebele UDAs; those of the higher and 
central UDAs were not held until the next round of 
general elections over a year later.
Like peasant associations, UDAs are given 
considerable powers over local matters. As noted 
earlier, the executive committees of UDAs are authorised 
to follow up land use and building; set up educational, 
health, market, road and similar services; collect land 
and house rent up to about fifty US dollars per piece of 
land or per house per month; and, spend the rent it
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collects and subsidy it receives on building economical
houses and on improving the quality of life of its
11 5 membersAA^.
The task of protecting public property and the lives 
and welfare of the urban population at the local level is 
entrusted to the public welfare committees which were 
made accountable to the executive committees of UDAs113. 
The public welfare committees were the equivalents of the 
defence committees of peasant associations; both later 
came to be known as "the revolution defence squads".
The mandate of the kebele judicial tribunal is to 
hear and decide disputes between urban dwellers over land 
and houses?114 that of the higher judicial tribunal, 
between kebele associations inter se and between kebele 
associations and urban dwellers?115 and that of the 
central judicial tribunal, between higher 
associations116. Unlike the judicial tribunals of 
peasant associations, those of UDAs were not given 
jurisdiction to preside over criminal offences at least 
at this stage.
Prior to the reform, these economic, social and 
judicial functions would have been exercised by officials 
appointed by and responsible to the government. After 
the reform, however, those functions were entrusted to 
UDA leaders (and incidental, to peasant association 
leaders ) elected by and responsible to the people. In a 
country where prior to 1974 virtually the only elected 
institution was one of the two houses of parliament (the 
chamber of deputies), the establishment of UDAs and the 
granting to them of such powers and responsibilities was 
an admirable exercise of devolution of power quite 
consistent with the Derg's principle of "self-reliance" 
which it reiterated in many of its policy pronouncements 
and which it enshrined in "Ethiopian Socialism".
However, the responsibility of UDAs to the people is 
partial in the sense that they are also responsible to 
the government for certain matters. It has been noted , 
for instance, that the officials of the Ministry of Urban
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Development and Housing that conduct the election of 
UDAs, give them directives on land-use and building and 
on the disposal of the rent they collect and the subsidy 
they receive117. Also, even if decisions of UDA judicial 
tribunals cannot be taken to the regular courts on 
appeal, the Ministry is empowered to review the decisions 
of the higher UDA tribunals which are the highest courts 
within the system118.
Further, the Ministry was authorised to designate 
persons who would organise the records and offices of the 
UDA courts and who would preside over their proceedings 
until such time as they became operational119.
It is apparent from the preceding provisions that 
the government's role as far as regards UDAs is more 
supervisory and educational rather than interventionist 
and, hence, very different from a military command 
structure with which members of the Derg are familiar.
In an age when most governments would claim, or at least 
practise some kind of right to guide society towards a 
goal like, for instance, "economic development" the kind 
of "parental function" of supervising and guiding of the 
UDAs that the government assumed cannot be condemned as 
inappropriate. In the final analysis, however, the 
democratic content of the devolution of power envisaged 
in the UDAs rested on the extent to which the election of 
UDA leaders remained free and the extent to which the 
government's relations with the UDAs remained parental.
As it happened, the popularly elected UDAs were 
responsible to a government which was not responsible to 
the people and the powers received by the UDAs were given 
rather than won and hence could be taken away at will. 
Subsequent developments, particularly the factional 
struggle for power, militated against democratic 
elections, transformed "the parental" into "the 
paternalistic" and reduced UDAs into instruments of 
reducing the people into submission.
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CONCLUSION
It appears that the decisions adopted up to the end 
of 1974 were taken by the Derg collectively and without 
the participation of ministries and other public 
agencies. Examples of some of the decisions so adopted 
were the summary execution of the sixty or so high 
officials of the ancien regime and others (November 23, 
1974), the Ethiopian Socialist programme (December 20, 
1974) and the nationalization of private banks and 
insurance companies (January 1, 1975). At the time, the 
differentiation between officers and other ranking 
members of the armed forces and the police within the 
Derg, between members of the Ad-hoc Supreme Organising 
Committee and the other members of the general assembly, 
was in the making. As a result, the imprint made on the 
decisions by members of that committee would have been 
substantially greater than by the other members of the 
Derg.
As noted earlier, the drafting of the policies 
regarding later nationalization measures was left to 
ministries and other public agencies to be carried out in 
accordance with the Derg's principle, enunciated in the 
Ethiopian Socialist programme, that those economic 
activities which, if left in private hands, would not go 
against the spirit of Ethiopia First, should be 
nationalized, and, in accordance with the precedent set
by the Derg in nationalizing private banks and insurance 
companies. It was on the basis of these vague guidelines 
that the ministerial committee created for the purpose 
shortlisted some seventy-one industrial and commercial 
undertakings as appropriate for nationalization. 
Obviously, the vagueness of the principle gave the 
committee some discretionary powers to suggest which 
undertakings should be nationalized and which not. For
example, the bulk of the businesses chosen by the 
committee as appropriate for nationalization were owned 
by aliens; on the other hand, however, it could have 
included on its list all, or most of the businesses owned
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by nationals or, alternatively, it could have prepared a 
shorter list than it did. Given the cursory manner in 
which the Derg considered the draft concerned with the 
business organizations to be nationalized and approved it 
in February, 1975, it is very unlikely it would have 
rejected any alternative proposals that the ministerial 
committee might have made.
Compared to the nationalization of rural and urban 
land and extra houses, which actually affected nationals 
more than aliens, that concerned with the nationalization 
of business organizations was moderate. This can, 
perhaps, be explained by the fact that the committee 
which prepared the list of businesses to be nationalized 
was composed of ministers and other high government 
officials of the ancien regime who were never identified 
with the radical student movement or any form of 
radicalism of their own making. Also, the fact that the 
same list was submitted to the Ad-hoc Supreme Organizing 
Committee but kept from the assembly as being too 
confidential, shows the decline in importance of the 
latter. Obviously, the non Ad-hoc Supreme Organizing 
Committee members of the Derg, were by then, being 
treated with less deference than the ministers who were 
made privy to confidential information.
It was the Ministry of Land Reform and 
Administration which was entrusted with the task of 
drafting the policy regarding the nationalization of 
rural land. There were, as noted earlier, two trends 
within the Ministry which held different positions on the 
subject. One advocated the nationalization and 
distribution of all land individually owned in excess of 
40 hectares? the other opted for the mere nationalization 
of all rural land. However, the Derg was on the side of 
the latter option? it had already declared 
nationalization of land as the appropriate agrarian 
strategy in the Ethiopian Socialism programme and had 
replaced the minister of Land Reform and Administration 
who was in favour of the conservative approach (Ato Belay
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Abay) by the more radical Ato Zegeye Asfaw. The new 
minister was later identified as having been a member of 
one of the Marxist underground organizations (the 
Ethiopian Oppressed People's Party) and a number of the 
other members of the drafting committee were identified 
as having been members of the other radical groups. Even 
if the more dominant members of the Derg would have had 
more say on the draft legislation, it appears the 
discussions on and the adoption of it in March, 1975, 
afforded the assembly more participation than did the 
nationalization of the business organizations a month 
earlier.
The task of drafting the policy regarding the 
nationlization of urban land and extra houses was 
entrusted to the Ministry of Urban Development and 
Housing. The Minister of the department (Ato Daniel) was 
later identified as having been a member of one of the 
underground Marxist organizations (AESM). The 
Affiliation of the Minister suggests that members of the 
drafting committee would, in most cases, have been drawn 
from the same underground organization. When, in July, 
1975, the draft came to the Derg, it is very unlikely it 
received a reading beyond the Ad-hoc Supreme Organising 
Committee. The need to consult the assembly had, by 
then, faded away and, in any case, a lot of the Derg 
members were away in the provinces busy helping in the 
implementation of the land reform policy and in diffusing 
tension wherever it arose.
The above several paragraphs suggest the existence 
of a shift by the Derg away from a reliance upon the 
technical services of bureaucrats to that of cadres, away 
from the technocrats and University lecturers of 
Haile-Selassie's government first to radical elements 
within the state apparatus and then more particularly, to 
Cadres of (AESM). In this sense, the nationalization of 
urban land and extra houses was a turning point? from 
then on, the Derg or the Ad-hoc Supreme Organising 
Committee was to draw upon the expertise of the Voice of
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the Masses group for the adoption of its major policies 
for a couple of years.
The socio-economic reforms that the Derg was to 
introduce were completed in 1975? what came after that 
were minor amendments and follow-up additions to them.
The impact of the reforms introduced in the industrial 
sector were to depose aliens of whatever little 
investment the country had been able to attract (or the 
extent to which it had been incorporated into the global 
capitalist system), leave the insignificant domestic 
capital intact and transform the workers of the 
nationalized business organizations into state employees. 
The impact of the agrarian reform was to transform the 
semi-feudal relations of production into a kind of 
state-farmer tenancy arrangement in which the individual 
farmer is given a piece of land by the land owner's (the 
state) local agent (the peasant association) - only now 
the farmer did not have the security of a fixed contract 
since he had to return the land when the peasant 
association or state so required. While the tenure 
lasts, the farmer can only work on his plot, and use the 
produce as he will. Like the nationalization of rural 
land, that of urban land and extra houses had as its main 
target the abolition of landlordism - a target concerning 
which both reforms were highly effective. The social 
effect of the reforms was to destratify Ethiopian society 
which had been divided along property relations. Also, a 
by-product of these reforms was the establishment of 
peasant associations and urban dwellers associations 
which were intended to act as local governments but which 
actually proved to be more important as forums of 
political struggle in subsequent years.
Finally, it is clear that the reforms were adopted 
with Marxist-Leninist ideas in mind. As far as the 
economy is concerned, this meant that Ethiopia would in 
due course acquire a centrally planned economic system 
as, indeed, it did a few years later. However, a more 
central question was whether the existence of a Leninist
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vanguard party is requisite for the adoption of Marxist- 
Leninist socio-economic reforms in view of the fact that 
such a party was lacking in the Ethiopia of 1975. If the 
answer to the question is yes, it would be difficult to 
call the reforms it would be difficult to see what the 
role of a Leninist vanguard party is. In other words, 
the issue of whether, according to the "socialist 
programme", the adoption of socio-economic reforms can 
come before the formation of the party or whether the 
latter should come first and adopt the reforms had 
preoccupied the Ethiopian left until then and was to 
continue to do so in the subsequent years. As will be 
noted in the following chapters, the hidden agenda behind 
the issue was the aspiration of each of the political 
organization to create the party under its control or to 
dominate the party to be formed by them jointly and in 
this way monopolize or dominate power.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Transition from an "African Socialism" to a 
"Scientific Socialism"
When the Derg took power in the summer of 1974, the 
most important demand of the opposition was the 
establishment of a Provisional People's Government which 
would represent more sections of the population than did 
the Derg and which would pave the way for the 
establishment of a non-provisional government. If the 
opposition had had its way, then the Provisional People's 
Government and/or the non-provisional government that the 
latter would have created might have been expected to 
adopt socio-economic and political reforms demanded by 
the revolutionary movement of the time. Nevertheless, 
the Derg felt that it could deliver whatever another 
'progressive' provisional or non-provisional government 
could deliver? it, therefore, continued to monopolize 
power and to adopt reforms, while at the same time 
promising to hand it (power) over to a government of the 
people.
Thus, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Derg 
adopted, in 1974 and 1975, Ethiopian Socialism and, in 
accordance with this, a series of nationalisation 
measures with far-reaching social and economic 
implications. Again, as will be noted in this chapter, 
in April 1976 the Derg adopted a National Democratic 
Revolution Programme which gave priority to the 
establishment of a Leninist Party rather than the 
formation of a non-provisional government. Ethiopian 
Socialism can be described as a variant of African 
socialism and the National democratic Revolution 
Programme of Ethiopia as a variant of Scientific 
Socialism? it is with the processes of this ideological 
shift of the Derg that the present chapter is concerned.
The Derg's change in ideological outlook was 
influenced in large measure by the leftist political
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organisations which surfaced on the Ethiopian political 
scene as of 1974. Thus, Sections A and B are devoted to 
describing the political spectrum of the time. The 
Ethiopian Democratic Union, which is dealt with in 
sub-section A, was, arguably, a proponent of a middle 
class revolution; the sub -section is, therefore, at the 
same time an attempt at explaining why such a revolution 
did not succeed in Ethiopia. The section also gives a 
brief overview of four leftist organisations which were 
important not so much in influencing the Derg's 
ideological outlook but in explaining subsequent 
political development. Section B deals with the 
Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party and the All 
Ethiopian Socialist Movement which were the most 
important leftist political organisations in their own 
right and in influencing the Derg to adopt Scientific 
Socialism. Finally, section C describes the processes by 
which the Derg adopted the national Democratic Revolution 
Programme of Ethiopia in response to the challenges posed 
by the above political organisations. Chapters 3 and 4 
have argued that the Derg had no ideological commitment 
other than nationalism when it assumed power in 1974.
(A) THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS
i. The Ethiopian Democratic Union
In the first half of 1974, a middle-class takeover 
of power seemed quite possible. Endalkatchew's draft 
constitution envisaged a constitutional monarch and a 
cabinet accountable to a democratically elected 
parliament. It was quite likely that he would have 
wished to become the leader of the cabinet to be 
constituted in accordance with the new constitution.
Under this contingency the government would have been 
dominated by Haile Selassie's technocrats and would
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probably have become more independent of the influence of 
the traditional aristocrats than ever before.
However, with the Derg's seizure of power in 
September 1974, and its subsequent falling under the sway 
of the civilian left, such a possibility dissipated very 
quickly. By the end of the year it had decapitated the 
middle class with the summary execution of the highest 
military and civilian officials of the ancien regime, and 
by the end of 1975 had broken its economic and political 
backbone through the nationalisation of the major 
business organisations, rural and urban land, and extra 
houses. The insignificant national business community 
was too small to make a difference and was in any case 
composed of Ethiopian Moslems who had always found it 
difficult to participate in the Christian-oriented 
government of Haile Selassie.1 The middle-ranking 
bureaucrats who were active in the popular uprising of 
1974 were later forced to tow the line of the Derg and 
the civilian left.
It has already been noted that, according to the 
Derg, the main reason for its establishment was the need 
to arrest and bring to justice the officials of the 
ancien regime, who were allegedly corrupt and hence 
responsible for the backwardness of the country. In the 
aftermath of its establishment, therefore, it carried out 
waves of arrests of such officials, and those who managed 
to evade the arrests fled to the safety of the 
countryside and from there to the neighbouring countries 
and beyond. Many ended up in western capitals where they 
met up with those who had defected from Ethiopian 
embassies abroad and defectees from government missions.
The most important western capital for the white 
'emigres' was London, to which the Crown prince, Merid 
Azmach Asfau Wosen, had moved towards the end of 1974, 
from Switzerland, where he had been under medical 
treatment since before the time of the popular uprising 
of 1974. It appears that initially the Crown Prince was 
a rallying point for the 'emigres'. At any rate, it was
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in London that the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) was 
established, issued its publications and where its 
recognised leaders lived and operated from. The date of 
its establishment can be traced to March 1975 when the 
Chairman of the organisation, Lieutenant General Eyasu 
Mengesha, made EDU's manifesto public for the first 
time.2 However, EDU did not start issuing its organ (EDU 
Advocate) until December 1975, and its programme (Aims 
and Objectives of EDU) was not published until the summer 
of 1976.
EDU claimed that its membership consisted of all 
Ethiopians, whatever their class, nationality or 
ideology, so long as they were opposed to the Derg. In 
particular, the peasantry, who have on their own accord 
established themselves in opposition to the Derg and have 
come in under the umbrella of EDU' were seen as forming 
'the broad base of EDU'. It has been suggested above 
that the leadership of EDU was drawn from the white 
emigres who fled the country in the aftermath of the 
Derg's onslaught on the high civilian and military 
officials of the ancien regime. In the words of EDU's 
programme, the leadership was composed of 'traditional 
leaders' at whose '...side are ranged an educated core of 
modern Ethiopians, international civil servants, military 
officers, businessmen, diplomats, educators and 
government administrators'.3 EDU saw itself as providing 
a command structure for all the forces opposed to the 
Derg. The highest organ in its structure was a supreme 
council with the mandate to formulate policies. It had 
17 members, each of whom apparently represented the 
different regions of Ethiopia. The responsibilities for 
implementing the decisions of the supreme council, and 
for running the day-to day- activities fell on the 
executive committee, made up of eight members.4 The 
chairman of both organs was the Eritrean Lieutenant 
General Eyasu Mengesha, who had been the Ethiopian 
ambassador to London until he defected some time towards 
the end of 1974. Two other well-recognised leaders, Ras
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Mengesha Siyiim and Brigadier General Nega Tegegn, came 
from the neighbouring provinces of Tigre and Gondar 
respectively. They were recognised as leaders of EDU's 
military operations in the north-west and north and both 
were grandsons-in-law of King Haile Selassie.
Like many of the political organisations that 
emerged in the post 1974 period, EDU shied away from 
calling itself a party. It saw itself as a movement 
which did not 'covet power for itself'. Its primary 
task, it maintained, was the overthrow of the Derg 
through political and military struggle.5 As soon as this 
was accomplished, EDU proposed to convert itself into 'a 
transitional administration for a fixed period' and at 
the same time to establish an elected 'constituent 
assembly' which would draft a new constitution to be 
ratified by the people. Pending the adoption of the new 
constitution and the handing over of power to the 
government which would be constituted in accordance with 
that constitution, the transitional administration (EDU) 
would return the security forces to their normal duties, 
revitalise the command structure within the armed forces, 
maintain law and order, protect members of the security 
forces from reprisals by the public, repeal all Derg 
laws, guarantee freedom of speech, assembly and 
association, organise and administer the economy on an 
emergency basis, negotiate with Eritrean representatives, 
grant amnesty for political prisoners and Ethiopian 
refugees abroad, re-open schools and institutions of 
higher learning, and despatch goodwill missions to 
friendly neighbouring countries.6
All these would appropriately fall within the 
competence of a provisional government, but there were 
others which seemed to require a long period of time to 
accomplish. For example, EDU argued that democracy and 
the creation of autonomous units within a federal 
structure were at the forefront of the demands of the 
1974 popular uprising7 and that these, together with land 
reform (the distribution of land to peasants in the form
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of individual ownership) constituted the three pillars of 
its programmes.8 Further, EDU sought to secure the smooth 
functioning of the economy and the mobilization of the 
national work force and thereby solve the problems of 
inflation and unemployment.9 Finally, EDU declared that 
it was committed to freedom, human rights and equality.10 
This perhaps suggests that, contrary to its assertions, 
EDU saw itself as a party; that it had an ideology (a 
pluralist political and economic order) which it sought 
to impose on the Ethiopian people; and that it had 
designs to launch itself as a non-provisional government 
after the overthrow of the Derg.
These allegations may be dismissed on the ground 
that its stated aims and objectives were matters it 
sought to advocate rather than impose on the people; 
what was more difficult to dismiss, however, was the 
allegation against it that it was restorationist (that it 
sought to reinstate monarchy and to de-nationalise land, 
extra houses and businesses that had been nationalised by 
the Derg). Here there is, perhaps, a case for arguing 
that EDU was more of a reformist than a restorationist 
organisation. Most of its members, like for instance, 
the educated Ethiopians, international civil servants, 
military officers, diplomats, educators, government 
administrators and businessmen, were not part of the 
aristocracy; they were technocrats whose interests did 
not depend on traditional institutions such as a feudal 
land tenure system, birthrights, personal rule and the 
like. It is very likely, therefore, that EDU was 
sincerely committed to the policies cited above, like 
freedom, democracy, federal government and land reform 
based on private ownership.
It appears that the question of reinstating the 
monarchy after the overthrow of the Derg was raised by 
the founders of DEU and rejected because it was supported 
only by the Shoan aristocracy who were very much in the 
minority. The group that finally emerged as EDU was 
dominated by Northerners who were traditionally not much
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committed to the Shoan dynasty, even though some among 
them were aristocrats. An outstanding example of this 
was Ras Mangesha Siyum, who, though a grandsons-in-law of 
King Haile Selassie, was recognised in his own right as a 
descendant of the Tigrean Emperor, Yohannis the fourth, 
and as a great reformer who often asserted his 
independence from the central government in ruling his 
province of Tigre. It is more likely than not that, 
given his temperament and zeal for reform, he might have 
fancied himself as a president rather than a king should 
the question have arisen.
If EDU had had its way, it would certainly have 
undone all the nationalisation measures of the Derg and 
reinstated private relations of production at least to 
the previous level. In the Marxian sense, this would 
perhaps have amounted to turning the clock back, but 
would not amount to reinstating feudal relation of 
production and an aristocratic style of government. In 
view of this, EDU was perhaps genuinely committed to its 
statement that it was
"...based on a fundamental conviction that the 
demise of feudal rule can only be replaced by a 
democratic reconstruction of the nation. No alternative 
is possible or desirable for Ethiopia and its 
development." 11
Even though the members of EDU were too closely 
identified with the ancien regime, which affected their 
credibility, the organisation nevertheless was at best as 
effective as any of the pan-Ethiopian political 
organisations in putting up resistance to Derg rule.
According to its policy statements, EDU's first and 
most important task was overthrowing the Derg, which to 
it was a 'fascist regime'12 which had deprived the
. . . 13popular movement of its aspiration to democratic rule.
The Derg's programme of Ethiopian socialism is, EDU
asserted, "...a slogan meant to dress its terrorist rule
in a respectable robe..." and is "neither Ethiopian nor
socialist? it is a simplistic device intended to
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hoodwink progressive Ethiopians and world public
opinion."14 Further, it argued that the land reform of
the Derg was hastily improvised and muddled, deprived the
peasants of ownership of land, herded them into communal
arrangements and rendered them vassals of the state? and
that the nationalisation of urban houses deprived
thousands of Ethiopians of their major source of 
15income.
It is for considerations like this that the EDU said 
that it sought to overthrow the Derg? the means chosen 
to achieve this were political and military. As far as 
its political strategy was concerned, EDU attempted to 
expose the Derg internationally and domestically.16 The 
conservative Islamic states of the region (Saudi Arabia, 
North Yemen and Sudan in particular) had been growing 
uneasy about the increasingly leftist stance of the Derg. 
What is more, Ethiopia was implicated in a July 1976 
attempted coup against El Numeri of the Sudan.17 In 
September 1976, the leaders of EDU were discussing a 
common strategy with Ali Mira (the traditional leader of 
the Afar people and their recently created 'Afar 
Liberation Front') and the leaders of the conservative 
Eritrean secessionist organisation (the Eritrean 
Liberation Front.) The venue was Jeda (Saudi Arabia). 
These developments brought EDU close to the conservative 
states and movements within the region, and particularly 
to the Sudan, which later allowed it to use its radio 
station to broadcast hostile propaganda, against the 
Derg. No doubt EDU also benefited in terms of military 
aid from the same sources.
As far as its military strategy was concerned, EDU 
declared that even though its members were familiar with 
guerilla warfare, it would go for a swift victory because 
that would not have detrimental consequences for the 
country. It argued that a majority of the Ethiopian 
people and a section of the army were opposed to the Derg 
and that EDU need only provide united command for the 
opposition. 19 As early as November 1975 it was reported
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that lieutenant General Eyasu Mangesha, Ras Mangesha 
Siyum and Brigadier General hiega Tegevy), had met in Nega 
(in the north-west province of Gondar near the Sudanese 
border) in order to plan military operations. 20
In May and June 1976, EDU was in a position to 
harass the Ethiopian army and help bring about the defeat 
of a peasant march against Eritrea, launched by the Derg 
21 and to engage and, at times, defeat isolated military 
garrisons in the provinces of Gondar, and Tigre.22 
However, the major confrontations between EDU and 
military forces of the Government did not start taking 
place until 1977, when the former was able to capture 
towns and sub-provinces in the north-western part of the 
country near the Sudanese border.
Prior to 1974, most Ethiopians in the modern sector 
would probably have chosen to live in a pluralist 
socio-economic and political order. However, there were 
no political organisations advocating such an ideology, 
mainly because Ethiopia had not been exposed to Western 
political processes or ideas? less touched by these than 
even the ex-colonial countries of Africa. The most that 
had been achieved in this regard was the incorporation 
into the Draft Constitution of Endalkatchew of a 
provision that would have allowed the establishment of 
more than one party had it not been abolished by the 
Derg. The emergence of EDU was a belated attempt at 
instituting a pluralist socio-economic and political 
order, which was doomed to failure from the start because 
its adherents were identified closely with the ancien 
regime, which was by then totally discredited; because 
they were seen as trying to avenge their associates who 
had been executed by the Derg? and because the 
organisation, being primarily based outside the country, 
had limited influence over the people.
The two most important political organisations, 
called the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) 
and the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (AESM) will be 
discussed in the following section. This sub-section is
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concerned with four other leftist political 
organisations, which were not very important in 
influencing the Derg's shift of ideology, so much as in 
determining the outcome of political development in the 
subsequent years. There is no need to go in any amount 
of detail into their own ideological dispositions, since 
they had nothing new to offer other than what will be 
discussed in the following section in relation to EPRP, 
AESM and the Derg's adoption of the National Democratic 
Revolution Programme (NDR) in April, 1976.
The political organisations concerned were the 
Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Organisation, 
the Ethiopian Oppressed People's Revolutionary Struggle, 
the Worker's League and Revolutionary Flame. The leaders 
of these organisations, with the exception of those of 
Revolutionary Flame, were active participants in the 
Ethiopian Student Movement, which will be discussed in 
Section B? in that sense, the origins of the 
organisation can be traced back to the student movement 
of the 1960s and early 1970s. There was, nevertheless, a 
new breed of Communists drawn heavily from the army as of 
1975 (trained either by the veterans of the Ethiopian 
Student Movement in political study groups and in the new 
Yekatit 1966 Political School, or in the socialist 
countries) upon which the Workers' league and the 
revolutionary Flame were dependent for the bulk of their 
membership.
ii. The Ethiopian Oppressed People's Revolutionary 
Movement
The Ethiopian Oppressed People's Revolutionary 
Movement's paper (Independence) was launched in December 
1975 and the first issue contained the programme of the 
organisation. With the issuance of the national 
Democratic Revolution Programme in April 1976 which 
treated existing groups as political organisations which 
had to form a joint front in order to bring about a 
fully-fledged party, the organisation under consideration
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had to change its name from 'party' to 'struggle' in 
September 1976.22
The leaders of that organisation were active 
participants in the Ethiopian Student Movement of the 
1960s. The original cell of the organisation may well 
pre-date the 1974 uprising, 24 though^ li((cfor all the 
the events of that and subsequent years were an 
impetus for “ accelerated growth.
The main difference between the Ethiopian Oppressed 
People's Revolutionary Struggles and the other political 
organisations appears to have been the emphasis that the 
former placed on the 'oppressed nations and 
nationalities' of Ethiopia. In fact, on that question 
its programme reveals nothing different from what the 
other organisations state; but it is common knowledge 
that the organisation saw itself standing for the cause 
of the oppressed 'nations' and nationalities more than 
the others. The bulk of its leadership, including its 
Chairman (Baro Tomsa), were from the biggest linguistic 
group in the country (Oromo). However, there was a 
sprinkling of individuals from the minority linguistic 
groups of the South in its ranks. It is doubtful if 
membership was open to other nationalities, especially to 
the more dominant linguistic group of the Amharas and 
Tigreans.
It appears that the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Struggle differed from the Oromo secessionist movement in 
that it believed in the continuation of an ethnically and 
religiously more just Ethiopia. Thus, like the other 
political groups under consideration the Ethiopian 
Oppressed People's Revolutionary Struggle was arguably 
pan-Ethiopianist? unlike them, however, it probably 
sought to subordinate the class question to the national 
question, or at least gave the latter more prominence 
than did the other organisations.
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iii. The Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary 
Organisation
By the end of 1975, the Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist 
Revolutionary Organisation had started issuing its paper, 
Revolution 25, but its programme was not made public 
until December 1976.26 Some sources suggest that the 
organisation was established as AESM's Youth League, and 
later broke away; others have maintained that AESM 
launched it deliberately in order to promote its own 
cause under the guise of another organisations. These 
suggestions appear to be the result of the fact that the 
two organisation were working very closely with one 
another at a later stage; the Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist 
organisation's Programme, for instance, states that the 
two had already formed a joint front, and that they were 
issuing a joint paper called Truth27.
However, there is evidence to believe that, like 
EPRP and AESM, the Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist 
Organisation was an offshoot of the Student Movement and 
particularly of the latter's strategy, as of the early 
1970's, of promoting political study groups in student 
circles. One such was established by a group consisting 
mainly of law students led by Ayed Ahmed, the Editor of 
the Addis Ababa University Students' Union paper, 
Struggle. It appears it was this group that later 
developed as an independent political organisation 
propelled mainly by the upsurge of political activities 
as of early 1974. Both the members of the organisation 
and its leaders were generally younger than their 
counterparts in other organisations.
iv. The Worker's League
A Dr. Senaye Likke was the leader of the Ethiopian 
Students' Union in North America in 1971, and in August 
of that year he, and thirteen others, walked out of the 
Nineteenth Congress of his Union because it rejected its 
Seventeenth Congress decision that the national question
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in Ethiopia was of a regional character. The reflection 
of the decision was at the instigation of the newcomers 
from Ethiopia who later formed the EPRP and against the 
wishes of the Ethiopian Students' Union of Europe which 
later formed AESM. Senaye's walk-out alienated him from 
the newcomers as well as from the Ethiopian Students' 
Union of Europe? the newcomers had ousted him and taken 
over his position, and the Ethiopian Students' Union in 
Europe had lost the support of the Ethiopian Students' 
Union of North America.
Later he completed his studies and returned to 
Ethiopia in 1972 when he started working for the Pasteur 
Institute in Addis Ababa. At the same time, he started 
teaching the air force cadets in Debre-Zait some 50 
kilometres outside the capital on a part-time basis.
This brought him into contact with the air force 
personnel and through them with members of the Derg when 
that was created in 1974. It is often acknowledged by 
people close to the government that Senaye was quite 
close to the Derg in its early days and that later he was 
involved in teaching Marxism and Leninism to Major (later 
Colonel) Mengistu Haile-Mariam and his group in the Derg.
It is not known exactly when Senaye established his 
political organisation (The Workers' League) but its 
paper (Workers) was in existence at least as of late 
1975, and its programme was made public in July, 1976.
In a pamphlet he wrote at the end of 1976, Senaye 
endorsed the positions of AESM discussed in the following 
section, glorified the victories of the 1974 'revolution' 
of Ethiopia and attributed the 'achievements' of the 
Revolution to the Derg much less grudgingly than did 
AESM28.
The members of the Workers' league were partly 
recruited from among partisans of the Ethiopian Student 
Movement but mostly from among the army. The 
organisation had cells in the various military units and 
it had absolute control of the Debre-Zait Air Force where 
Senaye was apparently worshipped. Recruiting members of
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the armed forces and the police was a departure from the 
practice of the other political organisations? the 
latter all seem to have shied away from recognising 
members of the security forces as a revolutionary class 
in terms of Marxism-Leninism.
v. Revolutionary Flame
Revolutionary Flame's programme was launched in 
August 1976 and its paper, Seded (Flame), does not seem 
to have pre-dated the issuance of the programme by more 
than several months. If this is correct, Revolutionary 
Flame would be the last of the political organisations to 
have come into existence? it was perhaps established 
some time in early 1976.
Apparently, during encounters between Major Mengistu 
and AESM leaders, the latter were accustomed to giving 
weight to what they were saying by reminding him that 
they were speaking on behalf of an organisation. Major 
Mengistu needed no reminding? it was clear to anyone 
that AESM was using the official forums (like the mass 
organisations, and, later, POMOA and its branches, and 
discussion groups in all offices) to recruit members and 
grow by leaps and bounds. It seems that Senaye, who also 
feared AESM's domination, and Mengistu got their heads 
together and came up with the idea that the latter should 
create his own political organisation and that Senaye 
would provide him with the necessary cadres to help in 
the endeavour. The result was Revolutionary Flame.
Apparently, it was difficult for the cadres of 
Revolutionary Flame and the Workers' League to see the 
difference between the two organisations since they were 
being instructed by their headquarters to work together 
closely. Also, people far outside the two organisations 
often claimed that Revolutionary Flame was merely the 
armed wing of the Workers' League. If this is correct, 
the claim often made that Major Mengistu was a member of 
AESM cannot hold water (except perhaps for the period 
prior to 1976), unless of course he was simultaneously a
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member of AESM and Revolutionary Flame as well as the 
Workers' League, which would not be an unusual practice 
for the time.
It was Major Mengistu and some 13 of his supporters 
from the Derg that first established Revolutionary Flame. 
At the time, Major Mengistu was the first Vice-Chairman 
of the Derg and as of February 1977 he became the 
uncontested leader of the country. Consequently, to 
become a member of Revolutionary Flame meant to be 
secured and privileged - a fact which helped the 
organisation to attract many members and to become 
powerful after that year.
Vi. THE ETHIOPIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY
(EPRP) AND THE ALL-ETHIOPIAN SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 
(AESM)
Unlike the origins of EDU those of the other 
pan-Ethiopian political organisations that sprung up in 
the 1970's could be traced, directly or indirectly, to 
what came to be known as the Ethiopian Student Movement 
(ESM) of the 1960's. EPRP and AESM, to which the 
previous chapters have been referring as the 'Democracia 
Group' and the 'Voices of the Masses Group' respectively 
were the most important and direct descendants of the 
ESM.
The origins of ESM have been traced to the late 
1950's, but it was not until the mid-60's that it 
acquired the organisational and ideological poignancy 
with which it was able to mobilise the University and 
later the school students and conduct an effective 
campaign against Haile Selassie's government. By then 
there were at least three main branch unions of ESM, 
operating independently of each other. Two of those were 
the Ethiopian Students Union of North America (ESUNA) and 
The Ethiopian Students' Union of Europe (ESUE), composed 
of students who went there for further studies. Less 
important unions also existed among students in North
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Africa and Eastern Europe. The third important union, 
the Ethiopian University Students' Union of Addis Ababa 
(EUSUAA), representing all the colleges in the capital 
city, emerged as the dominant student union in the 
country after years of struggle against the students' 
union at the national level.
Towards the end of the 1960's all the branches of 
ESM advocated Marxism-Leninism as the correct ideology to 
be pursued by them as well as by Ethiopia. It is not 
easy to attribute this trend to one specific cause or 
another. However, the anti-West backdrop of the 60's 
(the revolutionary movements in latin America, the 
anti-Israel, anti-West struggle of the Palestinians, and 
anti-imperialist war in Indo-China, and the general 
student movement in the West) could only direct ESM 
toward the goal of struggling for the violent overthrow 
of the existing order. The organs of ESUNA and ESUE 
(Challenge and Struggle respectively) clearly showed the 
identity of ESM within these global movements.29
The trend within EUSUAA was the same. A certain 
amount of Marxist literature was available in the 
libraries, and those who had contacts received more of it 
from unions in Western Europe. These and various 
pamphlets from China and North Korea were freely 
circulated among students and read by them avidly, often 
at the expense of their academic careers. A lot of the 
school and university instructors from the West, who 
tended to identify themselves with the global movements, 
were sympathetic to and, in the case of the Marxist among 
them, advocates of the trends within the student 
movement. Under the influence of factors like these, 
EUSUAA deliberately abandoned corporatist demands (like 
better food, better living quarters, better 
representation in the university administration ) in 
favour of struggling for matters of national importance. 
It mobilised the university and school students into 
holding frequent rallies, demonstrations, class boycotts 
and into the distribution of anti-government leaflets.
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The main demands, often echoed by these militant actions, 
included 'Land to the Tiller' (as of 1965) 'National 
Self-Determination up to and Including Secession' (as of 
1969) and democratic rights. By 1969 Marxism-Leninism 
had become the official ideology of ESM; EUSUAA which 
was at the forefront of the struggle against the ancien 
regime had become its most militant advocate.30
In December, 1969, the EUSUAA leader (Tilahun Gizaw) 
was gunned down outside the main university campus. On 
the next day tens of thousands of university and school 
students held a rally in the campus and, with the aid of 
slogans, chants and placards, vilified the government, 
which they held responsible for the death of their 
leader. The focus of the rally was the corpse of the 
victim, which the students got hold of and refused to 
release either to the authorities or the relations.• In 
spite of many hours of toing and froing between 
government representatives and student leaders no 
resolution to the problem was in sight. Then the 
soldiers who had been positioned within the campus, fired 
a volley of shots into or in the direction of the crowd 
(it is not clear which), and, in the commotion that 
ensued, they pursued the dispersing students, bayoneting 
the bottoms and legs of those they caught up with. The 
extent of the casualties has since remained a matter of
*5 1speculation. A
In previous years the Government's measure against 
ESM had been limited to several days of detention 
accompanied by a certain degree of physical hardship, 
mainly intended to discipline the students. The events 
of December, 1969, however, indicated to the students a 
change in Government policy towards them: a change away 
from a paternalistic approach by the King to a 
heavy-handed policy intended to crush the movement. The 
measures did not quell the movement; it continued with 
greater ferocity, not least because it had the advantage 
of martyrs to dramatise its cause. One thing was true, 
nonetheless: greater numbers of students started going
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abroad on scholarships, partly because the educational 
system in the country was often being disrupted by 
student activism, and partly because it was now too 
dangerous to continue the struggle from within Ethiopia. 
Some of the hard core of EUSUAA left the country by 
hijacking planes, others by trekking across the 
country-side. The new arrivals did not like what they 
found among students abroad. To them the students abroad 
were neither sufficiently committed to the cause of 
liberating Ethiopia nor followed the 'correct' 
Marxist-Leninist line on various questions. The 
adherents of ESUE and ESUNA tended to look at the new 
arrivals as infantile romantics, lacking in the rigours 
of Marxist-Leninist discipline. The effect of this was 
to divide the ESM into at least three recognisable 
factions: the new arrivals, led by Birhane Meskel Reda,
who hijacked, with others, an aircraft from Ethiopia to 
the Sudan; ESUE, led by Haile Fida in Paris; and a wing 
of ESUNA, led by Senaye Likke in the United States.
The first and most important controversy arose over 
an article on the national question written under the 
pen-name of Tilahun Takele, but widely believed to have 
been the work of Birhane Meskel Reda. The new arrivals, 
who were attempting to dominate the students movement 
abroad, supported the thesis of the article, while ESUE 
and a section of ESUNA opposed it. The main difference 
appears to be between those who wanted to treat the 
centrifugal tendencies in Ethiopia as national questions 
(the position of Birhane Meskel's group) and those who 
wanted to treat them as regional questions (the position 
of the veterans of ESM abroad). The issue was submitted 
to ESUE's eleventh congress in August, 1971, (West 
Berlin) and the position of Birhane Meskel's group won 
the majority. The eleventh congress was attended by the 
leaders and prominent members of all branch unions.
Within a week of the Berlin conference, ESUNA held its 
nineteenth congress in Los Angeles and reversed its 
decision on the national question adopted at its
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seventeenth congress, in order to go along with the 
position of Birhane Merkel's group. Disappointed with 
the outcome, Senaye Likke (President of EDUNA) walked out 
of the meeting with thirteen supporters, thus effecting 
the first faction within ESM;32 later he created his own 
political organisation.
It appears that as early as 1970 Birhane 
Meskel's group had floated amongst ESUE's leaders, 
including Haile Fida, the idea of launching a Communist 
party which would wage rural guerilla warfare against 
Haile Selassie's government. However, neither side could 
see eye to eye on the question of timing nor on the 
nature of the party to be established, despite that 
Birhane Meskel's group went ahead, and in 1971 created a 
provisional organising committee which would prepare the 
ground for creating a party. Encouraged by its success 
in dominating the Ethiopian students abroad and in 
pushing through its thesis on the national question, the 
provisional organising committee held a founding congress 
from 22 to 29 of April, 1972, and adopted the 
constitution and programme of the party. It was decided 
that the real name of the party would be the Ethiopian 
Communist party, and that in its external dealings it was 
to be known as the Ethiopian People's Liberation 
organisation. For the sake of simplicity, the party will 
be referred to from now on as the Ethiopian People's 
Revolutionary Party, which is the name that the 
organisation adopted as of August 1975. The congress 
elected members of the central committee and Birhane 
Meskel as its general secretary; in turn the central 
committee elected members of the politburo. It was 
further decided that the minimum programme of the party 
would be the consummation of the new democratic 
revolution and that the Leadership would initiate a 
guerilla unit which would raise a people's army from 
among the peasantry and wage protracted warfare in three 
stages: the strategic-defensive, the equilibrium and the
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strategic-offensive. In this way, it was believed, the 
cities would be encircled and finally fall. 33
The beginnings of the foundation of AESM can be 
traced to a 1969 meeting in which the question of 
creating a political organisation was discussed. The 
first chairman of that meeting was apparently Hagos (a 
veteran activist of ESUNA) and the second was Haile Fida 
of ESUE. It appears that Hagos fell out with the group, 
leaving Haile Fida to carry on with the task of leading 
the organisation. If the events of those early years did 
not amount to the formation of AESM, there is no doubt 
that Haile Fida established it at about the same time as 
the foundation of EPRP or soon after. The kind of 
effective resistance that ESUNA put up against the 
onslaught of EPRP after the national question was 
discussed in 1971 can only be explained in term of an 
organised response. There was a lot to be done: writing
of polemical essays, printing and distributing pamphlets, 
preparing and defending positions at the emotionally 
charged meetings of the congresses. All these were 
conducted on a bi-partisan basis.
An example of this was the question of mobilizing 
the Ethiopian students abroad into joining one side or 
the other, which was the preoccupation of both 
organisations at that time. EPRP took the initiative of 
proposing the establishment of federal structure among 
the branch unions of AESM to replace the previous and 
loosely organised structure of the World-wide Union of 
Ethiopian Students. ESUNA, which had come under the sway 
of EPRP, adopted the idea of federation, but ESUE 
resurrected it until its 14th annual congress in August, 
1974 (West Berlin). By then the Ethiopian students 
abroad were polarised into supporters of the World 
Federation of Ethiopian Students (called Federationists) 
and opponents of the idea of federation (called 
Europists). The differences between the two were so 
hostile, personalised and aggressive that they could no 
longer share a common platform after the fourteenth
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congress? the two organisations never met together after 
that.
Despite the hostility and downright hatred towards 
one another, both Federationsts and Europists, led by 
EPRP and AESM respectively, professed Marxism-Leninism as 
the correct ideology for their organisations to pursue. 
Nevertheless, there were substantial differences between 
them. Besides their differences of the national and 
federal questions already alluded to, there was the 
additional issue of who had led the early 1974 popular 
uprising which proved intractable at the ESUNA 14th 
congress. To the Federationists, it had been the workers 
that led the uprising; to the Europists, it had been the 
petit bourgeoisie that led it.34
The early 1974 popular uprising that exploded on the 
Ethiopian political scene was as much a surprise to EPRP 
and ASEM as it was to everyone else. Like EDU, both 
organisations were established abroad and the target of 
their activities until 1974 had been the Ethiopian 
students abroad whom, as indicated earlier, they managed 
to mobilise extensively. Due to limited presence in the 
country the organisations were unable to give the popular 
uprising any kind of leadership? on the other had, 
however, the uprising confronted them with the challenge 
of having to integrate themselves not only with 
Ethiopians abroad but also with the progressive forces 
and the masses in the country. In the following few 
years, they took up the challenge successfully, but only 
at the expense of polarising the nation as they had 
already polarised the Ethiopian students abroad.
By July 1974, the central committee of EPRP had 
returned to Ethiopia and launched its organ Democracia. 
Even though the central committee of AESM did not return 
to Ethiopia until early 1975, it had sufficient followers 
within the country to live up to EPRP's challenge and 
institute its own organ, Voice of the Masses, in August
1974. As amply demonstrated in the previous chapters 
both organisations used these organs to advocate the
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abolition of the crown, to condemn the Derg as a fascist 
junta dictatorship, to demand the immediate replacement 
of the Derg by a People's government, to instruct the 
literate population about Marxism-Leninism etc. 
Surprisingly enough their positions on these and other 
issues were almost identical until at least the summer of 
1975? in fact, 'Voices of the Masses' went as far as 
inviting the public to read both organs since, it argued, 
they were the only progressive papers in the country.3  ^
However, their papers were deceptive in this regard 
since, under the surface, the hostility between their 
adherents continued to rage.
There is no doubt that EPRP showed a greater 
capacity in organisational activity than AESM and had the 
upper hand in this until at least the summer of 1975. In 
accordance with the mandate given to it at the time of 
its formation, the leadership of EPRP laid the foundation 
of its armed wing (The Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary 
Army) by sending sixteen of its members from Algeria to 
Eritrea for guerilla training by the Eritrean People's 
Liberation Front in September, 1973,36 and by installing 
the same in the tortuous mountains of Assimba in Tigre 
province in February, 1975.37 Later, other Ethiopian 
People's Revolutionary Army bases were established in the 
North Western province of Gondar. The protracted 
people's war that was initially intended to fight Haile 
Selassie's government had now reached an advanced stage 
and was poised for a guerilla war against the Derg.
EPRP's organisational activities among the urban 
population were even more remarkable. The windfall that 
swelled its ranks came with the deployment in early 1975 
of the sixty thousand or so teachers and students to the 
countryside under The National Development Campaign 
Programme of the Derg. EPRP activists established study 
clubs which they called Secret Youth Associations', and 
engaged the campaign participants in a day in, day out 
discussion on the study of Marxist-Leninist Literature, 
the achievement of the Ethiopian Revolution by the
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Ethiopian Student Movement, the usurpation by the Derg of 
the Revolution, the failure of the Derg to implement 
effectively the land reform policy, and the obstruction 
of the implementation of the same by local officials 
which was again attributed to the Derg. The convinced 
participants of the secret youth associations, which by 
this time also existed in almost all the major towns of 
the country, were then channelled into one of the mass 
organisations created by EPRP (like the Ethiopian 
Workers' Associations, the Ethiopian Womens' Organisation 
and the Ethiopian Students' Revolutionary Organisation) 
depending on whether they were workers, women or 
students. All this came under the umbrella of yet 
another superior mass organisation, namely the Ethiopian 
People's Revolutionary Youth League, suggesting that most 
of EPRP's activities were directed towards the youth. In 
addition to the politburo and the central committee, 
which have already been mentioned, the party itself was 
structured at the regional, sub-regional, zonal, basic 
and cell levels. The mass organisations were used by the 
party for raising funds, distributing pamphlets and 
generally agitating for the Party's line. ° In this way, 
EPRP was able to mobilise to its side not only the 
campaign participants (who can be described as adherents 
of the Ethiopian University Students union of Addis 
Ababa) but also to infiltrate the Confederation of 
Ethiopian Labour Unions and the Ethiopian Teachers' 
Association, and to have them adopt its line in their 
annual congresses. By August 1975, it felt so well 
integrated with the progressive social groups that it 
issued its programme officially, while maintaining at the 
same time that it was an underground party, and changed 
its name from the Ethiopian Communist Party or the 
Ethiopian people's Revolutionary Movement to the 
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party.
The leadership of AESM returned to Ethiopia en masse 
in early 1975 with two things in mind. First, its 
characterisation of the Derg's members as petit bourgeois
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and, according to it, the Marxist conception of such a 
class as opportunist and as capable of taking sides with 
either the reactionary or progressive class enabled it to 
give what it called 'critical support' to the Derg. In 
other words, the leaders of AESM returned to work with 
the Derg until and on condition that it pursued 
progressive programmes. Having alienated the officials 
of the ancien regime through the deposition of the 
monarch and through its executions, the Derg had need at 
the time of alternative sources of support and had 
extended an invitation to intellectuals abroad to return 
to their homeland and help it construct the new Ethiopia. 
Accordingly, it interviewed all the returnees upon their 
arrival and assigned them to posts considered appropriate 
by both sides. This latter led to a collaboration 
between the leaders of AESM and a faction of the Derg led 
by Mengistu Haile-Mariam. Haile Fide (leader of AESM) 
and others from his organisation and the one time leader 
of the Ethiopian Students Union in North America (Senaye 
Likke) who had returned to Ethiopia several years earlier 
were by the summer of 1975 giving Mengistu and members of 
his faction their first lessons in Marxism-Leninism.
Secondly, AESM claimed to be a Marxist-Leninist 
political organisation and as such sought to integrate 
itself with the progressive social groups. In this 
regard, the most important opportunity offered itself 
with the creation of mass organisations particularly the 
Urban Dwellers Associations starting from the end of
1975. The Minister of Urban Development and Housing (who 
was responsible for running the elections of Urban 
Dwellers Association leaders) together with a number of 
others he was able to attract to work under him were part 
of the leadership of AESM. Further, the Derg was quite 
willing for AESM to have its members dominate the Urban 
Dwellers Association leaderships because of the alliance 
already forged between a faction of the Derg and AESM.
If a particular Urban Dwellers Association was 
infiltrated by EPRP supporters, a re-election of the
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leaders with a view to replacing them with pro-Derg 
pro-AESM individuals could be held at any time.39
In fact, there is asymmetry in the way the social 
organisations came down on the side of one or the other 
of the two political organisations: as EPRP infiltrated 
the Urban Dwellers Associations so did AESM infiltrate 
the Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions, the 
Ethiopian Teachers Associations and the Students' 
Movement. The fact remains, nevertheless, that the 
Campaign Programme was to EPRP as the Urban Dwellers 
Association were to AESM.
With the withdrawal of the campaign participants to 
the cities, the activities of both organisations became 
even more focused on the urban social groups than was the 
case before. There is no doubt that, like EPRP, AESM 
also laid the foundations of its organisational structure 
within these groups. However, it is unlikely that it 
organised a set of mass organisations alternative to 
those of the Derg. It appears it was content to share 
with the Derg the mass organisations created by them 
jointly.
Though the differences between them had been 
simmering under the surface for a long time, EPRP and 
AESM did not make them public until the end of 1975. As 
of then, the papers of EPRP and AESM (Democracia and 
Voice of the Masses respectively) started attacking each 
other for the first time. A column in the official daily 
(Addis Zemen) called 'Revolutionary Forum' was devoted 
for several months in early 1976 to the purpose of airing 
their differences publicly. The positions of the two 
organisations could also be seen in their programmes. As 
already noted, EPRP issued its programme in August 1975; 
AESM's programme was not issued until April 1976. The 
name of the organisation (The All Ethiopian Socialist 
Movement) was actually adopted in the programme for the 
first time and, according to its preamble, the choice of 
the word 'movement' as opposed to a 'party' was made 
partly because the organisation did not feel it was
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sufficiently integrated with the progressive classes and 
partly because it wanted to work closely with other 
political organisations of which by then there were 
several. More to the point was, perhaps, the implication 
of calling itself a party to the relations between AESM 
and the Derg: if the former had claimed to be a
full-fledged party, it could have been accused of having 
intended to take power to the exclusion of all others 
including the Derg. The rest of this Section is devoted 
to describing the major differences between EPRP and AESM 
as reflected in the above mentioned documents.
The National Democratic Revolution (NDR)
The one thing on which EPRP and AESM agreed was the 
characterisation of the then ongoing socio-economic and 
political change as what they variously called The 
Revolutionary Democratic Dictatorship of the Workers and 
Oppressed Peasants, The Democratic Revolution, The New 
Democratic Revolution, The National Democratic Revolution 
etc. According to them, this is a period during which 
feudalism, imperialism (especially that of the US) and 
capitalism, including bureaucratic as well as comprador 
capitalism, were liquidated by the working class in 
alliance with the peasants and the progressive petit 
bourgeoisie (progressive students, intellectuals, small 
merchants, soldiers and poor urban dwellers). Thus, the 
unfolding events since 1974 were seen as an 
uncompromising and violent struggle between the 
exploiting and exploited classes and their respective 
appendages. The struggle would come to an end when the 
exploiting classes were crushed, when the people's 
democratic republic was established, and when, in this 
way, the NDR gave way to the era of socialism.^0
A February 1976 article written under the pen name 
of Petros Heraclitos, who could easily have been an 
adherent of either EPRP or AESM, made an attempt at 
tracing the historical development of the idea of NDR 
with citations from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao. It
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explained that, during the English and French 
revolutions, the working class allied itself with the 
capitalists against feudalism, but that later, as it 
became obvious that the capitalists' interests diverged 
from those of the working class, the alliance gave way to 
antagonism. Marx and Engels were reported to have said 
that the role of the peasants in the 1848 
'anti-capitalist' revolution in France was one of 
indifference or even downright pro-monarchy. However, 
the article went on, with the penetration of capital into 
the countryside in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the poor farmers found themselves unable to 
compete with the rich ones, a fact which made the farmer 
politically conscious. Apparently, this development 
encouraged Marx and Engels to 'improve', as of 1870, 
their previous position on the poor peasants and treat 
them as a revolutionary class and urge communist parties 
to become active in the countryside as well. In other 
words, with the world domination of capital in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, the old contradiction 
between the aristocratic and middle classes gave way to 
an alliance between the imperialist, capitalist and 
feudal classes, forcing the workers and peasants to forge 
an alliance against them.
The article went on to explain that, to Lenin and 
Mao, their respective revolutions had to go through two 
stages; Democratic Revolution and Socialist Revolution. 
The former of the two revolutions is 'democratic' because 
it is led by the workers who would rule in the interest 
of the oppressed majority as contrasted with the previous 
'democracies' which ruled in the interest of the 
privileged minority. Mao is reported to have said in 
1949 that the workers must lead the NDR because that 
class, more than all other, is far-sighted, selfless and 
absolutely revolutionary.41 For EPRP and AESM the 
validity of the characterisation of the then on-going 
socio-economic and political change in Ethiopia rested on 
citations from Marxist-Leninist literature and not on an
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application of Marxism-Leninism to or on an analysis of 
the particular circumstances of Ethiopia (the size of the 
working class, the consciousness of the worker and 
peasant classes, the contribution of those classes to the 
changes that were taking place at the time and their 
ability to lead the revolution)•
The Leninist Vanguard Party; EPRP or AESM ?
Both EPRP and AESM explained that, if the struggle 
of the broad masses (the workers, peasants and 
progressive petit bourgeoisie) against the exploiting 
classes was to succeed, they had to form an alliance 
under the leadership of an organised working class party. 
Each of these organisations saw itself as the working 
class vanguard party (actual or potential) which would 
lead the broad masses to victory against the exploiting 
classes. However, given the fact that both of them were 
avowed devotees of a single party system, the question of 
which one of them was to lead the broad masses to victory 
became a most fundamental and intractable problem on 
which they were unable to compromise. One solution open 
to them was the formation of a joint front as might have 
been expected. In their programmes, both EPRP and AESM 
expressed an interest in forming such a front, not with 
each other but with the other leftist groups that were 
springing up at the time. The continued EPRP - AESM 
competition for the role of the vanguard party arguably 
constituted the most important difference between them, 
partly because they both endorsed the use of force and 
violence to get their way (which had grave consequences 
for both later) and partly because most of their other 
differences, which were tactical in nature, proceeded 
from the more fundamental aim of becoming the party in 
power.
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The Derg a fascist or a more petit-bourgeois 
government?
If EPRP and AESM each sought to seize power for 
itself, that was a matter for the future? in reality, 
power was then in the hands of the Derg and the Derg 
alone. The two organisations had to, and indeed did, 
take positions on that fact.
EPRP saw the steering committees that sprung up in 
the various rebellious corporate groups during the 
popular uprising of 1974 as equivalents of soviets in the 
USSR.4  ^ As noticed earlier, EPRP was condemning the Derg 
as 'fascist' from the time of its seizure of power mainly 
because it stifled the democratic rights of the steering 
committees which, according to EPRP, were progressive and 
hence on the side of the broad masses, and which would 
have been able to organise themselves and assume the 
position of leadership, had it not been for the Derg. It 
was never clear whether the characterisation of the Derg 
as ' fascist' was intended to mean that it was simply 
dictatorial (a common usage of the term in Ethiopia since 
the Mussolini invasion of the country in 193 6) or whether 
it was intended to suggest that the Derg was pursuing the 
socio-economic and political policies of national 
Socialism. As EPRP's condemnation of the Derg hardened, 
it seemed to move closer and closer towards the second 
proposition.
In an October 1975 article, EPRP argued that the 
three primary enemies of the broad masses with whom 
progressives could not compromise, even temporarily, were 
imperialism, feudalism and fascism (the last being 
represented by the Derg). It explained that imperialism 
(the West) was arming both the aristocracy (EDU), which 
was trying to make a come-back, and the Derg, which was 
stifling the activities of the progressives and diverting 
the revolution from its correct path. The only 
difference between EDU and the Derg, it continued, was 
that each of them sought the power for themselves; 
otherwise there was a coincidence of interests between
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the two and imperialism, all of which were collaborating 
to reverse the course of the Ethiopian Revolution. The 
Derg was thus portrayed as a fascist government equalled 
only by imperialism and feudalism in its enmity to the 
Revolution? the broad masses were called upon to destroy 
the three enemies with equal vigour.43
It was soon after this that AESM started making its 
differences with EPRP public. It admitted that 
previously it had itself also characterised the Derg as 
fascist, but that it had now rejected the 
characterisation because the Derg had recently showed its 
anti-feudal and anti-imperialist position through its 
reforms. AESM further explained that, being a petit 
bourgeois group, the Derg could have come down on the 
side of the broad masses or on the side of the 
reactionary forces; that there were still leftist and 
rightist wings within it? and that it was the leftist 
wing that made the reforms possible. AESM saw its role 
as being one of collaboration with the left-wing of the 
Derg and creating pressure on the remaining members with 
a view to forcing them to join the masses. 44
A Provisional People's Government versus a 
Provisional Military Government, or a 
Provisional People's Government versus the 
Politicisation, Organisation and Arming of the 
People.
It is difficult to trace the origin of the demand 
for a 'Provisional People's Government' in the context of 
the change that was taking place in Ethiopia. At the 
time of the early 1974 popular uprising, there were 
underground papers which demanded the establishment of a 
Provisional People's Government, primarily because Haile 
Selassie's government was crumbling and because there was 
no obvious organised group to replace it. In the summer 
of the same year, however, the Derg emerged to fill that 
gap. Despite that, both EPRP and AESM took up the demand 
for the establishment of a Provisional People's 
Government in place of the Derg, and agitated for it
- 216 -
until they decided to make it an issue between 
themselves as of the end of 1975.
In an extensive article of November, 1975, EPRP not 
only advocated the establishment of a Provisional 
People's Government more strongly than ever before but 
also attempted to give it a theoretical basis with 
citations from Lenin. The central thrust of the article 
was the proposed establishment of a 'Provisional People's 
Congress' composed of elected representatives of social 
groups (such as workers, farmers, soldiers, women and the 
petit bourgeoisie) and the formation of a 'People's 
Provisional Government' through election by the 
Congress. The Provisional People's Government was 
defined as a joint front of the politically organised 
oppressed peoples, and was to be led by the workers in 
alliance with the peasants. Its tasks were declared to 
be taking the necessary measures against the anti-people 
and anti-revolution elements, granting unlimited 
democratic rights to the oppressed people, improving the 
economic and political conditions, resolving the 
nationalities question (especially the Eritrean question) 
and, in this manner, paving the way for the establishment 
of a 'People's Government'. The Derg, which was 
condemned for stifling the democratic rights of the 
masses, was declared to be unfit to act as transitional 
to a People's Government, and had, therefore, to be 
replaced by a Provisional People's Government? its 
coercive machinery, like the Courts and the Police force, 
had to be abolished? and its international agreements 
with the imperialist powers had to be repealed. It was 
further explained that Provisional People's Government 
had a historical precedent in Lenin's 1905 proposal for 
the establishment of a Provisional Revolutionary 
Government, which was no ordinary government but the 
dictatorship of the proletariat in alliance with the 
peasants.45
In a February, 1976, article, AESM claimed that it 
was the first to raise the demand for the establishment
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of a Provisional People's Government in place of the 
Derg, but that it reflected it afterwards because it had 
realised that it would lead to a dictatorship by a 
section of the petit bourgeoisie. In a January, 1975, 
article, written in reaction to EPRP's proposition above, 
AESM had explained its reasons for the rejection of the 
Provisional People's Government . The thrust of the 
argument was that only the petit bourgeoisie were 
organised and hence able to take part in elections; that 
the establishment of a Provisional People's Government at 
that stage would lead to the formation of a petit 
bourgeois government; and that in order to establish a 
People's Government through elections in which only the 
oppressed masses would participate, feudalism and 
imperialism must first be violently destroyed through the 
insurrection of the people. To AESM 'People's' and 
'Provisional' do not go together: a government
established through elections in which the reactionary 
classes participate cannot be a People's Government; 
conversely, a government established through elections 
after the destruction of Feudalism and imperialism is a 
People's Government and hence need not be Provisional. 
AESM maintained that the establishment of a Provisional 
People's Government through election was the slogan not 
only of EPRP but also of EDU and CIA and of the Russian 
aristocracy on the eve of the Soviet Revolution, and that 
the correct slogan for Ethiopia at that time (1975/6) was 
the call for the 'Politicization, Organisation and 
Arming' of the masses. EPRP was castigated for equating 
its Provisional People's Government with Lenin's 
Provisional Revolutionary Government, the latter of which 
could only (according to AESM) be established after the 
overthrow of the reactionary classes through the 
insurrection of the masses, when truly democratic 
elections could be held. EPRP WAS further criticised for 
misquoting Lenin, for quoting a passage from the works of 
Stalin and attributing it to Lenin, in order to evade 
being checked out, and for distracting the people from
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concentrating on their primary enemies of feudalism, 
imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism. 46
Variations of this theme continue to be vigorously 
advocated and defended on the pages of Addis Zemen in the 
early part of 1976. EPRP identified the mass 
organisations with the steering committees of the 
corporate groups which were coordinating resistance to 
the ancien regime at the time of the 1974 popular 
uprising and equated them with the soviets in the Russian 
revolution. It demanded confidence in them rather than 
in the Derg to lead the revolution to victory.47 On its 
part, AESM insisted that EPRP's call for an elected 
Provisional People's Government was a call for the 
depoliticisation, disorganisation and disarming of the 
masses; that it is EPRP's ploy to get to power through a 
shortcut; and that AESM would agitate for the violent 
abolition of feudalism and imperialism.48
It must be noted that both EPRP and AESM were 
aspiring Leninist parties and, as such, were not only 
theoreticians but also strategists. It is obvious that, 
if the Derg, which was then coming closer to AESM, was 
removed and replaced by a Provisional People's 
Government, EPRP might have hoped to absorb what it 
called the left wing of the Derg under its leadership and 
take over power for itself. The Derg adopted its 1975 
nationalisation measures in the absence of any party and 
AESM might have hoped to fill the gap. In this sense, 
the issue under consideration was arguably 'a Provisional 
People's Government versus a Provisional Military 
Government, as EPRP formulated it', rather than 'a 
Provisional People's Government versus the 
Politicisation, Organisation and Arming of the Masses' as 
AESM would have it.
Limited versus Unlimited Democratic Rights
The programmes of EPRP and AESM both had extensive 
provisions on democratic rights. 57 However, those 
provisions talked about the status of democratic rights
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only at some future date: the EPRP, programme dealt with
rights under 'The National People's Congress', which it 
envisaged as coming before the formation of the People's 
Provisional Government? and that of AESM dealt with 
rights under 'The People's Democratic Republic' which it 
envisaged as the period that comes after the consummation 
of the National Democratic Revolution. Since both 
organisations had, therefore, made their positions on the 
status of future rights clear, it can perhaps be assumed 
that the debate on Limited versus Unlimited democratic 
Rights that raged on the pages of Addis Zemen in early 
1976 were intended to relate to rights under the Derg.
To take an example of the status of future rights 
for a moment, EPRP's programme provided that the National 
People's Congress would safeguard the freedom of activity 
of all political parties, organisations and individuals, 
on condition that they were anti-feudal, 
anti-imperialist, and anti-bureaucratic-capitalist;50 
AESM's programmes provided that the 'Unrestricted Rights' 
of speech, press, assembly, organisation, demonstration 
and strike of the people would be guaranteed under the 
People's Democratic Republic.51 It is obvious from these 
provisions that EPRP sought to limit democratic rights to 
the broad masses after the removal of the Derg and during 
the period of National Democratic Revolution, and AESM 
sought to extend them to all the people, albeit after the 
declaration of Socialism when all reactionary classes 
would have presumably been ousted from power. Despite 
this projection of democratic rights, however, the 
arguments in the Addis Zemen made out that EPRP 
(advocates of unlimited rights) sought to extend 
democratic rights to the reactionary classes, and AESM 
(advocates of limited rights) sought to limit them to the 
broad masses. As suggested earlier, the debate relates 
to the time of the Derg.
Articles written in support of AESM's position 
argued that in no class society are rights the same for 
all classes? that proletarian dictatorship is brought
- 220 -
about not through the granting of rights to the 
reactionary classes but through violent and bloody 
struggle with them; and that if democratic rights are 
not limited to the masses, the opportunists, swindlers 
and reactionaries would confuse the people and reinstate 
the old order. 52 On its part, EPRP argued that the 
claim that reactionaries might use rights given to them 
to their own advantage was indeed a problem but at the 
same time showed lack of confidence in the broad masses 
who had resisted the ancien regime heroically and thereby 
showed the degree of their consciousness? that, rights 
or no rights, the reactionaries were shedding blood all 
over the country? that it was not laws but the people 
who could curtail the freedom of action of the 
reactionaries? and that if rights were granted for a 
given classs but not for another, there would be a • 
problem concerning who was to act as the arbiter on the 
question of who was and was not reactionary.53
Here, EPRP seemed to be caught unprepared; it 
seemed to want to give a modicum of rights to the 
reactionary classes. However, given the provision cited 
from its programme above and given its other records (its 
agitation for the violent ousting of landlords from their 
land, its condemnation of EDU, etc) it is impossible to 
assume that it was any more reconciliatory toward the 
reactionary class than AESM. At any rate, the question 
of limited versus unlimited rights was perhaps the most 
dangerous of the issues raised by the two organisations 
because of its implication that EPRP itself could be 
characterised as a 'swindler, opportunist and 
reactionary' organisation and, at best, be denied the 
democratic right to organise and agitate among the people 
or, at worst, be eliminated by the Derg, as happened 
later.
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Privatisation versus Nationalisation of Rural 
Land
EPRP's programme went along with most of the ideas, 
contained in the Derg's measure of nationalisation of 
rural land of March 1987. Thus, the programme announced 
that EPRP would advocate the redistribution of land to 
peasants, the settlement of nomadic people for 
agricultural purposes, the gradual and voluntary 
collectivisation of holdings and promotion of state 
farms. One important departure from the Derg's policy 
was that EPRP would base its redistribution of land not 
on use-right but on private ownership of holdings.54 As 
noted earlier, the only Derg measure that the EPRP had 
accepted wholeheartedly was the nationalisation of rural 
land? the reasons for its deviation from that position 
later are not altogether clear. There is no doubt, 
however, that it constituted a change of mind which 
brought it closer to the position of EDU than AESM.
On the other hand, AESM's programme endorsed the 
Derg's agrarian strategy in its entirety, and declared 
that its only concern was the correct implementation of 
that policy.55 Addis Zemen articles written in support 
of AESM's position on the question rejected EPRP's 
endorsement of private ownership of redistributed 
holdings as going against Marxism.56
People's versus Bureaucratic Control of the 
Economy
By and large, both EPRP and AESM went along with the 
Derg's nationalisation of urban land and extra houses, 
industrial and commercial enterprises and financial 
institution particularly those owned by aliens. 57 The 
difference between the two groups related to the 
appropriate management of the nationalised means of 
production and other undertakings; EPRP seemed to want 
to pursue a more decentralised form of management than 
did AESM. EPRP's paper (Democracia) had throughout been
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condemning the Derg's nationalisation measures because, 
it claimed, they transferred the means of production from 
private to bureaucratic control instead of transferring 
them from private to peoples control. EPRP's programme 
re-iterated the same position: for instance, it
guaranteed that rural land would come under 'the full 
control of the broad peasant masses in practice'58 that 
industry and finance would not come under the monopolist 
control of the bureaucracy; that their 'economy and 
finance' would be brought under the people's control?59 
and that 'all banks, insurance companies, corporations, 
power stations, big transport companies, communications, 
basic industries, mines,....' of the state would be 
brought under 'the direct control of the people in 
practice'.60 Further, EPRP's overall management strategy 
was declared to be ' to plan for a balanced and 
self-reliant economy based on the correct relationship 
between agriculture and industry and between light and 
heavy industries'. 61
AESM made no such reference to people's control of 
the nationalised micro-economic units in its papers or 
programme. On the contrary, it welcomed the 
nationalisation of rural land by the Derg;62 the 
retention as public property of the nationalised 
industrial, distributing and commercial companies?63 and 
the placing of all foreign trade under the 'control of 
the state'.64 AESM's programme further provided that its 
policy concerning the management of the economy was to be 
based on 'a strong and centrally planned ... national 
economy.../65
EPRP's notion of the people's control of the 
micro-economic units was never explained but it can 
perhaps be interpreted to mean peasant associations and 
workers' control of the units rather than control by the 
government bureaucracy. This, coupled with the idea of 
the national plan (the purpose of which was not to bring 
the national economy under central control but to iron 
out imbalance between the agricultural and industrial
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sectors and between light and heavy industries), gives 
the impression that EPRP was in favour of a 
decentralised, democratic economy order. Conversely, 
AESM's espousal of a 'strong centrally planned national 
economy' and its emphasis on the industrial sector (as 
reflected by the declaration in its programme that 'with 
agriculture as the foundation of the economy, all 
possible efforts are to be made to establish and expand 
heavy and light modern industries that will play a 
leading role in the development of the economy throughout 
the country.')66 suggest that its strategy was more 
urban-based and centralisation-orientated than that of 
EPEP's.
CONCLUSION
Despite the publicity given to the debates, it is 
doubtful whether the population, save those within it who 
were already versed in Marxist literature, was any the 
wiser for it. In the first place, Marxist terminology 
was new to the official language (Amharic) in which the 
debates were conducted? as a result, a lot of new usage 
of old terms and the coining of new phrases had to be 
made. A more confusing problem was the multiplicity of 
the topics raised and discussed but not sufficiently 
distinguished one from the other. An enumeration of the 
types of governments discussed in the debates makes the 
point clear: the Ancien Regime, the Derg, the Provisional 
People's Congress, the Provisional People's Government, 
the People's Revolutionary Government, the People's 
Republic, the Party etc. To make matters worse, each of 
these in turn had a multitude of names by which they were 
called. The bulk of the debate revolved around the 
question of what a Leninist party's position ought to be 
towards these different stages of government in the 
process of attaining a socialist political order.
As argued earlier, most of the issues raised by the 
two organisations were concerned with strategies of how 
to get to power and reflect the time when they were
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debated (end of 1975 and 1976). As such, the positions 
adopted cannot explain the essence of the differences 
between the EPRP and AESM since their existence as 
different organisations precedes the controversies under 
consideration. Perhaps the real importance of the public 
debate lay in widening the already existing gap between 
the two organisations; in arming their adherents, the 
members of the Derg, and the society at large with 
slogans and polemics, with which they fought verbal wars? 
and in defining the cleavages along which the civil war 
was fought out later.
On the theoretical plane, it could be argued that 
EPRP espoused Maoism and AESM Stalinism. The former 
talked about the New Democratic Revolution, raising a 
people's army and encircling the cities into submission 
from a rural base, and about people's control of the 
nationalised means of production, which were more similar 
to the locally managed communes of China than to the 
centrally run collectives and enterprises of the USSR.
As of the middle of 1975, however, EPRP seemed to revise 
its earlier positions and move towards moderation and an 
urban based revolutionary strategy. Thus, it advocated 
the need to develop capitalist relations of production 
before a successful socialist revolution could be carried 
out;67 private ownership of redistributed rural land? 
the formation of a provisional government made up of the 
mass organisations (which were mainly urban-based) to 
lead the revolution to victory? in addition to which it 
abandoned its idea of a rural people's army in favour of 
an urban armed struggle against AESM and the Derg as of 
the Autumn of 1976. Conversely, AESM was, during the 
same period, moving away from the more reconciliatory 
stance of inviting the public to read the progressive 
paper of EPRP, beside its own, to initiating a public 
controversy with it. Thus, the leaders of AESM returned 
to Ethiopia in early 1975 to ride the tide of change - an 
event which they apparently likened to Lenin's return to 
revolutionary Russia - and subsequently identified
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themselves with the highly centralised government of the 
Derg; advocated a strong centrally planned national 
economy and the mobilisation of the national economy by 
giving a leading role to the industrial sector. These 
positions coupled with the fact that it had no rural 
revolutionary strategy could, arguably, identify AESM 
with Stalin rather than with Mao.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful if these theoretical 
questions were at bottom of the differences between the 
two organisations. First, most of those differences in 
outlook developed after the emergence of the two as 
different organisations. Second, most of those 
differences did not figure substantially in the 
controversy under consideration. Finally, the fact that 
both of them were changing their positions on some of the 
questions distorted whatever clarity there might have 
been previously.
It is suggested that the real differences between 
EPRP and AESM remain deeply embedded in the annals of the 
Ethiopian Student Movement of the j&fcrly 1970's; in the 
differences of going abroad at different times, in 
personal rivalries, and in group competition for 
leadership of student bodies. The conflict that flared 
up in student circles then was later fed with fiery 
polemics and slogans to justify and sustain the notion 
that the differences between the two organisations were 
no mere splitting of hairs but rooted in irreconcilably 
antagonistic ideological foundations. For Ethiopians, as 
perhaps for most peoples of the world, the art of 
politics is not the art of compromise but of victory - a 
cultural bias which the traditional factional infighting 
common to Marxist groups did very little to mitigate.
(B) THE DERG'S SHIFT FROM "AFRICAN SOCIALISM" TO
"SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM".
With the return from abroad of the radical left and 
especially of the adherents of EPRP and AESM as of the
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summer of 1974, Ethiopia started acquiring the first 
generation of organised progressive revolutionaries. 
Within a year, they dominated the political scene of the 
country by entrenching themselves in the already 
politicised corporate groups and movements and were in a 
position to challenge the monopoly of power of the Derg. 
The adoption by the Derg of the ideology of the civilian 
left not only seemed to offer the hope of closing the gap 
between it and the leftist political organisations but 
also came nearest to exonerating the Derg's atrocities 
against the high civilian and military dignitaries of the 
old order as well as providing a theoretical basis for 
its measures of nationalisation. The adoption of liberal 
politics such as was represented by the Ethiopian 
Democratic Union meant, in part at least, having to 
account for measures that were not appropriate or legal. 
It was for considerations like these and its nationalist 
- populist sentiments (and not because of a pre-existing 
commitment) that the Derg set in motion as of September 
1975 the process of adopting Marxism-Leninism as an 
appropriate ideology for Ethiopia.
On the occasion of the inauguration of Revolution 
Square in Addis Ababa on September 11, 1975, the chairman 
of the Derg (Brigadier General Teferi Bante) gave a 
strong indication that the process of adopting a new 
ideology by the government was underway. He said that 
the Derg's programme of action for the following year of 
the Ethiopian calender (September 1975 -August 1976) 
would include among others, a new labour legislation to 
help workers become organised, politicised and more 
productive; political education for the peasants; the 
establishment of a Mass Political Education and 
co-ordination office under a People's Organising 
Political Committee (the latter of which had apparently 
already been created by the Derg); and the 'leadership 
of the masses by revolutionary democracy.'68 From then 
to April 1976, the rhetoric of the Derg began to change; 
mostly it continued to talk of 'Ethiopia First' and of
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'Ethiopian Socialism'? at times, however, it started 
using the terms and phrases of the leftist groups. A 
communique of the Derg issued towards the end of 
Septembers, 1975, declared that it would hand power over 
to the workers, peasants and the true progressives after 
it had destroyed the reactionary classes. 69 Also, in his 
December, 1975, address to a seminar on the 
implementation of a new labour legislation, the first 
vice president (Major Mengistu ) emphasised that a 
revolutionary workers' organisation is one which is
• • . . . . . .  70anti-feudal, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist. u 
Further, on the occasion of the Adwa victory day 
anniversary (Yekatit 23, 1976), the first chairman of the 
Derg talked of anti-feudal, anti-capitalist and 
anti-colonial struggle71 but concluded his speech on the 
occasion of another victory day a month later by saying: 
'May the Lord of Peace, the all powerful God allow us to 
have peace and enable us to celebrate the occasion again 
next year.'72
The same trend was reflected in the legislation of 
the Derg at the time. The preambles to those 
legislations started dropping 'Ethiopian Socialism' in 
favour of just 'Socialism' and the new labour legislation 
and the Peasant Association Consolidation Proclamation of 
December 1975 gave unions and peasant associations 
extensive political roles in their relations with their 
members. Thus, unions had to function in line with 
socialist principles and cooperate in the formulation of 
political directives;73 and Peasant Associations were 
directed to enable the peasantry to participate in the 
struggle against feudalism and imperialism by building 
its consciousness in line with socialism, and were 
directed to establish, among other things, cooperative 
societies and peasant defence squads. 74Similarly service 
cooperative societies were obliged 'to give education in 
socialist philosophy and cooperative work in order to
7 Renhance the political consciousness of the peasantry.' 3 
and the agricultural producers cooperatives 'to struggle
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for the gradual abolition of exploitation from the rural 
areas and to refrain from any kind of exploitation' , and 
'to engage in continuous political involvement in order 
to enhance the political consciousness of the members.'76 
Similar provisions existed for the politicisation and the 
arming of the urban dwellers associations as well. The 
idea of defence squads, which was envisaged for both 
Peasant Associations and Urban Dwellers Associations, was 
none other than what AESM and EPRP had been advocating as 
the arming of the masses in order to defend the 
revolution against its enemies. Thus, while EPRP and 
AESM were agitating for the politicisation, organisation 
and arming of the masses, the Derg was implementing the 
same, not under the control of these organisations but 
that of its own.
The People's Organising Political Committee, which 
the first chairman mentioned on September 10th, 1975, as 
already having come into existence appears to have been 
made up of seven Derg members as well as Lij Michael 
Imiru (Political adviser to the chairman of the Derg) and 
four ministers. The members of the Derg on the committee 
were Major Mengistu Haile-Mariam (Chairman), Major Sisay 
Habte, Captain Moges Walde-Michael, Captain Alemayehu 
Haile, Lieutenant Colone( Asrat Desta, Major Birihanu
• . 77 . .Baye, and Major Debela Dmsa." Obviously, this 
committee was launched for the purpose of articulating 
the ideology required to involve the masses in what the 
chairman of the Derg called: 'revolutionary democracy.'
As it happened, the Committee seems to have chosen to 
delegate this mandate to another committee made up of 
individuals better versed in the subject matter while 
retaining for itself the power of supervision. As 
already noted, the impending establishment of such a 
committee (The mass Political Education and Coordination 
Committee) was announced by the chairman of the Derg on 
September 10th, 1975. Soon after, the members of that 
committee were interviewed and recruited by the People's 
Organising Political Committee and the committee was in
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full swing as of December , 1975. Its members were Haile 
Fida (Chairman), Senaye Likke (vice-chairman), Negede 
Gobeze, Tesfaye Shewaye, Fikre Merid, Wond-Wosen Hailu, 
Melese Ayalew, Mesfin Kasu, Alemu Abebe, Bezabh Maru, 
Nigist Adane, Andargachew Asegid, Yonas Admasu, Ishetu 
Chole and Asefa Medhane. With the exception of several 
of these like Senaye Likke (Leader of Worker's League) 
Jonas Admasu (Member of EPRP who probably joined the 
committee without declaring his allegiance to that 
organisation), Tesfaye Shewaye, Mef.ese Ayalew, Ishetu 
Chole and Asefa Medhane (Independent marxist), the others 
were members of AESM.
By April 20, 1976, the Mass Political Education and 
Coordinating Committee had completed drafting what came 
to be known as 'The National Democratic Revolutionary 
Programme of Ethiopia' (NDRPE) and the People's 
Organising Political Committee and the Derg had approved 
the same. 78 In a radio and television address to the 
nation on the same day, Major Mengistu explained the 
outlines of the Programme in a fair amount of detail. He 
said that feudalism had emerged in Ethiopia towards the 
end of the Axumite Empire (the end of the millenium AD) 
and had spread first to northern Ethiopia and then been 
imposed by Emperor Minilick on the pre-existing feudal 
system of Southern Ethiopia towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. Imperialism had come to Ethiopia, he 
continued, with the scramble for Africa in the late 
nineteenth century? although political independence had 
not been lost by the country as a result, imperialism had 
penetrated Ethiopia and started exploiting the people. 
Then, feudalism and imperialism had created the 
instrument of exploitation (bureaucratic capitalism) 
which coordinated them in their drive to exploit the 
people. Bureaucratic capitalism was described as devoid 
of nationalism and any intention of liberating the 
country; rather, it was interested in using its power to 
amass wealth illegally. These three (imperialism, 
feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism), as well as
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comprador bourgeoisie, he explained, constituted the 
enemies of the Ethiopian people.
Pitted against these were, he explained, the 
workers, farmers, the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist petit 
bourgeoisie, and similar classes, who had been resisting 
exploitation over the years and who, since February,
1974, had been scoring a number of victories against the 
reactionaries. The exploited classes, he continued, 
constituted live Ult ej- ^  population , and had to rise and 
fight for the NDRPE. He explained further that the 
programme was called 'National' because it liberated the 
people from neo-colonialism and imperialism; and it was 
called 'Democratic' because it abolished feudalism and 
bureaucratic capitalism, made the masses owners of the 
means of production, gave them democratic rights and 
resolved the national and workers' questions 
democratically. The difference between a bourgeois and a 
democratic revolution was that the former was led by the 
bourgeoisie and abolished feudalism, whereas the latter 
was led by the workers and abolished feudalism, 
imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism.
Mengistu concluded his speech by making an 
impassioned appeal to progressives. He said that the 
neighbouring states were not supportive of revolution or 
of a strong socialist Ethiopia? that Ethiopia was the 
land of many oppressed people and not of many 
revolutionaries? that time is life? and that, 
therefore, 'it is the duty of revolutionaries to form a 
joint front quickly and fight feudalism, imperialism and
. • • 7 0bureaucratic capitalism'.'*
The NDRPE was published in the daily papers the next 
day (April 21, 1976)#8° The Programme was envisaged to 
govern the period during which the progressive forces and 
the broad masses would be politicised, armed and 
organised in order to eliminate the reactionary classes, 
the workers' party formed, and the people's democratic 
republic established.
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The Programme declared that the Government would 
give its urgent attention to the following matters. The 
broad masses were to be engaged in 'a continuous 
revolutionary process' under which they would be involved 
in mass consciousness, in the setting up of mass 
organisations and in being armed in order to eliminate 
the class enemies of the people. In this way the masses 
were to struggle for the establishment of a people's 
revolutionary front and the Government would back them in 
the endeavour.81
Further, the Government acknowledged that, in order 
for the masses to become politically conscious, organised 
and armed, only the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist and 
anti-bureaucratic-capitalist forces should be allowed to 
exercise democratic rights, including freedom of speech, 
press, assembly, holding peaceful demonstrations, and of
. , , oo .forming organisations. Also, the Government recognised 
that the programme would be assured of victory when the 
anti-feudal and anti-imperialist parties and 
organisations formed a united revolutionary front; that 
the struggle of democratic parties under the umbrella of 
the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist objective would 
strengthen the common revolutionary mass struggle? and 
that the victories of the united revolutionary front 
would be consolidated when the vanguard of the revolution 
(the working class party) was established. Thus the 
Government committed itself to extending 'unceasing 
support' to revolutionary parties whose struggle would be 
aimed at the establishment of a working class party, the 
'necessary moral and material support to democratic 
parties willing to work under the joint front', and 
'special assistance' to the working class party. J
Something not declared to require the urgent 
attention of the Government and hence, perhaps, a matter 
of long term interest, was the establishment of a 
non-provisional government. It was stated that after the 
masses were organised and the revolutionary joint front 
formed, the people would elect the members of a people's
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revolutionary assembly through free and secret ballot.
The candidates were to be representatives of parties and 
organisations that took part in the struggle to organise 
the masses and to form the joint front. The people's 
revolutionary assembly was declared to constitute 'the 
highest political office in the government.' Then, in 
line with a constitution to be approved by the 
representatives of the people (perhaps meaning a 
constitution to be drawn and approved by the people's 
revolutionary assembly), the people's democratic republic 
would be established under the leadership of the working 
class party.84
As noted earlier, AESM was working in close 
collaboration with the Derg; in fact it is often said 
that the leader of AESM (Haile Fida) personally drafted 
the NDRPE. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising 
that AESM's positions as described in the previous 
section were incorporated wholesale into the NDRPE. The 
emphasis on politicisation, organisation and arming of 
the masses? the granting of democratic rights 
exclusively to the masses and to progressives; the 
holding of democratic elections only after the 
elimination of the reactionary classes? and the 
establishment, in this way, of the people's democratic 
republic were all positions emphatically claimed by AESM 
as its own. Perhaps, the most important difference in 
this regard between EPRP and AESM was concerning the 
duration of the Derg; EPRP sought to abolish it right 
away in favour of what it called 'The Provisional 
People's Government' while AESM showed its willingness 
for the Derg to continue to rule by evading the subject, 
by according the Derg what it called 'critical support' 
or by expressing a desire to collaborate with what was to 
it, 'the left-wing of the Derg.' Here, too, AESM's 
position was upheld by the NDRPE, since the latter 
envisaged the continuation of the Derg until the 
establishment of the people's democratic republic.
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The Derg's intention to preside over the 
implementation of the NDRPE and all that it entailed is 
seen more clearly in the legalisation of the committees 
which were primarily responsible for the drafting and 
approval of the programme. On April 21, 1976, a 
proclamation was decreed inaugurating the establishment 
of a new agency called 'The Peoples Organising 
Provisional Office', later re-christened 'The 
Provisional Office for Mass Organisational Affairs'
(POMOA). This agency was a fully fledged government 
department, which was to receive a budgetary allocation 
from the Treasury?85 manage affairs coming within its 
jurisdiction under the direction of a body called 'The 
Supreme Organising Committee' to be established by the 
head of state (perhaps the Derg)?86 and submit quarterly
. . . .  , 07
reports on its activities to that committee. °
The Supreme Organising Committee was most probably 
what was referred to earlier as the People's Organising 
Political Committee chaired by Mengistu.
POMOA's leading organ was its commission of 15 
members who were directed to organise themselves into 
four permanent sub-committees in the areas of philosophy 
dissemination and information, political education, 
current affairs, and organisation affairs.88 The 
commission is none other than The Mass Political 
Education and Coordination Office discussed earlier.
Also, POMOA was to have branch offices at the provincial, 
awraja and district levels, for which the Commission was
• . . .  Q Qto review periodic reports on their activities0  ^and to 
which it had to assign cadres.90 In addition, the 
Commission was entrusted with the task of heading the new 
Yekatit 1966 political school, established for training 
cadres.91
Further mandates of POMOA included: enforcing and 
interpreting the scope of a democratic rights 
proclamation (a proclamation which was promised but never 
decreed)? preparing articles and directories on the 
philosophy of socialism in the languages of various
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nationalities and disseminating the same; and preparing 
directories and plans for training of cadres at home and
Q5 , ,
abroad* . The developments which were not specifically 
envisaged by the legislation but which followed in the 
wake of POMOA's establishment were the launching of its 
paper (called Revolutionary Ethiopia') used for the 
dissemination of Marxism-Leninism, and a weekly 
discussion meeting lasting two hours in all governmental 
and non-governmental organisations of the country.
As is obvious from the names of the permanent 
sub-committee and the discussions above, the main takes 
of politicising the masses along Marxist-Leninist lines, 
for which AESM had been agitating so much, was entrusted 
to POMOA (which was dominated by AESM but controlled by 
the Derg). The other question for which it had been 
agitating as much (the organising of the masses into mass 
organisations) had, however, to be shared by POMOA with 
government agencies created partly for the purpose, like 
the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing and 
Ministry of Agriculture. The third focus of AESM's 
agitations (the arming of the masses) was, nevertheless, 
retained by the Derg completely. The fact that the law 
on democratic rights was promised but never enacted not 
only hindered the emergence of new political 
organisations but also left the existing ones in limbo.
It must be noted that what was stated in the POMOA 
proclamation was much more concrete than what was stated 
in the NDRPE, since the former is a legal document and 
the latter a declaration of policy.
Be that as it may, the NDRPE constituted a massive 
ideological shift on the part of the Derg, not for the 
first time either. 'Ethiopia First' of July 1974 could 
be described as the programme of a coup d'etat;
'Ethiopian Socialism' of December 1974 as the programme 
of African socialism; and 'the NDRPE' of April 1976 as 
the programme of scientific socialism. The first of 
these programmes did not have a policy on the question of 
party formation but merely criticised the officials of
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the old order and talked about the 'general good' as 
something to be pursued in the future. 'Ethiopian 
Socialism' was also inward looking: "the political 
philosophy should spring from the culture and the soil of 
Ethiopia and should, moreover, emanate from the 
aspiration of the broad masses and not be imported from 
abroad like some decorative article of commerce .... The 
political philosophy which emanates from our great 
religions which teach the equality of man, from our 
tradition of living and sharing together, as well as from 
our History so replete with national sacrifice, is 
Hibretesebawinet" (Ethiopian socialism).
Further, it saw the Ethiopian society as a mere 
extension of the family: not only did it assert that 
contradictions between the rulers and the ruled had 
emerged only in the previous 30 years, but it also argued 
that the appropriate party for Ethiopia was 'A single 
mass party embracing the whole of society, engaging the 
people in a free exchange of ideas and acting as a check 
against government ineptitude...' The NDRPE, on the other 
hand, saw the Ethiopian society as divided into classes, 
and the unfolding events since 1974 as part of a workers' 
world-wide movement towards socialism. It further 
provided for the establishment of more than one party, 
but such parties had to be anti-feudal, anti-imperialist, 
and anti-bureaucratic- capitalist, and also had to aim at 
establishing a single workers' party.
CONCLUSION
The import of this chapter is that because of the 
preponderance of leftist movements in the wake of the 
1974 uprising, the Derg was persuaded to adopt, not only 
increasingly radical socio-economic reforms as discussed 
in the previous chapter, but also Marxism-Leninism as the 
official ideology of Ethiopia. It would appear that the 
Derg need not have involved the radical left in its 
decision making processes. However, starting from well 
before 1974, the Students' Movement had established the 
orthodoxy that to be Marxist was to be progressive.
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Consequently, upon its seizure of power, the Derg invited 
leftist individuals at home and abroad to come and work 
with it and, when they did, assigned them to work in its 
headquarters as well as in key government positions.
This gave factions of the civilian left ample opportunity 
to influence members of the Derg and, as will be noted in 
the following chapter, to involve them in the factional 
feuds of the civilian left.
Some have dismissed ideology as unimportant on the 
ground that Marxism-Leninism is a smoke screen for 
justifying the seizure and exercise of power by the 
military. This may well be the intention of the Derg in 
adopting NDRPE. However, in the first place, the 
adoption of an ideology by the Derg has provided it with 
a kind of legitimacy to rule or as much claim to power as 
the civilian left. Secondly, Marxism-Leninism has been 
important in rallying certain sections of the partisans 
of the ideology and the masses of the people behind the 
government. Thirdly, the fact that the ideology was 
crucial in influencing the direction of the revolution 
makes the adoption of NDRPE important. Marxism-Leninism 
has in practice concrete programmes: nationalization of 
the means of production, central planning of the economy, 
an anti-west pro-east foreign policy and the like. As 
will be noted in the following chapters, it was this 
direction that Ethiopia followed, more determinedly than 
ever, after the adoption of the NDRPE and after 
Mengistu's ascent to absolutest powers.
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CHAPTER SIX
Mengistu Haile-Mariam's Emergence as the Absolute Head of
State
The previous chapters have shown how the Derg 
emerged as a collective body of absolute government 
powers in 1974; how that power fell into the hands of an 
officers' junta by the beginning of 1975? and how that 
junta adopted radical socio-economic and ideological 
policies in 1975 and 1976. The adoption of NDRPE 
(Scientific Socialism) was the last important collective 
act of the junta. The adoption of this ideology was 
perhaps important in giving the changes some sense of 
direction? at the same time, however, it appears to have 
brought to the forefront the question of power, which has 
a greater claim on the minds of those engaged in the 
business of politics than does ideology. The present 
chapter is concerned mainly with the power-struggle 
within the officer's junta and with the process of 
Mengistu Haile-Mariam's emergence from that as the 
absolute head of state.
The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 
A deals with the configuration of coalitions among the 
political groups in the country and with how, as part of 
the leader of one of these coalitions, Mengistu rallied 
support around himself, thus posing a challenge to the 
pre-existing collegiality among the officers' junta of 
the Derg. Section B deals with the response of the junta 
to Mengistu's challenge; and Section C with Mengistu's 
victory over the junta.
(A) Mengistu's Challenge to the Officers' Junta
As noted in the previous chapter, no less than seven 
pan-Ethiopianist organisations had sprang up on the 
political scene of Ethiopia by 1976. The proliferation 
of the pan-Ethiopian political organisations was matched
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by an even greater number of secessionist movements, 
several of which had a much longer history than did the 
former. The most important of the secessionist movements 
were the Eritrean Liberation Front, the Eritrean People's 
Liberation Front, the Tigrean People's Liberation Front, 
the Afar Liberation Front, the Orromo Liberation Front,
By the autumn of 1976, three important coalitions 
seemed to emerge, which brought about co-operation 
between the pan-Ethiopianist and secession organisations, 
and in some cases involved the neighbouring states. The 
first of these coalitions concerned the conservative 
Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU). It has already been 
explained that the conservative states of the region like 
Saudi Arabia, North Yemen and the Sudan, had been growing 
uneasy about the Derg's radicalism, 1 and that this had 
facilitated the conclusion of an agreement (Summer, 1976) 
between EDU and two of the conservative secessionist 
movements (the Eritrean Liberation Front and the Afar 
Liberation Front) concerning joint military operations 
against the Derg.2 As the result of these developments, 
EDU was able to broadcast hostile propaganda against the 
Derg from the Sudanese radio station and, more 
importantly, to have access to Ethiopian territory 
through the Sudan and Eritrea.
Thus EDU was able to engage the Derg's military 
forces in the Northern provinces of Gondar, Tigre, and 
Wollo. EDU's strength was furthered by the alliance it 
could forge with the local traditional leaders in the 
areas of its operations and, through them, in having 
access to the peasants from whom it could raise fighting 
men. Although agricultural tenancy had been abolished by 
the Derg's nationalisation of land, in the Northern 
provinces, where tenancy was, in any case, limited, the 
reforms were of less import. In a lot of the cases the 
tenants in one locality were, at the same time, landlords 
in another; and though there were sizeable minorities
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whose members could only become tenants because they had 
no hereditary or other titles to land, they were too 
isolated to make a difference in the region 's balance of 
power. On occasion the official media made out that 
certain of the bureaucracy was in secret league with EDU; 
however, EDU's urban presence in any organised form is 
extremely doubtful. As already noted, the essence of 
EDU's existence, according to its own programme, was the 
destruction of the Derg, just as the Derg's had become 
the destruction of the forces of reaction, under which 
category it included EDU.
The second coalition concerned the Ethiopian 
People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) which had both a 
rural and an urban revolutionary strategy. It's early 
agitational successes among the peasants of Southern 
Ethiopia were coming unstuck, mainly as a result of a 
counter-campaign which portrayed the government as the 
primary agent of the land reform of 1975 and hence as the 
one which 'gave' the peasants their land. EPRP had no 
military presence in the South. In the Northern 
provinces, however, EPRP had bases and young 
revolutionary men and women under arms, drawn from among 
the student activists who were taking part in the 
campaign programme of the Derg. The success in the 
North could be explained, in part, by the receptiveness 
of the local population to agitation against the Derg, 
which could not be seen to have given land to many of 
them, and, in part, because the Derg could easily be 
portrayed as a dictatorial and illegitimate government.
No less important to EPRP's success in the North was the 
agreement it reached with the Eritrean People's 
Liberation Front (the radical wing of the Eritrean 
secessionist movement) conferring guerrilla training 
facilities and passage to the interior in exchange for 
recognition by EPRP of Eritrea's right to secede from 
Ethiopia.3 Further, a lot of weapons in Assimba (one of 
EPRP's bases ) had the insignia of some of the radical 
Palestinian factions. It is not clear whether the
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weapons were delivered to EPRP as a result of a direct 
agreement between it and the factions, or transferred 
from the Eritrean People's Liberation Front? at any 
rate, it suggests that one or both organisations were 
working in collaboration with radical Palestinian 
movements. While the EPRP fighters in the countryside 
were recluses earning themselves the name of 'Cave 
Intellectuals', EPRP's urban armed struggle was pursued 
vigorously. In a relatively short period of time, it was 
able to infiltrate the unions and various other 
associations, and later the newly created Urban Dwellers' 
Associations. By the Summer of 1976 it looked poised to 
oust the Derg from power.
With the adoption of the NDRPE in April, 1976, and 
with the call by the programme and by Mengistu for the 
formation of a joint front among progressive forces, one 
might have expected that the gap between EPRP and the 
Derg would narrow and disappear. However, this was not 
so. While EPRP accepted the invitation to form a joint 
front in principle - and this was in itself a most 
dramatic deviation from its unwavering position against 
any firm co-operation with the Derg, - it attached so 
many conditions to its acceptance that it could only be 
taken as a rejection of the invitation.
First, it proposed five points that should be 
discussed by members of the joint front and incorporated 
into their common programme: the front must be led by
the workers and must include the farmers, the petit 
bourgeoisie and other sections of the oppressed people; 
the front must be a forum for their united struggle 
against the reactionary classes, as well as a forum for 
struggling amongst themselves to promote the divergent 
interests within the oppressed classes? some sixteen 
enumerated mass organisations, movements and national and 
regional political groups must be represented in the 
front? the programme of the front must be discussed and 
adopted by member organisations? and all this must be
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carried out publicly and not behind the backs of the 
people.
Secondly, EPRP demanded that in addition to its 
nine-point minimum programme (points which were not 
really different from those of the NDRPE) the following 
six should also be incorporated: all treaties concluded
with imperialist states, especially with the US, West 
Germany and Israel, which were prejudicial to the 
interests of the people and to the independence of the 
country, were to be repealed? the right of national 
self-determination up to and including secession was to 
be recognised, especially for Eritrea, and the 
organisation leading the secessionist struggle in Eritrea 
was to be recognised as a legal representative of the 
people; the workers and peasants were to be armed 
immediately so that they could lead the revolution: the
organisations that had become members of the joint front 
were to be given the freedom to agitate among the armed 
forces and recruit members from among them? since the 
bureaucracy, including the one within the armed forces 
and the police, had shown that it was anti-revolutionary, 
it should be demolished completely? and a provisional 
people's government was to be established by the forces 
that came under the joint front. EPRP also rejected 
POMOA because it was under the control of the government, 
because the appointment of its members was undemocratic, 
because it was not representative of the various 
progressive sections of the population and because it 
represented the interests and the voice of one narrow 
group.
The above were presented by EPRP as points of 
negotiation between it and the government? much more 
important, however, were the following five points which 
EPRP insisted had to be met by the government before 
negotiations on the previous points could begin. The 
five points were: the repeal of all laws that curtailed
democratic rights and the enactment, in their place, of 
laws guaranteeing unlimited democratic rights for the
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supporters of the anti-feudal, anti-imperialstic and 
anti-bureaucratic capitalist revolution, namely, the 
workers, farmers, the petit bourgeoisie and the groups 
and movements that represented these classes? the 
immediate cessation of military campaigns against the 
Eritreans and other nationalities? the immediate and 
unconditional cessation of massacres of the masses, like 
the workers and peasants, which was still going on? the 
immediate release from prison and the cessation of 
persecution of progressives (like workers, teachers, 
members and leaders of peasant associations, that had 
taken part in national movements) and of members of the 
armed forces and the police who had been arrested for 
their participation in political activities? and the 
publication on radio, in the press and other mass media 
of the fact that the government had accepted and 
implemented these points. EPRP concluded these 
conditions with an invitation of its own: if the 
government was unwilling to meet the above prerequisites 
and start negotiations, it was the historical duty of all 
progressive and democratic forces to join it (EPRP) and, 
without the involvement of the government, form a joint 
front.4
It is worth citing the above EPRP response to 
Mengistu's call for the formation of a joint front on 
April 20th, 1976, because it constituted the final 
rupture between EPRP and Mengistu's faction within the 
Derg, because it led to a division among the officers' 
junta of the Derg on the question of how to deal with the 
civilian left, and because it finally led to the 
white-red terror confrontation between EPRP and the third 
coalition.
The third coalition concerned the remaining five 
pan-Ethiopianist organisations of the left (the 
All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (AESM), the Ethiopian 
Oppressed Peoples' Revolutionary Struggle, the Ethiopian 
Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Organisation, the Workers' 
League and Revolutionary Flame). It should be noted that
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there was no obvious affiliation between these and any of 
the separatist movements and external powers, with the 
exception perhaps of the Ethiopian Oppressed People's 
Revolutionary Struggle which was commonly believed to 
have colluded with the Orromo-based secessionist 
movements. Also, AESM, which was the biggest of these 
political organisations, was becoming identified with the 
Southern part of the country because the North was 
dominated by EDU, EPRP and a string of secessionist 
movements and because, as an advocate of the Derg's land 
reform law, which 'granted' land to the tenants of the 
South, it could relate to the peasants more readily than 
could EPRP, which appeared to oppose the reform.
More importantly, however, all of the five 
organisations were urban-based, and whatever following 
they had was concentrated in the cities, and especially 
in Addis Ababa. With the acceptance by them of the 
government's NDRPE it became possible for them to 
dominate the official forums like POMOA, the Yekatit'66 
Political School, the Urban Dwellers' Associations and, 
to a certain extent, the mass media. 'Revolutionary 
Ethiopia' (a paper of POMOA) which was also at their 
disposal became the instument by which official ideology 
was expounded to the public. This third coalition used 
these forums to lump together the other two 
above-mentioned coalitions (those of EDU and EPRP) and 
condemn them with increasing monotony as reactionaries in 
league with imperialism, the CIA, the conservative Arab 
States, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism.
The five organisations which formed the coalition, 
were able to work closely with one another for different 
reasons. As noted in the previous chapter, the leader of 
the Workers' League was on POMOA's Commission helping 
draft the NDRPE with the leaders of AESM; there was 
hardly any difference between the Workers' League and 
Revolutionary Flame? and AESM had worked very closely 
with the Ethiopian Oppressed Peoples Revolutionary 
Struggle and the Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary
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Organisation. When the NDRPE was finally adopted on 
April 21, 1976, it was easy for these groups to identify 
themselves with it and work under its prescriptions. By 
the summer, they had all expressed interest in the idea 
of forming a joint front among themselves, though the 
formal establishment of the front did not take place 
until Februay, 1977.
An important aspect of this third coalition was the 
fact that it included within it some of the most powerful 
members of the Derg, namely Mengistu Haile-Mariam and 
his faction. After the execution of Lt. General Aman 
Andom, Mengistu had been enjoying the most prominent 
position in the government as the first vice chairman of 
the Derg, because Aman's replacement as chairman 
(Brigadier General Teferi Banti) was relegated to 
presiding over the affairs of the subservient Council of 
Ministers, and since he was in any case a non-Derg 
member.
Also, Mengistu had formed his own faction within the 
Derg with the help of which he had created his political 
organisation (Revolutionary Flame). It was this faction 
that AESM had been referring to as 'the left wing of the 
Derg' further, AESM had been expressing interest in 
collaborating with that faction with a view to subsuming 
the remaining and willing members of the Derg under the 
joint leadership of Revolutionary Flame and AESM and 
ousting the unwilling members of the Derg from power.
There is perhaps no need to raise the question of 
whether the third coalition was the brain-child of AESM's 
leaders or a result of Mengistu's drive to effect a 
rupture among the civilian left and bring a section of it 
under his influence. The fact remains, nonetheless, that 
the formation of Revolutionary Flame and the modus 
vivendi arrived at between the fire organisation 
including Revolutionary Flame was to boost Mengistu's 
power base within and outside the Derg. For his actions 
in the Derg, Mengistu could now count on the support of 
the Derg members who were at the same time members of
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Revolutionary Flame as well as those Derg members who 
were also adherents of the four other political 
organisations within the coalition. Further, he could 
now play a more effective role in influencing the 
govenment and non-governmental organisations through the 
cadres of the five groups.
This turn of events threw grit into the collective 
operation of the officers' junta, which had survived 
intact the adoption of the radical socio-economic reforms 
of 1975 and the NDRPE of April 1976. In the first place, 
the mere fact of the emergence of relatively strong 
political organisations and their close association with 
the Derg led its members to become suspicious of each 
other's affiliations with the political organisations.
The affiliation of Mengistu's faction in the Derg to the 
third coalition was obvious? though there is no concrete 
evidence to show that the remaining members of the Derg 
were full-fledged members of one political organisation 
or another, it was also obvious that some among them were 
at least sympathisers or supporters of the other 
coalitions, especially that of EPRP. As a result, the 
officers junta was unable to speak with one voice about 
the approach to be taken towards the civilian left.
More important were Mengistu's rallying of the third 
coalition around himself (with the result that he could 
now influence the outcome of events within and outside
the Derg more effectively than ever before) and AESM's
'exaltation' of Mengistu's faction as the left wing of 
the Derg and its condemnation of the rest as 
reactionaries who needed to be brought under the 
leadership of Mengistu's coalition or else ousted from 
their positions. This was an open threat to the position 
of power of the members of the officers' junta that 
requires no further explanation.
Yet another point of friction was the Eritrean 
question, on which two parallel and contradictory 
policies were emerging at the time. In his address to
the nation on April 20, 1976, concerning NDRPE, Mengistu
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had classified the Eritrean separatists at being in the 
camp of anti-revolutionaries ( on an equal footing with 
landords and the EDU) because, he argued, they had failed 
to form a joint front with Ethiopian progressives (as the 
Chinese communists and nationalists had done against 
Japan) and because they had instead attacked the 
revolution in collaboration with the conservative Arab 
States and the West.5 About the same time, the 
government had launched a militia mobilisation campaign ( 
apparently intended to raise some 400,000-strong peasant 
army, especially in the Northern provinces) and had 
started marching them north for deployment in Eritrea as 
of the end of May. EPRP opposed the move as being 
genocidal between oppressed brothers, as unlikely to 
succeed and as going against the successful outcome of 
the revolution.6 EDU went further and claimed that it had 
helped to defeat the peasant march by attacking them on 
their way to Eritrea. 7
By contrast, there was a policy in Eritrea whicb was 
issued on May 17, 1976, under the title 'A Policy 
Intended to Solve the Eritrean Problem Peacefully'. It 
was a nine point policy, one point of which provided that 
the government would give full support for the co­
operation of Ethiopian and Eritrean progressives to 
agitate, organise and lead the working people of Eritrea 
on the basis of NDRPE and to facilitate the unity of the 
Ethiopian and Eritrean broad masses.8
The expectation of certain sections of the civilian 
left was that the adoption by Ethiopia of 
Marxism-Leninism would subsume under it contending 
ideologies, (like religion and nationalism including both 
its chauvinist and local variants), and bring about 
greater unity within the country. Contrary to such 
expectations, however, it led to the emergence of warring 
factions among its proponents, -factionalism which later 
engulfed members of the Derg. This turn of events led to 
a great deal of friction, not only among the civilian 
left but also among the officers' junta, over questions
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like ideology , the civilian left and Eritrea and, most 
importantly, over the question of power. Arguably, these 
were in the final analysis, responsible for the bloody 
confrontation that followed in the wake of the adoption 
of NDRPE.
(B) The Decline of Mengistu's Coalition
The first to challenge Mengistu's newly acquired 
prominence was Sisay's group. After Majors Mengistu 
Haile-Mariam and Atnafu Abate (first and second 
vice-chaiman of the Derg, respectively), Major Sisay 
Habte was the most influential member of the Derg, being 
entrusted with the task of heading the Political and 
Foreign Relations Department of the Derg. He was an air 
force major and, according to Rene Lefort, a radical 
intellectual with a master's degree from an American 
University and the architect of the rapprochement between 
the Derg and the civilian left.9Probably, he was also the 
most important author of 'Ethiopian Socialism' and an 
important contributor to the drafting and adoption of 
NDRPE.
It has already been noted that the functions of 
organising and politicising the masses was entrusted to 
POMOA when it was established along with the adoption of 
NDRPE. This meant that the day-to-day operation of those 
functions was overseen by Haile Fida, who was the chaiman 
of POMOA and the leader of AESM, with Sisay's role in 
these matters being limited to sitting on POMOA's 
supervisory body (the Supreme Organising Committee) 
chaired by Mengistu*10 As a result, Sisay's role in 
domestic politics was substantially curtailed. The 
activities of his department (Political and Foreign 
Affairs) was limited to overseeing the operations of the ' 
Foreign Office? as far as regards receiving diplomats 
and foreign guests, the chairman and first vice-chairman 
of the Derg had precedence over him.
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Apart from the narrowing down of the scope of his 
functions, or perhaps, because of it, Sisay found himself 
at odds with Mengistu over certain matters. One instance 
of this concerned EPRP's rejection of Mengistu's call for 
the formation of a joint front among progressive 
organisations. After this incident, Mengistu wanted 
nothing else but the declaration of an all-out war 
against EPRP; Sisay, on the other hand, sought to pursue 
a more conciliatory approach towards that Organisation. 
Needless to say, AESM aided and abetted Mengistu's 
position.11
Similarly, Sisay and Mengistu were at odds over the 
Eritrean question. After the May declaration of the 
nine-point policy concerning Eritrea, a committee led by 
Sisay had started secret negotiations with the leaders of 
the Eritrean People's Liberation Front. However, the 
negotiation was not making much headway, not least 
because Haile Fida, who was also on the committee, was at 
loggerheads with Sisay on this question as on all others. 
As opposed to Mengistu who went for the aggressive policy 
on Eritrea as described earlier, Sisay apparently sought 
to give a chance to the peace offensive as reflected in 
the nine-point policy declaration of the Derg.
In early July, Captain Moges Wolde-Michael led a 
high delegation to Moscow to explain Ethiopia's adoption 
of Scientific Socialism and to seek economic aid. 12 
Apparently, Sisay was supposed to lead that delegation 
but had declined when asked to do so, perhaps because he 
was preoccupied with other concerns. On July 10, he is 
said to have launched an abortive coup d'etat which, 
according to most observers, was directed against 
Mengistu. The coup is said to have involved Major Kiros 
Alemayehu (head of the National Campaign Department), Lt. 
Sileshi Beyene (member of the Political and Foreign 
Affairs Department), General Nadew Zekarias (commander of 
the armed forces in Eritrea and a non-Derg member) and 
many more non-Derg members, mostly from the armed forces. 
Some nineteen of these including Sisay and Getachew Nadew
- 255 -
were arrested by Daniel Haile (head of the Derg's 
Security Command) and executed on 13 July.13 A month 
later, Kiros was reported to have committed suicide while 
in prison?14 Negash and a Lt. Colonel Alemayehu Asfaw of 
the paratroop battalion, who was not a member of the 
Derg, defected to the Eritrean People's Liberation Front 
and to EPRP, respectively.15
It is not clear whether Daniel's move against Sisay 
and his group was authorised by the Derg as suggested by 
John Spencer16, or by Mengistu acting on his own behalf 
as suggested by most other observers. In fact, Rene 
Lefort takes the second proposition further and suggests 
that, in a July 16 General Assembly meeting of the Derg, 
one member demanded that Mengistu explain by what right 
he had alone decided the execution of Aman Andom a few 
years earlier and that of Sisay and his group then. 
Mengistu reacted by demanding the arrest of the 
questioner but the Derg refused to grant the request. 17 
The speed with which the action was taken against Sisay's 
group and its similarity with the earlier circumstances 
in which Aman and others were executed dictates the 
conclusion that Mengistu and his close associates did 
indeed perpetrate the summary execution of the group upon 
discovering the possibility of the existence of a plot to 
overthrow the government.
Obviously, the General Assembly of the Derg was 
called to a meeting after the event? it was called in 
order to get an explanation of the incident. Sisay was 
accused of having been in the habit of changing his 
flight schedules whenever he was sent abroad on missions 
in order to make contacts with agents of imperialism, and 
of having refused to undertake his revolutionary duty of 
leading a high level delegation to the Soviet Union. 
Apparently, such allegations were first made by EPRP and 
what the General Assembly was being asked to believe was 
that the reason EPRP accused Sisay was because they 
intended to cover up the existence of their collusion 
with him.18 It is not clear whether Sisay was accused in
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the Assembly of having planned to overthrow the 
government, but the official line has since been to 
compare Pinochet's coup against Salvador Allende to the 
abortive 'counter-coup' of Sisay, in alliance with EPRP, 
the Eritrean Liberation Front and the CIA against the 
Ethiopian revolution. However, there is no independent 
evidence to show whether Sisay's group sought to pursue 
an even-handed policy towards the civilian left in 
general or whether it was sympathetic towards EPRP and 
even collaborating with it in order to get rid of 
Mengistu's coalition. What is more, it is not clear 
whether the Derg was convinced by Mengistu's explanations 
at all.
The elimination of Sisay and his group only deepened 
the crisis of the officers' junta and opened the way for 
the Assembly of the Derg to reassert itself even if only 
temporarily. In the first place, the issues over which 
Sisay and Mengistu had been at odds (what to do with the 
civilian left, the disastrous peasant march, the Eritrean 
question in general and the jockeying of members of the 
officers' junta for positions of influence) continued to 
be divisive. Also, such important positions as had been 
occupied by Sisay and Kiros had to be filled by new 
individuals to be elected by the Assembly. To make 
matters worse, the old rivalry between Mengistu 
Haile-Mariam and Atnafu Abate resurfaced in the 
Assembly's proceedings, especially over conflicting 
claims by the two concerning what matters should come 
under their respective jurisdictions, and over Atnafu's 
accusation that Mengistu was becoming a dictator. Unable 
to resolve all these difficulties and convinced of the 
clumsiness of its own proceedings, the General Assmebly 
asked Mengistu and Atnafu to leave the meeting and 
instituted a fifteen-man committee mostly made up of the 
department heads. Moges Wolde-Michael was appointed 
chairman of the committee. Judging by the outcome, the 
committee's mandate appears to have been not only to 
delimit closely the functions of Mengistu and Atnafu
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(first and second vice-chairmen respectively) but also to 
overhaul the structure of the Derg once more. The 
committee's deliberations lasted from August to December, 
1976.19
In the meantime the propaganda warfare between EPRP 
and Mengistu's coalition was stepped up, followed by an 
armed confrontation between them as of the second half of 
September. A lengthy article written in the official 
daily (Addis Zemen) in early Septemeber referred to EPRP 
by name for the first time, and argued that it was not 
the workers' vanguard party but that in reality it was an 
anarchist organisation since it had destroyed property 
and since it had instigated workers to go on strike. In 
conclusion, the article called upon the Ethiopian people 
to expose EPRP, and promised that the government would 
place at the disposal of the people anything required to 
fight the Organisation. w Within a few days, another 
article of the same paper claimed that EPRP had destroyed 
80 million Birrs worth (about 40 million US Dollars) of 
agricultural products in the two provinces of Shoa and 
Arsi alone and that Mengistu and other members of the 
Derg had gone to the places of destuction and seen it all 
for themselves.21 These articles were written in the 
name of the Derg; they must, however, have been the 
result of multiple sovereignty, since it is difficult to 
imagine that all of the Derg or junta membership would 
have endorsed them.
The tenor of the language used by these Addis Zemen 
articles was in keeping with that of POMOA's paper 
Revolutionary Ethiopia, which also mentioned EPRP by name 
for the first time instead of referring to it indirectly 
as an anarchist or a petit-bourgeois organisation as it 
had previously done. In September, the paper argued that 
the differences between EPRP and the Ethiopian 
progressives was not a case of two lines among 
progressives but between reactionaries and progressives 
(between EPRP, EDU and imperialism, on the one hand, and 
Ethiopian progressives, on the other). It concluded by
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repeating its call for the arming of the masses against 
the reactionaries. 22
Conscious of the increasingly aggressive stance of 
Mengistu's coalition against EPRP since the latter's 
rejection of the call for the formation of the joint 
front, the central committee of EPRP had, by September 
met and decided to conduct urban armed struggle against 
the coalition and had authorised its politburo to map out 
a strategy. The latter met in October and decided to 
intensify both rural and urban armed struggle, provoke 
general insurrection, and in this way pressurise 
Mengistu's coalition into submission23. EPRP's defence 
and operation squads had already been put in place and 
had gone into action by the second half of Septemebr, in 
accordance with the decisions of its central committee. 
The face of a suspected 'anti-people' individual (one who 
was suspected of being a supporter of Mengistu's 
coalition) was followed up mainly by the mass 
organisations of EPRP (the organisations for the youth, 
women and workers) and, based on information provided by 
them, the appropriate organ of the Party decided whether 
he was to be eliminated or not. In the event that he was 
found guilty, it was up to the Operation Squad to hijack 
a car, kidnap him and hand him over to a Defence Squad 
for action. Many others were simply gunned down in their 
places of work or residence or while walking in the 
streets. 24
The first intended victim was Mengistu himself? 
towards the end of September, an assassination attempt 
was made on him, but he survived it with a minor 
injury25. The first real victim was Fikre Merid (a 
prominent member of AESM and of POMOA's Commission) who 
was shot and killed in his car while waiting to collect 
his wife from work. His two assassins were caught 
shortly afterwards.26 Towards the end of October, the 
EPRP exploded an incendiary device in the Yekatit 1966 
Political School with damage to life and property27. The 
urban armed struggle had begun in earnest.
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According to most observers, the Derg had restricted 
Mengistu's freedom of action after his August 
confrontation with members of the officers' junta, but 
perhaps relaxed it after the onset of the armed stuggle 
with EPRP28. He certainly was able to pay EPRP back 
double and triple the losses to his side. Nevertheless, 
the relaxation did not go as far as freely arming the 
mass organisations, especially the urban dwellers 
associations, and unleashing them on EPRP. For the time 
being, therefore, Mengistu's coalition had to satisfy 
itself with using the mass media and the forums of the 
mass organisations to condemn EPRP and to demand the 
arming of the broad masses.29
In early November, the second round of elections of 
Addis Ababa urban dwellers associations' leaders was 
held30. At the time, Revolutionary Ethiopia complained 
that the urban dwellers' associations had not rejected 
EPRP, as peasant associations had done, and insisted 
that, like the latter, the urban dwellers' associations 
should create their own revolutionary committess as well 
as defence squads and take 'revolutionary action'
(summary executions) against anti-revolutionaries.31 A 
few weeks later, the same paper blamed EPRP for starting 
terrorism during the previous September and compared it 
to how the 'Petit-Bourgeois social democrats' started 
terrorism during the Soviet Revolution and even wounded 
Lenin. The paper concluded by citing the Soviet 
Government's reaction: 'all reactionaries and those who
support them will be held responsible for assassination 
attempts against workers and against those who struggle 
for a socialist revolution. The government of the 
workers and peasants will counter the reactionary terror 
of its enemies and launch a general terror against the 
bourgeoisie and their agents'32. The theoretical basis 
of the red-white terror that was to engulf the urban 
centres of Ethiopia as of early 1977 was laid out thus.
While Mengistu's coalition was thus locked into an 
urban armed struggle with EPRP, it was surprised by a
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further and drastic clipping of its wings. This was done 
in the name of reforming the structure of the Derg 
through a legislation drawn by the fifteen-men committee 
appointed by the Derg in August 1976. The legislation 
(Proclamation 108/1976) came into force on December 29,
1976. According to it, the Derg was to continue to enjoy 
the legislative and executive powers discussed in Chapter 
2 above. Instead of a general assembly, subcommittees 
and a kind of central committee, the relationships 
between which were never clear, the Derg was now to have 
a Congress consisting of all Derg mambers, a Central 
Committee of forty Derg members, and a Standing 
Committee of seventeen Derg members. It was provided 
that the members of the last two committees were to be 
elected by the Congress.33
Under the new arrangement, General Teferi Bante 
became not only the effective chairman of the three 
organs of the Derg (the Congress, the Central Committee 
and the Standing Committee), but also the head of state, 
the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, chairman of 
the Defence and Security Council, conferrer of high 
appointments and promotions, supervisor of the 
implementation of the decisions of the three organs of 
the Derg and of the Council of Ministers, and the one who 
approves the decision of the Council of Ministers etc.34 
Previously, he had been the chairman of the Derg, but 
only in name? his real task had been presiding over the 
affairs of the subservient Council of Ministers - in 
effect, a prime minister subject to the whims of the 
officers' junta of the Derg.
Atnafu Abate retained not only his position as 
second vice-chairman of the Derg but, in addition to 
being responsible for heading the militia, was put in 
charge of their politicisation, organisation and arming. 
Further, a new and key post (Secretary General of the 
Derg) was created and given to Captain Alemayehu Haile 
who was one of the prominent members of the committee 
which drafted the law under consideration. As such, he
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was responsible for acting as the secretary general of 
the three organs of the Derg, managing the secretariat 
and budget of the Derg, co-ordinating the activities of 
the three organs of the Derg, channelling to each matters 
forming within its jurisdiction and ensuring that 
decisions of the three organs were transmitted to and 
implemented by the relevant officers.35 These three men 
(Teferi Atnafu and Alemayehu) became the main 
functionaries of the Derg after the December 
reorganisation.
Mengistu, on the other hand, was stripped of 
practically all his Derg functions. Since he was a 
member of the Derg and since he had retained his first 
vice-chairmanship, he could attend the proceedings of the 
three organs of the Derg and vote in them; further, he 
was specifically authorised to act in place of the 
chairman in his absence. Otherwise, he was given as his 
main task the previous functions of Teferi Bante, namely, 
presiding over the functions of the Council of Ministers. 
As such his tasks consisted of chairing the meeting of 
the Council of Ministers, making administrative decisions 
on matters referred to him by individual ministries and 
other government agancies,36 and submitting to the head 
of state (Teferi Bante) periodic reports concerning the 
activities of the Council of Ministers.37 In carrying out 
his duties, Mengistu was responsible not only to the 
three organs of the Derg (as were Teferi, Atnafu and 
Alemayehu)38, but also to the Council of Ministers which 
he was supposed to lead.39 Under the previous 
arrangement, Mengistu had all the powers that were now 
given to Teferi.
Apparently, Mengistu's reverses were not limited to 
him but extended to his supporters in the Derg who were 
also stripped of their Derg functions and assigned to the 
provinces or sent abroad, ostensibly for political 
education. For example, Lt. Col. Mersha Admassu was 
posted to Eritrea. Captain Ashebir Amare to Tigrai, and 
Lt. Col. Zeleke Beyene to Hararghe while Lt. Col. Teka
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Tulu, Lt. Col. Getachew Shibeshi, and Lt. Col. Gebreyes 
Wolde-hana were sent to East European countries for 
political education.40
Finally, the legislation sought to divest Mengistu's 
coalition not only of governmental functions but also of 
any role in political activities. It did this by 
abolishing POMOA's supervisory body (the Supreme 
Organising Committee, chaired by Mengistu) and by 
bringing it under the direct control of the organs of the 
Derg. This meant that Mengistu's role in the 
politicisation and organisation of the masses was removed 
completely, while his supporters in POMOA's commission, 
who were very much in the majority, could be removed or 
their functions restricted by the Derg. Thus, it was up 
to the Derg's Congress to issue directives on the 
establishment of political parties and mass 
organisations?41 up to the Central Committee to ensure 
the implementation of the political and other policies of 
the country?42 and up to the Standing Committee to:
issue directives on the enforcement 
of democratic rights and to take the 
necessary measures to give political 
consciousness, to organise and arm 
the broad masses with a view to 
making the tfPRP achieve its 
objectives.43
If under the new arrangement any individual Derg 
member was intended to have powers over political 
matters, it could only have been Alemayehu who, as 
secretary general of the Derg, was made responsible for 
ensuring that all decisions of the three organs were 
transmitted to, and implemented by, 'the concerned 
officers'44, a term which certainly includes government 
agencies, like POMOA, but perhaps also mass 
organisations. Obviously, such a strategic position 
would provide the secretary general with a great deal of 
room for manoeuvring develpments in the sphere of 
political activities.
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(C) Mengistu's Ascent to Absolute Power: "The Revolution 
is Transformed from a Defensive to an Offensive 
Position11
In his address to the nation on January 29, 1977, 
Teferi Bante condemned the conservative Arab states for 
supporting EDU and the Eritrean separatists with a view 
to making the Red Sea an Arab lake of peace; and the 
leaders of the Sudan and Somalia for posing a threat to 
Ethiopia's integrity and revolution by claiming that the 
country was weak and divided and trying to exploit that 
situation. He admitted that, because of the revolution 
and ensuing power struggle, there had emerged many groups 
with immense differences among them and that the 
differences were affecting not only the integrity but 
also the economy of the country and that, had they been 
more careful previously, the groups would have formed a 
joint front and a party by then. He concluded by 
stating:
What we beg of Ethiopian progressives 
and intellectuals at this hour and 
from this platform is that there must 
be unity; a party must be 
established; a joint front must be 
formed; and, until that happens, our 
revolution will always be in 
danger.
Two days later, Teferi reiterated the same 
sentiments in another speech delivered to a rally of the 
people of Addis Ababa in Revolution Square.46
The uneasy truce between the groups of Mengistu and 
Teferi in the Derg finally came to a head-on collision.
On February 3, there was a great deal of gun fire in the 
headquarters of the Derg for all Addis Ababans to hear.
On the next day, it was explained that 'revolutionary 
action' had been taken against some seven Derg members : 
General Teferi Bante, Captain Alemayehu Haile, Captain 
Moges Wolde-Michael, Lt. Col. Asrat Desta, Lt. Col. Hirui 
Haile-Selassie, Captain Tefera Deneke, and Corporal Haile 
Belay. It was further explained that these were agents 
of EPRP and EDU in the Derg, because Teferi had failed to
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condemn EPRP in his speeches of January 29 and 31, and 
because, as a forty-seven page programme of theirs 
showed, they had planned to reverse the revolution by 
rehabilitating EPRP, kidnapping progressives, abolishing 
POMOA and by executing a fascist coup d'etat in 
collaboration with imperialism and neighbouring 
conservative states. Finally, the explanation declared 
that the revolution had been transformed from a defensive 
to an offensive position.47 In his February 4 address to 
a rally of Addis Ababans, Mengistu lumped together those 
killed on the previous day with EPRP, EDU, the Eritrean 
Liberation Front, the conservative states of the region 
and imperialism, as enemies of the Ethiopian
a a
revolution. °
Obviously, these were some of the differences which 
had divided Mengistu's and Sisay's groups and which must 
have continued to divide the officers' junta of the Derg 
thereafter. More important was, however, the 
power-struggle in the officers' junta partly provoked by 
these differences. All observers agree that the group 
which was eliminated on February 3 was not led by 
Teferi, who, according to them was used as a pawn in the 
power struggle, but by Alemayehu and Moges and that it 
was the same group which had stripped Mengistu's 
coalition of practically all governmental and political 
functions in the previous December. There is, however, 
no evidence to show that Teferi's group sought to take 
this further and eliminate members of Mengistu's group of 
dismiss them from the Derg, nor is there evidence to show 
that they were intending to abandon the NDRPE altogether 
(as suggested by the accusation that they had planned 'a 
fascist coup d'etat' in alliance with imperialist 
powers). More likely than not, Teferi's group was trying 
to pursue an even-handed policy towards the civilian left 
in accordance with a recommendation made to the Derg by a 
committee in the Intelligence department which was 
created to instigate the real causes of the EPRP-AESM 
frictions. Apparently the committee interviewed some of
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the leaders of the two organisations, found the EPRP was 
incensed by the fact that the Derg or a section of it 
should collude with AESM, and recommended that the Derg 
as a government should stand aloof from factional feuds.
The circumstances suggest that the move against 
Teferi's group was not a case of Mengistu taking 
advantage of a shoot-out that took place on February 3 
nor a case of Mengistu's reaction to Teferi's speeches on 
29 and 31 of January, as suggested by Rene Lefort and 
others49, but a plan carefully worked out over time. It 
has been argued earlier that it was Mengistu who first 
formed a coalition with the civilian left with a view to 
bringing all members of the derg under the leadership of 
the coalition, and ousting from power those unwilling to 
co-operate, and that this initiative of Mengistu's caused 
a disequilibrium within the officers' junta, from the 
time when Sisay's and Teferi's groups rebelled. It would 
appear that Mengistu had foreseen that some members of 
the junta would react against his initiative (as did 
Sisay's and Teferi's groups) and that he had been 
prepared to meet such a contingency. Further Mengistu 
and his coalition accepted their decline from August to 
January as something temporary, not least because they 
were acting defiantly throughout that time. The member 
organisations of the coalition were busy not only 
fighting it out with the EPRP on the military and 
propaganda levels but also mobilizing the mass 
organisations and cadres to reject Teferi's group and 
come to their support.^0 It is also worth noting that 
the individuals killed during the February shooting were 
only those who were responsible for assigning Mengistu to 
an inferior government position and stripping him of his 
roles in political activities. In fact, according to 
some reliable sources, it was the greatly feared Lt. Col. 
Daniel Asefaw (head of the Derg's Security Department), 
Dr. Senaye Likke and Mengistu who planned the coup and 
presided over its execution. Apparently, when Yohannis 
(a supporter of Teferi's group and the second head of the
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Derg's Security Command) learnt of what had happened, he 
opened fire at Daniel and Senaye killing the first and 
fatally wounding the second. It seems he also went for 
Mengistu but was cornered and killed in the process.
Be that as it may, the February 3 incident opened 
the way for Mangistu's meteoric ascent to the heights of 
absolutism. On February 12 a proclamation 110/1977 
(amending Proclamation 108/1976 which had reorganised the 
structure of the Derg during the previous December) was 
issued51 and it was announced that Mengistu and Atnafu 
were elected as chaiman and vice-chaiman, respectively, 
by the Derg.52 Thus, not only did Mengistu inherit all 
the powers of Teferi as noted earlier, but was also 
authorised by the amended version of the legislation to 
retain his prime ministerial position.53 Further, the 
amended version created a completely new power and 
entrusted it to the chairman of the Derg, namely, the 
power to take measures against 'anti-people and 
counter-revolutionary elements'*54 All the amendments 
introduced in the new legislation had to do with the 
powers and responsibilities of the chaiman. It is 
believed, nonetheless, that a consideration of the 
chairman's relations with the organs of the Derg and of 
the continued dispersal of the Derg members will throw 
more light on the matter than a discussion of the amended 
provisions of the new legisalation.
The chairman was directed to exercise his powers and 
responsibilities in accordance with directives issued to 
him by the Congress, the Central Committee and the 
standing Committee55. This, coupled with the mandate of 
the Congress to take 'serious' measures against offending 
Derg mambers, seemed to suggest that the chairman's 
powers were not absolute. Unlike the Standing Committee, 
which was declared to be responsible to the Congress and 
to the Central Committee (and to which it was bound to 
submit periodic reports)56 no similar obligations existed 
for the chairman, thus depriving the organs of the Derg 
of any effective means of evaluating whether he had
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carried out their directives or not. Also, it was 
provided that the Congress could take serious measures 
against Derg members only at the recommendation of the 
Standing Committee57; should the Congress discover 
dereliction of duty committed by the chairman in some way 
and seek to take measures against him, it would first 
have to overcome the difficulty of securing a 
recommendation from the Standing Committee which could 
only by convened be the Chairman himself58. In addition, 
if members of the Congress sought to challenge Mengistu, 
there was always the concern that they might also face 
the fate of those who had done that in the past (like 
Aman, Sisay, Teferi and their associates). At any rate, 
according to the drafters of Proclamation 108, the new 
structure 110 was intended to enable the Derg to operate 
on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles59,
-principles which in practice have been seen to favour a 
highly centralised monolithic government structure rather 
than the more diffuse structure of the separation of 
powers operating on the basis of checks and balances.
When all is said and done, the organs of the Derg 
did not survive Mengistu's February coup d'etat? they 
could, therefore, not restrain any absolutist tendencies 
on the part of the chairman. During the Congress's first 
meeting after the coup (May, 1977), it was agreed that 
the Congress should be convened once a year and the 
Central Committee twice a year. This in itself would not 
have given the two organs adequate time to discharge the 
multitude of functions entrusted to them by the Law;60 
the fact remains, nevertheless, that no such formal 
meetings have really ever since been held by either of 
the organs concerned. No doubt, there have been several 
meetings held in the name of the Congress but those 
meetings involved only those Derg members that happened 
to be in the capital city at the time? in any case, such 
meetings, of which there were about four, persisted only 
until the middle of 1978. The only way in which the 
Congress (the Derg ) survived as a body was in its annual
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June 28 meetings held not to discharge its legal 
functions (as envisaged by Proclamation 110/1977 and by 
the May 1977 decision of the Congress) but to commemorate 
the establishment of the Derg on June 28, 1974.
As individuals, however, Derg members continued to 
enjoy privileged positions in various departments of the 
government. It has previously been noted that their 
assignment to positions outside the Derg (to offices in 
the capital as well as the provinces) had begun as early 
as 1974. In August 1978, this trend was reinforced when 
six Derg members were appointed as chief administrators 
of provinces,61 and when within three months of that 
twelve of the fourteen provinces were given similar 
administrators.62 Many more Derg members were appointed 
as administrators of subprovinces or given positions in 
various other departments mainly in the capital.
The idea of assigning Derg members to government 
departments was instituted by the Derg for the purposes 
of using them as watch-dogs in their places of work. 
However, their function was never sufficiently 
articulated until December 1976 when a Directive was 
issued along with Proclamation 108/1976. The Directive 
provided, inter alia, that Derg members assigned to 
government departments were to act as senior cadres in 
their places of work and oversee the implementation of 
the NDRPE, and were to politicise, organise and to arm 
the masses, the people's militia and the revolution 
squads? in addition it stipulated that government 
officials had a duty to collaborate in helping the high 
political officers (members of the Derg) carry out their 
functions.63
Obviously, the functions of these Derg members 
overlapped with those of POMOA and the Joint Front of 
Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Organisations,64 and their 
functionaries. POMOA was brought under the direct 
control of the Derg's Standing Committee by Proclamation 
108/1976; this status of POMOA was retained by 
Proclamations 110 and 119 of February and July 1977,
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respectively.65 Similarly, the Derg members assigned to 
various government departments were directly accountable 
to the Standing Committee which in the final analysis 
meant Mengistu himself. Interestingly enough, he played 
the Derg members against POMOA's functionaries especially 
those in the provinces, with the result that the 
influence of the former fluctuated until the 
establishment of the Commission of the Organisation of 
the Ethiopian Workers' party in early 1980. More often 
than not, however, the Derg members enjoyed a very 
privileged position in the society, exacting deference as 
factions of a head of state- a hangover from proclamation 
1 and 2 of September 1974, which made all Derg members 
collectively head of state - rather than a reflection of 
Proclamation 108 of December, 1976, and 110 of February 
1977, which appointed the chairman of the Derg as the 
only head of state. It must be noted, nevertheless, that 
the continued enjoyment of power and prestige rested on 
their loyalty to Mengistu and not on their membership of 
the Derg.
The absence of the Congress and Central Committee 
raises the very important question of who was to exercise 
the functions that had been entrusted to them by Law. 
Unlike those of the latter, the powers of the Congress 
were extensive and crucial, especially as far as 
policy-making was concerned. For example, according to 
Proclamation 110/1977, a government department prepares a 
draft budget and submits it to the Council of 
Ministers,66 which, with or without amendments, passes it 
on to the Congress through its chairman (Mengistu)67, 
since the organ of the Derg was the one authorised to
• C O  ,approve the consolidated budget of the nation. ° This 
was the procedure for the adoption of a Proclamation the 
most important kind of Law in the country? that type of 
law was the instrument by which all important policies of 
the central government were promulgated. In other words, 
law-making power was given to the Congress of the Derg
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and not to the Central Committee, the Standing Committee 
or the chairman of the Derg.
Of these Derg organs, it was only the Standing 
Committee which was retained as a body; it continued to 
hold fairly regular meetings under the chaimanship of 
Mengistu, until at least the formation of the Workers' 
Party of Ethiopia in 1984, when it, with the addition of 
more members, became the politburo of the Party. As 
noted earlier, draft Proclamations ended up at the desk 
of the Derg's chaiman since he was at the same time the 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The relevant 
question is whether he submitted such Proclamations to 
the meetings of the Standing Committee or simply 
promulgated them as Laws. Obviously, he was under no 
obligation to submit them since the Standing Committee 
lacked competence over the matter. As a matter of 
practice, however, it appears that he submitted some 
Proclamations and not others? he retained the power to 
issue Proclamations with or without consulting the 
Standing Committee and with or without his own 
amendments. As it happens, it is not uncommon to hear 
departmental officials complaining about their draft 
Proclamations rusting away on the shelves of the 
chairman's office, either because he did not like the 
contents of the draft legislations or because he could 
not spare the time to review them, whereas Proclamations 
initiated by him would be issued readily. This was the 
way that major policies and legislations were adopted at 
least until the inauguration of a new Constitution in 
1987. The legislation under consideration (Proclamation 
110/1977) had an impressive-looking list of functions 
that had to be discharged by the Standing Committee 
collectively. However, there was a separate provision in 
the same legislation which directly or through 
interpretation could be said to confer the same functions 
on the chairman.69 This meant that the chairman could 
convene the Standing Committee in order to discharge the 
functions collectively or refrain from exercising his
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power of convening the Committee and fall back on his 
power to discharge the functions personally. If there 
were certain functions that fell within the exclusive 
domain of the Standing Committee, they were relatively 
unimportant and in any case could not be discharged by 
the Committee without it having to rely on the Chairman 
convening a meeting. The difference between the Standing 
Committee and its predecessor (the Adhoc Supreme 
Organising Committee) was the difference between 
personal and collective responsibility; while the first 
could be accused of being a more dictatorial scheme than 
the second, it has in its favour the fact that it could 
and did bring order to the Derg which had been subject to 
a series of convulsions in its previous few years of 
existence.
All this is at any rate in the realm of theory? 
perhaps, the practice would throw a clearer light upon 
the question. The Chairman always came to the meetings 
with a ready-made decision? he would arrive at such a 
decision in consultation with anyone from within or 
outside the government, including diplomats, and then 
impose it on the members of the Standing Committee. By 
all accounts, the main function of the members in the 
Committee was to make a caricature of the correctness of 
the chairman's sentiments and positions on the matter 
under consideration.
The only member who is widely believed to have even 
aired his opinions in the meeting, without necessarily 
contradicting the chairman, was, and is, Captain Fikre 
Selassie Wog-deres (then General Secretary of the Derg). 
This procedural scheme (of processing a decision through 
a brow-beaten meeting after it has already been made 
outside) later became so well established, particularly 
in the activities of political organisations and the 
Workers' Party of Ethiopia, that it had a name specially 
coined for it, namely, 'organisational operation'.
Moreover the obedience of the Standing Committee 
members was exacted by the memory of the fate of those
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who had dared to challenge Mengistu in the past (like 
Aman, Sisay, Teferi and their associates) and by his 
readiness to exertise his power 'of taking measures 
against anti-people and anti-revolutionary elements'.
The last to fall prey to the excesses prepetrated against 
prominent Derg members was Atnafu Abate who was the 
vice-chairman of the Derg and a member of the Standing 
Committee. On November 13, 1977, he was executed in as 
mysterious a manner as Aman and the others. The official 
charges against him were numerous but on the whole 
revolved around the accusation that he had always been 
reactionary and continued to be so, despite advice
•7 ft
against it by members of the Derg. u From the 
circumstances of the time and the emphasis made in the 
charges against him, it appears that the main bone of 
contention between him and Mengistu was the desire by the 
latter to 'intensify' the 'red terror', against EPRP, 
extending it to include AESM which had fallen out with 
Mengistu's coalition three months earlier. Atnafu 
appears to have pleaded moderation on this as well as on 
the government's radical stance on a number of political 
questions.
According to the official reports, Atnafu was 
executed in pursuance of a decision of the Congress which 
was adopted during a November meeting held in its name71 
- a decision which it could adopt legitimately under its 
mandate 'to take serious measures against Derg 
members'.72 According to other sources, the decision was 
taken by Mengistu personally73 - a decision which, 
arguably, came under his mandate 'to take measures 
against anti-people and anti-revolutionary elements'.74 
Be that as it may, the demise of the man who had done 
much more than anyone else to bring about the formation 
of the Derg in the first place meant the abolition of the 
office of the vice-chairman and the gobbling up of the 
functions of that office by Mengistu. As always, he was 
the beneficiary (in terms of powers gained) of the 
executions of prominent Derg members.
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The size of the Standing Committee was reduced from 
17 to 16 because of the abolition of the office of the 
second vice-chairman in the February reorganisations of 
the Derg. The bulk of the members of the Standing 
Committee would have been members of his coalitions; 
their promotion to that status was no doubt a reward for 
the support they had given to Mengistu in his struggle 
against members of the officers' junta who were opposed 
to his assertion of power. With the exception of 
Fikre-Selassie Wog-deres and Teka Tulu ( who are widely 
believed to have been members of the Worker's League and 
the Ethiopian Oppressed Peoples' Revolutionary Struggle, 
respectively) and Atnafu, who was neutral, the others 
were most probably founder members of Mengistu's 
political organisation (Revolutionary Flame). Since 
these organisations as well as AESM and the Ethiopian 
Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Organisation had together 
formed a coalition effectively, under the leadership of 
Mengistu, they had obviously taken a common stand against 
the EPRP and EDU coalitions and against those in the Derg 
who went against the wishes of their coalition.
Thus, the strength of the Standing Committee members 
rested not so much on the power they were to wield 
collectively but on the loyalty they had and continued to 
have for Mengistu. Over the years, the Derg 
Sub-committees which were established to oversee 
particular spheres of government activities had been 
moving away from being run by Derg sub-committees and 
begun turning into departments run by the chairman of the 
sub-committees. It was these offices that the members of 
the Standing Committee inherited from their disgraced 
predecessors in February 1977. As heads of these 
departments, they emerged as the most powerful men in the 
country after Mengistu; they became his personal 
assistants in matters coming within their competence.
Each one of them was in charge of one or more government 
departments and, as such, exacted as much deference from 
their subordinates as did Mengistu from they themselves.
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%However, the process of running spheres of 
government activities through individuals rather than 
subcommittees was not complete in 1977? the two concepts 
of 'subcommittees' and 'departments' are, therefore, used 
interchangeably in the list of names given below. The 
military ranks given are as they stood at the time. 
According to the February 1977 reorganisations, the 
members of the Standing Committee were as follows:
1. Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam: First
Vice-Chairman (June 1974-February 1977), and 
Chairman (February 1977 -)?
2. Lt. Col. Atnafu Abate? Second Vice-Chairman 
(June 1974-)
3. Captain Fikre-Selassie Wog-Deres: member of the 
Social Affairs Subcommittee (1974- August 
1976), head of the Revolutionary Campaign 
Department (August- December 1976), and General 
Secretary (February 1977-)?
4. Major Fissiha Desta: member of the
Administration Subcommittee (1974-1977), and 
joint head of the Administration and Legal 
Affairs Subcommittee (Feburuary 1977 - )?
5. Col. Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan? Chairman of the
Defence Administration Subcommittee (1974 - 
February 1977), and joint head of the same 
Subcommittee (February 1977- )
6. Major Hadis Tedla: member of the Defence
Administration Subcommittee (1974 - December
1976), and joint head of the same Subcommittee 
(February 1977 -)
7. Sergeant Legese Asfaw: personal assistant to 
Mengistu (1974-December 1976), member of the 
Political Affairs Subcommittee (December
1976-February 1977), and head of the Military 
Political Affairs Department (February 1977-)
8. Major BirJ .hanu Baye: Chairman of the Legal
Affairs Subcommittee (1974- July 1976), head of 
the Political and Foreign Relations Deparment 
(July - December 1976), head of the Legal
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Affairs Department (December 1976-February
1977), and head of the Foreign Affairs 
Department (February 1977-);
9. Lt. Col. Teka Tulou: Chairman of the
Intelligence Subcommittee (1974 - December
1976), sent for political training abroad 
(December 1976 - February 1977), and joint head 
of the Intelligence Subcommittee (February
1977-)?
10. Major Kasahun Tafese: members of the
Intelligence Subcommittee (1974 - February
1977), and joint head of the same Subcommittee 
(February 1977-)?
11. Leading Technician Gesese Wolde-Kidan: member 
of the Economic Subcommittee (1974 - December 
1976), and Chaiman of the same Subcommittee 
(December 1976-);
12. Major Endale Tesema: member of the Social 
Affairt Subcommittee (1974 -);
13. Major Ge^achew Shibeshi: Chairman of the
Confiscations Subcommittee (1974 - December
1976), sent for political training abroad 
(December 1976-April 1977), and head of the 
Derg's Security and Revolutionary Campaign 
Department (April 1977 -);
14. Lt. Gebeyehu Temesgen: Chairman of the
Information and Public Relations Subcommittee 
(February 1977-)?
15. Petty-officer Tamrat Ferede: member of the
Social Affairs Subcommittee (1974 - February
1977), and Acting Chairman of the Information 
and Public Relations Subcommittee (February 
1977 -);
16. Major Wubishet Dese: member of the Legal 
Affairs Subcommittee (1974 - July 1976), 
Chairman of the same Subcommittee (July - 
December 1976), sent abroad for political 
training (December 1976 - February 1977), and 
joint head of the Administration and Legal 
Affairs Subcommittee (February 1977 -).
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CONCLUSION
Haile Selassie was an absolute monarch who had 
supreme powers in the legislative, executive and judicial 
spheres of the government. He could initiate any Laws or 
veto those initiated by parliament or by the cabinet.
He could, on petition from anyone or on his own 
initiative, make administrative decisions on any matter 
or veto decisions made by the executive branch including 
the cabinet. He had a judicial office (chilot) over which 
he presided and overturned decisions made by the courts 
of the land. He had a separate department under him (the 
Ministry of Pen) with the help of which he made his 
decisions known to the subordinate organs of government. 
These offices constituting the monarch's court were all 
based in the palace.
When the Derg overthrew the monarch in September 
1974, it started exercising his powers collectively? by 
the time the year was out, the powers had devolved on the 
officers' junta within the Derg? and in February 1977, it 
had reverted back to an autocratic control. In this 
sense, the emergence of Mengistu as an absolute ruler can 
be seen as a continuation of Ethiopia's political 
culture. The resemblance is all the more striking when 
it is noted that individuals who did not belong to the 
royal dynasties or the aristocracy like Teodros and 
Yohannis had also become autocratic monarches and ruled 
the country without much legitimacy crisis.
Despite these similarities, however, there are 
differences between the old and new autocracies to 
justify the conclusion that a political transformation 
has taken place. The differences relate not so much to 
what had happened until February 1977 but to the 
developments afterwards. As will be discussed in the 
following chapters, Mengistu eliminated the political 
organizations that had been opposed to, or had not sided 
with him, purged their members from government and social 
institutions, formed under his personal direction a 
Leninist party and subordinated the government and social
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institutions as well as the whole of society under the 
control of the party. It was this deliberate emulation 
of a foreign, 20th century, totalitarian political model 
that came to distinguish the new autocracy from the old.
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PART THREE
CONSOLIDATION OF POWER (FEBRUARY 1977 - SEPTEMBER 1984)
CHAPTER SEVEN
The Elimination of Internal and External Threats to
Mengistu's Power;
(A) "Revolutionary Ethiopia of Death”
Like rnosf* dictators, Mengistu was not only head of 
the government but also head of state and as such 
personified the state. As of 1977, therefore, it became 
increasingly difficult to distinguish between the threats 
directed against him and those directed against the 
state. By and large it can perhaps be stated that 
whereas the internal opposition was a threat against 
Mengistu's position as a leader, the external invasion 
can be taken as a threat to both him as a leader and to 
the state.
When Mengistu assumed absolutist powers in February 
1977, the government was engulfed by internal and 
external threats with the result that Ethiopia looked as 
though it was on the point of dismemberment. In the 
urban centres, Mengistu's coalition was locked into an 
assassination and counter-assassination match with the 
EPRP. In the north-west, EDU had captured the border 
towns of Metema and Setit-Humera and was poised to 
capture the provincial capital of Gondar. In the North, 
the Eritrean Liberation Force, the Eritrean Peoples' 
Liberation Front, EDU and the Tigrain Peoples' Liberation 
Front had brought chunks of the Eritrean and Tigrain 
countryside under their control and had besieged the 
major towns in those provinces. In the east, the Afar 
Liberation Front had been destroying military convoys and 
garrisons and periodically cutting the road leading to
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the only port of Aseb which was still under government 
control. In the south and south-east, the Western 
Somalia Liberation Front and the Somali Abdo had stepped 
up guerilla activists and were attacking military 
garrisons and police stations, killing highland settlers 
in the region and cutting the country's only rail link 
with the sea, the railway that linked the capital city 
with Djiboutti. The road linking the Eritrean capital 
(Asmara) to the remaining Ethiopian port of Massawa 
having come under the threat of the Eritrean People's 
Liberation Front, the country had in effect become 
land-locked.
These developments brought Ethiopia into conflict 
with the neighbouring conservative states, notably Sudan 
and Saudi-Arabia, which were openly supporting such 
conservative Muslim as well as Christian insurgents in 
Ethiopia as the Eritrean Liberation Forces, the Afar 
Liberation Front and EDU.1 To add to its liturgy of 
problems, the government learnt, from its intelligence 
department, that its eastern neighbour (the Republic of 
Somalia) was not only promoting the insurgents of the 
Western Somalia Liberation Front and the Somali Abdo but 
was itself preparing to invade Ethiopia with a view to 
annexing the Ogaden region which had been under Ethiopian 
control since the turn of the century.2
Mengistu took a war-like stance against these 
threats in the aftermath of the coup on February 3, 1977. 
A communique issued in the name of the Derg on the 
following day pointed out that Ethiopian progressives 
(members of Mengistu's coalition) had been unable to take 
action against the counter-revolutionaries because of the 
dominance of the reactionaries and their supporters in 
the Derg? it then stated that the revolution's strategy 
would, from that day, be transformed from the defensive 
into the offensive3. In his address to a rally held on 
the same day, Mengistu condemned Teferi and his faction, 
EPRP, EDU, the Eritrean Liberation Forces, the 
conservative states of the region and imperialism as
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enemies of the Ethiopian revolution.4 In his address at 
another rally on April 12, Mengistu again condemned the 
same forces and asked the Ethiopian people to rally 
around the banner of 'Call of the Motherland' and fight 
the enemies of the revolution5. On April 17, he made a
similar speech and smashed three bottles filled with
blood (or something resembling it) to signify 
imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic-capitalism under 
which all the enumerated enemies of the revolution were 
supposed to be subsumed . Revolutionary Ethiopia (the
publication of POMOA) put the same on a more theoretical
plane: the main contradiction of the time was not
between Ethiopia and external aggression (as Teferi's 
group would have it)? nor between the national 
progressive and reactionary forces (as others would have 
it)? but between external and internal reactionaries, on 
one hand, and internal progressives, on the other, (as 
Moa would have it).7 Based on such rhetorical 
justifications, Mengistu, who now had brought all the 
resources of coercion under his control, declared war on 
all fronts and by the end of early 1978 had subdued all 
the internal opposition (and repelled external 
aggression) with the notable exception of the Eritrean 
and Tigrain separatist insurgents.
(B) The Elimination of EDU
In July 1976 Persident El Numeri of Sudan accused 
Ethiopia of involvement in a coup against him and 
subsequently provided open support to EDU and Eritrean 
insurgents in contravention of the 1972 Addis Ababa 
Agreement in which the two states had committed 
themselves to bringing about peace by closing their 
frontiers to each others' insurgents. In December 1976, 
EDU, supported by Sudanese tanks and artillery, launched 
an offensive in the north-western and northern provinces 
of Gondar and Tigrai. On January 13, 1977, the border 
towns of Metema and Setit-Humera , in the province of
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Gondar, fell? from then on, EDU was poised to capture 
the provincial capital of Gondar and the region between 
the border and the capital town. By the spring, the 
soldiers in the area had abandoned their garrisons and 
joined EDU. The wing which, with the assistance of the 
Eritrean Liberation Forces, had gone on the offensive in 
Tigrai did not enjoy as much success as the one which had 
gone into Gondar? it had to compete with two other 
movements which were active in the region, namely, EPRP 
and the Tigrai People's Liberation Front, and the 
territory was far removed from the Sudan where EDU had
, , o . ,its basis. The movement's operations in other regions 
like Wolo and Shoa were even less spectacular than in the 
first two provinces.
Despite the threat that was hovering in the south 
and southeast, Mengistu's government withdrew some of the 
brigades from there and sent them north to fight the EDU. 
As will be noted below, Ethio-Soviet relations had taken 
a dramatic turn for the better in the aftermath of 
Mengistu's February coup with the result that a sizable 
number of tanks and armed personnel carriers were 
delivered to Ethiopia in March and April. These weapons 
were also deployed to the EDU fronts as of delivery.
Thus was launched the government's counter-offensive in 
the spring of 1977? while attacking Sudanese involvement 
in Ethiopian affairs ferociously, the mass media began to 
report successful operations against EDU forces almost 
everday. Before the summer was out, EDU forces had been 
driven out of Ethiopia and back into their Sudanese 
sanctuary. Though they were able to regroup and launch 
further offensives starting from the autumn9, EDU forces 
have never since been able to achieve as credible a 
success in the battle field as they had done in the first 
half of 1977.
(C) The Red Terror (the Elimination of EPRP)
The threats posed by EDU, the separatist insurgents 
and the Republic of Somalia were cases for the army, of
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which Mengistu had become commander-in-chief soon after 
his February coup? as such, he was finally in charge of 
the military operations against those forces. The case 
of EPRP which had engaged Mengistu's coalition in an 
urban armed struggle, on the other hand, required a 
different strategy: as noted earlier, for some time by
this stage, Mengistu's coalition had been advocating 'the 
arming of the broad masses' and the declaration of 
'revolutionary action' and 'the red terror' against 
what it called 'the white terror' of EPRP. The February 
4 declaration that the revolution had been transformed 
from a defensive to an offensive position as of then 
meant, inter alia, the endorsement of these strategies 
against EPRP - strategies which were vigorously pursued 
by the government in the wake of Mengistu's coup d'etat.
The peasant associations which came into existence 
in early 1975 were in December of the same year 
authorised to establish an additional organ (peasant 
defence squads) to be recruited from among 'the broad 
masses of peasants'. The urban dwellers' associations, 
equivalents of peasant defence squads - 'the revolution 
defence squads' - which were supposed to be composed of 
'the broad masses of urban dwellers', were not 
established until late 1976. 'Revolution defence squads' 
were also established among workers of the various 
industries at about the same time as the urban dwellers 
defence squads. All these types of squads were charged 
with the task of carrying out the duties of the police 
force at the local level? however, the role they played 
in political developments became more important than the 
role they played in fighting non-political crimes. The 
squads of the peasants' association had been envisaged as 
weapons in the stuggle against the landed gentry whose 
land had been expropriated? later, however, they came in 
handy for the struggle against EPRP. The squads of the 
urban dwellers' associations and factory workers had been 
launched directly against the EPRP from the start. In 
the aftermath of Mengistu's coup these squads were one of
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the sections of 'the broad masses' that were armed to 
carry out the 'red terror' against the 'white terror' of 
EPRP.
Similarly armed against EPRP were the cadres of the 
political organisations that came under the orbit of 
Mengistu's coalition. After the establishment of POMOA 
in April 1976, the bulk of the cadres were subordinated 
to its branch offices which existed at the provincial, 
awaraja and district levels. As explained previously, 
POMOA was brought under the direct control of the 
Standing Committee of the Derg in December 1976, an 
administrative link which Mengistu retained after his 
February 1977 coup. Given the subservience of the 
Standing Committee, this meant that POMOA came under the 
direct contol of Mengistu? the cadres and the defence 
squads, which were subordinated to POMOA for political 
guidance, were also finally accountable to Mengistu.
Further, there were the cadres which were drawn from 
the army primarily by the Workers League and 
Revolutionary Flame. It is not clear whether these 
cadres were controlled by POMOA at all. It appears that 
some among them who were assigned by the two 
organisations to POMOA to discharge the latter's 
functions were probably controlled by it to some extent? 
it appears that the remaining received their orders from 
Mengistu and his henchman Sergeant Legese Asfaw who was 
head of the Derg's Military Political Affairs Department. 
This was certainly the case with what were called 'the 
military cadres'. As soldiers, all these types of cadres 
would have been armed and skilled in the use of fire 
arms? in fact, they played a key role in the struggle 
against EPRP by leading assassination as well as search 
and seizure teams made up of the civilian cadres and the 
revolution defence squads.
Yet another resource for coercion was the highly 
trained and pampered military force which came under the 
Derg's Security Department headed previously by the 
fearsome Daniel Asfaw and after his death in the February
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coup by Major Getachew Shibeshi. This force became in 
charge of the palace's security instead of the old Body 
Guard of the king and later its role was expanded to 
include the security of the capital city and most of the 
province of Shoa. More relevant was the fact that it 
became the ground for recruiting and training what looked 
like Mengistu's private armies which operated from the 
palace and haunted the cities by night. They were 
certainly the most ruthless and horrifying of the 
assassins of Mengistu's government used to eliminate 
chosen prominent individuals10, and to act as a back-up 
force for the revolution defence squads and cadres.
As explained in the previous section a new task 
incorporated in Proclamation 110 of 1977 and entrusted to 
the chaiman of the Derg was that of 'taking measures 
against anti-people and counter-revolutionary elements'. 
Obviously, the means by which this task was to be 
discharged by the chairman (Mengistu) was the above 
described machinery of death. At the disposal of 
Mengistu were the following: the newly created people's
militia which was under the Vice-chaiman of the Derg 
(Atnafu Abate) until his execution in November 1977 after 
which it came under the chairman directly? the police 
force? the greatly expanded intelligence department 
which came under the Derg's intelligence department 
headed by Teka Tulou? and the biggest army in Black 
Africa of which the chairman was the commander-in-chief 
after his coup in February 1977.
The task of arming the revolution defence squads and 
possibly the civilian and military cadres was entrusted 
to Sergeant Legese Asfaw. In the meantime, a drive to 
disarm the civilian population was put into action. In 
traditional Ethiopia, the possession of weapons and the 
traffic in them was hardly regulated at all with the 
result that an estimated number of 9,000,000 pistols and 
rifles were kept in civilian hands? of these, 300,000 
were kept by Addis Ababans alone11. Armed squads 
composed of soldiers, policemen, cadres and members of
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urban dwellers' associations and revolution defence 
squads conducted house to house searches in the capital 
city from March 23 to 27 and from May 7 to 9. It was 
reported that during the first round of search and 
seizure, EPRP weapons, cars, and field-glasses were 
captured but only partially12. These armed squads were 
licensed to take revolutionary measures against suspected 
EPRP members and sypathisers? however, there are many 
reports that this power was used by them against innocent 
civilians for personal gain and for settling old scores. 
Similar rounds of search and seizure and the excesses 
that accompanied them were repeated in the urban centres 
up and down the country and even in some rural areas.
It has previously been noted that assassinations 
between EPRP and Mengistu's coalition had been played out 
in the streets and back yards of Addis Ababa since 
September 1976. The assassinations became more ferocious 
in the wake of Mengistu's coup and leaders of trade 
unions, urban dwellers associations and student bodies 
started to be gunned down everday by EPRP sharp-shooters 
in March and April13. In the meantime, EPRP and POMOA 
cadres were butchering each other in the provincial 
towns. The government's initiative of the time, 
nevertheless, had become less selective in its targets; 
on the contrary, it had made a definite choice to go for 
mass executions and for breaking the backbone of EPRP. 
This policy was reflected clearly in the mass executions 
of May.
Since 1974, May Day had become an occasion for the 
flexing of muscles of contending groups; they brought 
out as many of their supporters as possible to the 
rallies and made them shout their slogans and hoist their 
placards. The May Day rallies of 1975 and 1976 had 
resulted in the arrest of many and in the death of some 
EPRP supporters; the rallies of 1977 in Addis Ababa, on 
the other hand, led to the most horrifying carnage in the 
history of the country. An anti-government demonstration 
organised by EPRP to undermine the government's May Day
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rallies was launched on the evening of April 29; well 
over 500 of the demonstrators were gunned down during the 
same evening while marching, running for cover or in the 
houses they had fled to for refuge. The massacre 
continued in the following days; according to the 
Secretary General of the Swedish Save the Children Fund, 
over 1000 youths had been executed by May 16 and their 
bodies were left in the street and ravaged by hyenas in 
the night. School children of 11 years of age and above 
were at the forefront of EPRP demonstrations. It is 
widely reported that hospitals often refused to treat the 
wounded on the grounds that they were reactionaries14, 
and charged anything up to 100 US Dollars and 25 US 
Dollars for the release of students' and workers' bodies, 
respectively, to cover the cost of bullets wasted in 
killing them.
What was done to those who were detained under 
suspicion of being members or sypathizers of EPRP was no 
less horrifying than the street massacres. The number of 
detainees was too great to be accommodated by the 
existing prisons and police stations; as a result, all 
the offices of the urban dwellers' associations, the 
palaces and military garrisons in the towns up and down 
the country were turned into detention centres. The 
victims of the mass arrests and those picked up in the 
streets and their homes were taken to these centres and 
subjected to some of the most inhuman forms of torture of 
a cruelty unprecedented in the history of the country.
One typical form of torture was soaking the feet of the 
detainees in boiling water for a time and then suspending 
them up-side-down and beating the soles of their feet 
until the skins gave way to blood and the raw flesh and 
finally to the bo^cc- bones. Without doubt, many died 
during the ordeal, others many years later as a result of 
complications they developed afterwards, yet others 
became crippled for life, and the remaining became 
paranoid, unable to trust anyone. It is only the 
exception from among the generation aged between 15 to
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about 40 at that time who have not gone through 
imprisonment and some kind of torture.
One of the purposes of the exercise was to force the 
detainees to come up with the names of three EPRP 
members? it appears that an individual was allowed to 
know only three fellow EPRP members with whom he was to 
work. Other crude ways of establishing affiliation to 
EPRP included the publishing and broadcasting of 
government telephone numbers to which individuals could 
call anonymously and accuse others of belonging to EPRP; 
and the holding of mass meetings in which those present 
would be pressurised into self-incriminations and mutual 
accusations. Needless to say, these methods were open to 
abuse; EPRP members victimised members of Mengistu's 
coalition deliberately exposing them as belonging to 
their own organisation? others victimised their enemies 
for similar considerations? and yet others did so 
because of the torture. It is obvious that many innocent 
individuals were victimised in this manner? though 
terror is a negation of due process of law, it 
nevertheless was meant to achieve a goal through the 
generation of fear.
Thus screened, the presumed members of EPRP were 
herded into trucks, taken to various parts of the cities 
very early in the morning and executed with a volley of 
shots, their cries and wails being overheard by the 
residents of the locality. Then, their skulls smashed 
open with gun butts, their brains and blood scattered all 
around and slogans pinned to their bodies, the corpses 
would be left lying in strategic street corners till 
morning for passersby to see? sometimes, corpses were 
also displayed on television. With this morbid ritual 
over, the bodies were then collected and buried in some 
mass graves in the outskirts of the cities. Judging by 
the public display of the 'red' terror, it was obviously 
intended to force the urban populations into submission 
and into exposing EPRP members. Both EPRP and Mengistu's 
coalition were proud of the fact they were in the
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business of perpetrating terror against each other? 
however, they both claimed their own form of terror was 
'red' and that of the other side was 'white'16.
EPRP's back-bone was not broken by the terror of the 
first half of 1977 but it was beginning to crack under 
the weight. In fact, even when EPRP adopted its policy 
of urban armed struggle in the summer of 1976, there had 
been some among the members who had been opposed to the 
idea and who had apparently gone as far as betraying some 
of their comrades to the government. Further, the fact 
that the policy resulted in the slaughter of so many 
children alienated other members of the organisation? 
this is often cited as one of the reasons why EPRP's
1 7 • •presumed leader (Birihane Meskel Reda) led a break-away 
faction in the summer of 1977. The circustances of his 
arrest by the government are not clear? however, he 
finally ended in prison where he was made to write a 
long report/confession of a few hundred pages about the 
EPRP and was then executed. Further, the government had 
been able to piece together all the information that it 
extracted out of the mass of detainees through its 
torture.
Then the government launched its second round of 
'the red terror' in November 1977, directed this time 
not only against EPRP but also against AESM which had 
fallen out with the government several months earlier.
The excesses of the second round of terror were as 
horrific as the first? again, mass arrests and 
executions particularly of the youth were to haunt the 
cities. Nevertheless, one of the differences between the 
two rounds of terror was the fact that, by the end of 
1977, the Government had accumulated better information 
about the leaders and structure of EPRP and was, 
therefore, more systematic in its prosecution of the 
second round of terror. In March 1978, it declared that 
EPRP had been wiped out completely.
What was left of EPRP after that were its rural 
bases in Tigrai and Gondar provinces. The armed wing of
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EPRP (the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army) was not 
much of a fighting force? it had as a result lost its 
credibility among the peasants who lived near the bases. 
To make matters worse, EPRP's most important base which 
was situated in Tigrai (Assimba) was attacked and 
destroyed by the Tigre- People's Liberation Front in May 
1978. It is said that the reasons for this was the fact 
that the Front wanted EPRP out of its territorial 
preserve of Tigrai? it appears, nonetheless, that there 
were some other underlying frictions between the two 
organisations as well as differences they both had with 
the Eritrean People's Liberation Front. EPRP seems to 
have incurred the disfavour of its patron (the Eritrean 
People's Liberation Front) by calling itself a 'party' and 
by referring to the Front as one of its mass 
organisations.
Be that as it may, the Ethiopian People's 
Revolutionary Army in Assimba had no choice but to flee 
into Eritrea and into the hands of the Eritrean People's 
Liberation Front which accompanied members of the Army to 
the EPRP bases in Gondar. There, several plenary 
meetings were held in the subsequent years in order to 
examine the failure of the urban armed struggle and to 
come up with alternative strategies for the future. 
However, the meetings only led to recriminations 
particularly between the leaders and the rank and file? 
the former were accused of having been dictatorial, of 
misleading the rank and file about the progress of the 
urban armed struggle, and of generally leading the 
organisation into disaster18. With the exception of a 
relatively insignificant guerrilla unit which continued 
to operate from one of its Gondar bases (Chilga) and 
another which continued to operate in the Northern part 
of the same province under the Tigr«. . People's 
Liberation Front (the Ethiopian People's Democratic 
Movement), EPRP cannot be said to have survived the 
government's onslaught of 1977 and early 1978.
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(D) The Repulsion of Somalia's Aggression
'Everything to the War Front'
The threat posed to Mengistu's powers, as well as to 
the integrity of the country, by the Western Somali 
Liberation Front and the Somali Abdo insurgents, and the 
invasion of Ethiopia by their supporter (the Republic of 
Somalia) were much more dangerous than the threats posed 
by EDU and EPRP. Obviously, these internal and external 
threats, coupled with his policy of using force and 
violence to subdue internal opposition and repel external 
aggression, made him extremely dependent on military aid 
from foreign powers. He was able to surmount the 
threats, especially that posed by Somalia's coalition, by 
abandoning Ethiopia's traditional allies (the western 
powers, particularly the US) and by forging closer ties 
with the socialist countries, notably the Soviet Union, 
which provided him with massive amounts of the required 
weapons.
Despite the Derg's pro-socialist rhetoric in the 
early years of its existence and despite the training of 
hundreds of cadres in the socialist countries during the 
same period, no real progress was made in the 
strengthening of relations with communist states until 
after the adoption of Scientific Socialism in April 1976 
and, particularly, until after Mengistu's seizure of 
power in February 1977. As noted previously, an 
important delegation, led by Captain Moges Wolde-Michael, 
was dispatched to Moscow in early July 1976 to explain 
the adoption by the Derg of Scientific Socialism and to
. . • IQseek economic and military assistance"1- . One of the 
spin-offs of this visit appears to have been a secret 
Ethio-Soviet arms deal in December 1976 in accordance 
with which some 130 tanks and armed personnel carriers 
were delivered in March and April 1977, i.e. after 
Mengistu's seizure of power. The weapons were
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immediately deployed to the northern fronts to be used 
mostly against EDU.20
Mengistu's portrayal as the most left-wing
politician of the Derg members (drawn by the adherents of
his coal'tion especially by AESM) had promoted his
stature not only among the supporters of the coalition
but also among the diplomats from the socialist
countries. This, coupled with his radical posturing on
all matters considered by the Derg and the moderate
position of those that fell by the wayside, appears to
have led the socialist countries to conclude that he was
their man. They were the first to congratulate him on
his coup against Teferi and his group on February 3,
1977; when national journalists arrived on the scene,
the Soviet ambassador was already there, leading them to
speculate later that he may well have been present at the
time of the shoot-out. From then on, there is no doubt
that diplomats from the socialist countries had direct
access to Mengistu's office and that they were helping
him adopt decisions on certain important international
tand other questions, unbeknown to the Deparment of 
Foreign Affairs.
In the meantime Ethiopia's relations with its 
traditional supplier of arms (the US) were deteriorating. 
Earlier, William Schaufle (Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs under President Ford's 
administration), had told Congress that the US should 
continue its support for Ethiopia at her time of 
difficulty, particularly because such a policy would 
contribute to the stability of that second most populous 
African state? because it would assist black African 
states in maintaining their territorial integrity? 
because it would save the US from criticism by its 
friends in Africa and elsewhere? and because the US 
should not be seen to be distancing itself from 
Ethiopia's brand of socialism.21 Further, in the summer 
of 1976, Ethiopia had received its last delivery of FSE's 
from the US. Despite these positive overtures, the
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Derg's anti-US rhetoric continued to be increasingly 
hostile? its human rights record was getting worse? and 
its measures against pro-west individuals steadily more 
violent. In the first four months of 1977, the relations 
between the two states rock-bottomed.
In January, Mr. Carter became the President of the 
US with his human rights offensive and his idea of 
cultivating friendly relations with Third World radical 
states. Apparently, within a few weeks of taking office, 
he was reading voluminous studies on the Horn of Africa 
in the hope of challenging the Soviet Union's initiative 
in the region and thus leaving his personal mark on the 
events of the area22. However, Mr. Carter was to preside 
over the worst period of US-Ethiopian relations.
On 26 February, Washington announced that Ethiopia,
along with Uruguay and Argentina, would receive reduced
aid from the US because of human-rights violations. On
the same day, T. Seelye (Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs) was explaining to Ethiopian
officials in Addis Ababa that no funds would be made
available for the supply of military equipment on a grant
basis after the end of the 1977 US fiscal year, and that
the US was willing to improve relations only if the
Ethiopian government respected the human rights of its
citizens and if it restrained public condemnation of the
US. Apparently, President Ford's budget proposal
prepared in his last days of office had made no provision
for grant military assistance to Ethiopia for the
1 . .following fiscal year. Soon after T. Seeye's visit the 
US Embassy notified the Ethiopian government that the US 
was ready to begin negotiations concerning the closure of 
its communications facilities in Kagnew, Eritrea, 
scheduled for September 30, 1977. The Kagnew 
installation had been rendered obsolete by advances in 
satellite technology and the US had begun phasing it out 
in 1971 so much so, that by 1974 the personnel there had 
been reduced from 2000 to a few dozen23.
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Mengistu's response was swift and dramatic. Between 
23 and 30 April, he ordered the closure of the Kagnew 
communications facilities, the US consulate in Asmara 
(Eritrea), the US Information Service offices, the US 
medical research centre (NANMRU), and expelled, with 48 
hours notice, three western journalists, and terminated 
the 1953 Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement between the 
two countries. If Mengistu had been unduly violent 
towards Ethiopian citizens and hostile in his rhetoric 
towards the US, the Carter administration had mistimed 
its public censure of Mengistu's government. Mengistu 
had just begun savouring the pomp and circumstance as a 
leader of a country rubbing shoulders with world 
statesmen; under the circumstances, it is more likely 
than not that the US act of depriving him of weapons at a 
time when his country most needed them would have been 
taken as a disapproval of his ascent to power.
Legally, the power to decide on international 
questions like the one under consideration was entrusted 
to the Congress, the Central Committee and the Standing 
Committee of the Derg24, the chairman's powers being 
limited to 'granting audience to foreign guests and 
diplomats' and to 'supervising the implementation of 
international agreements'25. As argued earlier, the 
first two of these Derg organs could not have been 
involved in the decision to downgrade relations with the 
US, as they had been dispersed after February 1977 and as 
they at any rate did not hold any meetings in March and 
April of that year. Further, for reasons already 
explained, the involvement of the Standing Committee 
could only have been limited to being informed, if at 
all, of a decision already adopted and acted upon.
In fact, according to the then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (Dawit Wolde-Giyorgis), Mengistu told the 
officials of that Ministry to leave the matter to him and 
personally decided to downgrade Ethio-American relations. 
No doubt, before making the decision, he would have 
consulted certain individuals like Birihanu Baye (head of
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the Derg's Foreign Affairs Department), Lij Michael Imiru 
(political adviser of the chapman) and whoever else he 
chose to confide in. Perhaps more important than these 
would have been the diplomat from the socialist countries 
(particularly the Soviet and Cuban ambassadors) who, 
after February, were conferring with Mengistu privately 
every other day and for hours at a stretch26. It is 
pretty unlikely that Mengistu would have risked offending 
the US without a promise or guarantee, during those 
encounters with the diplomats, of an alternative source 
of weapons. After having downgraded Ethio-American 
relations at the end of April, Mengistu went to Moscow in 
the early part of the next month and concluded agreements 
on friendly relations and on economic, social and 
cultural cooperation, in addition to securing an arms 
pledge estimated to have been worth between 350 and 450 
million dollars27.
The final shift of alliances was determined by the 
conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. The bone of 
contention between chairman Mengistu and President Si*.d 
Bare of Somalia was the territory of the Ogaden, which 
the latter claimed on the basis that it was inhabited by 
people ethnically the same as those in the Republic of 
Somalia, and which the former claimed on the basis that 
the territory had been under Ethiopian control since the 
turn of the 20th century. On 14 and 15 April, 1977, Fidel 
Castro went to Addis Ababa and discussed with Mengistu 
the possibility of creating a confederation made up of 
Ethiopia, the Republics of Somalia and South Yemen, in 
the hope of thwarting the impending crisis over the 
question of the Ogaden. In subsequent meetings held 
between Mengistu and Bare in Aden (South Yemen) and 
between officials of the two countries in Moscow, East 
Berlin and Havana, Ethiopia is reported to have expressed 
interest in the proposal while Somalia rejected it out of 
hand. In July, Moscow came up with an alternative 
proposal; an Ethiopian delegation in Moscow was asked to 
consider ceding the territory of the Ogaden to the
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Republic of Somalia since the unification of all Somali 
people was a fundamental tenet of the state of the Somali 
Republic28. Mengistu rejected the proposal on the ground 
that the dispute between the two countries related to 
border and not territorial questions. He was as 
intransigent on the alternative suggestion as Bare on the
• ?  Qproposal of confederation**
In the middle of May (ie immediately after 
Mengistu's visit to the Soviet Union), Bare denounced 
Moscow's involvement in Ethiopia and warned that, if it 
was not stopped, relations between the two countries 
would suffer. Subsequently, his ambition to acquire the 
territory of the Ogaden was fuelled by Ethiopia's 
internal divisions and weakness and by his conviction 
that the conservative states of the Middle East and the 
West would provide him with the weapons he would require 
to wage war, in exchange for his shift of alliance from 
the East to the West. US, British and French promises 
made in mid-July to provide him with defensive weapons 
were withdrawn soon afterwards, apparently when it was 
realised that he had sent his regular forces to fight in 
Ethiopia30. This left Bare to the generosity of his 
benefactors in the Middle east, who in any case were not 
allowed by the US to transfer weapons to him, and to the 
wrath of the socialist countries and of Ethiopia.
While the full-scale war that broke out between the 
two countries was claimed by Ethiopia to have been 
launched on July 23, Somalia insisted that it was being 
fought between Ethiopian forces, on the one hand, and the 
forces of the Western Somalia Liberation Front and the 
Somali Abdo, on the other. The fact was, nonetheless, 
that within two months the regular forces of the Republic 
of Somalia had penetrated some 700 kilometres deep into 
Ethiopian territory and were on the point of capturing 
the provincial capital of Harar and the neighbouring 
air-force base town of Dire-Dawa. The Ethiopian army was 
no match for that of Somalia: it was divided between
supporters of one political group or another? some of
- 301 -
its units were refusing to fight on the ideological 
grounds that two oppressed peoples should not wage war on 
each other? it was badly armed; and it was extremely 
stretched, fighting as it was on many fronts. The 
humiliation led to an upsurge of Ethiopian nationalism 
among citizens especially those not committed to the 
political groups. Mengistu, who since May had been 
raising a militia hundreds of thousands strong and 
mobilizing the population into raising money, preparing 
food and providing logistical support to the army and 
militia at the war front, rose to the occasion and, with 
the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church on his side, started 
addressing rallies and championing the cause of 
nationalism under highly emotive banners like 'call of 
the motherland' and 'everything to the war front'31 By 
contrast, sections of the civilian left were, at the 
time, prevaricating about the impropriety or otherwise of 
two oppressed peoples fighting one another; they 
insisted that the war was not between the masses of the 
two states but between their leaders.
The war made the arms race between Mengistu and Bare 
much fiercer than ever before. Feeling betrayed by the 
West because of its withdrawal of the promised military 
assistance, Bare went to Moscow in July to try to patch 
up relations; however, he was cold-shouldered and 
returned disappointed? from then on, his rhetoric became 
increasingly hostile towards Moscow. Similarly, Mengistu 
made a timid effort to make it up to the US? in the 
middle of September, he called in the US Charge d'Affairs 
and asked for spare parts for the F5E's delivered a year 
earlier and for weapons? needless to say, the US 
response was negative. Mengistu's positive overtures to 
the US were the result of his disappointment with the 
Soviet Union's procrastinations regarding the delivery of 
weapons promised during his May visit to Moscow. On 
September 18, he gave a press conference in which he 
condemned the socialist countries for continuing to arm
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Somalia which he said was tantamount to complicity with 
'the reactionary regime of Bare'.
Unable to effect a cease-fire either through direct 
mediation or indirectly through other socialist 
countries, African states and the OAU, and being on the 
verge of losing the friendship of both Ethiopia and 
Somalia, the Soviet Union finally made its choice. It 
started delivering weapons to Ethiopia as of the end of 
September? and on October 19 the Soviet ambassador to 
Ethiopia issued a statement announcing the formal 
cessation of arms deliveries to Somalia. This was the 
final straw? a wave of outrage swept across Somalia? on 
November 13, Bare did to the Soviet Union and Cuba what 
Mengistu had done to the US during the previous April, 
only in a more dramatic and humiliating fashion. He 
severved diplomatic relations with both countries, 
expelled all their military personnel, and closed down 
Soviet naval and airplane facilities in Somalia. Western 
journalists were invited to witness the unruly and 
humiliating manner in which the expulsions were carried 
out32.
These developments finally opened the way for closer 
relations between Ethiopia and the socialist countries. 
Starting from the middle of December, the Soviet arsenal 
was wide open and massive quantities of weapons began to 
be air-lifted to Ethiopia. Also, thousands of Cuban and 
hundreds of South Yemeni troops began to arrive, no doubt 
because they were more familiar with Soviet weapons and 
also because they were better trained than their 
Ethiopian counterparts. Senior Soviet officers who had 
been expelled from the Republic of Somalia planned the 
counter-offensive which was finally launched in the 
middle of February 1978. Within weeks, the invading 
troops were in disarray? those who survived the joint 
onslaught of the Ethiopian army and of the Ethiopian 
superior air-force, Cuban and South Yemeni troops, fled 
across the arid region of the Ogaden back to Somalia. On 
March 19, Bare announced that his troops had withdrawn
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from Ethiopia. The West's preoccupation as of then 
became the question of whether the victorious forces 
would invade Somalia and keep it under the orbit of 
Soviet influence.
Bare's military adventures cost him the friendship 
of the socialist countries (which had been carefully 
nurtured since he took power in 1969) without necessarily 
winning him the friendship of the West and without 
securing the long-sought -after territory of the Ogaden. 
To Mengistu, on the other had, it created an occasion to 
win the friendship of the socialist countries, to rub 
shoulders with world statesmen like Castro, Honker and 
Breshnev, and to be seen as the man who delivered his 
country from the humiliation of external aggression. No 
doubt, all this amounted to a tremendous boost to his 
prestige and to his claim to power; in addition it gave 
him access to massive resources of coercion with which he 
was to impose his will upon his own country.
In justification of Mengistu's executions of fellow 
Derg members and his seizure of power, Raul Valdes Vivo 
(the then head of the Foreign Relations Department of the 
Cuban Communist Party Central Committee) asserted, in a 
book he wrote at the time, that there was documentary 
evidence to show that Teferi Bante was working with the 
CIA to overthrow the Derg and that Aman was 
counter-revolutionary and that they were both rightly 
eliminated33. He goes on to add that Mengistu sided with 
the oppressed people of Ethiopia because he had suffered 
racism in the US when he was there for training and 
because he knew of the Vietnam revolution, the black 
movement, and of the student movement34. Judging by 
Mengistu's subsequent behaviour, it appears that all this 
'eulogy' coupled with the welcoming embrace he received 
from the socialist countries had gone to his head by 
1978. However, it was not so much his prior commitment 
to any ideology, as suggested by ValdeS Vivo, that 
cemented the relations between Ethiopia and the socialist 
countries. It was rather, his readiness to echo the
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rhetoric of the civilian left and act on it for reasons 
of personal aggrandisement, the willingness of the 
socialist countries to embrace him despite his 
comparatively inferior academic and professional 
credentials, Ethiopia's strategic significance in the 
region, the size of its population (the second biggest in 
black Africa), and the presence in Addis Ababa of the 
headquarters of a number of international organisations.
Conclusion
The Ethiopian politics of the first four years after 
1974 were characterised by an excessive use of force and 
violence. Almost the first to fall prey to it were the 
senior military officers of the ancien regime. According 
to Rene Lefort, for example, out of the sixty or so 
generals of Haile Selassie's government, only five 
remained on the active list quite early on. Also by 1978 
out of the first graduates from the Harar Military 
Academy ( who were junior officers) only three remained 
on the active list35; by all accounts, graduates of the 
academically inferior Holeta Military Academy (which 
Mengistu attended ) appear to have survived the violence 
of the time better. The rest were purged, exiled or 
deliberately placed at the war front to be used as fodder 
to enemy fire-power. Similarly victimised were the high 
dignitaries of the ancien regime and the country-gentry 
especially those who resisted the Derg's nationalisation 
of rural land and those who put up resistance to Derg 
rule on account of their loyalty to Haile Selassie's 
govenment or its local officials.
Nevertheless, the use of force and violence was not 
limited to the above whom the civilian left would have 
referred to as 'the reactionary classes' but also raised 
its ugly head with much more gruesome morbidity against 
the advocates of change and violence themselves. For 
about a year and a half, starting from September 1976, 
adherents of EPRP were made victims of mass arrests, 
tortures and executions primarily in the urban centres of
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the country. The number of those killed on both sides is 
estimated to be as many as thirty-two thousand36. Also, 
as will be explained in the following chapter, adherents 
of the other leftist organisations which had rallied 
behind Mengistu in his struggle against the other 
prominent members of the Derg and against EPRP were 
similarly detained, tortured and mercilessly eliminated 
between the summers of 1977 and 1979.
Needless to say, force and violence are 
doubled-edged weapons? in fact, the number of those 
killed while fighting to prop up the Derg and to defend 
the integrity of the country far exceeds the number lost 
by the opposition especially when those who fell while 
fighting the secessionist insurgents is taken into 
consideration. According to one reliable estimate, the 
Ethiopian army lost 90,000 soldiers between 1975 and 1983 
on the Eritrean front alone. The number of Eritrean 
insurgents lost during the same period is estimated to be 
900037.
Obviously, the maintenance of the Derg's power was 
predicated on the use of force and violence more than 
anything else. Since its inception, its radicalism in 
this as well as other questions was fuelled by some among 
it (notably Mengistu) whose initial courtship with 
Marxism-Leninism and with the violence it endorses was 
propelled by the ambition to be seen as having unravelled 
the mysteries of a communist revolution and by the desire 
to out-shine fellow Derg members. The civilian left had 
made the communist revolution the only popular course of 
action that the country could pursue. Some writers have 
in fact tended to go further than this and hold that 
Mengistu was pesonally responsible for all the major 
decisions and excesses of the government, in that he 
executed them behind the back of the Derg.38 This fails 
to give due regard to the demand for the measures from 
sections of the civilian left.
However, the suggestion that Mengistu had always 
been at the centre of the Derg's major decisions is not
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without its justifications. He became the first 
vice-chaiman of the Derg from its inception probably 
because of his widely acknowledged qualities as a leader. 
By all accounts, he was in the early stages humility 
incarnate in private dealings and committee meetings 
during which he preferred to err on the side of listening 
rather than expressing his views? in assemblies, he was 
a compelling demagogue who roused emotion by appealing to 
nationalist-populist sentiments and grand ideals? he was 
untrusting, quick to avenge himself and to reward 
loyalty? and he had a great feel for publicity.
No less important to his prominence in the Derg was 
his popularity with NCO's and privates. He himself 
started his military career as a boy-scout in the army 
and from then on he inched his way up the ladder to 
become a private soldier when he became of age, an NCO, a 
second lieutenant in 1959 and a major by 1974. Whatever 
he may have lacked by way of academic education - the 
Holeta Military Academy which he attended offered no 
academic subjects whatever - he appears to have more than 
compensated for by his touch for the sentiments and 
aspirations of NCO's and soldiers. It was people like 
Sergeant Legese Asfaw (a Derg member from the Third 
Division like Mengistu himself) who mobilised such 
low-ranking fellow-Derg members and had Mengistu elected 
to the first vice-chairmanship of that body in June 1974. 
Further, the active sections of the NCO's and privates in 
the army at large, with whom Mengistu was popular, 
constituted his most important power base in the country? 
and from early on, they held the army firmly behind him 
and provided him with an access to the main resource of 
coercion. There were others in the Derg who had a 
similar career to that of Mengistu? however, they did 
not necessarily have Mengistu's other qualities such as 
those mentioned in the previous paragraph.
As the Derg's first vice-chaiman, he was head of 
certain key positions which made him tower over the other 
members. He was head of the Derg's secretariat and as
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such had influence on, and easy access to, information 
about the activities of the Derg and the implementation 
of its decisions. Also, he was head of over-all 
political matters and as such was at the centre of all 
political policy-making decisions of the Derg. As noted 
earlier, it was this position that enabled him to exploit 
the differences among the civilian left and bring one 
wing of it under the orbit of his influence.
More relevant was the fact that Mengistu was head of 
over-all security matters. This meant that in the early 
months of the Derg's existence, he chaired what was 
called the Planning and Operations Subcommittee of the 
Derg which, with the help of the unit committees 
discussed earlier, was responsible for arresting the
dignitaries of the ancien regime which took place in the
O Q  , ,
summer of 1974 . In the subsequent reorganisations of
the Derg, the Planning and Operations Subcommittee 
appears to have been rechristened as the 'Derg's Security 
Subcommittee' and made in charge of a highly trained core 
of soldiers, NCO's and officers which took over the 
functions of the old Body Guard of the king after it was
disbanded towards the end of 1974. It is difficult to
determine the size of the force that comes under the 
Derg's Security Subcommittee; however, the fact that the 
Body Guard was one of the four divisions of the Ethiopian 
army and the fact that after a few years of the Derg's 
existence the force under the Derg's Security 
Subcommittee took charge of the security of the capital 
city and most of the Shoan Province suggests that it was 
sizable. No doubt, like the other subcommittees, the 
Derg's Security Subcommittee was replaced by one-man 
management.
Lt. Col. Daniel Asfaw, a contemporary of Mengistu's 
at the Holeta Military Academy, was a member of the 
Planning and Operations Subcommittee and later became 
head of the Derg's Security Department until February 3 
1977 when he was gunned down in the palace coup, after 
which he was replaced by Major Getachew Shibeshi. It
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appears that Mengistu, in collusion with Daniel Asfaw, 
had been using the force under the Derg's Security 
Department as a private army and harassing and executing 
those who threatened his position; it was Daniel 
Asfaw his subordinates who arrested and executed Aman, 
Sisay, Teferi and their associates and the sixty 
officials of the ancien regime. Like the King's Body 
Guard, the Derg's Security Department was in charge of 
the security of the palace? unlike it, however, it was in 
addition the breeding ground for assassination squads 
that haunted the cities up and down the country before 
and after Mengistu's ascent to absolutist power in 
February 1977.
It was these positions (head of the secretariat, 
overall head of political affairs and overall head of the 
security subcommittee of the Derg) that Mengistu lost as 
a result of Teferi's coup against him in December 1976, 
and it was these powers that he regained as of February 
1977, and more. As of then, he became, inter alia, 
chairman of the Derg, commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces, chairman of the Defence and Security Council, 
defender of the peace and order of the broad masses and 
the integrity of the country, and responsible for taking 
measures against anti-people and counter-revolutionary 
elements. These positions brought the resources of state 
and people's coercion under his control. As indicated in 
the last section, the use of force and violence showed a 
dramatic increase after Mengistu's ascent to absolutism; 
it must be concluded, therefore, that his 'successful' 
political career was dependent on his readiness to resort 
to the use of force and violence rather than on his other 
merits of leadership.
From the perspective of the historical comparative, 
the use of force and violence by a dicator appears to be 
the natural progression from the anarchy that follows a 
revolutionary uprising. From a different perspective, 
the reliance on the use of force and violence implies the 
absence of legitimacy on the part of the government.
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Whatever the merits of the contending hypotheses, they 
both go to explain why Mengistu had to totalitarianise 
and militarise the whole of society. He had organised 
the civilian population into mass organisations, armed 
them, and, as noted in the last section, used them as 
instruments to subdue the opposition. These, coupled 
with the building up of the security forces (including 
the biggest army in black Africa, the newly created 
people's militia, the police force and a greatly expanded 
separate department of intelligence), transformed the 
country into one mass force of coercion. Haile Selassie 
before him managed to rule Ethiopia and hold it together 
with a minimum of force and violence.
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CHAPTER 8
THE FORMATION OF THE WORKER'S PARTY OF ETHIOPIA
Ethiopia is one of the few African countries that 
survived without being colonized by the Western powers. 
This fact, more than any other, perhaps kept her 
oblivious of Western political processes, notably the 
process concerned with political parties. An exception 
to this was Eritrea, which after having been under 
Italian colonial administration for about fifty years, 
came under British administration from 1941 to 1952 as an 
enemy occupied territory. In the 1940's a number of 
political organisations sprang up around the question of 
the disposal of the territory. It is arguable whether 
those political organisations were "parties”, since they 
did not have a programme on questions other than the 
disposal of Eritrea? at any rate, with the federation of 
Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952 by a decision of the UN 
General Assembly, the political organisations withered 
and died.
The last constitution of Haile Salassie's 
government, which was issued in 1955, provided that 
"every Ethiopian subject has the right to engage in any 
occupation and, to that end, to form or join associations 
in accordance with the law".1 This was the only 
provision of the constitution that could arguably be 
interpreted to allow the right to form political 
organisations. Nevertheless, it strongly implies that 
the formation of an association has to be related to 
occupation, and hence, excludes the formation of 
political organisations. In reality too, there was never 
any public demand to form political organisations, and 
the general assumption was that the legal right to do so 
did not exist.
Interestingly enough, Ethiopia had a bicameral 
parliament during Halie Salassie's time. The Chamber of
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Deputies (the lower house) was composed of elected 
members. A candidate to the Chamber of Deputies 
presented to his constituency not the programme of a 
party, but his own. Similarly, once he was elected, he 
voted on proposed legislations (initiated by the King, 
the Cabinet or a certain number of MP's) not along party 
lines but in accordance with his persuasion, his 
interests and those of his constituency.
As noted previously, the first attempt towards the 
formation of parties came with the establishment of 
political organisations in student circles abroad, 
starting from the early 1970's. Perhaps spurred by 
adherents of these organisations and similar other ones 
in the country, the activists of the early 1974 uprising 
demanded the right to form political parties for the 
first time. Even then there were some in the other 
sections of the urban population who argued against the 
idea because, according to them, the experience of Africa 
had shown that parties were a source of division along 
ethnic and other lines without necessarily achieving 
anything obvious.2 Nevertheless, in response to the 
dominant demand, Endalkachew's draft constitution 
provided that "all Ethiopians have the right to establish 
or be members of any association, including political 
parties, provided that its religious, racial or any other 
purposes are not detrimental to the integrity of the 
nation".3
With its seizure of power in September 1974, the 
Derg abandoned Endalkachew's Draft Constitution and, with 
it, the provision which would have served as the basis 
for the development of a multi-party system. In December 
of the same year, the Derg adopted its first and major 
economic and political programme (Ethiopian Socialism) in 
which it was argued that if the desired objective is to 
bring about fundamental economic and political changes 
(and not to give freedom to individuals to go their own 
way), it was necessary to have "... a national party 
which would bring together all progressive forces into a
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united front and which is capable of attracting and 
accommodating the entire people of the country".4
In spite of the Derg's advocacy of a single mass 
party system, a number of predominantly leftist political 
organisations surfaced in the course of 1975 and 1976.
The Derg fell under the sway of these leftist 
organisations and again revised its policy towards 
formation of parties. In April 1976, it adopted the 
National Democratic Revolutionary Programme of Ethiopia 
(NDRPE), which envisaged the establishment of a Workers' 
Party through the formation of a joint front among the 
progressive political organisations (organisations which 
were anti-feudal, anti-imperialist and 
anti-bureaucratic-capitalist) as well as among the 
democratic organisations which were willing to work under 
the umbrella of the joint front. The question of whether 
the organisations that would join the front would lose or 
retain their identity after the formation of the party is 
not addressed; subject to this proviso, the programme 
could be said to endorse a multi-party system to be 
developed among the "exploited" and "progressive" 
classes.
The policy of the NDRP differed from that of 
Ethiopian Socialism in two respects. First, according to 
Ethiopian Socialism, all Ethiopians had the right to 
organize and become members of a party, whereas according 
to the NDRP only progressives could do so. Second, the 
former envisaged the establishment of a single party 
system whereas the latter envisaged the formation of a 
number of parties, though it appears that, at the end of 
the day, one party (the Workers' Party) was presumably 
expected to emerge. Essentially, the difference was 
between a mass party and a class party.
This chapter is concerned with an explanation of the 
processes of the establishment of a party in Ethiopia - 
processes that culminated in the establishment of the 
"Workers' Party of Ethiopia" in 1984. It came about not 
through the formation of progressive and democratic
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organisations and their merger (as envisaged by the 
NDRP), but as the result of the recruitment to membership 
of individuals that Mengistu considered worthy on account 
of their loyalty to him. Since only one party was 
allowed, and since the highly personalized process of 
forming it denied any role to the pre-existing political 
organisations, the latter were eliminated.
(A) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JOINT FRONT OF THE
ETHIOPIAN MARXIST-LENINIST ORGANISATIONS
It is to be presumed that, in the wake of Mengistu's 
successful coup on February 3, 1977, his coalition would 
march forward with renewed vigour. On February 26, 
partisans of his coalition (AESM, the Ethiopian Oppressed 
Peoples' Revolutionary Struggle, The Workers' League, the 
Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Organization, 
and Revolutionary Flame) issued a joint communique 
announcing the establishment of a Joint Front of 
Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Organizations among 
themselves. According to the communique, the main 
function of the Joint Front was to provide its member 
organisations with a platform on which they would 
struggle jointly in order to bring about the formation of 
the Workers' Party of Ethiopia.5
In March, the Joint Front came up with a "guide 
line” in which the member organisations declared that 
they had agreed on the main questions concerning the 
revolution? on resolving outstanding questions on the 
platform of the Joint Front? and on a strategy to bring 
together progressives to struggle jointly. In the 
following month, the Front adopted ”a joint programme of 
action” in which the members assessed the political and 
security situation in the country? characterized the 
exploiting classes and the political organisations which 
did not join them as enemies of the revolution? and 
called upon the people to support the Joint Front in its 
struggle against the enemies that were attacking the 
country on three fronts. In May, the Front adopted its
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programme or constitution which was similar to the 
programmes of its members discussed earlier. Finally, it 
launched its paper called "Voice of Unity" in August, 
1977.6
The Joint Front was a separate organization from its 
members. The highest organ within it was the Central 
Committee made up of three representatives from each of
■ > 7 . .the member organisations.' Its functions included: 
making policies of the Organization; deciding on the 
nature of relations between the Front and other 
organisations; giving directives to its subordinate 
committees; attempting to create the situation in which 
the Front would be transformed into a merger; and 
admitting and dismissing members. The Central Committee 
was directed to hold fortnightly meetings in order to
, , Q ,
discharge its tasks. Also, the Central Committee had an 
Executive Committee which would oversee the 
implementation of its decisions; the Executive Committee 
was made up of a chairman, a secretary, a treasurer and 
other members of the Central Committee.10 Further, there 
were no less than nine joint-subcommittees in the areas 
of propaganda and agitation, the peoples' Army, peoples' 
organizational affairs, discipline, nationalities, 
foreign affairs, economy, education, and intelligence and 
defence. Finally, there were two additional committees 
intended to provide common services to the other 
committees; they were a Studies and Planning Committee 
and the Joint Front Activities Management Committee.11
Perhaps, the nature of the relationship between the 
Joint Front and the member organisations is worthy of 
note. On the one hand, the latter are authorized to keep 
their organizational independence from the Front; to 
adopt their own decisions; to agitate their positions 
among the people; to expand their individual 
organisations; and even to withdraw from the Front 
without posing danger to its existence.12 On the other 
hand, however, they are allowed to do these things only 
in accordance with the provisions of the Front's
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Constitution;13 they had to discharge the tasks of the 
Front; and they had to implement the decisions of the 
Front,14 This apparent contradiction between 
independence and subservience would be resolved if it is 
viewed from the perspective that the establishment of the 
Joint Front is one step in the process of forming the 
Workers' Party of Ethiopia through the gradual merger of 
the member organisations. In the words of the February 
joint communique of the Front: "after having examined
the history of the revolutionary struggle of many 
countries and the circumstances of Ethiopia, the five 
organisations have agreed that the most scientific and 
proven of the methods of forming a Workers' Party is 
through the bringing together of the forces of the 
different Marxist groups in order to conduct a true 
ideological struggle on tactical and strategic questions 
and to merge into one organization".15 From this 
perspective, the degree of subservience of the member 
organisations to the Joint Front is the measure of their 
merger and of the approach of the formation of the 
Party.
However, the merger of the Joint Front was for the 
indefinite future; in the meantime, it was directed to 
concentrate its attention on the implementation of the 
other objectives of the NDRPE other than the formation of 
the Party. These included: strengthening relations with
other Marxist groups; helping to establish and coordinate 
nationalities' movements, mass organisations and other 
anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, and anti-bureaucratic 
political organisations, and bring them within the orbit 
of a broad joint front;16 eliminating the internal 
enemies (EPRP, EDU and the Eritrean secessionists); 
circulating Marxist-Leninist literature among the people; 
training cadres at home and abroad and deploying them 
among the people; fighting against narrow nationalism and 
chauvinism; and struggling for the recognition of 
democratic rights for the oppressed people, for the 
politicization, organization and arming of the masses,
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for the politicization of the army and militia and for 
the recognition of the culture of the various 
nationalities.17
From this point of view, the differences, if any, 
between the Joint Front and POMOA, which was retained 
after the establishment of the former, are not clear.
They were similar in that both were managed by the 
leaders of the member organisations of Mengistu's 
coalition in that their mandates (the promotion of the 
objectives of the NDRPE as indicated in the previous 
paragraph) overlapped. On the other hand, they were 
different in that the Joint Front was, theoretically at 
least, a voluntary association of organisations which 
depended for its income on the contribution of its 
members? whereas POMOA, as indicated previously, was a 
fully-fledged government agency with a budget from the 
treasury. Perhaps a more important difference between 
the two was one of emphasis: the Joint Front was
primarily concerned with the formation of the Party? 
whereas POMOA was primarily concerned with the 
politicisation and organization of the masses of the 
people.
Be that as it may, the establishment of the Joint 
Front of the Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Organisations did 
not lead to the formation of the Workers' Party of 
Ethiopia through the merger of its members, nor in any 
other way. On the contrary, each one of them dropped out 
of the Front one by one in the subsequent two and a half 
years? the departure from the Front of each one of them 
was then followed by their liquidation? this finally 
opened the way for Mengistu to reconstruct the Party 
personally all over again. As will be argued in the 
following sections, such a state of affairs was brought 
about by the basic contradiction which revolved around 
the question of power and which beset the Joint Front 
almost from its inception.
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(B) THE LIQUIDATION OF AESM AND EOPRS; "THE UNITY OF THE
JOINT FRONT OF THE ETHIOPIAN MARXIST - LENINIST
ORGANISATIONS SHALL FLOURISH"
THE LIQUIDATION OF AESM
In the wake of his successful coup on February 3, 
1977, Mengistu occupied himself with strengthening the 
Army and raising a militia to defend the country and his 
government from internal and external threats, redefining 
Ethiopia's foreign policy and her alliances, negotiating 
economic and military aid from the socialist countries, 
and generally manning the government single handedly. As 
explained in the previous chapter, the few people he 
consulted in these matters were drawn from the 
bureaucracy including the Derg and the diplomatic 
community of the socialist countries. This trend left 
the political organisations, which were partisans of 
Mengistu's coalition, out in the cold. Whereas before 
February they had a role to play in government 
activities, like drumming up support among their 
followers for Mengistu's faction in the Derg, they were, 
after February, limited to campaigning against EDU and 
EPRP and engaging the latter in an assassination match. 
This seemed to be the role that Mengistu had intended for 
them? the dominant slogan of the time (let the unity of 
the Joint Front flourish) meant uniting against the 
opposition as well as strengthening the Front.
In mid May, the most dominant of the members of the 
Joint Front (AESM) announced that it had held a national 
congress about that time and examined the political 
developments obtaining and had adopted its position on 
them. Judging by the contents of the report, the concern 
of AESM was no longer Epfcp as had been the case 
previously, but the government itself. The report 
declared that AESM's relations with the Derg (Mengistu) 
would continue to be based on the principle of "critical 
support". Further, the report welcomed the support of
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the socialist countries but warned that foreign aid must 
not be allowed to compromise the honour and independence 
of Ethiopia and her resolve to be self-reliant and that 
believing that it is possible to make a success of the 
revolution on the strength of foreign aid was not only 
deceiving oneself but also losing national independence. 
Even more alarming was the charge of the report that 
anti-revolutionary bureaucrats were eliminating AESM 
members along with those of the EPRP? and that AESM was 
resolved to struggle against the bureaucracy (a term used 
to encompass the functionaries of the state apparatus, 
including Derg members). °
The national congress of AESM did not limit itself 
to pointing out its dissatisfactions with the unfolding 
developments but also adopted strategies intended to 
improve its posture. The same report stated that AESM 
was resolved to struggle for the formation of a 
Marxist-Leninist party through the merger of the Joint 
Front members, for the formation of a Peoples' 
Revolutionary vanguard among mass organizations and for 
the establishment of a Peoples' Revolutionary Army.
AESM, it continued, would struggle for the bringing of 
the vanguard of the mass organizations and the Peoples' 
Army under the leadership of the Joint Front and/or the 
Party. Furthermore, the report pointed out that AESM was 
to intensify its struggle for the recognition of 
democratic rights not under the slogan of "democratic 
rights to the oppressed quickly", as before, but under 
"democratic rights to the oppressed now". It argued that 
the declaration of democratic rights had been promised by 
the NDRPE as a matter of urgency? that Teferi's group, 
which had been obstructing its declaration, had been 
removed? and that the declaration of rights was important 
for the following reasons: to enable the member
organizations of the Joint Front to mobilize the people? 
to struggle for the politicization, organization, and 
arming of the masses of the people? to discuss the 
differences among the members of the Front publicly
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rather than basing their relations on rumour, suspicion, 
backbiting, and defamation as had been the case until 
then.19
The main thrust of AESM's strategy was to place 
itself as the dominant group within the Party to be 
established and to bring state power under its control.
It had already built itself a substantial following in 
the mass organizations, particularly in the urban 
dwellers' associations, and was easily the most prominent 
organization of the members of the Joint Front. For 
example, so many pro-AESM slogans such as "AESM is our 
Party" and "AESM has armed us" were displayed at the 1977 
May Day rallies that AESM was at pains to deny their 
validity in case they induced anger and jealousy on the 
part of the government and the other members of the Joint 
Front.20 If, in addition to this, democratic rights were 
granted, as urged by AESM, and it was as a result able 
to agitate among the people freely, AESM would be in a 
position to swell its ranks and would accordingly have a 
greater representation in the party to be. According to 
its other strategy, the mass organizations and the Army 
were to come under the leadership of the party - a party 
which would be dominated by AESM and which would give 
Mengistu and his organization (Revolutionary Flame), as 
well as the other members of the Front, a subservient 
position within it.
In spite of its bold posturing, AESM was, as of May, 
very much on the defensive. In June, it charged that 
malicious slanders were being circulated against it and 
expressed concern that, once such slanders were 
popularized, the stigma they would leave in the minds of 
the people would be difficult to remove, as had happened 
in the case of the erroneous characterization of EPRP as 
an "anarchist" and "Trotskyite" organization.21 In July, 
it came up with no less than ten slanders, such as that 
the AESM was the organization of feudal lords, of 
arrogance, of narrow nationalists, and of the Orromos,
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and attributed them to bureaucrats who sought to effect a 
feud between it and the Derg.22
In effect, AESM's protestations were appeals to 
Mengistu to continue to collaborate with it? however, its 
appeals were obviously falling on deaf ears. It has 
already been noted that Proclamation 108 of December,
1976, had stripped Mengistu's coalition of any role in 
political activities by transferring the control of POMOA 
from the Supreme Organizing Committee (chaired by 
Mengistu) to various organs of the Derg, particularly the 
Standing Committee. The control of POMOA by the Standing 
Committee was retained by Proclamation 110 of February,
1977, which was issued in order to amend the December 
Proclamation. On July 14, two further Proclamations were 
enacted to amend the Proclamation that had been issued to 
establish POMOA: the first reaffirmed the continued 
administration of POMOA by the Standing Committee,23 and 
the second brought the Yekatit 66 Political School, which 
had been run by POMOA till then, under the same Committee 
of the Derg.24 Thus, at a time when AESM was struggling 
to dominate the Joint Front and the party to be 
established and to bring the mass organizations and the 
Army under the Front/party, Mengistu was divesting the 
Joint Front of any role in the running of POMOA and the 
Political School and, therefore, of any role in the 
agitation to politicize, organize and arm the masses of 
the people.
If AESM had any doubts that its troubles were caused 
only by reactionary bureaucrats, it was clear to it by 
now that, reactionary or not, Mengistu was not on its 
side either. On July 28, it announced that it had 
decided to withdraw some of its members from the official 
forums and had placed them underground for a number of 
reasons including the following: Marxist-Leninist
organizations must implement the right of 
self-determination of nationalities immediately, and not 
recognize it only in principle, as the Joint Front had 
done;25 democratic rights were not recognized; instead of
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dealing with material issues, the Joint Front was bogged 
down with defaming AESM and with drawing up programmes 
that would never be implemented? AESM's proposals to the 
Derg and to the Joint Front had not been acted upon 
simply because they had emanated from that organization? 
the Derg's failure to arm the broad masses in the east 
had opened the way for the attack on the revolution and 
the country by reactionary classes and the Republic of 
Somalia? since March, the arming of urban dwellers' 
associations had slackened exposing AESM supporters to 
further assassinations? the feudo-bourgeois bureaucracy 
on which the Derg had been relying on for advice, was
* • * P fieliminating AESM leaders, especially in the provinces. ° 
In essence, the thrust of AESM's charges was that 
counter-revolution had set in and that Mengistu was a 
party to it.
It appears that AESM was fully aware of the risks 
involved in deciding to go underground. At the time, it 
called upon the Derg and especially the left-wing within 
it (Mengistu) not to take hasty and emotional measures 
against AESM's members and supporters because of the 
decision to go underground and pointed out that, 
otherwise, what happened to the Communists of the Sudan 
and Chile would repeat itself in Ethiopia.27 The fact 
that AESM went underground in spite of its knowledge of 
the risks involved in so doing lends support to the 
probability that the organization was in a desperate 
situation and to the sincerity of its allegations that 
malicious slanders were being circulated against it and 
that its members were being eliminated.
Be that as it may, soon after AESM's "fleeing" (as 
the official version would have it), a government order 
was apparently issued to its agents of coercion not to 
arrest but to take "revolutionary measures" against the 
organization's leaders and members on sight. A November 
19 circular written in the name of the Derg to the 
diplomatic community of the socialist countries put the 
same, thus: "... workers and peasants hunted down and
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rounded up those who fled the revolutionary camp and 
handed them over to the government.1'28
Within months of AESM's "fleeing the revolutionary 
camp", hundreds of "its leaders and members" were 
executed in their houses and offices or on the streets 
and in woods in the vicinity of towns as they were trying 
"to go underground" and others were arrested and 
tortured. With the declaration of the second round of 
"red terror" in November, ostensibly directed against 
EPRP, and the resulting intensification of the street 
gun-fights, the divisions along which the "civil war" was 
fought became enormously distorted; there is no doubt, 
however, that AESM members were also the victims of the 
second round of the terror, if not its intended targets. 
The ideological mentor of Mengistu and leader of AESM 
(Haile Fida) was arrested with several of his close 
associates some 40 kilometres to the north of Addis 
Ababa, tortured and summarily executed while in prison 
some two years later, i.e. after the whole thing had 
burnt out. Despite AESM's insistence throughout its 
political career that it was an underground organization, 
its liquidation was an easy matter since its leaders and 
members were well known to the government; it had lost 
its clandestinity when it adopted what it called "the 
principle of critical support" in February, 1975, and 
started working closely with the Derg.
The circular to the diplomatic community of the 
socialist countries, which was issued along with the 
declaration of the 2nd round of the red terror, denied 
the validity of AESM's accusations against the government 
and counter-charged that AESM was itself an arrogant, 
opportunistic, and pseudo-progressive-petit-bourgeois 
organization. More serious charges made by the circular 
included: AESM had openly opposed Ethiopia's closer
relations with the socialist country, especially with 
Cuba and the Soviet Union; it had attempted to disband 
the militia which was being trained to fight against 
Somalia's aggression; it had supported Somalia's naked
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aggression by arguing that it was a war of liberation; 
and it had committed the most cowardly and inexcusable 
crime against the revolution by abandoning the 
revolutionary camp at a time when the countries was 
encircled by enemies. * As AESM predicted, some of the 
charges against it, e.g. that AESM was arrogant and 
Orromo-centric and had wrongly timed going underground, 
have since been widely believed by the public though the 
surviving members of the organization still vehemently 
deny the truth of the charges.
Obviously, AESM's withdrawal of its members from the
official forums and going underground meant abandoning
the Joint Front of the Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist
Organizations as well as other legal platforms. The
Joint Front acknowledged this fact in April 1978 by
claiming to have dismissed the organization from
membership as of that month. It justified its action on
similar accusations as those made by the government 
.  ^nagainst AESM. u Apparently, the reason for delay of the 
Front was prompted by the fear of the government that 
publicity of the rupture might provoke AESM's supporters 
into an insurrectionary uprising.
One of the points emphasized by the April meeting of 
the Joint Front was the question of democratic rights.
It argued that AESM's slogan of "democratic rights to the 
oppressed without limitation now" was contrary to the 
Marxist principle that real rights could only be 
guaranteed after power had passed from the exploiting 
classes to the broad masses; that such power could pass 
to the broad masses only after the Marxist-Leninist party 
was established; and that AESM's slogan must, therefore, 
be replaced by "democratic rights to the oppressed 
through struggle."31 The so-called AESM slogan, which 
was being echoed throughout the country by members of the 
Joint Front and Mengistu himself, was thus dropped as of 
then. Whatever the merit of the theoretical argument 
made in support of the new slogan, the decision was a 
very important one. The term "democratic rights" was
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wide enough to embrace individual rights like freedom of 
speech and conscience as well as group rights like the 
right to organise associations and parties and the right 
to self-determination of cultural units. These rights 
were at the centre of the 1974 popular uprising and of 
the demands of EPRP and AESM from then; as such, it would 
seem appropriate that the Derg should have met them in 
some positive manner. However, the Joint Front's 
allegedly Marxian argument for the rejection of 
democratic rights provided a rhetorical basis for the 
Derg's pre-existing policy on those rights and for the 
removal of the question from its agenda indefinitely.
THE LIQUIDATION OF THE ETHIOPIAN OPPRESSED
PEOPLES' REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE
The troubles of the Ethiopian Oppressed Peoples' 
Revolutionary Struggle with the other members of the 
Joint Front and the government appear to have begun at 
the same time as those of AESM. Both organizations 
espoused similar positions on the questions of the time 
as pointed out in the last section; it is not surprising, 
therefore, that, after AESM's demise, the Ethiopian 
Oppressed Peoples' Revolutionary Struggle resisted 
pressure from the other members of the Front and the 
government to condemn AESM as a "right roader". Also 
important was the refusal of the Ethiopian Oppressed 
Peoples' Revolutionary Struggle to encourage the second 
round of red terror which was declared in November, 1977, 
and which was probably directed against not only the EPRP 
but also AESM. Quite apart from refusing to endorse the 
red terror in the meetings of the Joint Front, it went 
further and soon afterwards issued a lengthy critique 
agreeing with many of the points made by AESM earlier, 
condemning the way the red terror was conducted and 
demanding that those who had eliminated their own enemies 
or made personal gains by taking advantage of their 
powers under the red terror be brought to justice.
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Having officially confronted the Joint Front and the 
government thus, the leaders of the Ethiopian Oppressed 
Peoples' Revolutionary Struggle began disappearing from 
the legal forums like the Joint Front as of January,
1978. In June, the Joint Front acknowledged what was in 
effect the withdrawal of the organization from the Front 
by claiming to have suspended it until such a time as it 
had met the Front's criteria of membership.32 Later, the 
Revolutionary Flame's paper justified the "suspension” of 
the organization from membership on the following 
grounds: the organization had failed to condemn AESM? on
the contrary, it had advocated "democratic rights 
quickly" which was similar to AESM's position of 
"democratic rights now"? it had done this to get a short 
cut to power? its cadres were not conscious enough? it 
had contacts with EPRP and the Orromo Liberation Front? 
it had promoted narrow nationalism? and it had supported
i . . .  . . , ,reactionary Somalia's invasion of socialist Ethiopia. J
The fate of the leaders of the Ethiopian Oppressed
Peoples' Revolutionary Struggle was similar to that of
the leaders of AESM. A number left for the countryside
and some among them who managed to survive, perhaps
joined the Orromo Liberation Front. The leader of the 
organization (Baro Tomsa) was found dead in the 
countryside under mysterious circumstances. Those who 
were arrested are still (1989) languishing in a high 
security detention centre in Addis Ababa without trial 
and without sentence? close observers of the Ethiopian 
political scene wonder why the government found it 
necessary to incarcerate them for much longer than it did 
the leaders of other political organizations.
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(C) THE ELIMINATION OF THE WORKER'S LEAGUE;
"THE WORKERS' PARTY SHALL BE ESTABLISHED THROUGH THE
MERGER OF ORGANIZATIONS"
With the elimination of EPRP and AESM, which were 
the most important of the leftist organizations, as well 
as of the Ethiopian Oppressed Peoples' Revolutionary 
Struggle, the veterans of the student movement were 
effectively removed from the political scene in Ethiopia. 
The only remaining offshoot of the Ethiopian Student 
movement (the Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary 
Organization) was too small to make much difference; its 
role was to be limited to siding with one or other of the 
remaining members of the Joint Front. This left the 
Workers' League and Revolutionary Flame which grew by 
leaps and bounds as the others declined. The bulk of the 
rank and file members of the first three groups that 
survived the executions, imprisonment and torture that 
ensued the falling out of their organizations with the 
Derg, flocked willy-nilly to the Workers' League and 
Revolutionary Flame and swelled their ranks. Those who 
shifted their allegiances were young recruits who 
probably for the most part were introduced to 
Marxism-Leninism in the post - 1974 period. The core of 
the membership of both the Workers' League and 
Revolutionary Flame was, however, predominantly drawn 
from the army, starting from the inception of the 
organizations. Interestingly enough, the great majority 
of these civilian and military members of both groups 
were given their political education in the country by 
the veterans of the Ethiopian Students' Movement. A 
section were also trained abroad? a Derg paper stated 
that by September, 1976, a total number of 313 
individuals had received a month's to a year's training 
in the east European countries 34 with many more to 
follow suit subsequently. By the end of 1977, therefore,
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the era of the veterans of the Ethiopian Student Movement 
had given way to the era of what can be called "instant 
communists”.
At the time of the elimination of Teferi Bante's 
group in February, 1977, the Workers' League had lost its 
founder (Dr, Senaye Likae) and its other prominent leader 
(Colonel Daniel Haile) who was chief of the Derg's 
security. It is widely believed that the death of the 
two was more important for Mengistu's rise to power than 
the elimination of his colleagues in the Derg since they 
and their organization were well entrenched in the army 
and in the central government and, hence, in a position 
to oust him from his position at will. However, despite 
the loss of two of its most prominent leaders, the 
Workers' League continued to thrive under the direction 
of a Colonel Shitaye (who was by all accounts as 
strong-willed as his predecessors) and became the second 
most powerful organization after AESM.
By 1978, however, Revolutionary Flame had also 
become a power to contend with and was in fact on the way 
to prevailing over the Workers' League. In the first 
place, it was able to attract, more effectively than the 
Workers' League, the defectors from the organizations 
that had been eliminated. Secondly, it was engaged, 
during the same period, in a massive recruitment drive 
among the military and civilian bureaucracy, including 
the highest officials. The reason for the successes of 
Revolutionary Flame was the fact that it was led by 
Mengistu and his close associates in the government and 
the fact that as a result it could induce fear or favour 
within the public.
Despite the underlying rivalries, the Workers' 
league, Revolutionary Flame and the Ethiopian 
Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Organization seemed 
prepared to spearhead the formation of a workers' party
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for Ethiopia. This was clearly reflected in an April 
issue of the Front's paper (Voice of Unity) which 
criticized the Front's cadres for their lack of political 
consciousness and for their attempt to replace the 
supreme power of the people by the supreme power of an 
organization and by individual dictatorship, which, 
according to the paper, was worse. Lenin was quoted as 
having said that anyone who weakens the iron discipline 
of the workers' party even slightly is a supporter of the 
bourgeoisie.35 The paper explained further that the 
weakness of the Joint Front was the result of the fact 
that the member organizations had too much independence 
from the Front and that, therefore, the relationship 
between the two must be based on the principle of 
democratic-centralism.36
In June, the member organizations of the Joint Front 
issued a revised version of their original joint 
communique and action programme to serve as the basis of 
what they called "the transitional period" (the 
transition from the collaboration of the organizations to 
their merger). The joint communique stated that they had 
agreed, inter alia, to create the workers' party through 
the merger of the three existing member organizations of 
the Joint Front and other truly Marxist-Leninist groups 
that might emerge in the future; to draw up the bylaws 
governing the structure of the Joint Front during its 
transitional period and the structure, programme and 
Constitution of the party to be established? and to make 
the necessary effort to enable the cadres of the Joint 
Front to conduct strong ideological and political 
agitation within the army and the militia in order to 
make the latter two accept the leadership of the Front as 
well as convert them into a peoples' revolutionary 
army.37 The programme of action also declared that the 
three organizations had arrived at a joint position on
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the above points as well as others. It stated, for 
example, that they had agreed to strengthen the 
collaboration among themselves and to explore all means 
by which the collaboration would be transformed into a 
merger as soon as possible; and to make a joint effort to 
increase the quality and quantity of cadres and to 
establish a paper in which political questions will be 
analyzed for the benefit of the cadres. According to it, 
the reason for the speeding up of the merger of the 
organizations was the fact that AESM and the Ethiopian 
Oppressed Peoples' Revolutionary Struggle had dropped out 
of the revolutionary camp and the fact that a new 
historical juncture had been reached.38
Certain aspects of these joint positions had 
undesirable implications for the government and for the 
member organizations of the Joint Front, which plunged 
the latter into another crisis soon after the agreements 
were drawn. Obviously, what was being advocated by the 
Joint Front then was the same as what AESM had advocated 
a year earlier. The Front was arguing that the 
relationship between it and its members must be subjected 
to the discipline of democratic-centralism leading to a 
speedy establishment of the party through the merger of 
the member organizations? that such a party must be under 
the control of the supreme power of the broad masses and 
must never fall under the sway of individual 
dictatorship; and that the cadres, the army, and the 
militia must come under its and the party leadership.
This was a drive to bring the government under the 
central leadership of the Joint Front and the party, and 
a gibe against Mengistu and his ascent to the heights of 
autocratic rule.
This was a time when Mengistu was celebrating his 
victories against the invading forces of Somalia and 
against EDU, EPRP and Eritrean insurgents. The challenge 
posed by the Joint Front was another obstacle in his 
assertion of personal power. Nevertheless, he was now 
preoccupied with the war-torn economy: the effects of
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the devastation of the war had to be remedied and the 
national economy mobilized. With this in mind, he 
travelled all over the socialist countries in search of 
aid, and in the summer of 1978 put in place the planning 
machinery under his personal control. Those in the 
Joint Front who thought that such important matters 
should be carried out under the guidance of the party and 
that, therefore, the establishment of the latter should 
be given priority over the launching of a planned economy 
felt belittled? it was obvious that Mengistu meant to run 
the economy without the party; the Derg had also adopted 
the nationalization measures of 1975 without the party.
Another source of difficulty was the fact that the 
member organizations had not clearly defined the process 
by which the merger was to be created. Indeed, they had 
agreed to carry it out on the basis of the principle of 
democratic-centralism (which is in any case a very 
elusive concept) and to draw up the bylaws which would 
govern the structure of the merger? however, they had not 
come to an understanding of whether each member 
organization was to be given an equal quota of 
representation in the merger, whether it was going to be 
determined in relation to the size of membership or 
whether it was going to be determined in relation to the 
"quality” (basically meaning academic background) of the 
members. Each of the organizations continued to advocate 
the alternative that would most favour its emergence as 
the dominant group in the party to be established. One 
of the effects of this was, nonetheless, to intensify the 
rivalry between the organizations to increase their 
members in case that should give them an edge in the 
party to be formed.
It has been noted above that the Joint Front's paper 
had charged that some of the cadres were promoting 
individual dictatorship? it appears that the charge was 
directed against members of Revolutionary Flame since 
their organization was the handmaiden of Mengistu. 
However, though the bulk of Revolutionary Flame's
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membership may have been faithful to him, it appears 
there was a section within it which was committed to 
party rather than individual dictatorship. Conversely, 
there were also sections within all of the leftist 
organizations which took the reverse position, betraying 
their own groups in order to buy his friendship.
It was in this confused state of affairs that the 
elimination of the Workers' League's members started in 
the summer of 1978. The cleavage along which the armed 
struggle was fought is often seen as between the Workers' 
League and Revolutionary Flame; by and large, this is 
correct; however, the point overlooks the other important 
sections of the state apparatus which were even more 
effective in urban guerrilla warfare than the army 
itself. Notable in this regard were the Derg's security 
force and sections of the Intelligence Department.
The final show-down between the Workers' League, on 
the one hand, and the Joint Front and the government, on 
the other, came when the former apparently plotted to 
overthrow Mengistu in the middle of September, 1978. The 
plotters were betrayed by some among them and were 
rounded up and eliminated on the day when the coup was 
supposed to have taken place. In January of the 
following year, Revolutionary Flame's paper criticized 
the Workers' League's "crimes" against the revolution as 
follows: it had advocated the reinstatement of "the red
Terror" against EPRP, AESM, and the reactionary within 
the military bureaucracy with the intention of 
eliminating the true progressives; it had tried to 
dominate the Joint Front by increasing the number of its 
members in the organization at the expense of the other 
groups; and it had infiltrated its members into 
Revolutionary Flame with the intention of being 
represented in the Joint Front and in the merger through 
both organizations.39
Interestingly enough, members of the Revolutionary 
Flame were being arrested at the same time as the 
Workers' League was being eliminated. According to Pliny
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the Middle Aged, well over a hundred of the military 
cadres were imprisoned between August and October, 1978. 
Apparently, the reason for this was the split within 
Revolutionary Flame concerning the question of whether 
the military cadres should continue to come under the 
control of the Military Political Affairs Department of 
the Derg, headed by Mengistu's henchman (Sergeant Legese 
Asfaw) or whether they should come under POMOA.40 No 
doubt, those that were arrested were advocates not only 
of transferring the military cadres to the control of 
POMOA but also of party dictatorship (as opposed to 
individual dictatorship) and presumably were also the 
ones who were accused of having been planted by the 
Workers' League in Revolutionary Flame.
Be that as it may, the Joint Front of Ethiopian 
Marxist-Leninist Organizations was declared by its 
members to have survived these events of 1978 and the 
Workers' League to have continued to be a member. The 
only thing that was reported to have changed was the 
replacement of the "reactionary leaders" of the latter by 
new ones which meant that the ones who had betrayed the
September coup had become its leaders. Colonel Shitaye
was replaced by Shwan-Dagn Belete. As will be noted in 
the next section, however, neither the Joint Front nor 
the Workers' League really survived the forces of 
centralization and personalization of organizations.
(D) THE ELIMINATION OF THE JOINT FRONT OF ETHIOPIAN
MARXIST -LENINIST ORGANIZATIONS AND OF EMLRO; "THE
WORKERS' PARTY SHALL BE ESTABLISHED THROUGH THE
MERGER OF COMMUNIST INDIVIDUALS"
Towards the beginning of February, 1979, the Joint 
Front's paper announced that its members had agreed that:
1. they would not recruit new members henceforth?
2. they would form the party, not through the
merger of organizations, but through the merger
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of sincere communist individuals who are versed 
in Marxism-Leninism?
3. starting from its eruption, the revolution had 
a centre, the Derg was that centre, and the 
Derg was revolutionary;
4. in order to form the party, it is necessary to 
establish a centre made up, firstly, of 
individuals who are members of the three 
organizations of the Joint Front and who are 
known for their revolutionary merit and, 
secondly, of individuals who are not members of 
those organizations but who, nevertheless, meet 
the same requirements?
5. the centre will create the structure of the
party by recruiting members in accordance with 
revolutionary criteria and by giving priority 
to members of the Joint Front's organizations? 
and,
6. as the party grows by receiving the necessary 
cooperation from the organizations, the latter 
will wither and die. 1
The points of this agreement constitute a 
substantial departure from the past? their import will be 
dealt with in this subsection and in the following one.
It was Revolutionary Flame which first suggested the 
idea of forming the party through the "merger" of 
individuals as opposed to the merger of organizations.
In a January, 1979, article called "A Proposal of 
Revolutionary Flame Concerning the Formation of the 
Workers Party", it had argued that the effort made by 
member organizations of the Joint Front till then had not 
led to the formation of the party because they had not 
pursued the correct Marxist-Leninist theory on merger? 
that, instead of agitating for the acceptance by 
communist individuals of the fundamental principles of 
Marxism-Leninism and for the adoption by them of a common 
strategy to bring about one leadership, they had been 
fighting for the proliferation of organizations in the 
mistaken belief that they would come together through
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struggle with the result that different and fragmented 
leaderships had emerged. Further, the article had 
explained that the main principles that would bring about 
the merger of communist individuals were: the
acceptance of Marxism-Leninism as the main instrument of 
struggle? the analysis, on the basis of this ideology, of 
the level of development, history and nature of the 
society concerned? the adoption of common positions on 
the destruction of the old order and on building the new 
one, especially on the construction of a communist 
society.42 Similarly, the February agreement argued that 
the attempt to form the party through the merger of 
organizations had led Marxists to concentrate on form 
rather than content, to rivalry among them and to 
factionalism. It noted that in the 1905 congress of 
Russian parties, 26 of them were represented but, due to 
Lenin's determined leadership and due to the struggle of 
other committed Marxists, only one party emerged at the 
end; that in 1929, there were 3 parties in Vietnam but a 
year later, there was only one.43
These were the rhetorical justifications for the 
shift away from what was called "merger of organizations" 
to "merger of individuals". It must be noted that the 
collaboration of the member organizations of the Joint 
Front had come about at a time when each of them was 
afraid of being ousted from its position by powerful 
contenders for power, notably the members of the 
officers' junta (other than members of Mengistu's 
faction) and EPRP. By 1979, nevertheless, not only these 
contenders for power but also all the forces of internal 
and external aggression that had emerged later had been 
subdued by Mengistu? with this, the external threat that 
had held the members of the Joint Front together had been 
removed and only the threat from within remained. If the 
Leninist party (which can be defined as the core of 
society and the major source of all authority) was to be 
formed through the merger of the organizations, it meant 
that all the individual members of those organizations
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would become members of the party? under this scenario, 
the big organizations not only would dominate the rank 
and file membership but would also be in a position to 
elect their prominent members as leaders of the party. 
This appears to be at the heart of the decision to 
abolish the Joint Front of the Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist 
Organizations and replace it with a "centre", the task of 
which was declared to be to bring about the formation of 
the workers' party not through the merger of 
organizations but through the "merger" of individuals.
Closely related to the abolition of the Joint Front 
was the demise of its remaining members especially of the 
Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Organization.
In the first place, the organizations were directed by 
the agreement to refrain from recruiting new members but 
instead concentrate on purging the reactionaries who had 
infiltrated their ranks. The pre-existing free rein on 
recruitment of members, which perhaps had allowed the 
infiltration of the organizations by "reactionaries", was 
best explained by a February directive of Revolutionary 
Flame to its members concerning the agreement under 
consideration. It said that normally an individual 
becomes a member of a communist party only when two or 
more members nominate him as a candidate; only when, on 
account of his conviction that he is revolutionary and 
able and willing to struggle, the candidate applies to 
the party to become a member? and only when he passes a 
special examination after having been studying 
Marxist-Leninist literature for at least a year from his 
nomination as a candidate. In the Ethiopian context, 
however, (the directive continued) instead of individuals 
approaching organizations, it was the latter which had an 
abundant number of membership forms, had been going to 
the individuals and forcing or begging them to become 
members? only in exceptional cases did they recruit them 
voluntarily.44 There is no doubt that the decision to 
prohibit the organizations from indulging in further 
recruitment of members removed the pressure that had been
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brought to bear on the public to join one group or 
another starting from well before the onset of the "red 
terror" (early 1977)? it was greeted with a sense of 
relief. In this scenario, the prohibition marked the end 
of multiple sovereignty to which the public was subjected 
to for so long and the beginning of the final assertion 
of authority by the Leviathan to protect society from its 
members who by "nature are quarrelsome, brutish and 
selfish".
Secondly, not only were the organizations prohibited 
from engaging in further recruitment of members but they 
were themselves allowed to exist only until the party was 
established at which juncture they were to start 
withering away and dying . Though it can be argued that
none of them survived the agreement under consideration, 
it is enough to give the example of the Ethiopian 
Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Organization here.
At the beginning of 1978, the leader of that 
Organization (Ayed Mohamed) was gunned down in the 
Aboirre District of Addis Ababa presumably by EPRP. It 
is said that in the following days all the higher kebeles 
of the capital city (some 25 of them) were made to 
contribute 10 prisoners each for retaliatory executions. 
Be that as it may, Ayed was replaced by the articulate, 
but rather trusting, Tesfaye Mekonon, who led the 
organization for the rest of its political career. By
all accounts, it was the weakest of the political 
organizations mentioned so far? in 1978 and 1979, its 
role was limited to supporting Revolutionary Flame in the 
latter's drive to prevail over the Workers' League in the 
Joint Front and in POMOA.
However, the Ethiopian Marxist - Leninist 
Revolutionary Organization fell out with Revolutionary 
Flame in the aftermath of the February 1979 agreement. 
Apparently, the difference between the two revolved 
around the question of representation on the centre which 
was supposed to constitute or establish the workers' 
party. The agreement did provide that the first group of
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individuals who were to constitute the centre would come 
primarily from among the members of the organizations of 
the Joint Front? it did not, however, provide for the 
size and method of representation. The Ethiopian 
Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Organization insisted that 
each of the organizations should be accorded an equal 
quota of representation on the centre? Revolutionary 
Flame, on the other hand, sought admission to be based on 
the criteria of contribution to the revolution and degree 
of Marxist - Leninist consciousness. If Mengistu was the 
one who was to decide on Revolutionary Flame's criteria, 
as was the case later, it is obvious that he would use 
his discretionary powers in favour of his own 
organization. Further, if the criteria of "contribution 
to the revolution" included the number of executions 
perpetrated against "reactionaries", as it did, then the 
members of the Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary 
Organization stood little chance of competing with 
Revolutionary Flame. Be that as it may, the former's 
reluctance to yield on its position was used as an excuse 
to round up its leaders in June, 1979, and put them 
behind bars. It appears to be an "excuse" because, as 
will be noted in the following section, the process of 
launching Mengistu as the sole centre who would form the 
party must have been under way at about that time. At any 
rate, the leader of the Organization, Tesfaye Mekonon, 
was released from prison some years later? interestingly 
enough, he is the only leader of all the leftist 
organizations (with the exception of Mengistu) who has 
survived to tell the tale.
(E) THE DISSOLUTION OF REVOLUTIONARY FLAME? •* FORWARD
WITH THE SOLE LEADERSHIP OF COMRADE MENGISTU
HAILE-MARIAM"
The February 1979 Agreement of the members of the 
Joint Front provided that the Front was to be dissolved 
and replaced by what it called "the Centre". Whereas the 
first was intended to bring about the formation of the
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Workers' Party of Ethiopia through the merger of its 
member organizations, the second was said to achieve the 
same through the "merger” of committed Marxist-Leninist 
individuals. The Agreement further provided that the 
Centre would be made up, firstly, of individuals who were 
members of the remaining three organizations of the Joint 
Front known for their revolutionary merits and, secondly, 
of individuals who were not members of those 
organizations but were, nonetheless, meritorious 
Marxist-Leninists.45 What should happen after the Centre 
was constituted in this way was clear: the Centre made
up of the first group of individuals would recruit other 
committed Marxist-Leninists and grow into the Party.
What was left obscure by the Agreement, however, was 
whether the member organizations to the Agreement would 
appoint their representatives to the Centre or whether an 
individual or group of individuals would screen who were 
committed Marxist-Leninists and appoint them to become 
the first members of the Centre. As it transpired, 
Mengistu became the sole Centre.
Sergeant (later Captain) Legese Asfaw (member of the 
Standing Committee and head of the Military Political 
Affairs Department of the Derg) convened a seminar of the 
military komisars and cadres in the Military Aviation 
headquarters (Addis Ababa) from 11 to 18 August 1979 and 
had them adopt a twenty-four-point resolution concerning 
mainly the question of the Centre. The relevant part of 
the resolution stated: "...since it is our leader (the
revolutionary and determined Comrade Mengistu 
Haile-M<Lriam) who, as the centre, led the revolution from 
June 28, 1974, to the present hour and minute? even now, 
since the existence of our revolution is identified with 
the formation of the Workers' Party through our 
revolutionary leader as the centre? since there is no 
alternative to the fact that in the future Comrade 
Mengistu Haile-Mariam must be the Centre for our Workers' 
Party? we give our word of honour in the name of the 
seminar participants that we are prepared to make the
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necessary sacrifices required of us by our revolution and 
our revolutionary leader". The resolution further 
stated that the revolution reached the stage it did then 
not because of miracles nor of lack of enemies which had 
posed danger to it but "because it had on its side the 
mature, determined and revolutionary leadership of 
Mengistu Haile-Mariam". In an apparent reference to the 
members of the leftist political organizations including 
those that became members of the Joint Front, the 
resolution said "we know that the clever 
petit-bourgeoisie who had been hovering to usurp the 
power of the broad masses would not support, would even 
oppose, the establishment of the Centre because they know 
that it is the only instrument by which power would be 
captured by the workers? we will struggle with the true 
communists to purge and destroy these anti-Centre and 
anti-people elements and those like them who may surface 
in the future."46
Mengistu attended the last day of the seminar from 9 
a.m. to 7 p.m. and, in addition to listening to a welcome 
speech from Sergeant Legese Asfaw, gave the participants 
"a deep explanation and evaluation of different questions 
regarding revolutions". It was at the conclusion of the 
meeting on that day that the twenty-four-point resolution 
was adopted and read by a representative of the seminar 
participants in the presence of Mengistu.47 In the 
eveningof the same day, Mengistu gave a palace dinner to 
the participants of the seminar in honour of the adoption 
of the resolution. In his address to the participants on 
the occasion, he said "The success of the revolution is 
not due to my wisdom and effort (as the speaker had 
emphasized) but due to the uprising of the oppressed 
people and the selfless sacrifices of the army? the 
credit must go to the army. However, I would like to 
assure and reassure my readiness to sacrifice everything 
that is expected from an individual and a fighter".
Then, one of the representatives of the seminar 
participants read yet another eulogy on the theme on how
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history had entrusted the leadership of the revolution to 
Mengistu as of June 1974, i.e. after, according to the 
speaker, the demise of Haile Sellassie's "period of the 
man-eater”. Finally, Mengistu was given a present on 
behalf of the komisars and cadres.48
As of the next day, the urban dwellers' associations 
went into full swing mobilizing the city-dwellers into 
rallies in support of the resolution and messages of 
congratulations from the various government departments 
began to pour in. Also, the mass media, rally placards, 
banners on buildings, street arches, posters in offices, 
and resolutions of meetings of mass organizations, 
political study groups and the like, all began echoing 
the slogan; "forward with the sole leadership of Comrade 
Mengistu Haile-Mariam”.49
This is a perfect instance of what came to be known 
as "organizational operation” (the process by which an 
inner circle makes a decision and has it adopted by a 
brow-beaten meeting). In all probability, the 
twenty-four-point resolution and the speeches made 
eulogising Mengistu would have in the first place been 
written by him with the assistance of someone considered 
literate in the official language (Amharic). Then, some 
of the would-be participants of the seminar would be 
appointed to steer the meeting into adopting the 
resolution and the speeches. Some of them would sit 
among the audience and advocate and second the right 
proposals and nominate those to be elected as members of 
drafting committees and the like? the others would act as 
the members of the presidium (committee) which would 
chair and lead the meeting. In such proceedings, the 
presidium has the choice of either producing the 
resolution and speeches as though they were its own 
proposals to be adopted by the assembly or it could have 
a resolution and speech-drafting committee elected by the 
assembly to do the job for it. Normally, the 
participants closely watch the more influential 
individuals among them ( those appointed to steer the
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meeting) and figure out what is expected of them? such 
decisions are always adopted unanimously. Finally, 
Mengistu comes and listens to the eulogies and 
resolutions of the meeting that he had himself written in 
the first place. No doubt, the idea of the whole 
exercise is to give the autocratically-made decisions 
some kind of democratic complexion.
However, this style of Mengistu's government, which 
appeared manipulative of the komisars and cadres, need 
not detract from the fact that they were an important 
political force in their own right; they had been and 
continued to be a potent power base for the leader they 
happened to support. The origin of the institution of 
the komisars and cadres can be traced back to the popular 
uprising of 1974. It has been noted previously that the 
activists within the military and police units of the 
time were, in the summer of that year, transformed into 
what were called Unit Committees so that they could serve 
as a bridge between the Derg and the security forces and 
that, towards the end of the same year, they were 
disbanded because of their opposition to Derg rule. 
Starting from 1975, the bulk of the ex-Unit Committee 
members were sent to the socialist countries for 
political training and, on their return, were assigned to 
the various military and police units as political 
cadres. With the reorganization of the Derg in December, 
1976, a Politicization of the Army and Police Commission 
was set up under the Central Committee of the Derg in 
order to administer the military komisars and cadres 
separately from the other cadres.50 It was this 
Commission that Sergeant Legese Asfaw was chosen to head
in February 1977. According to him, only 6 out of the 28
founder members of the Commission were still with them at 
the 1979 seminar, suggesting that not many of the
original military and police komisars and cadres survived
the excesses of the previous years.51
The interesting question is why Mengistu fell back 
on the military komisars and cadres to appoint him as the
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Centre which would form the Party subsequently. One 
alternative open to him would have been his own political 
organization ( Revolutionary Flame ) of which the 
komisars and cadres were members. Since the other 
organizations which were members of the Joint Front had 
been purged, they could not have been used for the 
purpose? on the other hand, however, the congress, the 
central committee or the politburo of Revolutionary Flame 
could have been called upon to endorse the appointment of 
Mengistu as the Centre. The explanation appears to have 
been that, like the other member organizations of the 
Joint Front, Revolutionary Flame had also incurred the 
disfavour of Mengistu by insisting on party, as opposed 
to individual, dictatorship. This appears to have been 
at the basis of the demand by the members of the Workers' 
League and Revolutionary Flame to have the administration 
of the military komisars and cadres transferred from the 
Military Political Affairs Department (the successor of 
the Politicization of the Army and Police Commission) to 
the Joint Front. As indicated in the last section but 
one, (the demand which was in effect to remove the 
komisars and cadres from being used as an instrument of 
personal rule by Mengistu) did not succeed? on the 
contrary, it led to the rounding up of those who made the 
demand in the autumn of 1978.
A further instance of the decline of Revolutionary 
Flame was the provision of the February 1979 Agreement of 
the member organizations of the Joint Front which stated 
that the Derg had been the centre of the revolution from 
its eruption in 1974. In practice, this meant that 
whereas before the agreement the Derg members were made 
subordinate to the cadres of the Joint Front and POMOA 
and received instructions from them, they were now 
rehabilitated and made superior to the cadres receiving 
instructions from the central government directly. In 
fact, the provision of the Agreement affected mainly the 
cadres of Revolutionary Flame since the other 
organizations had for all practical purposes fallen by
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the wayside. If in effect, Revolutionary Flame had thus 
not been dissolved at the time of the February agreement, 
Mengistu's appointment in August as the seed that would 
germinate and grow into the Party could only have been 
the final blow to the only organization in existence.
From then on, the members of Revolutionary Flame could 
become members of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia on the 
strength of their loyalty to Mengistu and not on the 
strength of their membership of Revolutionary Flame, 
though as long time supporters of Mengistu and as being 
known to him more closely than the others, they were 
probably given priority in the recruitment pecking order.
A more credible alternative to Revolutionary Flame's 
endorsement of Mengistu's appointment as the Centre would 
have been the Derg itself. As already noted, the February 
agreement between the member organizations of the Joint 
Front had declared that the Derg was the centre of the 
revolution from its eruption. In fact, this provision 
seemed to suggest that the agreement had intended the 
Derg to replace the Joint Front and become the Centre 
which would recruit the committed Marxist-Leninists and 
grow into the Party. Moreover, according to the 
"Constitution" of the Derg, the task of "issuing 
directives on the establishment of parties..." was 
entrusted to its Congress.52 Obviously, this would have 
made the Derg a more appropriate body to authorize 
Mengistu to become the Centre that would grow into the 
Workers' Party. Nevertheless, Mengistu did not wish to 
use the Derg as the Centre nor to seek its endorsement of 
his emergence as the sole Centre of the Workers' party.
Thus, by 1979, it is possible to talk of the 
emergence of three categories of cadres in terms of 
their importance and relation to the central government. 
The first of these were those cadres drawn from both the 
civilian and military sections of the population who had 
been serving the cause of the "revolution" as members of 
the five political organizations of the Joint Front, and 
who had defected to Mengistu's side as their individual
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organizations were liquidated. The second were the Derg 
members who had stayed on the side of Mengistu till 1979 
and who had been serving the cause of the revolution as 
"senior cadres” (as the December 1976 directive which 
defined their functions characterized them). The third 
were the military komisars and cadres who were mostly 
drawn from among the NCOs and who had been serving the 
cause of revolution as political activists within the 
various military and police units. Of these, the third 
category had emerged as the group whose support was most 
sought after in that they moved among the army and police 
force, especially among the NCOs and privates, and held 
the security forces firmly behind the leader they 
supported. It appears that it was a recognition of this 
fact that induced Teferi's group to organize and 
administer them independently from the other cadres under 
a separate Commission, and that induced Mengistu not only 
to maintain their independent administration by bringing 
them under his direct control through the instrumentality 
of his henchman (Sergeant Legese Asfaw) but also to 
champion the cause of the NCOs (from which the komisars 
and cadres were drawn) throughout his political career.
(F) THE COMMISSION FOR ORGANIZING THE PARTY OF THE
WORKING PEOPLE OF ETHIOPIA;
•'THE MISSION OF COPWE WILL TRIUMPH.”
The Commission for Organizing the Party of the 
Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE), which was established 
by Proclamation 174 of December, 1979, was the 
culmination of the struggle between what were the 
"pro-Derg" political organizations and the central 
government in the context of the Provisional Office for 
Mass Organizational Affairs (POMOA) and of the Joint 
Front of Ethiopian Marxist - Leninist Organizations 
(JFEMLO). Article 18 of the Proclamation provided that 
the sources of income of COPWE were to consist of the 
contributions of its members and "other sources". The 
reference to "other sources" obviously meant government
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sources since the Commission appropriated the best 
government buildings in the country and fleets of 
government cars for its services. Further, being duly 
established by a Proclamation of the Derg, it would 
certainly be the case that a budgetary allocation from 
the treasury would have been at its disposal. Thus, like 
JFEMLO, the Commission had the character of being a 
voluntary association of individuals dependent for its 
activities on the contribution of its members; moreover, 
like POMOA, it had the character of being a government 
agency created by a Proclamation and funded by the 
treasury.
Furthermore, the Commission inherited the tasks of 
organizing a "strong party of the working people based on 
the teachings of Marxism-Leninism" from JFEMLO and of 
disseminating Marxism-Leninism among organizations and 
the masses from POMOA. Sub-article 1 of Article 6 of the 
Proclamation then broke down these functions of the 
Commission into 15 items and in its sub-article 2 
entrusted them to the chairman (Mengistu Haile-Mariam) by 
stating; "The chairman of COPWE who shall have all the 
powers and duties of COPWE as enumerated in Sub-article 1 
of this Article shall implement or cause the 
implementation of the same". There exists here a 
parallel between the natures of the trinities, on the one 
hand, and that of Mengistu and COPWE, on the other; the 
difference between the two lies in that in the case of 
the former, it is three in one, whereas in the case of 
the latter, it is two in one. Interestingly enough, 
Article 4 provided that the Commission was accountable to 
the Derg; however, if the arguments of Chapter 6 above 
are granted, Mengistu and the Derg were also one and the 
same. Housed in an extension of the Grand Palace in 
which Mengistu, like the monarchs before him, resided, 
the head office of COPWE became the centre of authority 
from where all ultimate government and party power 
flowed.
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It took COPWE four years (until September 1984) to 
recruit its members, construct its organs, rechristen 
itself "the Workers' Party of Ethiopia" and dub its 
chairman "the General Secretary of WPE" and its Executive 
Committee "the politburo of WPE". In other words, there 
was no real difference between COPWE and WPE; the members 
and organs of the Commission were the members and organs 
of the Party? what took place in September, 1984, was a 
characteristically wasteful fanfare to mark the 
rechristening of the organization.
Beyond stating that lower organs53 of the Commission 
could nominate candidates to higher organs54 and beyond 
stating that the chairman would issue the recruitment 
rules for members and candidates, the Proclamation is not 
helpful in explaining how members were to be recruited.
It is common knowledge, however, that, for the duration 
of the Commission, the chairman personally interviewed 
candidates and signed their membership cards though 
individuals recruited as of then do not seem to have met 
the chairman. The number of members of neither the 
Commission nor the Party has ever been made public. A 
report of the Central Statistical Office of 1987 put the 
composition of the membership as follows: workers 37.8.
percent, farmers 32.3. percent, civil servants 20 
percent, and others 9.9 percent.55 The proportion of 
workers and farmers appears to have been exaggerated 
beyond bounds mainly because of the felt need to make WPE 
sound like a Leninist party. In fact, as its name 
indicates, the mandate of COWPE was to organize the party 
of the "working people of Ethiopia" which was understood 
to mean a party based on that section of the population 
which lived off its own sweat and which in effect would 
exclude those who lived on the labour of others. When 
the party was established in 1984, however, it was 
declared to be not the "party of the working people of 
Ethiopia" but "the Workers Party of Ethiopia".
Obviously, the idea behind this was the desire to confer 
a vanguard role to the industrial workers and to subsume
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under their vanguardship the other progressive classes 
like the peasants and other sections of the population 
who had, as the jargon of the time had it, "betrayed" 
their class and accepted Marxism-Leninism as their 
ideology. Be that as it may, the same report of the 
Central Statistical office put the figure of the working 
class for 1985 at 271,233 in the then total population of 
about 45 million.56 If the figure for the industrial 
work force looks small, it is not for lack of emphasis? 
in fact, even that figure appears to have been multiplied 
at least by a factor of two.
The General Assembly, which represents the 
membership of the Party by such quotas as the chairman 
deems appropriate, meets under the leadership of the 
chairman as often as is specified by internal regulations 
of the Commission or when the chairman convenes it.57 
Though it is authorized to make recommendations regarding 
"domestic and foreign policy", approve internal 
regulations and programmes, comment and make 
recommendations on "important matters" concerning the 
Commission when referred to it by the chairman,58 The 
General Assembly has met too infrequently to make any 
difference on any of these questions. At any rate, even 
when it met, it has never gone beyond listening to the 
reports of the chairman and expressing its approval of 
them through standing ovations.
The other organ of the Commission-Party is the 
Central Committee, the members of which the Chairman was 
authorized to "select, assign, transfer, suspend or 
dismiss...."5  ^ Certain individuals, like members of the 
Derg, were selected to become members of the Central 
Committee of COPWE almost from the inception of that
the official daily (Addis Zemen) that the members 
numbered 136 and the alternate members 64. Thus, the 
total number of members and alternate members of that
Commission? however, it was not until 
#\'Uhk&rsL>^ tj- CHj£ Wi^ r
made public. At the time, it was reported in
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organ was 200, a figure which included the members and 
alternate members of the politbureau who were also 
members of the Central Committee. Of these, a quarter to 
a half were drawn from the army and the rest from the 
upper civilian bureaucracy. Further, women were 
represented on the Central Committee by one member and 
three alternate members.60 Though the Proclamation 
provides for a long list of functions that the Central 
Committee has to carry out in accordance with the 
directives of the Chairman,61 its role has been limited 
to meeting a few times a year and, like the General 
Assembly, expressing its approval of the Chairman's 
reports through a standing ovation.
Yet another organ was the Executive Committee or 
politbureau, the members of which were again to be 
selected, assigned, transferred, suspended or dismissed 
by the Chairman.62 Upon the establishment of the 
Commission, 7 members of the Derg's Standing Committee 
were selected to become members of the Executive 
Committee of COPWE and on the establishment of WPE, the 
same individuals, in addition to 4 civilian members and 6 
alternate members, became members of the politbureau.
The Executive Committee was given a number of relatively 
unimportant functions by the Proclamation. Nevertheless, 
since, as noted earlier, all the powers of COPWE were 
entrusted to the chairman, the Executive Committee could 
only act as an assistant to the chairman in his exercise 
of powers. In fact, the relationship between the 
Chairman and the Executive Committee was exactly the same 
as the relationship between him and the Standing 
Committee of the Derg (as discussed in Chapter 6 above)? 
the only difference now was that, since the Executive 
Committee had taken the place of the Standing Committee 
as of the establishment of COPWE, both governmental and 
party powers were concentrated in the latter body and (if 
the arguments of chapter 6 are granted) those powers were 
concentrated in the Chairman.
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Around the time of the formation of COPWE, members 
of the armed forces and the Police who became party 
functionaries, including members of the Executive 
Committee-politbureau were declared to be civilians and 
were in effect referred to only as "comrades”. When the 
Party was established in September, 1984, the members and 
the alternate members of the politbureau were the 
following comrades: Mengistu Haile-Mariam (General
Secretary), Fikra Selassie Wog-Deres, Fisiha Desta, 
General Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan (Minister of Defence), 
Birihanu Baye, Addis Tedla, Legese Asfaw, Hailu Yemenu, 
Amanuel Wolde-Michael, Alemu Abebe, Shimelis Mazengya, 
Teka Tulou, Fisiha Sidelil, Shoan-Dagn Belete, Tesfaye 
Dinka, Tesfaye Wolde-Selassie and Kassa Gebrae.
In addition to the General Assembly, the Central 
Committee and the Politburo, the Commission-Party had 
what the Proclamation called Regional Committees at the 
provincial, Awraja and Wereda levels and at the level of 
each organization.63 These were branch offices of the 
Party's Central Committee (secretariat at the national 
level) which is headed by the General Secretary and which 
also had committees as described above and departments 
for different spheres of activities like departments for 
Organizational Affairs, Military Political Affairs, 
Propaganda, Economics and Foreign Affairs. Some of these 
departments were duplicated in the regional committees. 
Unlike members of the organs of the Party, most of whom 
were employed in the government departments, those 
assigned in the regional committees were full-time party 
functionaries.
By the early 1980's, the administrative relationship 
between the lower and upper organs of the government and 
mass organizations was declared to be governed by the 
Leninist principle of "democratic-centralism" but this 
was not so for the relationships between the regional 
committees of the Party. Instead, it was provided that 
the Central Committee would prescribe the directives 
governing "the chain of command, the procedure of
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submitting reports and similar activities".64 Further, 
the Law does not give the regional committees any powers 
of decision-making; it only allows them to agitate among 
Party members and the masses of the people, nominate 
candidates to higher organs, resolutely struggle against 
factionalism, implement correctly and without delay 
decisions of superior organs, and hold meetings in order 
to "discuss" and submit "recommendations" to superior 
organs.65 Moreover, it is a common complaint of the 
party functionaries that they have no decision-making 
powers, that their recommendations are never acted on, 
and that they have no way of finding out the real reasons 
behind policies adopted by the central body concerning 
such important matters as villagization, resettlement 
and the civil wars, an omission which greatly handicaps 
their agitational work among the people. The regional 
committees and their functionaries are, more than 
anything else, a means of reporting to the central 
authority about "factionalists and other anti-people" 
tendencies among themselves; 66 and about similar 
tendencies in government and non-government 
organizations. Similarly, the regional committees are a 
machinery through which all the members of the party 
discharge their responsibility of resolutely "exposing 
anti-revolution and anti-unity" activities.67 Thus, the 
individual party member submits a daily report to the 
basic organization or to the Wereda secretariat 
concerning whatever "anti-revolution and anti-unity" 
activities he comes across in his work place, residence 
or anywhere else he thinks it exists.
Further, there is the relationship between the 
Commission-Party, on the one hand, and the government and 
non-government organizations on the other. In this 
regard, the Proclamation provided that "any natural or 
juridical person, government office, government or mass 
organization shall have the duty to cooperate with COPWE 
in all its activities to implement the purposes of this 
Proclamation".68 This gave rise to a tremendous amount
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of confusion among the regional committees and government 
departments regarding their respective jurisdictions.
This was so no less among the ministries and the Addis 
Ababa Regional Committee of the Party which was given the 
status of a provincial regional office.69 The ministers 
felt that, being in charge of spheres of activities at 
the national level, they should come under the Central 
Committee and not under the Provincial Committee.
Further, though they had the duty to cooperate with the 
Party and the latter had the right of giving them 
"directives” the question of delimiting the boundaries 
between "decisions" and "directives" was not always an 
easy one to make. In fact, the resulting confusion was 
used by Party functionaries to accuse those of the 
government officials they did not like of being 
"anti-revolutionary" and to victimize them. After a 
number of years of confusion, its continued decline was 
arrested by absorbing all the officials into Party 
membership. Nevertheless, a government official would 
ignore a Party directive (acknowledged as such by the 
central authorities) at his own peril.
The non-government organizations which also have the 
duty to cooperate with COPWE were what came to be known 
as the mass organizations including the Peasant 
Association, Urban Dwellers' Association, the 
Revolutionary Ethiopian Women's Association, the 
Revolutionary Ethiopian Youth Association, the All 
Ethiopian Trade Unions, and the professional associations 
like those of the doctors, nurses and teachers. The most 
important of these were the first two which, since their 
establishment in 1975, were expanded organizationally to 
embrace the entire population except the nomads and those 
under guerrilla control. For example, it was reported 
that in 1985, there were 20,367 basic peasant 
associations embracing 5,681,033 heads of families as 
members and that in 1986, there were 1,258 basic urban 
dwellers' associations embracing all of the urban
. 70population as members.
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The basic organizations of the Revolutionary 
Ethiopian Women's Association and the Revolutionary 
Ethiopian Youth Association were subordinated to the 
basic peasants' and urban dwellers' associations and, 
hence, brought under the leadership of the latter two 
mass organizations. In addition, they were subordinated 
to their own higher bodies which were established at the 
Wereda, Awraja provincial and national levels. The All 
Ethiopian Trade Unions and the professional associations, 
on the other hand, were established independently from 
the peasants and urban dwellers associations. This has 
meant that almost every citizen belonged to one mass 
organization or another, and often he belonged to more 
than one organization at the same time. A young lady
between the age of 18 to 30, for instance, would
automatically be a member of either the peasants' 
association or urban dwellers' association (depending on
whether she lived in the countryside or an urban area),
and of the Revolutionary Youth Association; further, she 
could be a member of the All Ethiopian Trade Unions, the 
nurses'-doctors' associations and of the Party.
Though (as explained in chapter 4 above) the 
Peasants' Associations and Urban Dwellers' Associations 
had extensive powers over social and economic matters at 
the time of their formation in 1975, and this was further 
expanded by Law later, it was their political functions 
that survived the eventful years following their 
establishment in 1975. An outstanding example of their 
political function was the role they played in harassing, 
detaining and eliminating members of the various 
political organizations during the red terror. Since 
then, the Urban Dwellers' Associations lost their control 
over house rents and with it their ability to promote 
social and economic activities in their localities like 
building communal toilets, communal water-taps, small 
roads, kindergartens and poultry rearing. This left them 
with the tasks, when asked to so by the centre, of 
mobilizing the population, hunting the youth for military
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service, pressurizing the population into conformity 
through the threat of withdrawing shopping rations and 
through refusing to write references without which many 
organizations including the Immigration Office were 
prohibited from providing their services, and 
co-ordinating contributions for the war effort or for the 
drought affected people.
The Peasants' Associations have been even more 
important than the Urban Dwellers' Associations in the 
implementation of policies of the government and of the 
Party. Apart from the fact that they wield the same 
powers over their members as do the Urban Dwellers' 
Associations over their's, they have in addition been 
involved in grand national projects of the 
government-Party. For example, they have been 
instrumental in allocating and collecting from their 
members grain quotas to be sold to the government at 
below market prices (the so-called quota system), in 
mobilizing hundreds and thousands of peasants in the 
drought affected areas of the north for settlement in 
southern regions hundreds of miles away from their 
homesteads (so-called resettlement), and in herding 
millions of peasants into villages from their 
pre-existing scattered hamlets (so-called villagization).
CONCLUSION
Having had himself declared the "sole leader" by the 
military cadres, Mengistu then became COPWE and 
personally constructed the WPE by recruiting members and 
by appointing some among them as members and 
functionaries of higher organs of the Party. Then, the 
government and non-government organizations were 
subordinate to the Party, generally speaking, for two 
purposes: to help the central authority control society
and to help in the implementation of its policies. As 
chairman of the Derg, Mengistu Haile-Mariam was the 
absolute head of government; in addition, as General 
Secretary of the Party, he became head of WPE after the
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establishment of the latter. Whichever hat he decided to 
wear at any given time, Mengistu emerged the absolute 
central authority whose policies, (adopted by the 
Politburo willy-nilly) were implemented by the totality 
of the body politic and on whose behalf society was 
controlled.
Often, observers of the Ethiopian political scene 
talk of the mobilization of the lower class and its 
incorporation into the political life of the country for 
the first time ever without much reference as to whether 
the mass of the people are incorporated into democratic 
government and party processes or whether they are 
incorporated into a totalitarian system. There is no 
doubt that either of those contingencies would constitute 
a radical departure from the past; nonetheless, it 
appears appropriate to query whether the incorporation 
was a democratic or a dictatorial one since there is a 
qualitative difference between the two. Viewed from the 
perspective of the participation of the newly created 
party and mass organizations in the implementation of 
policies, it could be argued that the new order allows 
the masses a degree of democratic participation in the 
political life of the country. This argument is in 
itself very weak in that an animal which is trained to 
perform certain activities through the use of sticks and 
carrots cannot be claimed to have had its consciousness 
taken into account by its master. Moreover, the 
participation of the masses in controlling themselves can 
only be taken as evidence of the emergence of 
totalitarianism.
At any rate, a Leninist party is not known for its 
democratic disposition towards the masses of the people. 
However, it is interesting to ask whether there are 
various degrees of democratic traditions within the 
Leninist ruling parties themselves, whether, for example, 
there was a degree of vitality and free debate within the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union even at the time of 
Stalin which enabled it to evolve a whole set of new
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ideas concerned with social engineering (five year plans, 
new forms of social and economic organizations, a new 
legal system) and to constantly revise them with a view 
to making innovations. This does not appear to have been 
the case in Ethiopia. Given the elimination of all 
political organizations (including those which seemed 
willing to cooperate with the centre), the highly 
personalized nature of the construction of the government 
and party machinery, and given Mengistu's ability and 
will to bulldoze his wishes through the Politburo, the 
Central Committee and the General Assembly, it would seem 
logical to conclude that no degree of pluralism (even 
when that pluralism was within the accepted bounds of 
Marxism-Leninism in practice) has been possible in 
Ethiopia. Except in its military-like command structure 
the new political order distinguished itself by a 
withered party, government and mass organizational 
machinery aped from a foreign model. When, after 
February 1977 and especially after the summer of 1979, 
Mengistu as much as developed a fever, the whole of 
Ethiopia was seized with a spasmodic convulsion of 
sneezes, a convulsion which evaporates into oblivion 
within a month or two only to be stirred thereafter by 
another round of fever, cold and sneezes for a month or 
two only to completely forget it and turned its attention 
towards a new policy in the next round of fever, cold and 
sneezes.
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CHAPTER MINE
CONCLUSION
This chapter is primarily concerned with examining 
the causes and outcomes of the revolution from the 
perspective of contemporary social science research. It 
begins with a section which summarizes the main findings 
of the previous chapters. The summary is followed by 
other sections intended to develop aspects of the causes 
and outcomes considered to be controversial and important 
in explaining the revolution.
(A) SUMMARY
The collapse of the old-state was brought about by 
structural crisis induced by the centralization, 
modernization and territorial consolidation drive of the 
monarchy and by the post-war changes in the international 
scene. Centralization gave rise to the emergence of a 
highly centralized autocracy which made itself 
increasingly irrelevant to a democratizing society; 
modernization to a new elite which became increasingly 
vocal in its opposition to the obsolete monarchy; and, 
territorial consolidation to a more diversified 
population which became more and more difficult to 
govern. The international dynamic further weakened the 
state by providing alternative political models to the 
new elite, weapons and diplomatic support to regionalist 
insurgents and by imposing economic relations inimical to 
development. While structural crisis is believed to have 
played the crucial role in weakening the old-state, it 
is, perhaps, complimentary. Structural crisis can be 
seen as having prepared the ground for the 1974 action of
i
the revolutionary social groups. The harassment of the 
old-state through strikes, demonstrations and petitions 
coordinated by the steering committees that sprang up in
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the corporate groups in the course of the uprising of 
1974 cannot be fully explained without resort to 
conscious action on the part of the partisans.
During the uprising, it was the organized social 
group like the security forces, the students, teachers, 
civil servants and workers that were most active. When 
the old-state collapsed in September, however, it was 
some 106 junior officers, NCO's and privates who, after 
having formed a committee called "Derg”, took power in 
the name of the security forces. They did this to the 
exclusion of all the civilian corporate groups. Feeling 
left out in the cold, the groups especially CELU, the 
students unions and the teachers associations, put up 
resistance to the Derg's monopoly of power in the 
subsequent years.
Starting from the summer of 1974, however, various 
political organizations came to the surface and assumed 
the leadership role of the opposition. Some of these 
like the left wing EPRP and the rigllfcwing EDU continued 
their opposition until they were crushed by the Derg 
starting from 1977. Similar organized resistance to Derg 
rule came from regionalist insurgents; EPRP and EDU 
formed de facto coalitions with the regionalist 
organizations in the course of their common struggle 
against the Derg. Some of the pan-Ethiopian 
organizations other than EPRP and EDU came to the side of 
the Derg from the time of their establishment and the 
remaining sided with it later. These, all of which were 
left wing, included AESM, the Workers League, EOPRS,
EMLRO and Revolutionary Flame. They formed a coalition 
with Mengistu's faction within the Derg which emerged 
victorious in February 1977, and monopolized power. The 
five political groups which had been working with the 
faction fell out with it between the summers of 1977 and 
1979 leaving Mengistu Haile-Mariam and his close 
associates to construct the party and government 
structures on their own.
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The chances were that left to its devices, in other 
words left without the challenge posed by the other 
political organizations, the Derg would not have gone 
beyond the achievement of a mere coup d'dtat. It is 
believed that it was the political organizations, which 
were dominated by members of the intermediate social 
strata, and the complex interplay between them that gave 
birth to the particular kinds of outcomes or 
transformations that followed in the wake of the collapse 
of the ancien regime.
One of the first and most fundamental 
transformations achieved in the course of 1975 was the 
nationalization of business organizations, rural and 
urban land, and extra houses. The achievement of those 
transformations was a result of the concession made by 
the Derg to the demands of the civilian left. These 
reforms, coupled with the establishment of a central 
planning machinery in 1978, laid the foundation to a 
"socialist" economic system in Ethiopia. It is believed 
that such an economic system was not more productive than 
the pre-capitalist order that prevailed prior to the 
revolution nor more than an economic system that might 
have been brought about by a middle class revolution.
The second important transformation was the change 
in social structures introduced by the same legislations 
of 1975 which announced the nationalization measures. 
These had the effect of dispossessing the upper class of 
its assets in land, property, and business organizations 
and of bringing abut a great levelling down of society.
In addition, those legislations provided for the 
organization of the entire population into peasant 
associations and urban dwellers associations which, as 
arenas of struggle between the political organizations in 
the ensuing years became increasingly centralized, 
politicised and armed. In fact, the mobilization of the 
rural population and its incorporation into the new 
polity is one of the most striking achievements of the 
revolution. The most important effect, in the political
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sphere, of the mobilization and incorporation of the 
population was the laying down of the bases for the 
control of the whole of society by the party-state.
The third transformation relates to the adoption of 
a new ideology. In December 1974, the Derg issued 
"Ethiopian Socialism" by way of meeting half way the 
clamour of the civilian left for the adoption of the 
Marxist-Leninist programmes. However, Ethiopian 
Socialism was rejected by the leftist political 
organizations on the ground that there is only one kind 
of socialism, namely Marxism-Leninism, and that, whatever 
else it might be, Ethiopian Socialism is not such an 
ideology. In the course of 1975, the Derg fell under the 
sway of the leftist political organizations with the 
result that, in April 1976, it adopted NDRPE as the 
official ideology of Ethiopia. The NDRP is the socio­
economic and political programme that Soviet Marxists 
prescribe as the appropriate policy for pre-capitalist 
societies to pursue. Much of the leftist literature 
questions the sincerity of the Derg in adopting the 
Programme. The question of whether Derg members really 
believe in the ideology or not is in a way rather 
academic. Whatever the merits, the new ideology has in 
practice been important in influencing the nature of the 
reforms that were adopted by the new regime. It has 
brought into existence "socialist" programmes like shift 
of alliances from the west to the east, central planning 
and a Leninist party.
The fourth transformation concerned the important 
change in the nature of the government itself. Despite 
the radical socio-economic and ideological reforms of 
1975 and 1976, the conflict over power between the 
various civilian political organization continued to 
intensify and to divide members of the Derg among 
sympathisers of one organization or another. Between 
July 1976 and February 1977, Mengistu, backed by a 
faction within the Derg and by the five leftist groups, 
carried out palace coups against other Derg factions and
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emerged as the unchallenged autocrat. In effect, this 
meant that power passed from monarchical autocratic 
control to a collective control by the Derg till the 
beginning of 1975 and then by an officers' junta within 
the Derg and finally reverted back to an autocratic 
control.
In this sense, the re-emergence of autocracy can be 
seen as a continuation of Ethiopia's political culture, 
and hence, not a transformation. However, the similarity 
between the two governments rests on the fact that they 
are both dictatorships. On the other hand, however, 
Mengistu's autocracy is more modern, more determined and 
stronger than its predecessor. This^pf/so because it has 
mobilized the population into social institutions and 
laid an elaborate network of administrative, intelligence 
and party structures with the help of which it controls 
and guides society and pursues its policies more 
vigorously than ever before. The difference is between a 
paternalistic traditional aristocratic autocracy and a 
ruthless 20th century totalitarian autocracy.
The fifth transformation concerned the struggle 
against counter-revolutionary forces and shift of 
international alliances. By the time Mengistu assumed 
dictatorial powers in February 1977, Ethiopia had been 
engulfed by regionalist as well as domestic and 
international counter-revolutionary wars backed by the 
conservative states of the Middle East. Particularly 
important in this regard was the invasion of Ethiopia in 
July 1977 by the Republic of Somalia which was an ally of 
the socialist countries. These created tremendous 
pressures on the new regime forcing it to seek urgent 
international assistance. The fact that the Derg had 
adopted "scientific Socialism” as the official ideology 
and the emergence as victorious of Mengistu's faction 
which was believed to have been pro-Moscow, had brought 
about closer relations between Ethiopia and the socialist 
countries. One of the results of this was the delivery 
of a modest amount of tanks, armed cars and other weapons
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in June 1977 with the help of which the regime was able 
to crush EDU forces in the summer of 1977 and curtail the 
activities of Eritrean insurgents. However, the 
relationship with the socialist countries was not 
consummated until the end of that year. Feeling 
aggrieved by the reluctance of the Socialist countries to 
continue to supply her with weapons and by suspicion that 
they were collaborating with Ethiopia and hoping to 
attract western aid, Somalia unilaterally terminated 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Cuba in 
October thus opening the way for further collaboration 
between Ethiopia and the socialist countries.
Despite the fact that so much is made of the 
strategic importance of Ethiopia, the impact of the shift 
of alliances on the bipolar security system is minimal if 
at all. On the other hand, the massive delivery of 
weapons received from the Soviet Union and the troops 
provided by Cuba were certainly important in enabling 
Ethiopia to achieve quick victories against the counter­
revolutionary forces of EDU, ALF and the Republic of 
Somalia. Also, those victories were a tremendous boosl'to 
the new regime. Given the size of its population, 
however, it is likely that Ethiopia would in the long run 
have prevailed over those forces. Further, the shift of 
alliances was important in characterizing Ethiopia as one 
of the “anti-imperialist1 third world states following 
the non-capitalist path of development with all that it 
implies to her economic relations with the west and east.
The sixth and final transformation was the creation 
of a Leninist party. Soon after his emergence as an all 
powerful leader in February 1977, Mengistu launched the 
Red Terror against EPRP and managed to crush it before 
the year was out. Similarly, between the summers of 1977 
and 1979, he crushed the five organizations that were 
working in close collaboration with him and his faction 
within the Derg. This effectively purged from government 
and social institutions cadres and members of the 
political organizations including those of Mengistu's
- 369 -
own creation (Revolutionary Flame). The liquidation of 
the members of the contending political organizations 
opened the way for their replacement in the government 
and mass organizations by cadres loyal to him and his 
close associates personally. In this way, the ground was 
prepared for Mengistu to personally interview and recruit 
members of the party, appoint the Central Committee and 
politburo members and launch WPE in 1984. As a Leninist 
party, the importance of WPE lay above all in serving as 
an instrument for controlling government and social 
institutions as well as society at large.
(B) THE EMERGENCE OF A REVOLUTIONARY CRISIS
The first three chapters above deal with the 
revolutionary situation in Ethiopia which led to a 
politico-military crisis in early 1974 opening the way 
for a protest movement of the urban population and 
culminating in the collapse of the ancien regime in 
September 1974. It is the central thesis of the first 
chapter that the emergence of the revolutionary crisis 
was, above all, the result of Ethiopia's absorption into 
the European political system which had been taking place 
over a long period of time. In other words, in response 
to European expansionism, the monarch pursued a 
reasonably successful programme of territorial 
consolidation, centralization and modernization from the 
late 19th century which gave birth to a sovereign state, 
a highly centralized autocracy and a new elite. Starting 
from 1960, however, developments in the domestic and 
international scenes began rendering the absolutist 
monarchy obsolete.
First, there emerged regional movements in the 
Ogaden, Bale and Eritrea which were opposed to the 
central government on religious, linguistic and political 
grounds. These movements which were based among the 
predominantly Islamic communities of those regions were 
able to receive material and diplomatic support from the
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countries of the Middle East which sought to liberate 
their co-religionists from the Ethiopian Christian state. 
Juxtaposed against the Middle East was the African 
subsystem which lent its support to the Ethiopian state 
over the regional question but only on the diplomatic 
front. Further, the cold war meant that while Ethiopia 
threw in her lot with the west to ward off Middle Eastern 
pressures on the regional question, at the same time she 
laid herself open to the hostility from the East. Thus 
Ethiopia's domestic problems over the regional question 
coupled with the emergence of the Middle East and Africa 
into the state-system and the emergence of the bi-polar 
security system in the post World War II era not only 
posed a danger to country's territorial integrity but 
also to the credibility of the state.
Second, from 1960 onwards, there emerged an 
increasingly militant opposition against the monarchy 
among the partisans of the modern sector. In December of 
that year, there was an abortive coup d'etat which
scrutiny and criticism in the subsequent years. The army 
which had put down the abortive coup and which later bore 
the brunt of the onslaught of the regional insurgents 
became restive and felt free to demand pay increases from 
the monarch as and when it wished. As the number of 
those in the modern sector grew in the 1960's as a result 
of an accelerated expansion of the bureaucracy and the 
industrial work force, and as the partisans became 
organized into students' unions, teachers' associations, 
trade unions and professional associations, they became 
increasingly politicized and militant.
Despite its numerical insignificance in relation to 
the size of the population, the political impact of the 
new elite (the military and civilian bureaucracies in 
particular) was substantial; this is not surprising, 
since it had taken over the military and administrative 
functions of the traditional elite with the result that 
the monarchy had become more dependent on it. Though the
monarchy and subjected it to rational
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new elite was the product of the modernizing drive of the 
monarchy which it had, under European influence, been 
pursuing for a long time, the allegiance of that class 
was no longer to the traditional institutions of the 
country but to European ideologies and political 
processes. Moreover, the opposition at the centre and on 
the peripheries had a tendency to reinforce each other's 
sentiments against the monarchy: not only did the 
civilians and regional insurgents become ideologically 
closer to one another over time but also the army was 
pinned down by the insurgents in the arid and semi-arid 
regions adding to its grievances against the state.
Third, two aspects of transnational economic 
transactions appear to be relevant to the popular 
uprising of 1974. The first is the fact that Ethiopia's 
cyclical drought was made worse in the 1960's and 1970's 
by a population explosion brought on by the intervention 
of modern medicine (malaria control, antibiotics, health 
centres and the like) made available mainly through 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements. The impact of 
demographic factors on ecology (like forests and rain 
fall) are clear enough. This, coupled with the 
subsistence agrarian economy, gave rise to the food 
crisis of 1973 and 1974 which greatly discredited the 
ancien regime in the eyes of its critics both at home and 
abroad.
The other aspect of the transnational economic 
transaction is the north-south divide. Despite the 
presumed specialization of the north in manufactures and 
of the south in commodities, it is obvious that the 
deteriorating terms of trade for the third world 
countries have militated against the poor countries 
spearheading their development drive through exports. 
Ethiopia's ability to export agricultural products (the 
commodities of special interest to her) is barred by the 
mountains and lakes of temperate agricultural surpluses. 
Further, coffee, Ethiopia's main export earner, has, 
since the early 1960's, been subject to the regime of the
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International Coffee Agreement according to which she can 
export the commodity only in the amount of quota 
allocated to her. Her ability to vary the size of the 
quota is greatly restricted by competition with more 
important third world producers of coffee. Consequently, 
the incentive to increase the production of the commodity 
with a view to exchanging it for weapons, luxury items or 
capital goods, as the case may be, is restricted.
As a result, like all third world governments, the 
ancien regime may have been too constrained by these 
international factors to be able to do much about 
development; however, its critics would attribute any 
lack of development to its ineptitude. It is submitted 
that the broad spectrum of international economic 
transactions (and not the international capitalist system 
understood in the sense of foreign private capital) must 
go some way in explaining the frequency of revolutions in 
the third world and also in constituting one of the 
causal structural dimensions responsible for the 
emergence in Ethiopia of the revolutionary crisis of 
1974.
Fourth, the state which was operating in the 20th 
century within the constraints of this domestic and 
•international ecology was comparable to the reforming but 
at the same time decaying absolutist monarchies of Europe 
of past centuries. As discussed in chapter 4 above, its 
policy of modernization had produced a tiny capitalist 
enclave in the industrial and agricultural sectors.
Apart from the fact that the latter was dominated by 
foreign investors, the development of industries and 
commercial farms came rather late, in the early and late 
1960's, respectively. A more important effect of the 
modernizing drive of the monarchy was the fact that it 
had destroyed its traditional base of authority (the 
aristocratic class of warriors) and replaced it by the 
petit bourgeoisie (civilian and military bureaucrats, 
white collar workers, teachers and students) who became 
opposed to it. Like the traditional base which it
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destroyed, the monarchy belonged to a different age and 
was therefore, unfit to govern a society in which 
participation of broader sections of the population in 
the political life of the country was becoming 
increasingly important. It surrounded itself by the 
residual aristocrats and cut itself off from society? it 
was extremely autocratic and refused to devolve power to 
the new elite? its style of administration (divide and 
rule) was divisive of the new elite and precluded the 
emergence of a credible alternative source of authority 
which would appeal to those in the modern sector.
To crown it all, the monarch (Haile Selassie) with 
so much power in his hands was, by 1974, too old and 
senile to exercise his authority in any meaningful way.
By the same year, the monarchy was so discredited by all 
these trends that its benefactor (the US) had started 
demoting its relations with Ethiopia substantially in 
order to avoid being identified with the ancien regime. 
When the uprising came, the high dignitaries, who had 
lost the leadership of the monarch were too divided among 
themselves to make a difference.
These perspectives of world-time, international 
structures, geopolitics, state and social structures may 
go a good deal of the way in explaining the decline and 
decay of the ancien regime but they do not directly deal 
with the question of why the urban population rose up in 
a spontaneous uprising in 1974 as discussed in chapter 2 
above. When an old-state is in such a state of decay, 
all that is needed to light a revolt is a mere spark like 
the denial to the soldiers and NCO's of access to the 
water well of Negele which led to a mutiny and arrest of 
the officers there in January? the oil price increases 
that led to the demonstration of Addis Ababa taxi owners 
in February? the sector review that brought the teachers 
out on strike in the same month? or the devastation of 
the hidden 1973-1974 drought? the discovery of which led 
to the protests of the students and intellectuals at the 
same time. Such sparks (like the student demonstrations
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and rallies) had been taking place for the previous 
decade. However, they did not light a big fire as did 
the sparks of 1974 mainly because they were contained by 
the police and military force of the state.
It is believed that on balance social order is not 
predicated on consent of the ruled that the latter can 
withdraw at will (as the liberal tradition would have it) 
so much as on coercion, an instrument which the ancien 
regime lost as a result of the structural crisis 
described in the previous paragraphs. In other words, 
the popular uprising of 1974 was possible not because 
those who took part in it were discontented with the old 
order as because the ancien regime was too weak to 
control even its cities.
The revolt of the urban population cannot be fully 
explained by reference to its relations with the state 
only but also by its internal structures. In this 
regard, the fact that the members of the urban population 
lived in close proximity to one another, that they were 
organized into unions and associations of all 
descriptions and that they were, in addition, able to 
organize spontaneous steering committees in their places 
of work are all relevant. Chapter 2 above gives emphasis 
to this ability of the urban population to organize and 
its ability therefore to prepare endless petitions and 
co-ordinate strikes, demonstrations, and rallies and in 
this way harass the government. Perhaps, the absence of 
similar structures among the rural population goes to 
explain to a degree why they also did not rise up in 
revolt at the time of the popular uprising. By the same 
token, the superior organisational structure of the 
military and its access to the resources of the state 
goes to explain why it, as opposed to the other urban 
groups, was finally able to replace the ancien regime.
While it is proper to emphasise the structural 
approach, there is still the need to take into account 
the role of will. Strikes, demonstrations and rallies 
would have been unimaginable a few decades earlier; the
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environment for such actions was created only with 
increased industrialization and urbanization. Moreover, 
it is believed that such actions were guided by the will 
or belief systems of the actors, belief systems that grew 
with industrialization and urbanization and (as argued in 
chapter 1 above) belief systems directly emulated from 
abroad. Particularly relevant in this regard was the 
educational system pursued by the country, the expatriate 
teachers, the library facilities, and the training of 
members of the military and civilian elite abroad. All 
these were effective channels through which western ideas 
like Marxism were imported and propagated particularly 
among those who emerged out of the crisis of 1974 as the 
agents of the revolution. It appears that the 
international dynamic was relevant not only in 
influencing the actions of the state but also those of 
certain sections of the population even when the impact 
of the transnational on a given society takes place over 
the head of the state.
It is believed that the above international and 
domestic constraints and opportunities within which the 
old state and the new elite had to operate are relevant 
in explaining the emergence of the revolutionary crisis 
in Ethiopia but they are by no means the only approaches 
that have been applied to the question.
One of these is the classical Marxian class concept 
of society within a given state according to which the 
exploited lower classes revolt and overthrow the surplus 
appropriating upper classes. The official rhetoric is 
replete with this exposition of the old order and of the 
1974 uprising? the rhetoric of the leftist political 
groups often slides into it.
However, as argued in Chapter 2, the exploited 
peasantry did not take part in the uprising? the role of 
the industrial workers in the uprising was not any more 
militant than any of the other groups including the 
church and mosque clergy. Rather it was the army, 
teachers, students and the white collar leaders of the
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trade unions who played a more active role than the other 
groups. In fact, it may boldly be stated that in the 
context of Ethiopia, to be a worker is not to be 
exploited so much as to be privileged: it is to have a 
regular income, however little, and to have access to 
health services and schools which were not, on the whole, 
available to the unemployed or to the peasants. However, 
privilege does not seem to be a guarantee against revolt 
since it is the more privileged (the petit-bourgeoisie) 
who were more active in the uprising than any other 
sections of the population. Conversely, exploitation 
which characterized the Ethiopian society since time 
immemorial does not appear to be a recipe for revolt. 
There were certainly rivalries among the petitbourgeoisie 
at the time of the uprising - for example between the 
higher and lower employees of government departments or 
between the junior and senior officers - but these cannot 
be sensibly equated with class divisions. At any rate, 
in the post-Lenin period, Marxist intellectuals have 
abandoned the phenomena of intra-national class 
exploitation as a valid causal explanation of revolution.
Closely related to this is the theory of 
structuralist Marxism according to which transnational 
capital flows destabilize the existing social and 
political order and cause the overthrow of the old-state. 
As documented amply in chapters 3, 5, and 7, this was the 
central rhetorical point of the left wing political 
organisations including most notable EPRP and AESM as 
well as that of the regime as reflected by their common 
juxtaposing of classes into imperialism, feudalism and 
bureaucratic-capitalism, on one hand, and the workers and 
peasants, on the other.1 Of the serious authors on the 
Ethiopian revolution, Markakis and Nega Ayele were the 
first to offer a version of this theory. They argue that, 
the alliance between the Ethiopian ruling class and 
international capital (an alliance forged by the former's 
encouragement of foreign investment) precluded the 
emergence of an indigenous middle class (and incidental
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the possibility of a middle class revolution). They 
explain that the state's intervention on behalf of 
capital in taking drastic measures against workers' 
restiveness made them militant? that the domination of 
the modern sector by foreign capital narrowed the social 
horizon of the educated petit-bourgeoisie by barring its 
way from emerging as a middle class and reducing it to 
employee status? and that the control of large scale 
trade blocked the emergence of the self-employed 
petitbourgeoisie (the lower mercantile class) into a 
middle class. This, they argue, was the reason why the 
petit-bourgeoisie (including the students who prepared 
the ground for revolution by politicising land reform and 
the exploitation of workers by the alliance of the ruling 
class with international capital) joined the workers and 
peasants in 1974.2
Similarly, the work of Halliday and Molyneux, which 
is much richer in the structures it considers, argues on 
this point, that the main social impact of exogenous 
capital was on the state machinery itself, on the civil 
servants including the teachers and army officers who 
were most exposed to alternative ideas and political 
models. They maintain that this was because the civil 
servants and students came from an intermediate social 
strata.3
These authors were right in choosing the petit 
bourgeoisie and, to a lesser extent, the working class as 
the main target of the influence of penetrating capital 
since these were the classes that were most active in the 
popular uprising. On the other hand, the impact of 
penetrating capital is portrayed by these authors 
predominantly as acting on the cognitive state of the 
consciousness of these classes without acknowledging what 
they are doing, they thus transform what is intended to 
be an economic explanation into a purposive one.
Moreover, as noted earlier, an exogenously stimulated 
capitalist relation is not the only nor the most 
important source of political consciousness nor of
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discontent as seems to be suggested especially by 
Markakis and Ayele. Finally, if by capital it is meant 
•'private foreign capital", as seems to be implied by 
these authors then it is not logical to speak of the 
impact of incorporation before it has taken place, 
before, in other words, a sizable amount of foreign 
capital has been imported into the country. As argued in 
chapter 4, the amount of private foreign capital invested 
in Ethiopia was absolutely minimal.4 Halliday and 
Molyneux confirm this fact when they point out that 
Ethiopia and Afghanistan were not attractive economically 
to be absorbed into the world economy5 perhaps meaning 
that those countries did not have the natural resources 
that would attract foreign capital.
Clapham rejects the validity of economic determinist 
explanations altogether and shifts the whole debate to 
the political sphere. To him, it is the political 
ineffectiveness of an inherently decaying monarchy and 
not economic exploitation that leads to revolutions. 
Essentially, Clapham focuses his analysis on the state 
perceived as being autonomous from economic or class 
reductionism6. Since states are at the centre of all 
revolutions and since it is obvious that a decaying 
state which is unable to control its citizens must 
collapse, Clapham's emphasis on the autonomy of the state 
is very much to the point. However, the collapse of an 
old-state need not necessarily lead to social and 
political transformations, as the collapse of the 
decaying Gondar dynasty did not at the time of Tewodros 
and his successors. Further, one of the main reasons for 
the failure of General Mengistu's coup of 1960 and the 
success of the 1974 uprising was, arguably, the fact that 
an enlarged and more politicised urban social sector had 
emerged between the two conjunctures. It appears that 
the varied structures should be used not only to explain 
the constraints and opportunities of the ancien regime 
but also to explain those of the modern social sector
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which appears to be equally important for the emergence 
of the revolutionary crisis of 1974.
Perhaps, more than the works of Halliday and 
Molyneux as well as that of Clapham, the method employed 
here to explain the emergence of revolutionary crisis is 
a reaction to Skocpol who is one of the most influential 
contemporary authorities on the sociology of revolutions. 
To her, the emergence of a revolution is the causal 
convergence of three structural dimensions (the division 
of society into producing property-owning-surplus- 
appropriating classes, the internal repressive and 
resource extractive capabilities of the state, and the 
external military and economic pressures upon the state). 
Skocpol explains that she developed her theory from the 
classical Marxian perspective of the division of society 
into producer and surplus appropriating classes and from
, *7 ,
conflict theory . Her work appears to be eminently 
relevant for the project of explaining the Ethiopian 
revolution not least because her work is concerned with 
revolutions in agrarian bureaucratic societies (France, 
Russia and China) which were the main focus of her study. 
Furthers)she maintains that the studying of the specific 
inter-relations of class and state structures and the 
complex interplay of domestic and international 
developments are useful for describing the logic of 
social revolutionary causes and outcomes "from France in 
the 1790's to Ethiopia in the 1970's"8. However, it is 
here in order to point out some of the difficulties 
involved in applying Skocpol's model to the Ethiopian 
experience.
The first of these is Skocpol's insistence on what 
she calls "the non-purposive structural perspective" of 
the causes and outcomes of revolutions. In this, the 
central point of her argument is that the causes and 
outcomes of revolutions are determined by social, state 
and international structures and not by the will and 
actions of the agents of revolutions9. Without doubt, 
Skocpol advances forceful arguments in support of her
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position? nevertheless, she can still be accused of 
reducing the sociology of revolution to the study of 
fate.
Despite its structural reductionist insistence (its 
refusal to take human will into account) the approach 
does make sense in the context of the causes of 
revolutions when the "emergence1 of revolutionary crises 
appears to be beyond any individual's or group's control. 
The Ethiopian experience is a case in point. By all 
account, the uprising was spontaneous and it could hardly 
be otherwise in the absence of any political organization 
to direct the course of events, if historical events can 
be directed at all. Even then, an argument can be made 
(as in the previous paragraph) that the cognitive state 
of the social actors had a role to play in influencing 
the collapse of the ancien regime. Moreover, when it 
comes to the course and outcome of the revolution (to the 
coincidence at times between the intentions of the agents 
of the revolution and outcomes, to the struggles between 
revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries, to the 
influence dictators yield), the impact of human will and 
action looks even greater.
Secondly, though Skocpol acknowledges the 
international capitalist system as a valid causal 
explanatory component, she gives much more emphasis to 
political rather than economic considerations. In what 
she calls the "organizational realist perspective", she 
treats the state as an autonomous organisation in 
competition with other states and in potential conflict 
with agrarian class structures10. According to this 
scheme, a typical scenario of the emergence of a 
revolutionary crisis would be if the state, because of 
international military threats, launched a programme of 
centralization or economic restructuring which goes 
against the interests of the dominant class. A 
revolutionary situation would emerge if the dominant 
class is in a position to obstruct the programmes,
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paralyse the regime and open the way for the lower class 
revolt.
Arguably, such a situation existed in the Ethiopia 
of the 1930's when Italian invasion was a reality and 
when the aristocracy were obstructing the centralization 
and modernization drive of the monarchy (centralization 
and modernization set in motion by European expansionism 
in the first place). Nevertheless, such structural 
conjunctures did not lead to a revolution at the time.
By 1974, however, the peasantry had shown no tendency to 
revolt and the aristocracy oj&s replaced by the new elite 
as a result of the modernization policy of the monarchy 
so that it was unable to play its obstructive role.
To sum up, the international environment was
relevant in several respects. European expansionism was
important in setting in motion the processes of
territorial consolidation, centralization and
modernization starting from the end of the 19th century.
The threat posed by the countries of the Middle East in
the post-war years was important in driving Ethiopia to
the security umbrella of the US and, hence, in bringing
ih.
her to the centre stage of the cold warthe broad sense 
aid and trade were important in exaox^rbating the food 
crisis of the early 1970's and, also, in creating 
constraints to the economic development of Ethiopia? and 
the contact of the new elite with western Europe was 
important in providing to the former contemporary 
political modes.
The emergence of the revolutionary crisis was in 
part the result, not of capitalist penetration which in 
the case of Ethiopia was incidental, but of the longtime 
centralization and modernization policy of the monarchy 
which gave rise to a class of military and civilian 
bureaucrats, teachers, students, and workers who together 
embodied the core of the 1974 protest uprising. Further, 
Skocpol's idea of state competition leading to changes in 
domestic economic policies which result in agrarian elite 
obstruction and in peasant revolt does not appear to be
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relevant to the emergence of the revolutionary crisis in 
Ethiopia. The fact that the crisis did not involve the 
agrarian class structures distinguishes the Ethiopian 
experience from the French and Soviet revolutions but not 
necessarily from those of China and Vietnam where the 
rural sector was mobilized after the collapse of the 
old-states.
(C) THE MOBILIZATION OF THE RURAL POPULATION
The question in the abstract of "Which class is 
revolutionary?" does not seem to be particularly helpful. 
The workers, who are normally portrayed by Marxists as 
the most revolutionary of classes, have been accused in 
the circumstances of the two world wars of having played 
a reactionary role in abandoning the principles of 
proletarian internationalism and in fighting on the side 
of nationalist and conservative forces. Conversely, the 
middle class which is normally portrayed as reactionary 
had, according to Marx, played a revolutionary role at 
the time of the French revolution. Further, Lenin, and 
later Soviet scholars, have accorded a revolutionary role 
to anti-imperialist, anti-communist and who were 
nationalist third world leaders.11. There seems to be a 
general consensus that the feudal class is reactionary 
though it could, perhaps, arguably be maintained that the 
class did not necessarily play a reactionary role in the 
German and Japanese transformations in which it acted in 
concert with the reforming upper class. From this, it 
can be concluded that whether a particular class is 
revolutionary or not depends not on the intrinsic 
disposition of the class so much as on the context within 
which it is operating.
In the wake of the successful peasant revolutions of 
the 20th century, and particularly in the wake of the 
Vietnamese peasant revolution which pinned down the 
resources of a superpower over such a long time, the 
contexts within which peasants participate in radical
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politics have been made the subject of scrutiny by 
western scholars. Thus scrutinized were the immediate 
circumstances of the peasants including their 
geo-politics, their mode of production and their 
relations with landlords; the relations of the peasants 
to political organizations? their relations with the 
state? and the impact of the international capitalist 
world on them*^. It is believed that of these composite 
factors, political organizations, state competition, 
relations with the old-state, geo-politics and mode of 
production are, in various degrees, the most relevant to 
the mobilization of the Ethiopian rural population. As 
described in chapter 4, the Ethiopian rural relations of 
production were so diverse that one could find parallels 
between them and those categories that are familiar in 
the Marxian tradition: primitive, communal, classical,
feudal, Asiatic and capitalist. Nevertheless, suffice it 
here to comment only on three rural social formations 
(the nomads, the tenants and the rist-holders) as these 
together constituted almost the entire rural population.
The general literature on nomad participation in 
radical politics is thin on the ground? however, the 
Ethiopian experience confronts us precisely with this 
question. It has been pointed out in chapter 1 that the 
Islamic nomads of the Ogaden and of the Eritrean Sahil 
plains had been involved in regional or secessionist 
struggles against the central Christian government since 
about 1960. It was argued, further, that this was 
occasioned by the emergence among them of political 
organizations (WSLF and ELF) and by the ability of these 
organizations to persuade the nomads that it was in their 
interest to provide the organizations with human and 
material resources and participate in the struggle. It 
was also pointed out that the involvement of the nomads 
in radical politics was made possible by the material and 
diplomatic support provided by the Islamic states of the 
Middle East in the hope of promoting the cause of their
• • • • • , , i  *»co-religionists in those regions of Ethiopia. In
- 384 -
chapters 5 and 7, it has also been pointed out that the 
Islamic nomads of Afar were similarly mobilized in 1976 
by the ALF with the backing of the conservative Arab 
states.14 In these cases, it is not difficult to see how 
the interplay between the emergence of even conservative 
political organizations, state competition and 
geo-politics (the fact that the nomads lived in areas 
that could easily be penetrated by the political 
organizations and the Islamic states) goes to mobilize 
nomadic people into radical politics.
On the other hand, the new regime has failed to 
mobilize the nomadic people into the revolutionary 
process and, hence, into the political life of the 
country. This was because some of those communities have 
continued to be controlled by the regionalist political 
organizations. Further, in the case of the remaining, 
the institutions created by the revolution (cadres and 
mass organizations) have not been versatile enough to 
penetrate the ever mobile nomads and influence their 
lives. The regionalist organizations have, in this 
regard, shown superior commitment and versatility.
The sedentary farmers who constitute the great 
majority of the people who live in the highlands of 
Ethiopia. Save in the numerically unimportant cases of 
those in the highlands of Bale and Eritrea, the rest were 
neither mobilized by any political organization nor 
hardly incorporated into the political life of the 
old-state. The Derg, in competition with the leftist 
political organizations (most notable EPRP and AESM) for 
the heart and mind of the peasants issued the policy of 
Development Through Campaign Programme in November 1974 
and the Public Ownership of Rural Land Proclamation in 
March 1975. With the help of these legislations the 
landed class was ousted from their land holding and the 
peasantry was organized before the year was out.
The deployment in the countryside of some 60,000 
teachers and students from January 1975 under the 
Campaign Programme created the occasion for EPRP and AESM
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to strengthen themselves by recruiting members from among 
the participants of the Programme and to take an active 
part in the politicisation and organization of the 
peasant masses. The teachers and students, who had 
already been highly politicized, were if anything over- 
zealous in their campaign to instigate the peasants to 
revolt and drive the landlords out of their holdings.
The speed with which these groups acted was so swift that 
the Derg's radicalism could not keep abreast with the 
events. Despite that, it can only be said that the Derg 
did, indeed, take the initiative in the mobilization of 
the peasants? not only did it issue the Campaign 
Programme which created the conditions under which the 
teachers, students and political organizations were able 
to act, but also issued the Proclamation which authorised 
the "nationalization” of rural land and its 
redistribution to the peasants Further, even more 
important was the fact that it committed the state's 
military resources against landlord backlash.
Regarding the degree of incorporation of the rural 
population into the new polity, a distinction is often 
made between the peasants of the north and those of the 
south on the basis of the particular relations of 
production that had prevailed among them. Prior to the 
reforms in the south, where big land ownership and 
crop-sharing arrangements were widespread, the peasants 
are said to have embraced the transformation with open 
arms? whereas in the north, where the rist system was 
widespread, the peasants are said to be resistant to the 
change and to the new regime. Viewed from the 
perspective of the prevalence of guerilla activities 
against the regime in the north, the argument seems to 
hold water. However, there are considerations which 
militate against pinning down the resistance entirely to 
the differences in the modes of production that had 
existed in the north and south.
First, though there was a greater incidence of 
share-cropping arrangements in the south, there were at
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the same time important pockets of tenancy among minority 
groups in the north. The figures of the Ministry of Land 
Reform and Administration suggest that the extent of 
tenancy in the south and north was about 25 percent and 
11 percent of the rural population, respectively. Second, 
though the extent and variation is not clear, upper class 
surplus appropriation and exaction of certain 
"seigneurial” rights had persisted both among 
share-croppers and rist-holders. Third, more important, 
was the fact that the Derg's reforms were carried out in 
the north in competition with a number of other political 
organizations which were opposed to it, namely, EPLF, 
EPRP, EDU and TPLF. The preponderance of resistance in 
the north can in part be explained by geo-political 
factors: by the region's proximity to northern Sudan and
the Red Sea and through them to the Middle East from 
where much of the assistance to the insurgents has 
originated. It has already been noted that the 
conservative Arab states were providing assistance to 
ELF, EDU and ALF and trying to bring them under a joint 
front and that the EPLF, which was, probably, receiving 
much of its assistance from the progressive forces in the 
Middle East and beyond, was promoting EPRP and TLF.
In some respects, the factors relevant for the 
mobilization of the nomads and peasants were similar. In 
both cases, geo-politics and political organizations 
appear to have played an important role. On the other 
hand, however, the nomads (but not the peasants) seem to 
have been capable of acting in the face of danger to 
their security posed by the old state. This can perhaps 
be explained by the fact that they live a mobile life 
which had precluded the emergence among them of an upper 
class allied to the state and capable of regulating their 
daily lives. This could only have made it difficult for 
the State to establish a presence of its administrative 
machinery in their midst and control them. These factors 
coupled with the emergence of political organizations 
among them, shielded the nomadic people from reprisals by
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the old state. The importance of the international 
factor appears to have been as important to nomad 
mobilization in the lowlands as the collapse of the 
old-state was to the peasant mobilization in the 
highlands.
The elite, especially when organized and armed, 
appears to play the most crucial role in the mobilization 
of the lower class? this seems to have been born out by 
the experience of Ethiopia. This is not surprising since 
it is the class capable of articulating the grievances of 
the lower class, providing alternative political models, 
acting as a vehicle for the transfer of resources from 
international sources and since, above all, it stands to 
benefit from the redistribution of power involved in the 
revision of the status quo. The Ethiopian experience 
suggests that the convergence of nationalism and Leninist 
strategy in a political organization appears to make it 
much more potent and effective than organizations which 
lack one or both elements. TfLf- which espoused Maoism and 
which operated among the linguistic group of Tigre from 
which its members were drawn is the only credible 
organization to the south of Eritrea which has survived 
the 1977 new regime's onslaught against the pan-Ethiopian 
and regionalist political organizations. Conversely, EDU 
which was right wing and EPRPwhich was left wing, (both 
being pan-Ethiopian organizations), were not based on a 
particular nationality and they were both wiped out by 
the Derg during 1977. The triumph in Eritrea of the left 
wing EPLF over its right wing rival (ELF) appears to 
confirm this argument. The doubling by Tpjjp and EPLF in 
Maoist style guerilla strategy and the exploitation of 
local nationalist sentiments appears to have given these 
organizations superior qualities in mobilizing the rural 
population.
Skocpol makes a distinction between autonomous 
patterns of peasant mobilization (the French, Russian and 
Mexican revolutions) and directed patterns of peasant 
mobilization (the Chinese, Vietnamese and Cuban
- 388 -
revolutions and the anti-colonial movements in Portuguese 
Africa). Under the first pattern, the peasants revolt 
during the breakdown of the ancien regime thus 
undercutting the landed upper class and preparing the way 
for the emergence of the revolutionary state. In these 
cases, the organizations of the new state do not mobilize 
the peasants politically but rather by coercively 
imposing administrative and military controls on the 
countryside. Under the second pattern, on the other 
hand, the peasants are directly mobilized by organizing 
revolutionary movements either before (Cuba and 
Portuguese Africa) or after (China and Vietnam) the 
collapse of the ancien regime. According to Skocpol, 
though peasant participation under the second pattern is 
less spontaneous than under the first, the results could 
still be more favourable to the peasants because, during 
the revolutionary process, direct links would have been 
established between them and the political organizations 
and because peasant resources and manpower would have 
ended up participating in the building up of the new 
regime's social institutions and state organizations as a 
result of the direct mobilizations15.
Viewed from these perspectives, the mobilization of 
the Ethiopian peasantry appears to have been an episode 
unto itself. Unlike the first pattern of mobilization, 
the role of the Ethiopian peasants at the time of the 
popular uprising of 1974 was minimal. It was neither 
spontaneous nor autonomous nor did it lead to sudden land 
seizures nor to refusal of any feudal rights and thus 
preparing the ground for a revolutionary regime to take 
over.
Further, the mobilization of the Ethiopian peasants 
does not fit the second pattern either. Initially, EPRP 
had a peasant-based guerilla strategy with which it 
sought to encircle the urban centres and squeeze out the 
ancien regime. However, despite the fact that it 
continued to establish and strengthen isolated rural 
military bases after the outbreak of the revolution, EPRP
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was deflected from that strategy by its choice in the 
summer of 1976 to launch an urban armed struggle against 
Mengistu's coalition; the result was total defeat in the 
urban centres and internecine squabbles which led to the 
dismantling of its bases in the countryside. With the 
exception of TPLF which may have designs of replacing the 
central government by over-running the cities from a 
rural base, this put an end to the possibility of a 
direct peasant mobilization by an organization contending 
for power against the ancien regime and against the new 
one.
Instead, the peasants were mobilized mainly by the 
Derg after the ancien regime had collapsed and, hence, 
without their human and material resources having 
participated in the revolutionary process in exchange for 
land redistribution and for abolition of upper class 
exploitation. The one exception to this was the fact 
that the hundreds of thousands of the militia was raised 
from among the peasantsp In the spring of 1977, in this 
way, the peasants did, indeed, take part, not so much in 
the red terror, but in the new regime's anti-regionalist 
and anti-counter-revolutionary wars. However, this came 
(not as a result of reciprocal benefits) but as a result 
of forceful recruitment made possible by the new regime's 
coercive imposition already achieved before the wars of 
1977.
The imposition on the peasants of the regime's 
social and administrative institutions began with the 
establishment of peasant associations as envisaged by the 
Public Ownership of Rural Land Proclamation of March 
1975, which was substantially implemented in the same 
year. Thereafter, the associations were established at 
the wereda, awraja, provincial and national levels. In 
this way, the peasants were subordinated to the Derg and 
then to the party. The peasants were also subordinated 
to the local government administration through which 
superior government decisions were communicated and 
implemented. According to the 1975 Proclamation the main
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function of the associations was to take part in the 
redistribution of land. Later, however, their functions 
were extended to cover a wide mandate over local social, 
economic, political and security affairs. In the 
meantime, the intensification of the struggle between 
EPRP and Mengistu's coalition and, later, between the 
member organizations of the coalition inter se gave a 
boost to their use by the regime as instruments of 
campaign and coercion in its drive to oust members and 
supporters of those political organizations from the 
ranks of the associations. More importantly, however, 
they recruited from among their members hundreds of 
thousands men to help in the raising of a peoples militia 
which fought in the wars against Somalia in 1977 and of 
the regions since then. One of the effects of the 
emphasis laid on the organization, politicization and 
arming of the peasants and in that way, sucking them into 
conflicts of the political organizations has been the 
neglect of their social and economic functions.
Perhaps, the fact that peasant participation in the 
revolutionary process was not based on reciprocal 
benefits with the government but rather exacted 
coercively goes some way to explain the regime's 
attitudes towards them. When prompted by aid agencies, 
its officials often argue that the quota system, (by 
which the peasants are forced to sell a portion of their 
produce to the government at below the market price), 
should not be abolished because the peasants have 
benefited a lot from the revolution whereas the urban 
population has not. Further, the regime has felt free to 
forcefully move the peasant from one end of the country 
to the other under its "Resettlement Programme" (a 
programme ostensibly designed to give fertile land to the 
drought affected peasants) It has also felt free to 
forcefully herd them into villages from their 
pre-existing scattered hamlets under its programme of 
"villagization" (a programme intended allegedly to
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facilitate the delivery of services like schools, clinics 
and meals).
To sum up, with the exception of the nomads and the 
highland peasants a variable number of whom have come 
under the control of the regionalist movements over the 
years, the remaining sections of the Rural population 
have been mobilized and incorporated into the new polity. 
Since then, the peasants have controlled the movements of 
anti-government elements in the countryside, and provided 
the regime with fighting men as well as with their 
"surplus" produce to feed its army. What they have 
received in return is not clear. The redistribution of 
land has granted them a mere right to use land; it has 
not led to the control of their surplus any more than the 
previous system had done. The one sidedness of the 
benefits in the relations between the peasants and the 
state is, arguably, a result of the way they were 
mobilized. It did not come about as a result of 
instigating them to take part in the revolutionary 
processes with any degree of enthusiasm through promises 
of good times to come but as a result of coercively 
organizing, politicizing and arming them. If the 
Ethiopian experience is a case of peasant revolution, it 
can be so only to the extent that the peasants are used 
by the new state.
(D) THE CONTENDING AGENTS OF THE REVOLUTION
Various writers have proposed different social 
groups and classes as being effective agents of the 
Ethiopian revolution. The candidates are the lower class 
(workers and peasants), the upper class (the high 
civilian and military officials), and the intermediate 
social strata. However, the question of which class or 
other social group "led" the revolution is important in 
the characterisation of the revolution and the answer to 
it depends on the approach adopted.
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An example of this is Marx who defines the role of 
classes in revolutions as follows: the generation of a
nacent mode of production within the confines of an 
existing one creates a dynamic basis for the growth of 
unity and consciousness of each proto-revolutionary class 
through ongoing struggles with the existing dominant 
class... The revolution is accomplished through class 
action led by the self-conscious rising revolutionary 
class, i.e., the bourgeoisie in bourgeois revolutions and 
by the proletariat in socialist revolutions.16 In 
Ethiopia, there was no middle class to talk of and the 
small size of the proletariat that existed did at best 
participate in the urban uprising of 1974 and, like the 
other social institutions, became the arena of struggle 
for the regime and the political organizations 
thereafter. At no stage did it play a leading role.
Marx did not envisage the intermediate and peasant 
classes as revolutionary.
The ideas of later day Marxists are, perhaps, more 
relevant to the Ethiopian case than those of Marx 
himself? however, their controversial nature makes their 
usefulness doubtful. It was they, most notably soviet 
scholars, who developed the notion of the non-capitalist 
path of development or states of socialist orientation 
according to which it was envisaged that an amalgam of 
intermediate and/or lower classes in pre-capitalist 
states could lead any revolution at all. But then, the 
controversy has since been raging as to whether such a 
revolution is nationalist, middle class or socialist 
which in effect means that the question of which class is 
leading it is unsettled.17 Arguably, a version of this 
approach is that of Markakis who maintains that the 
Ethiopian revolution was led by the workers and peasants 
with the support of certain sections of the intermediate 
classes especially the students.18 However, in the case 
of Ethiopia, it is difficult to maintain that 
intermediate classes and their organizations were
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organically linked to the exploited classes since any 
interaction between them and the workers and peasants was 
at best superficial having come only after the outbreak 
of the revolutionary crisis of 1974.
Skocpol, who draws her approach from Marx, defines 
social revolutions as follows: "Social revolutions are
rapid basic transformations of a society's class and 
state structures and they are accompanied and in part 
carried through by class based revolts from below."19 
The changes that have taken place in Ethiopia certainly 
amount to a rapid and basic transformation of class and 
state structures. However, the reference to social 
revolutions being of necessity accompanied or in part 
carried through by class based revolts from below is of 
doubtful validity at least to the experience of Ethiopia. 
In fact, when Skocpol talks about revolts from below, she 
has in mind peasant revolt in the overthrow of her ancien 
regimes of France and Russia or the overthrow of a post­
revolutionary state which fails to control the 
countryside as in the case of post-1911 China. Skocpol 
does not think much of urban uprisings. In the case of 
Ethiopia, however, urban revolt was by far the most 
important factor in the overthrow of the old-state. 
Peasant participation came as part of the revolutionary 
regime's programme of reform. In fact, whether the word 
"revolt" can ever be used to refer to any of the 
Ethiopian peasant activities at any stage is doubtful.
Another approach is proffered by Trimberger's notion 
of "revolution from above". According to it, high 
military and civilian bureaucrats, without great land 
holdings or ties to landlords or merchant classes, 
overthrow traditional rulers and institute a programme of 
modernization covering radical social and economic 
r e f o r m s . Halliday and Maxine Molyneux endorse, with 
some proviso, this proposition as being valid to the 
Ethiopian case.21
Here again, the problem is the question of the 
actors in the revolution. Skocpol's cases show a crucial
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role being played by the lower class. By contrast, the 
cases of Trimberger (the revolutions of Japan in 1868, 
Turkey in 1923, Egypt in 1952 and Peru in 1968) show the 
crucial role being played by the upper class (the high 
military and civilian bureaucrats). It may be maintained 
that since the radical socio-political reforms in 
Ethiopia were by and large given by the Derg to the 
peasants (instead of resulting from reciprocal 
transactions between the two), the revolution was carried 
out from above. However, viewed strictly from the class 
point of view, it is doubtful whether the notion of 
"revolution from above" fits the Ethiopian experience at 
all.
Such a possibility existed in the abortive coup of 
1960. One of the differences between it and the 1974 
onslaught against the old-state was the fact that the 
former, perhaps like most military political revolts, was 
led by high military and civilian officials while the 
latter was led by lower ranking officers, NCO's and 
privates. This seems to suggest that the 1974 political 
crisis was, if anything, a result of lower class action 
or a revolt from below as argued by some observers on the 
basis that the lower ranking officers and privates were 
from humbler backgrounds than the senior ones. The fact 
that in 1974 the employees of all the government and non­
government organizations were at odds with the top 
several officials in each of those organizations has, 
generally, also been invoked to support the argument that 
the revolt of that year was from below. Whatever the 
merits of these arguments, it is difficult to maintain 
that the Ethiopian socio-political transformation was a 
case of revolution from above since, in 1974 and after, 
it was the intermediate classes that were the most 
important actors in the revolution and since the high 
military and civilian officials were eliminated by them.
Upper and lower class action in the early stages of 
the Ethiopian revolution was made to look important. 
However, this was not because the lower class revolted
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and prepared the ground for the takeover of power by the 
revolutionary regime nor because the upper class, which 
was in any case weakened by long years of the monarchy's 
modernization programme put up much resistance against 
the revolution. Rather, it was, arguably, because, being 
influenced by Leninist strategies the agents of the 
revolution saw the lower class as a potential ally of the 
revolution to be cultivated and the upper class as an 
enemy of the revolution to be eliminated and, 
consequently, echoed these notions in their campaigns and 
actions.
In other words, it was the intermediate classes (the 
security forces, the civilian bureaucrats, the students, 
teachers and workers) who, without much support from 
below or much resistance from above "revolted" in 1974 
and prepared the ground for the takeover of power by the 
armed forces. Moreover, afterwards, the course of the 
revolution is characterized not so much by lower and 
upper class conflict but by the struggle between the 
political organizations inter se and between them and the 
regime. It appears, also, that the intensity of the 
struggle as reflected in the red terror and the depth of 
the transformations as reflected in the radicalism of the 
nationalization of rural land was the result not of class 
but of rivalry between the same actors over power. Thus, 
Skocpol's and Trimberger's notion of lower and upper 
class participation in revolutions does not appear to be 
half as important to the Ethiopian case as that of the 
intermediate class.
With some proviso, I find Tilly's idea of revolution 
more aptly describes the effective actors and the 
interplay between them that gave birth to the 
transformations in the Ethiopian revolution than do the 
works of Marx, Skocpol or Trimberger. According to 
Tilly's model, a revolution is a special kind of 
collective action in which the government and other 
organized contenders for power fight for ultimate 
sovereignty over a population and in which the contenders
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succeed in displacing existing power holders.22 Tilly's 
idea of "multiple sovereignty which relates to the 
occasion of the take over of power from an old-state can 
be extended to describe the course of the revolution 
afterwards. Examples of this in the case of Ethiopia 
were the post-1974 struggle among the political 
organizations which culminated in the red terror of 1977, 
and the ensuing intense competition over the recruitment 
of members by the remaining organizations during which 
the population was forced to obey more than one 
authority. More relevant to the issue at hand is, 
however, the fact that Tilly accords a central role not 
to upper or lower class but to organized group action in 
the course and outcome of the revolution. It was the 
organized corporate groups that were most active during 
the popular uprising of 1974 and, afterwards, it was the 
political organizations that took their place and brought 
about "socialist" socio-economic and political reforms by 
creating pressure on the Derg. Needless to say, these 
organized groups were dominated by the intermediate 
sections of the population.
This may explain how the interplay of actions by the 
organized groups up to at least 1977 influenced the 
outcomes of the revolution but it does not explain the 
question of why the intermediate classes, especially the 
lower ranking officers and privates, became active in the 
1974 popular uprising in the first place. Here, perhaps, 
culture rather than class is the more helpful of the two 
explanations. According to some anthropologists, the 
class stratification of the Ethiopian society has not 
been as strictly articulated and solidified as it is in 
Europe. According to Levine, for example, the Ethiopian 
peasant thinks that he is born// to great destiny and that 
his current position is to him only provisional.23 
Further, it is widely known that the son of a well-to-do 
person left his home early in his childhood for a distant 
place and pursued priesthood, a military-administrative 
career or any other profession by attending a church
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school or by serving a master often in extremely deprived 
circumstances. Also, whatever title he earns in his life 
time like fiefdom was often not capable of being passed 
on to his heirs. Yet again, though one of the dynasties 
maintained that it was a descendant of Solomon the Wise 
and, hence, claimed an exclusive hold on the throne, 
there were other dynasties that ruled northern Ethiopia 
over the centuries. For example, two outstanding 10th 
century monarchy (Tewodros and Yohannis), who initiated 
the territorial consolidation and centralization of 
present-day Ethiopia, had no royal connections whatever 
and, arguably, suffered no legitimacy crisis as a result. 
In other words, class and position were, to say the 
least, less transgenerational, and vertical social 
mobility more widespread, than in Europe. To Moore at 
least, culture plays a dominant role in whether a social 
group took part in revolutionary politics or not.24
Perhaps, this suggests that in Ethiopia an 
individual or group capable of altering its social 
position would readily take advantage of a favourable 
situation created by the convergence of structural 
changes even when that involves the use of force and 
violence. Compared to other social groups, the army had 
the advantage of being organized and armed, perhaps the 
reason why the other classes and social groups were not 
able to act effectively and alter their position. 
Moreover, with the establishment of Revolutionary Flame 
and the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, the army acquired a 
political organization and ideology which gave it a sense 
of purpose, international allies and further access to 
the resources of coercion on top of what it had inherited 
from the old-state. Though the civilian political 
organizations greatly influenced the outcome of the 
revolution, they were no match to such a military and 
political organization and were doomed to lose the 
struggle against it.
That the army should succeed in taking power is 
hardly surprising when we consider the multiplicity of
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military coups and political revolutions in the third 
world by which the Derg could not but be influenced. In 
fact, the first attempted military coup in sub-saharan 
Africa was the one attempted against Haile Selassie in 
1960 in which most of the Derg members would have 
participated by fighting on the side of the loyalists.
As such, they were fully aware of the fate that befell 
the 1960 coup leaders and their followers (capital 
punishment, imprisonment and banishments to remote 
garrisons) and were well aware of what would befall them, 
should the old-state make a come back, after they got 
involved in the 1974 mutinies and arbitrary arrests of 
government officials. This was a good reason for 
soldiering on with the business of overthrowing the 
government once they were implicated in the popular 
uprising. Probably, the turning point in this regard 
came with the massacre of the 60 officials of the old- 
state in November 1974. After that, they could not live 
safely as private citizens since there was danger of 
reprisals from friends and relations of the victims.
(E) TOWARDS AN EVALUATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY CRISIS
There seems to be a consensus on the understanding 
that a degree of socio-economic and political 
transformations have to be achieved before a social 
revolution can be said to have taken place. However, 
there is lack of clarity on what exactly the effect of 
the sum of such transformations is or ought to be. In 
fact, Clapham appears to suggest that it is not necessary 
to adopt some criteria against which the transformations 
could be weighed? to him, it is enough for 
transformations to have been achieved for a revolution to 
exist even when the transformations have brought about 
little change from the past.25 To Markakis, a revolution 
can be said to have been achieved if the sum of 
transformations amounts to true socialism.26 To Halliday 
and Molyneux, the transformations must bring about an
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effective distribution of social and political power for 
an irreversible socialist revolution to be achieved.27 
None of these authors in fact go into the question of 
evaluating the transformations in any detail.
Likewise, Skocpol seems to be satisfied with a mere 
achievement of transformations. She delimits the scope 
of transformations thus: "Social revolutions differ from 
other sorts of conflicts and transformative processes 
above all by the combination of two coincidences: the 
coincidence of societal structural change with class 
upheaval? and the coincidence of political with social
• PR . . . .transformation."*0 In this way, she distinguishes the 
conflicts of social revolutions from other conflicts like 
rebellions, coups, and political revolutions. Further, 
she distinguishes transformations of social revolutions 
from other sorts of transformations like the industrial- 
commercial revolutions and the rise of nation-states. To 
Skocpol, the transformations achieved in Japan, Germany 
and Turkey do not amount to social revolutions? to
• P QTnmberger, on the other hand, they do. * Both appear to 
agree that, whatever their implications to economic 
progress, radical socio-economic reforms in themselves 
constitute revolutions, in the case of Skocpol, if the 
transformations are accompanied by revolts from below, 
and, in the case of Trimberger, if the transformations 
are carried out from above.
To Marx, on the other hand, transformation of the 
mode of production is central, in the order of 
revolutionary outcomes.30 As opposed to Skocpol and 
Trimberger, therefore, Marx would regard the unleashing 
of more dynamic relations of production than the 
pre-existing ones as a more important requisite to social 
revolutions than mere social and political 
transformations.
The question that arises here is whether revolutions 
are progressive in the economic sense or not. Here, note 
must be taken of Clapham's important caution against 
adopting some assumed goal and concluding that the goal
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will inevitably be attained once the revolution is taken 
to be a proper one or, conversely concluding that the 
revolution is not a real one because the goal is not 
met.31 In considering whether revolutions are 
progressive or not there is, perhaps, the danger of 
falling foul of Clapham's warning against what he has 
called the teleological conception of revolution.
However, this cannot be allowed to stand in the way of 
inquiring of whether the older revolutions like those of 
France, the Soviet Union and China or the post-war third 
world revolutions, of which there were a number, were 
progressive or not and, given their performance over 
time, of making reasonable projections into their 
prospects. This may lead to a kind of evaluation of 
revolution but then evaluation is no less scientific than 
explanation assuming that the two are different. If such 
a scientific inquiry leads to the finding that some 
revolutions have been progressive but not others, it 
would certainly be fruitful to establish, if possible, 
wherein lies the difference between the two types of 
episodes.
At any rate, there are further considerations why 
the question of whether revolutions are progressive or 
not should be accorded a central position in the order of 
transformations. First, though writers in the field do 
not always explicitly acknowledge it, they often revert 
to a recognition of its centrality quite frequently.
Apart from discussing economic aspects of 
post-revolutionary reconstructions in her cases, Skocpol 
for one, states in her introductory chapter that the 
Russian revolution produced an industrial and military 
super-power and the Mexican revolution made it one of the 
most industrialized of post-colonial nations32. Second, 
much of the appeal of engaging in revolutionary 
activities not only to professional revolutionaries but 
also to large sections of the people who get involved 
rests on economic nationalism and the pursuit of faster 
rates of industrialization. The frequency of revolutions
in the third world can in part be explained by this 
consideration. Third, dwelling on social and political 
transformations alone would, it is believed, render the 
sociology or revolutions sterile. On the face of it, the 
pursuit of equality (an example of social structural 
transformation) is worth all the effort. However, apart 
from the fact that it is unattainable, economic measures 
like redistribution of land taken with a view to equality 
as an end in itself can lead to the levelling down of 
society, fragmentation of the means of production and 
lower productivity.
Finally, there are many excesses of revolutions like 
suspension of legality, diaspora*, mass executions, 
torture and terror which are often prevalent in the 
immediate post-revolution years and which obviously cause 
the people concerned undue suffering. Legality, 
democratic rights, accountability to the people of the 
new institutions created by the revolution and the like 
could be used as criteria against which the quality of 
the transformations could be weighed. In fact, these 
criteria have been used in the relevant chapters to 
evaluate the component parts of the transformations. 
Nevertheless, since the rule of law and the standards of 
human rights break down during revolutionary crisis, it 
is, perhaps, not in order to give emphasis to such 
standards here. If, in addition to the suffering of the 
people, the social and political transformations are not 
progressive in the economic sense and promise some 
benefits to the majority of the people in the not distant 
future or, even worse, if they are retrogressive, then 
social revolutions must be taken for what they would be: 
a mass suicidal delirium that seize nations at certain 
stages in their history or a structural crisis about 
which men and women are unable to do anything but fall 
prey to their excesses.
The literature on the Ethiopian revolution suffers 
from similar shortcomings as the above. Much of it 
ignores the economic transformations achieved altogether
- 402 -
and the rest discusses in a cursory fashion the areas in 
which nationalizations have taken place without 
evaluating whether the measures are likely to lead to a 
growth in the national economy. Though inadequate in 
itself, it is hoped, that Chapter 4 is a modest 
corrective in this regard. It has been noted in that 
Chapter that in 1975 the new regime nationalized rural 
land and the major means of production in the industrial 
sector expropriating national and foreign investors. 
Starting from 1978, the regime made a concerted effort to 
launch a central planning machinery in order to manage 
the nationalized industries, state farms and rural land 
especially that part which had been collectivised. These 
radical state interventions in the economy and the 
adoption of scientific socialism as the official ideology 
were partially responsible for the strengthening of close 
diplomatic and security relations with the socialist 
countries, and for the worsening of relations with the 
west. Arguably, these policies together amounted to the 
adoption by Ethiopia of what is called "the 
non-capitalist path of development" often understood to 
include an emphasis of the state sector of the economy, 
thorough going agrarian reform, limitation on foreign 
investment and a pro-east foreign policy.
The adherence to the non-capitalist path of 
development, it is believed, raises a number of 
fundamental economic questions with negative implications 
in the international and domestic arenas about which only 
a brief mention can be made here. Under the old-state, 
Ethiopia had not been able to attract much international 
private capital, perhaps, mainly because of the absence 
in the country of the sort of natural resources required 
by foreign interests. Despite the new regime's policy of 
attempting to attract private foreign capital through the 
establishment of joint ventures in which the state was 
envisaged to have a minimum of 51 percent of total 
shares, foreign investors have not found it in their 
interest to risk their capital by investing it in
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Ethiopia, not least because of the expropriation of 
foreign assets that had preceded the issuance of the 
Joint Venture Proclamation. Thus, in addition to the 
absence of the relevant natural resources, the new policy 
has acted as a barrier to private foreign investment.
The picture regarding bilateral and multilateral aid 
is more complex. Though Ethiopia had through its leftist 
policies fallen foul of western expectations and though 
the US for one is by law bound to prohibit bilateral 
assistance to such countries and to exercise against them 
its weighted voting power in the international economic 
organizations, Ethiopia has not done too badly in 
exploiting the international public assistance 
programmes. Despite the fact that direct US bilateral 
assistance has been suspended for a long time, Ethiopia 
has been a beneficiary of a great deal of food aid (which 
is traceable to the US government and EEC sources), and 
of economic development aid from the EEC, the World Bank 
and other UN agencies, and from a lot of the western 
countries which have been willing to extend direct state 
to state assistance. Further, the US weighted voting 
power in the International Coffee Agreement has not 
precluded Ethiopia from selling her major export (coffee) 
through that organization to western countries including 
the US.
Obviously, the west has not victimized Ethiopia as 
much as it had Vietnam, Cuba and Nicaragua? rather, it 
has chosen to use its economic muscle on Ethiopia, as it 
has done with most other socialist countries, as sticks 
and carrots in its foreign policy drive to influence her 
political direction. Though counter-factual, it may be 
maintained that had Ethiopia not offended the west, it 
might have avoided all the sticks in addition to 
attracting greater transfers of international capital and 
other forms of public aid. In fact, Ethiopia's per 
capita benefit from aid has been reduced in the post­
revolution period to become one of the lowest in Africa. 
Also, an important point is that the radical third world
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states including Ethiopia have not found it appropriate 
to pursue autarchy as a possible alternative but rather 
sought to secure aid not only from the socialist 
countries as is expected but also from the west. Some 
which have attempted that alternative like Tanzania and 
China have not found it fruitful and have abandoned it. 
Autarchy is a luxury which they cannot afford since they 
need the aid for the purpose of importing skills, capital 
goods and weapons from abroad without which they can 
hardly survive let alone achieve faster rates of 
development.
The adoption of the non-capitalist path of 
development creates further complications by bringing the 
country concerned to the centre stage of the cold war.
The force of example is here too overwhelming to maintain 
otherwise* The right wing/left wing contenders for power 
in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola, just to 
mention a few, are provided weapons by the west and east
to fight it out to the bitter end. In the case of
Ethiopia, the aggression perpetrated against her by 
Somalia and the counter-revolutionary wars she had to 
fight against the EDU, ELF and ALF, which were supported
by the Middle East and through them by the west, can be
seen as an extension of the cold war into the Horn of 
Africa.
There are occasional reports suggesting western 
involvement in the regionalist and anti-government wars
. # ‘j'j ,of Ethiopia. J Further the circumstances lend support to 
this position. These peripheral wars have increased 
dramatically not only in the areas where they existed 
prior to the outbreak of the revolution, but also in the 
areas where they emerged afterwards. The bulk of the 
weapons used by these forces come from abroad? they 
certainly come from the Middle East but western aiding 
and abetting of those benefactors cannot be ruled out? if 
the west challenges the other radical states through the 
promotion of dissension, there is no reason to suggest 
that Ethiopia was made an exception. The choice of the
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non-capitalist path of development has reduced the new 
regime to a defensive position in these crippling wars as 
it has done to the radical third world states which have 
pursued a similar revolutionary course. Anti-colonial 
third world revolutions have produced politically 
independent states; anti-imperialist
(anti-world-capitalist) third world revolutions, on the 
other hand, cannot be said to have produced economically 
independent states.
The debilitating effect on the national economy of 
these wars is obvious. However, it is not possible to 
attribute all the ills of the economy to the hostility of 
international and domestic "enemies” of the revolution as 
Mengistu has, time and again, tended to emphasise in his 
public speeches. The implications of the regime's policy 
on the domestic economy must also account for a good deal 
of the inefficiency in the running of the economy.
Whereas in the west a company is run by a manager with 
the assistance of some experts in accounting, 
engineering, salesmen and the like, the equivalent in the 
socialist countries (a state enterprise or a state farm) 
is run by the same kind of people in addition to a 
multitude of civil servants working at each level of the 
state administrative machinery from the central 
government down to the enterprise. The amount of red 
tape, the delay in the procurement of raw materials, the 
inefficiency in the distribution of products, the 
concealed unemployment, the sectional and regional 
autarchy involved in managing the state enterprises is 
well recorded in the case of the older socialist 
countries. A further crippling feature of the socialist 
management of the economy is the fact that the means of 
production are owned by the state and that the interest 
not only of workers but also the bureaucrats involved in 
the management is limited to their pay. The protection 
of the means of production and the maximization of profit 
(which have important implications to efficiency) have no 
real guardians like the owner in the capitalist
\
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countries. Yet again, the attempt to substitute 
incentives based on private ownership and personal gain 
by an ever-increasing elaborate system of collective 
incentives (the raising of social consciousness, working 
for the communist and nationalist ideals and group 
bonuses) have not proved as effective as the former. It 
is these and similar management difficulties that 
Ethiopia has been importing since the adoption of central 
planning as an aspect of her non-capitalist path of 
development strategy. In her case, the problems are 
further compounded by the fact that the skilled 
administrative substructure required at each level of the 
administrative hierarchy is lacking in quality as well as 
quantity.
From the perspective of employment difficulties as 
well as the depth of food crisis that has been the cause 
of so much suffering and death in Ethiopia, it can be 
said that the need to adopt an efficient agrarian 
strategy would have been even more urgent than the 
pursuit of an efficient industrial policy. Up to the 
early 1980's the regime's policy was to collectivize the 
redistributed holdings and bring them within the central 
planning machinery, a policy which would have raised 
similar problems as those that concern state enterprises 
and farms. As the decade wore on, however, 
collectivization slackened for a number of reasons.
These included lack of interest on the part of the 
peasants, their expectation that the state would provide 
all the inputs without them having to do much about it, 
the inability of the government to provide the inputs 
that it kept on promising in order to promote 
collectivization, and the inefficiency of the token 
collectives already established.
The result has been that only a tiny part of the 
arable land (under 2 percent) has been collectivized. 
Since then, the regime has been forced to try and promote 
productivity through the targeting of extension services 
to the millions of individual peasants without much
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success in promoting their productivity. The 
difficulties involved are too detailed to go into at this 
stage, suffice it here to mention just a few. First, 
there is lack of incentive on the part of the farmers to 
increase productivity because the regime appropriates a 
large part their produce through forced purchases at 
below the market price, levies, taxes, and collects 
mandatory contributions towards social institutions and 
various causes. Second, the farmers are allowed to use 
their holdings until such time as their associations 
decide to redistribute land, a practice that has had 
negative implications to the care of the land and to the 
independence of the farmers from association leaders. 
Third, providing inputs like fertilizers and agricultural 
implements through farmers' service co-operatives and 
farmers' associations which are charged with the 
responsibilities of collecting payments for them has led 
to the wasting of substantial amounts of financial and 
other resources partly because the leaders do not have 
the requisite skills for keeping appropriate balance 
sheets and partly because of corrupt practices.
When looked at the national level, these problems 
are colossal. The bulk of them emanate from the 
socialist orientation of the revolution, from lack of 
faith in the merits of the individuals' pursuit of 
enlightened self interest and, consequently, the 
preference of social groups and organizations to the 
individual as the basic economic units, and from the 
conviction that state intervention in the economy would 
achieve a faster rate of development and a more just 
society. The non-capitalist path of development in 
Ethiopia has put an end to the development of the 
emerging commercial farms which certainly were extremely 
efficient in terms of raising productivity. If socialist 
orientation is more inimical than feudalism to the 
emergence of capitalism, as appears to be the case, it is 
at least debatable which of the two relations of 
production are more progressive.
The concept of the non-capitalist path of 
development is a highly controversial subject among 
Marxist intellectuals. Much of the controversy revolves 
around the question of whether it will lead the third 
world countries that have adopted it towards a socialist 
transformation or not. A lot of the debate among the 
Ethiopian leftist political organizations and among 
leftist writers on Ethiopia has similarly dwelt on the 
question of whether the Derg's rule would lead to a 
socialist transformation or end up being a mere military 
dictatorship. As suggested in the preceding paragraphs, 
however, the fact of socialist orientation (real or 
unreal) is part of the problem. The concern that the 
Derg is lacking in socialism assumes that socialist 
relations of production are necessarily more progressive 
than their capitalist counterparts, an assumption not 
validated by reality.
In fact, the bulk of the older socialist countries 
have abandoned central planning in favour of the market 
economy or are in the process of so doing. For the third 
world states, the capitalist path of development is not 
necessarily a solution. While it may be argued that it 
is the more efficient method of mobilizing the national 
economy, it does very little to alter the existing 
dependency relationship between the rich and poor states. 
The non-capitalist path of development does poorly on 
both counts. The point is that, given the context of 
world-time, third world "socialist " revolutions like 
that of Ethiopia are no more progressive than middle 
class revolutions in achieving economic growth and 
independence. If anything, the evidence suggests that 
they are less so. At any rate, if the non-capitalist 
path of development leads to socialism and then to 
capitalism , as it seems to be doing in the case of the 
older socialist states, as opposed to providing a 
mechanism for by-passing capitalism as it was originally 
intended to do - it is a much more circuitous route to 
capitalism than a mere middle class revolution.
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The import of the preceding paragraphs is that 
Ethiopia has achieved transformations in the social, 
political, and economic fields, that the transformations, 
nevertheless, do not amount to a progressive change in 
the economic sense of the term and that whether this turn 
of events amounts to a social revolution or not depends 
on the approach adopted. If the arguments attempting to 
show that the transformed economic system is not 
progressive are granted, it is, interestingly enough, 
Marx's approach that would exclude the changes achieved 
by Ethiopia from the realm of social revolution. This is 
so not because his requisite for revolutions (a change in 
the mode of production) is not met - since the 
nationalization of the means of production in Ethiopia is 
arguably such a change - but because he assumes that the 
changed mode of production is essentially more 
progressive than the one it replaces. In other words, he 
envisages capitalist relations of production to be more 
progressive than those that prevail under feudalism and 
socialist relations of production to be more progressive 
than those that prevail in capitalist societies. By this 
token, the transformation undergone by Ethiopia is as 
argued above, not progressive and, therefore, not a 
social revolution.
A contrary position can be arrived at based on 
Skocpol's and Trimberger's models which do not require 
progressiveness as a requisite for revolutions. Except 
for their positions on the need for the participation of 
the lower class or upper class in their revolutions, the 
models of those authors come near enough to embracing the 
Ethiopian episode within the scope of social revolutions. 
If, despite Marx, the Ethiopian experience is considered 
to be a revolution, it appears clear from the 
contemporary "revolutions " that are taking place in the 
east European states that Ethiopia is in desperate need 
of another revolution from above, below or an 
intermediate social group to undo some of what has 
already been done and much of what continues to be done.
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However, we can say this only if we recognize that 
revolutions are or can be progressive i.e., if they can 
bring about change for the better.
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APPENDIX A
1908
1922
1928
1930
1932
1936
1941
1948
1952
1957
1958 
1960
1962
Chronology of Events
The completion of the process of defining 
all present day Ethiopian territories 
except Eritrea through the conclusion of 
boundary treaties with Britain, France and 
Italy.
Ethiopia's admission into membership of 
the league of nations.
The establishment of the Royal Body Guard.
The crowning of Haile Selassie I as King 
of Ethiopia.
The establishment of the Holeta Military 
Academy
41: The occupation of Ethiopia by Italy.
The liberation of Ethiopia by the allied 
forces. Eritrea which had been under 
Italian colonial rule FOR 50 YEARS comes 
under British administration as enemy 
occupied territory.
The return to Ethiopia of the Ogaden which 
had come under British administration from 
1941.
The federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in 
accordance with a UN General Assembly 
Resolution. Economic and military 
agreements concluded between Ethiopia and 
the US.
The establishment of the Harar Military 
Academy.
The establishment of the Eritrean 
Liberation Movement.
An abortive coup d'etat against Haile 
Selassie by senior officers and the Royal 
Body Guard.
The emergence of British and Italian 
Somalilands into independence as the 
Republic of Somalia.
The establishment of WSLF in Mogadishu.
The dissolution of Eritrea's federal 
status and its absorption into the unitary
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1962:
1965:
1968:
1970:
1972:
1973:
1974:
January:
February
March: 
April:
June 28: 
July:
The dissolution of Eritrea's federal 
status and its absorption into the unitary 
state of Ethiopia.
The formation of the Confederation of 
Ethiopian Labour Unions.
The formation of the University Students' 
Union of Addis Ababa.
The formation of an underground political 
organization abroad which later became 
AESM.
The formation of EPLF.
Formation of EPRP ABROAD.
US starts demoting its military presence 
in Ethiopia.
Successful Arab pressure on Ethiopia to 
cut diplomatic rations with Israel.
Mutiny of the 24th unit of the 4th 
Division in Negele and Dolo.
18: Strike and demonstration of taxi owners,
teachers and students; often considered 
the beginning of the 1974 popular 
uprising.
The first round of military uprising.
The resignation of Aklilou's cabinet and 
Endalkachew's appointment as prime 
minister.
Appointment of Alem Zewd's Committee by 
Endalkachew. All the urban corporate 
groups start going on strikes and 
demonstrations.
The second round of military uprising and 
the arrest of Aklilou and members of his 
cabinet as well as many senior officers 
and civilian officials.
Appointment of the National Security 
Commission by Gen. Abiy.
The official date for the establishment of 
the Derg.
The return to Ethiopia of EPRP leaders and 
the launching of their weekly paper 
(Democracia).
The enhancement of the arresr of the old- 
state officials.
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August: 
September 12:
November:
December 20: 
1975
January:
February:
March:
July:
August:
September:
December:
The launching of AESM's weekly paper 
(Voice of the Masses).
The replacement as prime minister of 
Endalkachew by Michael Imiru.
Deposition of King Haile Selassie and 
suspension of the 1955 revised 
constitution.
CELU calls for a general strike as an 
expression of its opposition to Derg rule.
Issuance of Proclamation of Development 
Through Campaign Programme.
Summary execution of some 60 officials of 
the old-state, the chairman of the Derg 
(Aman Andom) and Derg members.
Adoption of the Ethiopian Socialism 
programme.
The nationalization of financial 
institutions.
The beginning of the return to Ethiopia of 
AESM leaders.
The nationalization of financial 
institutions.
The failure of EPRP and AESM leaders to 
come to an understanding.
The adoption of the Public Ownership of 
Rural Land Proclamation.
Formal adoption by AESM to give the Derg 
"critical support".
The beginning of sending Derg members and 
others to the socialist countries 
including Tanzania for political training. 
The formation of EDU abroad.
The nationalization of urban land and 
extra houses.
EPRP issues its programme and declares 
itself a party.
CELU calls for a general strike.
The adoption of a highly centralizing 
labour proclamation.
The establishment of an AESM dominated 
committee in charge of politicising and 
organizing the masses.
The beginning of the EPRP-AESM public 
campaign against one another in the 
papers.
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1976
April:
May:
July:
August:
September:
December:
1977
February:
AESM declares its programme but falls 
short of calling itself a party.
The adoption of the NDRPE.
Formation of Pomoa.
Mengistu invites all progressives to form 
a joint front against reactionary forces.
EPRP rejects Mengistu's invitation to form 
a joint front.
The establishment of the Yekatit 1966 
Political School.
The Derg issues a nine-point peace policy 
concerning Eritrea.
Sisay and his associates are rounded up 
and executed allegedly for plotting to 
overthrow the Derg.
The official withdrawal by the Derg of the 
Campaign Programme.
Deterioration of relations between 
Ethiopia and the Sudan because of the 
former's alleged involvement in a coup 
against President El Numeri.
On the occasion of its general assembly 
meeting to hear the case against Sisay and 
his associates, the Derg appointed a 
committee under the chairmanship of 
Alemayehu to revise its constitution.
EPRP decides to eliminate members of 
Mengistu's coalition.
Assassination breaks out between members 
of EPRP and Mengistu's coalition.
EDU forms a coalition with ELF and ALF and 
goes into operation in the north-western 
province of Gondar from a base in the 
Sudan? it starts a propoganda campaign 
against the Derg with the help of Sudan's 
radio station.
The Alemayehu committee revised the 
constitution and bylaws of the Derg and 
stripped Mengistu of almost all his Derg 
functions.
A palace coup in which those who had 
emerged victorious in the previous 
December reorganizations were rounded up 
and executed.
Mengistu became the chairman of the Derg 
and the unchallenged leader of the
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March:
April:
May 3:
July:
November:
December:
1978
February:
March:
May:
June:
country.
The launching of the Red Terror campaign 
against EPRP.
Suspension of further aid by US to 
Ethiopia on the grounds of human rights 
violations.
Visit of the Horn of Africa by Fidel 
Castro and Soviet Premier Podgorni to try 
and resolve the dispute between Ethiopia 
and Somalia.
The formation of JFEMLOs.
The closure of the Kagnew installation and 
a number of other US concerns by order of 
Mengistu.
Mengistu visits Moscow and concludes an 
agreement for the shipment of Soviet arms 
to Ethiopia.
The training of hundreds of thousands of 
militia is in full swing.
Invasion of Ethiopia by the Republic of 
Somalia.
AESM breaks with JFEMLO and the Derg goes 
underground.
EDU forces are driven out of northern 
Ethiopia.
Summary execution of the Derg's Vice- 
Chairman Atnafu Abate)
The Republic of Somalia expels Soviet and 
Cuban advisers and diplomats out of the 
country.
delivery of massive amounts of soviet 
weapons to Ethiopia.
Arrival of Soviet military advisers and 
Cuban troops begins.
EOPRS breaks with JFEMLO and the Derg.
AEPRP is crushed after a year's resistance 
to the Red Terror.
The forces of the Republic of Somalia are 
driven out of Ethiopia.
Official condemnation of AESM BY JFEMLO AS. 
THE RIGHT ROADER and its decision that the 
party must be established through the 
merger of its member organizations.
The Derg's offensive against Eritrean 
secessionist fighters is stepped up.
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The leadership of the Workers League is 
purged.
1979
April:
August:
1980
January:
1984
September:
JFEMLO decides that the party must be 
established through the •'merger*1 of 
communist individuals around a centre to 
be established by representatives of the 
member organizations of JFEMLO.
Decision of the representatives of the 
military cadres that Mengistu should be 
the sole centre who will establish the 
party.
The establishment of COPWE.
The establishment of WPE.
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